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Abstract  
Corporate Governance and its contribution to risk and crisis management 
in small companies   
Small companies are regarded by policymakers and society alike as being 
important sources of wealth creation, employment generation and innovation.  
Yet, many small companies fail to grow or simply grow to then fail.  One potential 
way of explaining the high rate of failure is through the absence of meaningful 
appropriate, and relevant corporate governance.  The few studies undertaken on 
corporate governance in small companies and its constituent sub-sets of risk and 
crisis management typically focus on one of those elements rather than, as this 
study does, adopting a more holistic and combined perspective. 
This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge through an exploration of the way in 
which corporate governance can assist in improving the management of risk and 
crises in small business.  To explore this phenomenon, four small companies 
feature in a multiple case study using a qualitative and inductive approach with 
an exploratory questionnaire and interview-based research as the principal 
sources of data.   
According to owner-managers’ and directors of small companies, corporate 
governance is acknowledged as a matter of importance but is, in practice, of 
peripheral concern with operational imperatives dictating the conversation.  
External influences and compliance requirements are drivers of fuzzy 
governance procedures although concerning risk, previous incidents are found to 
be an influencing factor related to policy, processes and practices.  However, the 
key determinant relating to the functioning of corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management is that of the attitudes, values and beliefs of the owner-
manager. 
The findings suggest that the appreciation of corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management is weak and that the actors involved tend to have disparate 
levels of understanding of both the issues involved and the consequent 
implications of failure at policy level for both themselves and the company.  
 
4 
 
Dedication 
I dedicate this thesis to the Entrepreneurs, the Bedroom Start-Ups and the Little 
Guys whom, against all the odds, have been brave enough to have a go.  You 
have my admiration and respect.  
  
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Copyright Statement        2 
Abstract          3 
Dedication          4 
Table of Contents        5 
List of Tables         14 
List of Figures         16 
Acronyms and Abbreviations      19 
Preface and Personal Statement      20 
Acknowledgements        21 
Declaration         22 
Introduction         23 
Chapter 1-Governance and Corporate Governance, Risk and 
Crisis Management – Principles, Practices and Paradoxes 
Overview of the chapter       31 
Governance-its context and purpose     31 
Governance - a universal or relativist concept?    33 
Governance and Ethics       35 
Governance and Government       36 
Altruism and self-interest       37 
Governance, Corporate Governance and Ethics   38 
Corporate Governance Agents and Principals    42 
Corporate Governance and Small Companies    42 
Small Companies, Risk and Crisis Management   44 
Theorising Corporate Governance     46 
Contingent or Universal Application of Corporate Governance 47 
 
6 
 
Agency Theory        50 
Transaction Cost Economics      54 
Stewardship Theory        54 
Stakeholder Theory        55 
Shareholder Theory        58 
Resource Dependency Theory      60 
Managerial Hegemony Theory      61 
Institutional Theory        63 
The Role of the Board       66 
Codes of Corporate Governance      68 
History and development of codes     72 
Purpose of codes        77 
Content of codes        78 
Corporate Governance and Risk      86 
High Reliability Theory       95 
Normal Accident Theory       96 
Risk Assessment        97 
Risk Taxonomy        99 
Risk Management Process      103 
The Risk Rainbow        104 
Crises Theory, Models and Frameworks     105 
Chaos Theory        115 
Chapter 2- Literature Review  
Overview of the chapter       117 
Aim of the literature review       118 
Planning the review        119 
Conducting the review       121 
7 
 
The nature and dynamics of small companies     122 
Definition of small companies      124 
Characteristics of small companies     127 
Fragility and vulnerability of small companies    134 
Defining Corporate Governance      138 
Corporate Governance-Small Companies-one size does not fit all 146 
The Paradigm of Elasticity in Small Companies    149 
Relationships and Socio-Economic Wealth    150 
Risk Management in Small Companies     151 
Crisis Management        156 
Definition of a Crisis        158 
Crises and Small Companies      164 
Summary of Literature Review      166 
Research gap 1: CG in Small Companies    168 
Research gap 2: CG and Risk in Small Companies   168 
Research gap 3: CG and Crisis Management in Small Companies 169 
Justification for the study and contribution to the body of knowledge 170 
Research Problem        170 
Chapter 3-Research Philosophy, Strategy and Methodology  
Overview of the chapter       174 
Research Philosophy       174 
Research Approach: Deduction, Induction and Abduction  182 
Research Design: Exploratory, Descriptive, Analytical & Predictive 183 
Author’s Assumptions       184 
Methodological Choice        196 
Characteristics and defining features of qualitative research  197 
Research Strategy        200 
8 
 
Case Study Design        210 
The Theoretical Grounding for a Multiple Case Study   214 
Case Study Protocol       215 
Planning the Research       216 
Case Study Conceptual Model and Research Questions  217 
The Multiple Case Study       222 
Research Ethics        226 
Chapter 4-Data Collection and Methods of Analysis 
Overview of chapter        228 
The Unit(s) of Analysis       228 
Selection of Cases and Respondents     228 
Data Collection        231 
Fieldwork         234 
Transcription         236 
Analytical Techniques       237 
Thematic Analysis        240 
Content Analysis        241 
Discourse Analysis        241 
Narrative Analysis        241 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis    242 
Pre-Interview Exploratory Questionnaire     245 
Semi Structured Interviews      248 
Data Reduction, Data Display and Conclusions    254 
Data Analysis using NVivo 10      256 
Chapter 5-Introduction to Cases and Respondents 
Overview of the chapter       260 
Introducing the four cases       260 
9 
 
Introduction to CO1 and structure of the company   263 
The board and associated governance procedures  264 
Products and Services, Financial and performance data 265 
Summary of CO1       266 
Introduction to CO2 and structure of the company   267 
The board and associated governance procedures  268 
Products and Services, Financial and performance data 269 
Summary of CO2       269 
Introduction to CO3 and structure of the company   270 
The board and associated governance procedures  272 
Products and Services, Financial and performance data 272 
Summary of CO3       273 
Introduction to CO4 and structure of the company   274 
The board and associated governance procedures  275 
Products and Services, Financial and performance data 275 
Summary of CO4       276 
Chapter 6-Analysis and Findings 
Overview of the chapter       278  
Introduction         278 
Within–case analysis and findings of the exploratory questionnaire 281 
Responses from directors of CO1       
Corporate governance understood by respondents in CO1 282 
Risk management as understood by respondents in CO1 283 
Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO1 284 
Beliefs about crisis management by respondents in CO1 285 
Responses from directors of CO2       
Corporate governance understood by respondents in CO2 286 
10 
 
Risk management as understood by respondents in CO2 287 
Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO2 288 
Beliefs about crisis management by respondents in CO2 289 
Responses from directors of CO3       
Corporate governance understood by respondents in CO3 289 
Risk management as understood by respondents in CO3 290 
Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO3 291 
Beliefs about crisis management by respondents in CO3 291 
Responses from director of CO4       
Corporate governance understood by respondent in CO4 292 
Risk management as understood by respondent in CO4 293 
Crisis management as understood by respondent in CO4 294 
Beliefs about crisis management by respondent in CO4 294 
Summary of cross-case responses to the exploratory questionnaire  
Corporate Governance      294 
Risk Management       299 
Crisis Management       302 
Beliefs and attitudes related to crises    303 
Within-case analysis & findings from semi-structured interviews 306 
An overview of emerging key concepts and higher order themes 307 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO1  308 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 308 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute  
to a small company like yours?      311 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
 influence corporate governance?      313 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance  
relates to risk management in your company?    315 
11 
 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a  
crisis that the company has faced recently?    319 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer,  
acceptance or mitigation?       320 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk  
and crises – a risk taker or risk averse?     322 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business 
 continuity post any crisis?       323 
Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO1   325 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO2  326 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance?  326 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute  
to a small company like yours?      327 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager  
influence corporate governance?      328 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance  
relates to risk management in your company?    329 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a  
crisis that the company has faced recently?    332 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer,  
acceptance or mitigation?       334 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk  
and crises – a risk taker or risk averse?     336 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business  
continuity post any crisis?       337 
Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO2   338 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO3  339 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 339 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute 
 to a small company like yours?      340 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
 influence corporate governance?      341 
12 
 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance  
relates to risk management in your company?    343 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a  
crisis that the company has faced recently?    346 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer,  
acceptance or mitigation?       347 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and  
crises – a risk taker or risk averse?     349 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business  
continuity post any crisis?       350 
Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO3   351 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO4  352 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 352 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance  
contribute to a small company like yours?    353 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
 influence corporate governance?      354 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance 
 relates to risk management in your company?    355 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage  
a crisis that the company has faced recently?    356 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer,  
acceptance or mitigation?       357 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises 
 – a risk taker or risk averse?      348 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business  
continuity post any crisis?       358 
Conclusions - interviews with participant in CO4   359 
Cross-case pattern matching and explanation building   360 
Summary of Findings       363 
An overview of emerging key concepts and higher order themes 366 
 
13 
 
Chapter 7-Discussion and Conclusions 
Overview of the chapter       369 
Introduction         369 
Revisiting the research context      370 
Culture and Change       375 
Memories         376 
Procedures and Processes      377 
Disposition of owner-manager      378 
Summarising the research findings     379 
Reflections on the foundational philosophy and methodology used 385 
The contribution of the study to knowledge    389 
The contribution of the study to practice     395 
Limitations and recommendations for future research   399 
Some concluding remarks       400 
References         402 
Appendices         431 
Appendix 1 Key texts used in the literature review 
Appendix 2 Paper published in Economics and Business Review 
Appendix 3 Ethical Approval Notice 
Appendix 4 Key journals searched 
Appendix 5 Storyboard 
Appendix 6 “Heightening Your Awareness of Research Philosophy” (HARP)  
Appendix 7 Research Protocol 
Appendix 8 Invitation to Participate, Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Appendix 9 Exploratory Questionnaire 
Appendix 10 Interview Activity Control 
Appendix 11 Transcription Guide 
Appendix 12 Node Code Book sample pages 
Appendix 13 UK Code of Corporate Governance - Effectiveness Criteria 
14 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Agency Theory Overview      53 
Table 2 Tomorrow’s Company’s Social Model    57 
Table 3 Summary of Huse’s Board Theories    65 
Table 4 Core Content of Corporate Governance Codes  78 
Table 5 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance   79 
Table 6 Core Content of UK Corporate Governance Code  84 
Table 7 Board roles and functions     86 
Table 8 Determinants of effective risk management   89 
Table 9 Context and Descriptors of Risk     92 
Table 10 Business Risk Distribution     92 
Table 11 Risk Taxonomy - Internal Processes    100 
Table 12 Risk Taxonomy - Business Operating Environment  101 
Table 13 IFC Governance Risks Review for SMEs   102 
Table 14 Sequential Frameworks for Crisis Management  111 
Table 15 UK Definition of company size (employee numbers) 127 
Table 16 EU classification of company size    127 
Table 17 Estimated number of businesses in the UK private  
             sector, associated employment and turnover (by size of  
             business at December 2017).     128 
Table 18 Key characteristics of small enterprises   130 
Table19 Storey’s characteristics approach    131 
Table 20 New firm closure rates      136 
Table 21 Corporate governance orientation and scope  140 
Table 22 Alternative philosophical paradigms    179 
Table 23 Research strategies and their philosophical bases  201 
Table 24 Relevant situations for different research methods  203 
15 
 
Table 25 Characteristics and appropriateness of strategies 
               in qualitative research      204 
Table 26 Stages of the case study     215 
Table 27 Progress towards defining and realising research aim 221 
Table 28 Theory and purpose interview questions   223 
Table 29 Ten key principles in research ethics    226 
Table 30 Sampling criteria       230 
Table 31 Summary of fieldwork      234 
Table 32 Data analysis and representation    237 
Table 33 Analytical stages for data analysis    239 
Table 34 Semi-structured interview questions    249 
Table 35 Strategies and techniques used in data synthesis  254 
Table 36 The extended process of analysis and synthesis  257 
Table 37 Higher order themes      259 
Table 38 Characteristics of participating companies   261 
Table 39 Details of SIC Codes      261 
Table 40 Details of respondents      262 
Table 41 Categories and definitions of analysis of questionnaire 281 
Table 42 Responses to statements related to corporate governance 298 
Table 43 Responses to statements related to risk management 300 
Table 44 Responses to Statement 62 – “We have a relationship that 
               links governance, risk and crisis management planning” 301 
Table 45 Responses related to crisis management   302 
Table 46 Responses to crisis beliefs and attitudes   304 
Table 47 Examples of test analysed from question 1a   308 
Table 48 Research questions and higher order themes  367 
 
16 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Homeostatic Model      24 
Figure 2 Collibration Model of Corporate Governance in 
                Small Companies      26 
Figure 3 Principal Agent Relationship     51 
Figure 4 Stakeholders and their relationship with the firm  57 
Figure 5 Board Roles and Corporate Governance Theories  67 
Figure 6 Evolution of Research on Corporate Governance Codes 
              (1992–2014)       68 
Figure 7 Onion Model of Corporate Governance    68 
Figure 8 Diffusion of National Corporate Governance Codes 
                (1992–2014)       70 
Figure 9 Diffusion of Transnational Corporate Governance Codes 
                (1992–2014)       71 
Figure 10 Linking Corporate Governance, risk and crises with 
                business objectives      75 
Figure 11 Linking Corporate Governance with Risk Management 90 
Figure 12 Differing world views       96 
Figure 13 Risk Assessment Bow Tie      98 
Figure 14 IRM Model of Internal and External Risk    100 
Figure 15 Resource application and organisational  
                resilience framework      105  
Figure 16 Gundel’s Crisis Typology Matrices    108 
Figure 17 Development of issues with and without Intervention 110 
Figure 18 Mitroff’s “Onion Model” of crisis management  112 
Figure 19 Crisis creation model - Design for Disaster   114 
Figure 20 Collibration Model of Corporate Governance in 
                Small Companies      117 
17 
 
Figure 21 Three Stage Literature Review Model   120 
Figure 22 Overlapping spheres in small companies   132 
Figure 23 Risk and Crisis Management Process   156 
Figure 24 Provisional Conceptual Model for Corporate Governance 
                risk and crisis management in small companies  171 
Figure 25 Scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature 
               of social science       180 
Figure 26 Philosophical positions and paradigms   185 
Figure 27 Guernica        188 
Figure 28 Distinctive features of qualitative research   199 
Figure 29 Research Tripod       211 
Figure 30 Provisional Conceptual Model for corporate governance 
                risk and crisis management in small companies   217 
Figure 31 Research questions model following Wengraf (2001) 219 
Figure 32 Multiple case studies offering comparisons within  
                a common boundary       224 
Figure 33 Research ethics compliance     227 
Figure 34 Case embedded as a secondary unit of analysis   229 
Figure 35 Coding structure for case study analysis   238 
Figure 36 Cezanne’s interpretive work Mont Sainte-Victoire  242 
Figure 37 Phases of analysis using IPA     244 
Figure 38 Screenshot of part of coding nodes categorisation  244 
Figure 39 Screenshot of a section of the questionnaire showing  
                corporate governance statements,  
                responses and analysis      246 
Figure 40 Screenshot of a section of the questionnaire showing  
                risk statements, responses and analysis   247  
18 
 
Figure 41 Screenshot of section of the questionnaire showing  
                crisis statements, responses and analysis    247 
Figure 42 Screenshot of section of questionnaire showing  
                crisis belief statements, responses and analysis   248 
Figure 43 Pattern Matching      252 
Figure 44 Tannenbaum and Schmidt leadership continuum theory 253 
Figure 45 Example of the process of IPA synthesis   255 
Figure 46 Example of moving from open codes to themes  256 
Figure 47 Example of node properties and description   258 
Figure 48 Roadmap of Chapter 6      280 
Figure 49 Aggregated responses related to corporate governance 298 
Figure 50 Aggregated responses related to risk management 300 
Figure 51 Aggregated responses to crisis statements   303 
Figure 52 Responses to related to crisis beliefs and attitudes  304 
Figure 53 Aggregated responses to crisis beliefs statements  305 
Figure 54 Phases of analysis using IPA     306 
Figure 55 Provisional conceptual model for corporate governance,  
                risk and crisis management in small companies  370 
Figure 56 Revised conceptual model for corporate governance,  
                risk and crisis management in small companies 
                reflecting the bestriding externalities    373 
Figure 57 Types of Methodological Approach    391 
 
  
19 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ABS Association of Business Schools 
ACCA Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
AET Affective Events Theory 
AIM Alternative Investment Market 
BISS Department of Business Innovation and Skills  
BEIS Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BSI British Standards Institution  
BU Bournemouth University 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSSSC Cross Sector Safety and Security Communications 
CDT Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EU European Union 
CG Corporate Governance 
ECoDA European Confederation of Director Associations 
ESV Enlightened Shareholder Value 
EU European Union 
FRC Financial Reporting Council 
HBR Harvard Business Review  
HR Human Resources 
HRT High Reliability Theory 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales  
IFC International Finance Corporation 
IOD Institute of Directors 
IRM Institute of Risk Management 
MAR Meaningful, Appropriate and Relevant 
MD Managing Director 
Mgt Management 
MHT Managerial Hegemony Theory 
NAT Normal Accident Theory 
OED Oxford English Dictionary 
OGC Office of Government Commerce 
OM Owner-manager  
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
QCA Quoted Companies Alliance 
RBV Resource Based View 
RSA Royal Society of Arts  
SME Small to medium-sized enterprises 
TOR Terms of Reference 
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority  
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
20 
 
Preface and Personal Statement 
As a company director for over thirty years, and having sat on the boards of large 
and small companies, principally the latter and usually in the role of chairman, I 
have been party to a rare insight into the dynamics of the boardroom, often 
referred to as the “Black Box”.  From that position of an “inside dealer” I have 
been privileged to observe and participate in some five hundred board meetings 
both as a director and as a consultant to boards under the auspices of own 
company.  As such, I have approached my PhD research topic with “previous 
form” and baggage that has at times been helpful, at others not.  The PhD journey 
has, at times, been difficult and perplexing as my own pre-conceptions have been 
critically challenged and their weaknesses exposed. 
One clear message has dominated during my PhD studies.  That message is 
both simple and profound and teaches that learning is a process of continual 
renewal and regeneration, of re-structuring one’s thoughts, ideas, values and 
beliefs to the extent that one inhabits the “discomfort zone” rather than the 
beguiling promise of Nirvana or the artifice of Elysium.   
The motivation to undertake a PhD was, as Richard Bach wrote, to embark upon 
“a journey into the self” and in so doing improve my professional skills as a 
director in addition to contributing to knowledge concerning corporate 
governance in small companies.  That knowledge resides in a context that 
bridges the Aristotelian concepts of sofia and phronesis and is knowledge that I 
trust will have some measure of impact in the boardrooms of small companies.  
If as a consequence of my study, one small business survives a crisis, then this 
PhD will have meaning and value beyond an academic pursuit presented to an 
academic audience.  This study and the associated processes related to it have 
had a bearing upon me at a personal level long before completion.  Undertaking 
a PhD has not only enhanced my “know about” in addition to adding to a residual 
stock of “know how”, but has contributed to my effectiveness as a company 
director capable of exercising a more analytical and insightful understanding of 
the concept of direction.  Furthermore, the PhD process has facilitated a greater 
appreciation of the diversity of pathways to knowledge, problem solving and the 
linking of theory to practice.  
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Introduction 
Background 
For investors to trust a company enough to buy its shares and for lenders to 
supply loan capital a sine qua non is that the company will be managed and 
directed using, what Section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 describes as, 
“reasonable skill, care and diligence”.  The exercise of these attributes are 
demonstrated through the implementation of effective corporate governance by 
the Board of Directors through its twin roles of “pilot” and “watchman”. 
Following a number of high profile corporate scandals in the UK such as the 
failures of BCCI, Polly Peck and the Maxwell Communications Corporation, all of 
which collapsed in 1991, (Mallin 2004; Nordberg 2011; Cheffins 2015), the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession, with backing from the UK Government, established a committee to 
examine and report upon the financial aspects of corporate governance.  In 1992, 
the year following its inception, that committee, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
issued what is widely referred to as “The Cadbury Report”.   
The Cadbury Report and its recommendations acted as the springboard for the 
development of a series of codes of practice, initiated outside the legal system, 
to raise the standards of corporate governance in the UK.  Subsequently, the 
effects of the Cadbury Report have been felt beyond the shores of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (Nordberg 2011) as awareness of the value and contribution 
of effective corporate governance has become a matter of international concern 
(Cheffins 2015). 
Corporate governance codes and the associated boardroom protocols, as 
recommended by the Cadbury Report, came about as a direct response to 
corporate crises, such as those mentioned above, that destroyed shareholder 
value and undermined public confidence in institutions.  Thus, a question posed 
to the boards of large companies, to whom the code is directly applicable on a 
comply or explain basis, is related to how boards of directors can effectively 
analyse, identify and mitigate the risks that may lead to crises and should an 
unanticipated incident occur to then ensure that the event is well managed.  
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The 2016 UK Code of Corporate Governance alone contains 36 references to 
risk and specifies a requirement to manage and mitigate risk thereby preventing 
or minimising the impact of a risk becoming a reality and resulting in a crisis 
whether internally or externally driven.  Similar codes across the world likewise 
contain references to risk.  In what may be considered a homeostatic model, it 
can be seen that the impetus behind a call to higher standards of corporate 
governance through codification is derived primarily from internally created 
failures leading to an internal crisis event, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Homeostatic Model 
 
Source: Author 
This homeostatic model is essentially reactionary and whilst it has internal crises 
at its source thus reflecting the crises of the early 90’s, external events such as 
conflict, political change and natural hazards could equally be added as an 
adjunct.  Dang-Nguyen et al. (1993) claim however, that the differences between 
internal and external drivers are irrelevant and have all but vanished in an ever-
increasing world of technological complexity where the interface is akin to that of 
diaphanous gossamer.  
Thus it was major crises that precipitated the development of corporate 
governance codes which in the UK have no force of law and are based upon a 
belief that statutory measures would lead to compliance with the letter, rather 
than the spirit, of the law.  Nevertheless, Dunsire (1993) points out that where 
there are structural failures that are the pre-cursors of crises, the government of 
the day often turns to legislation to minimise the chances of a recurrence or to 
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prevent further harm.  Examples of such are the Clean Air Act 1956 introduced in 
response to lung diseases caused by “pea soup” smog, the Road Traffic Act of 
1962 that addressed rising road traffic accidents as a consequence of driving 
under the influence of alcohol and the Health Act 2006 that prevented smoking in 
public places as a response to increasing incidences of lung cancer.  A recent 
example of legislative nudge related to environmental damage was the 
introduction of a small charge for plastic bags resulting in an 83% reduction in 
their use (UK Government 2017b). 
However, in seeking to address public concerns regarding the behaviour of 
boards of directors, UK lawmakers preferred an approach that did not resort to 
legal instruments but rather relied upon self-regulation and the process of 
collibration, a term used to describe unobtrusive intervention by using social 
tension to tip behavioural change that is generally achieved through the 
participation and support of non-governmental agencies. 
Self-regulation, with caveats, was the underlying principle behind the Cadbury 
Committee’s recommendations on corporate governance and those of its various 
successors all of which had at their focus the large corporation.  The vast majority 
of businesses in the UK, in common with the rest of the world are, however, small 
enterprises where concepts of corporate governance and its practice are a 
peripheral matter (Spiers 2017), seen by owner-managers as having limited 
relevance to businesses that frequently operate on the survival rungs of Maslow’s 
hierarchy. 
Small companies are, by their very nature, fragile and tend to have limited 
resources that would enable them to withstand a crisis irrespective of its origin.  
Operational imperatives transcend planning for the unexpected and as such, risk 
awareness, risk analysis, risk identification and risk and crisis management 
policies and procedures tend to be fuzzy and imprecise, if indeed they exist at all.   
Moving from the tripartite homeostatic model that involves reactivity and the 
concomitant implications of perturbations in the context of survival, this thesis 
proposes that a collibration model (Kirkbride and Letza 2004) has greater 
relevance to small companies in dealing with unanticipated events within a 
meaningful, appropriate and relevant (MAR) framework of corporate governance.   
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An example of collibration found within small companies is evident in the 
widespread adoption of standards such as ISO 9001, a commonly used quality 
standard that is independently verified and accepted across networks (Mayntz 
1983).  Such standards are not determined by statute but nevertheless assist in 
the promotion of best practice determined with, and by, actors within industry and 
look to foster a pro-active attitude towards specific risks allied to processes.  
Attempts to nudge behaviours using collibration have been made in the last 
decade by bodies such as the Institute of Directors and the British Standards 
Institution through the introduction of self-regulated corporate governance codes 
applicable to non-listed companies in the UK.  The policy objective of such actions 
is to improve corporate governance together with risk and crisis management 
and, ipso facto, decrease failure rates in small companies that in turn have a 
negative effect on the UK economy. 
A collibration model therefore considers the relationships between corporate 
governance, risk and crisis management through the lens of pro-active corporate 
governance, see Figure 2.  The model has meaningful, appropriate and relevant 
(MAR) corporate governance, which is not subject to comply or explain, as the 
driver of risk and crisis management.   
This context-driven model functions in practice with the introduction of the 
“invisible hand” of the market by way of a kick-start through intervention and 
nudge that is consistent with public policy objectives.  
Figure 2: Collibration Model of Corporate Governance for small companies  
 
Source: Author 
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But here’s the rub: one clear and distinctive feature of a small company that sets 
it apart culturally from a large enterprise is that of the all-pervasive influence of 
the owner-manager and without due weight being given to this factor, the practice 
of corporate governance, at whatever level of sophistication, cannot be assessed 
without acknowledging the impact of the values, defined as “the moral principles 
and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group”(Collins Dictionary 
2018a).   
The collibration model with the addition of this additional factor is the backdrop to 
this thesis which seeks to explore the contribution of corporate governance to risk 
and crisis management in small companies. 
Research Gap, Research Questions and Contribution 
Small companies are an under-researched area in general, but more specifically, 
there is gap in the literature concerning our understanding of how corporate 
governance functions in small companies and the contribution of corporate 
governance to risk and crisis management within those small companies.   
Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) claim that over recent years there has been a sharp 
increase in the number of crisis events, due in large measure to added complexity 
and the pace of change in social and technological systems.  In addition, 
improved communication networks have raised our level of awareness of such 
events.  They argue that, accordingly, crises more than ever, have become an 
integral part of modern business and public life.   
Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) further propose that ever-increasing reliance upon 
technology and its associated supply chain exemplifies the ubiquitous nature of 
interconnectedness and the corresponding vulnerability inherent within such 
intricate structures, most of which are poorly understood by owner-managers of 
small companies.  Boin and Lagadec (2000) support this view when they note 
that,   
“Crises are becoming more complex in nature; they are increasingly trans-
boundary and interconnected”. Boin and Lagadec (2000, p.185). 
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As small companies, in many cases, tend towards insularity and focus on 
operational imperatives owner-managers see corporate governance, of which 
risk and crisis management is at its core, as peripheral issues despite acute 
vulnerability from unanticipated events in the interlinked spheres of business and 
personal life. 
This study therefore, seeks to address this gap in the literature and hence to 
make a contribution to the body of knowledge accordingly.  The overarching 
question is therefore, “How can corporate governance contribute to risk and crisis 
management in a small company?” The detailed research questions are outlined 
below. 
Structure of the thesis 
In seeking to address these questions, and following an introduction, Chapter 1 
of this study examines the principles, practices and paradoxes of governance 
within the nation state and its sub-set corporate governance, so described in The 
Cadbury Report of 1992 as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Cadbury 1992, p.12).  This chapter introduces the concept of risk and 
crisis management, both of which are core element of effective corporate 
governance.  A provisional conceptual model is developed against which the 
research question is established. 
Chapter 2 comprises an extensive literature review whilst Chapter 3 outlines 
research philosophy, research strategy and methodology.  The study is inductive 
in nature and is a consistent with the subjectivist philosophy of the author.  The 
study is based within a real life context and answers the “how mode” of 
exploratory questions.  Accordingly, analysis of data is undertaken using an 
interpretivist phenomenological approach (IPA).   
According to Remenyi et al. (2009) this paradigm of enquiry is concerned with a,  
“theoretical point of view that advocates the study of direct experience 
taken at face value; and one which sees behaviour as determined by the 
phenomena of experience rather than by objective and physically 
described reality” (Remenyi et al. 2009, p.34). 
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This research uses an exploratory questionnaire to ascertain current practices 
and attitudes amongst directors relating to corporate governance and risk and 
then develops those findings through use of a multiple case study method to 
explore in depth a contemporary phenomenon related to small companies and 
how corporate governance in such entities contributes to risk and crisis 
management.   
This is followed by Chapter 4 that details the approach to data collection and 
analysis.  Data are extracted through a series of semi-structured interviews with 
owner-managers and directors of four small companies.  Subsequent analysis of 
that data is undertaken using NVivo software.  Data are reduced to a series of 
Higher Order Themes and the original conceptual model is revised in the light of 
the findings. 
Chapter 5 introduces the four companies that feature in a multiple case study and 
describes the participating organisations together the respective contributing 
directors.  
Chapter 6 presents the analysis and findings of the pre-interview exploratory 
questionnaire and the findings of a series of semi-structured interviews with the 
various directors of the case companies. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the findings of the study and its 
contribution to knowledge.  One of the main contributions of this study is that it 
expands upon previous research conducted into the role of the owner-manager 
by placing his or her personal disposition and concomitant attitudes, beliefs and 
values as the impetus of corporate governance rather than codes and legal 
compliance.   
The research finds that there are varying levels of awareness of corporate 
governance processes and procedures on the part of the owner-manager, or their 
proxy, albeit with an acceptance that such mechanisms add value.  
Probing more deeply, it is discovered that where formal board meetings are held 
there is an undercurrent of belief that such events are more of a symbolic and 
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ceremonial nature than a genuine gathering of decision-making, independent 
equals.   
There follows an assessment of the limitations of the study together with its 
implications for both theory and practice and recommendations for further 
research.   
The final paragraphs offer a few concluding remarks concerning the nature of 
corporate governance in small companies and suggest that in order to engage 
with owner-managers a starting point may be a re-naming of the concept to better 
reflect its applicability and relevance to the 208,000 small and 5,445,000 micro 
businesses in the UK.  
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Chapter 1–Governance, Corporate Governance, Risk 
and Crisis Management – Principles, Practices and 
Paradoxes 
Overview of the chapter 
This chapter embeds the concept of corporate governance firmly within the 
overall umbrella of the regulatory systems that operate within the nation state 
together with its instruments and agencies of government, its laws, its protocols 
and its directives. 
 
The chapter then moves beyond legal considerations and reflects upon ethical 
and behavioural matters associated with both the governance of the people and 
the governance of the corporation.  There follows a short deliberation on the 
philosophical and practical aspects of corporate governance that draws heavily 
upon a stream of thought emerging from classical Greece, through the 
Renaissance and The Enlightenment to Adam Smith and Humanist philosophy.  
 
The chapter then introduces agency theory, a construct that has been central to 
thinking on corporate governance for decades, and then examines more recent 
theories related to the way in which corporations are governed.  The chapter goes 
on to explore the relevance of corporate governance to small companies - the 
contextual heart of this thesis - and introduces the nature of the risks faced by 
such companies and the implications of a crisis event.   
 
Governance- its context and purpose 
Governance relating to corporations and organisations – “corporate governance” 
- functions as a system within a wider structure of jurisprudence that prescribes, 
evaluates and amends societal “ground rules” through legislation, directives and 
executive orders.  Such regulation is designed to create stable mechanisms 
through which, inter alia, trade and commerce can act as a force for good and 
enable ethical and equitable contracts to proceed.  The way in which 
organisations are governed within democratic a state such as the UK, is a critical 
factor in maintaining a just and fair society through the appropriation of taxes paid 
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and the redistribution of wealth as a consequence of the gross added value 
achieved through trade that enables public services to function.  
Beyond the legal prescription related to governance of organisations, there is a 
raft of interpretations related to processes that are contained within industry-
based codes and professional protocols upon which concepts of good practice, 
good behaviours and ethical considerations are determined through collibration.  
However, “governance” at the level of the nation state, into which corporate 
governance dovetails, could be considered as a theoretical concept alluding to 
the practices and activities by which stable mechanisms and organisations are 
created and develop.  Governance of the nation state, according to Fasenfest 
(2010) is concerned with decisions and processes designed to reflect social 
expectations and exercised through the mechanisms of government. 
Additionally, the term “governance” can be used as a means by which it is 
possible to identify the structures and procedures that offer the citizens of the 
nation-state the stability, security and ethical framework that enables them to 
engage in purposeful and meaningful lives and to meet the mutual obligations 
placed upon each party by civil society.  Crane (2011), in his work on cross-
sectional partnerships, seeks to differentiate the nature of governance and refers 
to “big G governance” and “small g governance” (Crane 2010, p.17) with the 
former referring to societal governance in contrast to the “small g” governance 
that is applicable to organisations.  
In the context of the nation state, “big G” governance, as practiced, is the means 
by which the rules, and the values that they reflect, are conceived, implemented 
and enforced.  Such rules are the object of an incessant series of compromises 
and iterations between the actors of state who produce the rules, and the 
governed, whose acceptance and consent to abide by them is the ultimate arbiter 
of the legitimation of those rules.  However, such enlightened, or even Utopian, 
principles remain far from universal in cases where the power of authority does 
not require consent by common will and is neither subject to scrutiny nor onerous 
in its obligations to the franchise.  Rawls (1999) describes such governance and 
its dysfunctionality in terms of “outlaw states”, (Rawls 1999, p.81) and as 
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“societies burdened by unfavourable conditions", (Rawls 1999, p.106) or as 
"benevolent absolutism” (Rawls 1999, p.92).  
Governance, in its normative state, is designed to lend transparency to the 
activities that take place within the process of government.  It seeks to ensure 
that the delicate equilibrium that exists between ideologies of sovereignty and the 
stakeholders, whose credit legitimises those processes, is maintained.  Such 
fundamental notions, it could be argued, are the bases of a philosophical 
construct concerning the nature of governance and the efficacy of its various 
manifestations.  Hence, the polysemous disposition of the term “governance” is 
such that its translation occupies a continuum that extends from, at one extreme, 
a term associated with reverence and admiration, whilst at the opposite extreme, 
a term that is not infrequently linked with authoritarianism and oppression 
(Roseneau and Czempiel 1992).   
Governance, across a wide spectra, is contextual in both policy and in practice, 
although, from an occidental perspective that tends to engage with fluctuating 
neo-liberalism, free markets and laissez-faire individual rights, it could be argued 
that the prevalent governance paradigm of democracy based on plebiscite is one 
that is generally valued and appreciated by the citizenry, despite its flaws, 
inconsistencies and inherent aberrations (Bowler et al. 2007).  Yet, seen through 
other lenses, governance may be widely perceived by the governed as little more 
than the preserve of despotic, distant, self-serving, self-imposed and self-
perpetuating ruling elites (Jamal and Tessler 2008).  
Governance - a universal or relativist concept? 
As the previous paragraph illustrates, what could be considered as acceptable 
governance, is, by its very nature, heterogeneous and operates with contextual 
legitimation and the general will.  Accordingly, the notion of the universality of 
governance principles may be subsumed and diminished in favour of deeply-held 
customs, rites, practices, cultural norms, religious observances, ethical positions 
and communal attitudes or indeed dispensed as a consequence of totalitarianism 
(Stack et al. 2015).  Governance, therefore, it can be argued, should not be seen 
as an absolute concept as advocated by Kant (Howell and Letza 2000), but one 
that is itself a paradox.  It relates to the circumstances in which it takes place and 
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is a notion that morphs according to life situations.  Practices that, for example, 
may be considered as “ethical” in one society may be viewed with distaste or 
abhorrence in another context.  An instance of such relates to differing attitudes 
to usury between countries of an Islamic tradition and much of the remainder of 
the world.  A further example illustrating this point is the case of the widely 
divergent views that exist relating to female genital mutilation that vary from 
viewing the practice as a serious assault punishable by a custodial sentence, to 
a claim that it is a legitimate rite of passage that carries with it certain health 
benefits.  The matter of slavery, [the Global Slavery Index estimate that in 2013, 
29.8m individuals were enslaved (Walk Free Foundation 2013)] a practice widely 
thought of as inhuman, is considered by some to be part of the natural order and 
justified by biblical passages such as those contained in Deuteronomy 15:12-15; 
Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1 (God. 2008) that give instructions on how slaves 
should be treated, thereby tacitly affirming an a priori assumption that slavery is 
somehow acceptable (Reddie 2007).   
Despite divergences in contextual norms relating to what may be labelled as 
governance ethics (Melé et al. 2011), international governance charters such as 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights are conceived with an 
expectation of universal application and compliance, and for non-compliance, the 
exercise of sanctions remains available although, in practice, monitoring of 
aberrance and subsequent legal retribution is frequently limited to little more than 
moral opprobrium and “naming and shaming” (Cronin-Furman 2009, p.177). 
Relativism exercised the mind of the Italian political theorist Gramsci (b.1891) as 
he considers the nature of culture and cultural practices and their influence on 
governance from a Marxist perspective and asserts that prevailing cultural norms 
are imposed by the ruling, hegemonic elite and must not be taken as either 
natural or inevitable.  He further asserts that such phenomena must be seen as 
artificial social constructs that form the basis of domination but which 
nevertheless transcend imposition and, in time, assume a normative status.   
Gramsci’s views add to the relativist argument that the prevailing cultural 
ideologies are influenced by the impositions of governance (Nowell-Smith and 
Hoare 1971).  Others (Rafiee and Sarabdeen 2012) however propose that it is 
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culture, which the author defines as the ideas, beliefs, customs, and social 
behaviours of a particular identifiable people, group or society, that is the core 
driver behind context-related governance. 
Governance and Ethics 
The philosopher John Locke (b.1634) commonly known as the "Father of 
Liberalism", claims that a relationship subsists between governance and ethical 
behaviours in the form of social compacts (Locke 2001).  Kant (b.1724) extends 
this theme to the level of the person with his belief that behaviours are such that, 
as individuals, we are obligated to do what is right as we internalise a code of 
virtue ethics (Gregor 1996).  Such social compacts are evident, for example, in 
the behaviours of many early American settlers that enabled them to live in such 
a way that both altruism and the greater good combined with egoism and self-
interest to offer mutual assurances.  Following the out-break of civil war, the then 
US President, Abraham Lincoln, attempted to reclaim this covenant of community 
in his Gettysburg Address of November 19th,1863, when he spoke of 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people”.  The Declaration of 
Independence, would appear to echo Locke stating that,  
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed”  (Jefferson 1776, p.35). 
Lincoln’s statement is coincidental with the views of the social constructionists 
who aver that governments, as political institutions, are created by humans and 
should only operate with, and by, the consent of those whom they govern.  
Accordingly, government, and the act of governance itself, may be considered as 
a series of paradigms, based upon an ethical scaffold, that are designed to 
conjoin the individual and the institution in order to create a framework of a 
mutually determined common order.   
Governance, as practiced by the neo-liberal state for example, reproduces and 
endorses a market model, as advocated by such as Hayek (b.1899), that relates 
to decision-making within which rules and regulations, to varying degrees of 
permissions, empower, moderate or constrain both government and individual.  
In this regard, a critical issue for governance is the extent to which the governors 
36 
 
adopt a regressive mode that is inhibitive, or whether it assumes an ontology that 
is permissive in its posture and creative in its outlook (Hayek 2001).  Dependent 
upon such positioning, the climate for enterprise governance is determined.  The 
extent to which the market or the institutions of political governance should 
dominate is a debate without end, due in part to the ebb and flow of views on 
matters such as the impact of globalisation as corporate behemoths circumvent 
porous legal structures created by the state and wells of capital exploit 
deregulated markets. 
Governance and Government  
Political governance operates at a series of levels from transnational, the 
European Union for example, through international protocols such as the Geneva 
Convention (1994) concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and the Vienna 
Convention (1961) relating to diplomatic relations, to the national, regional and 
parochial.  Each layer employs the mechanics of power and influence entrusted 
to them accordingly.  However, government and governance differ.  According to 
Fasenfest (2010) government may be thought of as the office, authority or 
function of governing, whilst governance, the activity of governing, he defines as, 
“a set of decisions and processes made to reflect social expectations 
through the management or leadership of the government (by extension, 
under liberal democratic ideals, the will of ‘the people’ as they rule 
themselves)”(Fasenfest 2010, p.771).  
The will of the people permits democratic government to enjoy specific 
prerogatives in that they, by ultimate consent of the governed, can determine 
taxes, duties, fees, precepts and levies.  Government can regulate institutions; 
create legal infrastructures that enable the state to function in a secure and 
ordered manner and develop policies to promote well-being in civil society.  In a 
functioning democracy, the covenant that exists between the government, its 
process of governance, and the governed, is an enduring agreement that is 
founded in a political philosophy designed to ensure cohesive behaviours whilst 
simultaneously maintaining individual freedoms in order to achieve a common 
aim. 
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The degree of governmental interventionism varies according to political 
philosophies from “governance without government” (Roseneau and Czempiel 
1992 p.11) to absolutist and centrist totalitarianism.  Hence, the infrastructure of 
government, its agency and legitimation is pre-determined by its underpinning 
philosophy of governance – the activity of governing and the focus of interest that 
asks the question, Governing for the benefit of whom? 
Altruism and self-interest 
Adam Smith (b.1723) states that as individuals, human beings have a natural 
tendency towards self-interest and egoism that reflect nothing more than 
prudence.  However, Smith then goes on to assert that as social creatures, we 
are also imbued with a sense of altruism, or beneficence as he calls it, and an 
innate natural empathy towards others.  Accordingly, Smith adds, that when we 
observe the anguish or joy of others we are capable of reciprocal emotions as a 
vicarious experience.  In turn, he states that others participate in empathising and 
associate with us.  Smith concludes therefore, that morality stems from our social 
nature and that the effective functioning of trade is built upon these traits between 
government and commerce. Smith recognises that human beings and their 
interactions are part of nature and not to be understood separately from it.  
Smith also sees social and political behaviour as following a natural logic and 
makes the same claim for economic acts. He claims that human society is as 
natural as the people in it, and, as such he asserts that there was never a time 
that humanity lived outside of society, and political development is the product of 
evolution rather than a radical shift in organisation.  
This leads to a key question relating to governance that seeks to discover how 
institutions can balance these sometimes conflicting instincts in order to promote 
widespread prosperity and social cohesion.  Smith concludes that, paradoxically, 
altruism and self-interest can co-exist, stating, 
“How selfish so-ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from 
it, except the pleasure of seeing it.” (Smith 2011a, p.8). 
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Smith’s philanthropic expression of the nature of mankind reflects a particular 
view of governance that speaks beyond self-interest despite his conflicting 
assertion that suggests an acceptance of the predomination of egoism.  He 
writes, 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.”(Smith 2008, p.119). 
Smith fully understands that this channelling of egoism into collective gain occurs 
only if the market is viewed as a construct (Collins 1988) that does not give 
primacy to the laissez-faire, but rather has boundaries shaped through morals 
and social norms set by the state so as to create a more equitable social order.  
Bounded by these two ontologies of altruism and egoism dwells the essence of 
governance, its purpose and the roles of the actors involved. 
Governance, Corporate Governance and Ethics 
Corporate governance is part of a congeries of governances that reside within 
the skirts of political, or nation-state governance (Becht et al. 2007) whilst 
Bonnafous-Boucher (2005) argues differently that the theories surrounding 
corporate governance are of a mere “technical nature” and accordingly its status 
is “distinct from that designated by the more general term ‘governance’” 
(Bonnafous-Boucher 2005, p.34).   
Developing this claimed dichotomy, the literature pertaining to governance of the 
nation state speaks of liberty, and the rights of people whilst the literature relating 
to corporate governance is dominated by what may be described as a 
functionalist, prescriptive and descriptive agenda.  Such an agenda is based upon 
either the orthodoxy of property rights and contracts or a heterodoxy, whose 
currency is increasing, that has the stakeholders at its focus and seeks to 
incorporate positive engagement in corporate social responsibility, by way of 
example, relating to its ethical posture. 
The word "ethics", deriving from the Greek "ethos", refers to a "custom" or "habit".  
It differs from morals and morality in that ethics reflect a world view and 
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designates the theory of right action and the greater good, whilst morals are 
concerned with the practice and application of ethical or virtuous behaviour. 
According to McNutt (2010), corporate governance is, however, less concerned 
with ethics and morals and is more about processual matters and “box-ticking”,  
“process-based behaviour that correlates with ever increasing shareholder 
value and less about ensuring that the basic principle of ethics – that a 
person is not a means rather an end – is not violated”.(McNutt 2010, 
p.745). 
Coulson-Thomas (2017) expresses a view that contradicts that of McNutt (2010) 
and believes that corporate ethics are intertwined and interlaced with ethical 
theory. He writes that ethics,   
“represent the essence of responsible and sustainable business which is 
based upon trust, the building of mutually beneficial relationships with 
shareholders, an understanding of risk and the balancing of risk and 
return.”(Coulson-Thomas 2017, p.1). 
Whilst Coulson-Thomas (2017) paints a positive, albeit some may claim, naive 
picture of business and its ethical dimensions, McNutt (2010) responds, with 
some justification, it might be argued, that there is an “oxymoronic twist of 
‘business’ and ‘ethics’ combined as a workable concept” (McNutt 2010, p.741). 
In spite of inadequacies in practice, the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance generally aspires to the “good behaviour” philosophies that emanate 
from the thinking of Socrates (c470-399BC), Plato (c427-348BC) and from 
Aristotle’s (384-322BC) ethical treatises, (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016).  
These works cover similar issues, each beginning with a discussion of the notion 
of “eudaimonia” meaning “happiness” or “flourishing”, and then go on to examine 
the nature of “aretê” meaning “virtue” or “excellence” and the qualities of 
character that are needed in order to live a good life and to govern well (Howell 
and Letza 2000).  Both treatises deal with the subjects of praise or blame and 
reflect on the circumstances as to when laudation or admonishment is 
appropriate.   
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Aristotle goes on to extol ethical virtue or hexis ,a tendency or disposition, induced 
by our habits, to have appropriate feelings, and states that “Virtue makes the goal 
right, practical wisdom the things leading to it” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy 2017).  Furthermore, the associated concept of phronesis, meaning 
practical wisdom or prudence, is a notion considered earlier by Socrates as being 
synonymous with a virtuous person.  In the mind of Socrates, phronesis also 
equates to virtue, and this enables an individual to exercise moral or ethical 
strength.  In Plato's Meno, Socrates explains how phronesis is the most important 
attribute to learn, albeit gained not through pedagogic means, but through a 
process of self-development that in turn leads to morality; and is the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong - the foundation of ethics.   
Virtue likewise, dwells within the individual and the notion of “Organisational 
ethics” is merely the aggregation of the ethical values of the human beings that 
inhabit a given society, and who, through positions of individual influence, power, 
behaviours and attitudes, create a climate that tends to be principled and moral 
or alternatively, in extremis, functions as unethical and unscrupulous.  Such 
concepts reflect a constructivist’s view of reality as emanating from the individual, 
whilst constructionists would claim that it is the wider community that is the 
impetus and the instigator. 
In assembling the linkages that prevail concerning governance and virtuosity, 
moral understanding and the practical implementation of wisdom there is, as 
Howell and Sorour (2016) describe,   
“a clear relationship between governance, morality and the social contract 
as well as ethical perspectives relating to human existence and social 
development.” (Howell and Sorour 2016, p.5). 
Corporate governance, it can be claimed, is associated with ethical leadership 
and morality pertaining to corporations and their interactions with a range of 
stakeholders with whom there are both legal and social contracts.  Whilst 
corporations are established and operate within the framework of the law, they 
also operate within a collibrational, societal context whereby there is broad 
consensus that they will act with virtue and within the parameters of Aristotle’s 
triad of knowledge that comprises phronesis, practical wisdom, episteme, 
41 
 
scientific knowledge and techne, skill and craft knowledge.  The Companies Act 
(2006) s.174 describes this as the exercise of “reasonable skill, care and 
diligence”.  
Other Greek philosophers such as Thales, Xenophanes of Colophon (570 - 480 
B.C.), Anaxagoras, Pericles (c. 495 - 429 B.C.), Protagoras, Democritus and the 
historian Thucydides (c. 460 - 375 B.C.) all of whom preceded Aristotle, are 
instrumental in contributing to the shift away from a morality based on the 
supernatural to the development of humanism, rationality and free thinking.  This 
view holds that behaviours and relationships should be determined on the basis 
of rationality and reason, and not by beliefs, tradition, dogma or the diktats of 
invisible sky gods presented in super-human forms and whose acolytes claim 
legitimacy on the deities’ behalf.  Humanistic philosophy, with its emphasis on the 
dignity and worth of all people and their ability to determine right and wrong is 
further developed in the Renaissance that took place in Europe in the 15th and 
16th centuries and is expounded by, amongst others, the Dutch scholar Erasmus, 
the Italian poet Petrarch, the English philosopher, Sir Thomas More and the 
French writer François Rabelais.  Corporate governance and its associated 
ethical perspective draw heavily upon the Humanist philosophies circulating 
during that period with,  
“its emphasis on the dignity and worth of all people and their ability to 
determine right and wrong purely by appeal to universal human qualities” 
(Mastin 2017, p.1).  
as the theoretical basis of policy.  In praxis there are however legion examples of 
tectonic schisms that lead to the abandonment of Aristotelian altruism and the 
degradation of virtue in favour of egotism and hubris, behaviours that frequently 
lead to nemesis.  Demidenko and McNutt (2010) summarise the relationship 
between corporate governance and ethics, incorporating both the ethical and 
commercial case for engagement, 
“Corporate governance should be more than the mantra “doing well by 
doing good”.  A corporate governance code should become part of a 
company’s competitive advantage”(Demidenko and McNutt 2010, p.803). 
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Corporate Governance, Agents and Principals 
It was precisely such instances of ethical breaches, within public companies, and 
the subsequent degradation of virtue combined with arrogance, hubristic 
behaviours and distain for shareholders that gave impetus to the formalisation of 
what is currently recognised as corporate governance.  “Corporate governance” 
is the term that is commonly used to define the processes that seek to improve 
the way in which the corporation and its directors behave and the means through 
which it establishes contracts between owners of rights related to the corporation, 
and those charged with managing the assets of the corporation.  Until the early 
years of the 21st century, the notion of corporate governance resided largely 
within the exclusive domain of the listed company (Cadbury 1992) with its 
dispersed shareholding and journeymen managers acting as agents of the 
shareholders, or principals.  Two models of corporate governance have tended 
to dominate the discourse in the western world, (Mallin 2004) the first of which is 
the Anglo-Saxon model of shareholder primacy and secondly, the German model 
which takes into account a wide range of stakeholders all of whom have legitimate 
interests in the management and governance of the entity. 
At its most basic level, corporate governance seeks, amongst other matters, to 
address a problem of agency that Berle and Means(1932) raised whereby an 
external investor, the principal, seeks objectives that differ from those of the 
manager, the agent, responsible for the activities, performance and direction of 
the business (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  An increase in the dispersion of share 
ownership amplifies the agency problem that in turn results in conflicts of interest 
between principals and agents (Kellogg School of Management 2011).  
According to Becht et al. (2007), 
“Most research on corporate governance has been concerned with the 
resolution of this collective action problem.” Becht et al. (2007 p.833). 
Corporate Governance and Small Companies 
Although the agency problem that, as Becht et al. (2007) suggest, is at the heart 
of much of the research into corporate governance, it has limited relevance to the 
5.7 million small and medium sized companies in the UK whose shareholders 
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and owners are closely associated with the company through managerial, 
financial and socio-emotional relationships (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Herbane 
2010; UK Government 2015b).  Within such small companies, the principals and 
the agents are frequently the same individuals with coincidental aspirations, 
values and interests thus rendering the classic agency problem irrelevant.   
Nevertheless, researchers recognise that in the case of small, closed companies 
a system of internal agency can exist between owner-directors, who may or may 
not be family members, and salaried directors, in the form of altruism and 
shareholder expropriation (Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003; Siebels and zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012).  Accordingly, the nature and scope of corporate 
governance that is exercised in small companies differs significantly from the 
prescriptive and legalistic models evident in large public corporations (Uhlaner et 
al. 2007b; Uhlaner et al. 2007c; Choudhury 2008; Swamy 2011).   
Developing this issue, Bannock (2005) claims that the world-views of politicians 
and civil servants concerned with matters of government and governance 
compared to those of the owner-managers of small companies are such that 
there is a chasm of disparity.  Bannock (2005) further claims that owner-
managers’ view governance as an unwanted and burdensome imposition from 
those whose dealings and affinities are closely linked with public companies 
where corporate governance plays a significant role in the regulation of markets 
and the protection of shareholders.  Bannock concludes that to most SME owners 
based in their local communities, central government seems remote and above 
all “uncomprehending of the reality of their day to day business activities” 
(Bannock 2005, p.63). 
The disconnect that Bannock (2005) suggests exists is a symptom of a lack of 
appreciation as to the nature of corporate governance and its relevance and value 
to small businesses who do not consider themselves as “corporates” and whose 
role is to “manage” rather than to “govern”. This issue is matter of critical concern 
to this study and is germane to the research questions.   
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Small Companies, Risk and Crisis Management 
It is axiomatic that where corporate governance is weak and risk management, a 
widely acknowledged sine qua non of “effective” corporate governance, is given 
low priority, effective mitigation and response to an unanticipated event 
decreases thereby opening the door to unwanted disruption (Irvine and Anderson 
2004; Herbane 2010; Asgary et al. 2012).  Research conducted by Irvine and 
Anderson (2004) into the impact of foot and mouth disease on small rural tourism 
businesses in the North of England and Scotland concludes that the ability of the 
business to manage a crisis effectively represents the difference between 
“survival and disaster and even life and death.”(Irvine and Anderson 2004, p.234). 
In a further study into rural companies, Asgary et al. (2012) assess the impact of 
the floods that occurred in Pakistan in 2010.  They conclude that small companies 
with limited resources suffer disproportionally greater losses than larger 
enterprises.  This finding is consistent with the extant literature that highlights the 
vulnerability of small enterprises (Runyan 2006).   
The literature related to risk and crisis management in small companies 
(Drummond and Chell 1994; Smallman 1996a; Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; 
Herbane 2010; Hong et al. 2012; Mahzan and Yan 2014; Parnell 2014; Doern 
2016) portrays a range of responses to the multiplicity of turbulences that may 
pose a threat to the long-term survival and growth of an already fragile entity 
(Mette 2014).  Drummond and Chell (1994) emphasise this fragility when they 
state that “Of all the organizations at risk, small businesses are the most 
vulnerable” (Drummond and Chell 1994 p. 37).   
In considering attitudes to crisis management in small companies, researchers 
(Close 1974; Smallman 1996b) have viewed crisis management through the lens 
of organisational behaviour theory and proposed the adoption of complex 
organisational routines for developing adaptive strategies and procedures to 
manage diverse and adverse circumstances (Chakravarthy 1982).  Others 
(Mitroff and Anagnos 2000) have introduced the idea of information signalling as 
a critical element in dealing with risk and environmental complexities as a means 
of mitigation thereby avoiding costly and convoluted crisis response mechanisms.   
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In contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) use the resource-based view of the firm 
to suggest that various fungible resources are deployed to manage differing 
environmental situations.  They argue that such resources represent dynamic 
capabilities that are idiosyncratic, specific and identifiable processes that include 
strategic decision making, alliancing and best practice models. 
Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005), however, advocate an emphasis away from 
adaptive routines towards comprehensive resilience capacity.  They propose that 
in order to cope with the unanticipated event, robust transformations are required 
that involve internal psychological resilience that engages with anticipation, 
preparedness and recovery.  In turn, Smallman (1996) proposes a holistic model 
that comprises organisational learning, forecasting and data collection and 
collation based upon a pre-requisite that embraces a broader world view and a 
universalist mind-set.  How reasonable it is to expect such thinking to prevail in a 
small business is a matter of conjecture. 
The implications of an unanticipated event leading to business disruption can be 
particularly severe for owner-managers of small companies where social capital, 
economies of scale, low equity ratio, internal resources and capacities are limited 
(Irvine and Anderson 2004; Ansong 2013; Gao et al. 2013; Sunjka and Emwanu 
2015).  Resource constraints in small companies limit both crisis preparation and 
crisis response despite the direct and immediate consequences of a crisis that, 
in the case of a small company, may impinge upon both the private and 
commercial spheres (Doern 2016).   
Whilst the consequences of a crisis may have a catastrophic and direct impact 
on the owner-managers’ involved, there is a secondary issue that relates to 
wholesale job losses and subsequent social disruption in the developmental 
growth stage of small companies (Ingley and McCaffrey 2007; Cater and Schwab 
2008; Karoui et al. 2014).  Beyond the micro level, there is also an over-arching 
macro-perspective concerning the high levels of early stage failure that has a 
concomitant, largely negative, impact on a local economy (Cochrane 1992) that 
once aggregated translates to a national economy.  Whilst economists refer to 
such redundancy as creative destruction (Schumpeter 2003), owner-managers 
simply see it as destruction (Doern 2016).  
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Theorising Corporate Governance  
Defining and scoping corporate governance by the FRC and others has almost 
developed into a mini-industry alongside the development of codes of 
governance at a national, regional and international.  Such endeavours are 
relatively recent, yet the driving force behind much of the thinking on what is at 
the heart of corporate governance emanates from the long-standing agency 
issue.  The tension pertaining to relationships between owners and managers is 
identified by Berle and Means (1932) when they declared in their book “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property” that within the largest American 
corporations, a new condition had developed in that there were no dominant 
owners and that control is, to a large degree, separated from ownership thus 
creating dissonance as a consequence of contradictory aims .  This view 
dominated thinking about corporate governance (Hawley and Williams 2000) 
during the 20th century and into the 21st century as the default paradigm (Cheffins 
and Bank 2009).  Nevertheless, this commonly held perception has been 
challenged (Hannah 2007; Holderness 2009) with claims that far from a 
diversified ownership, those same American corporations had a concentrated 
ownership with fewer shareholders owing greater percentages of the equity.  The 
work of, inter alia, Veblen (1997), in his book “Absentee Ownership”, first 
published in 1923, pre-dates Berle and Means’ seminal publication, and reflects 
wide concern relating to issues of governance in the early years of the twentieth 
century.  Veblen (1997) refers to the separation of ownership and control and to 
the disparate interests between managers and shareholders (Lewis 2010) and is 
a link in the chain of thought that culminates half a century later with the work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the enduring concept of agency theory. 
The shareholder, Berle and Means (1932) claim, has limited interest in genuine 
and active ownership and postulate that their prime concern is the capital growth 
of their investment and the dividends receivable.  They argue that with reduced 
engagement by shareholders, a culture of “managerialism” (Armour and Gordon 
2009) would result in executives developing policies that would be inimical to 
shareholders interests and would allow both egocentricity and pressure groups 
to unduly influence the management of the business.   
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Whilst rapacious managers reward themselves handsomely, the shareholders, 
whose investments are growing, choose to relegate corporate governance to the 
backseat (Rappaport 2006) and in so doing, it may be argued, they give tacit 
approval to abuses of power whilst capital growth and dividends are flowing their 
way in what could be viewed as an act of complicity and an unwise adventure of 
common purpose. 
Contingent or Universal Application of Corporate Governance? 
Contrary to the widely held view that corporate governance must be contingent, 
Maassen (2004) proposes that certain elements of corporate governance 
principles are universal and can be as relevant to small companies as they are to 
their larger counterparts.  In his work on corporate governance in Macedonian 
small businesses, he states that practices such as transparency, openness and 
corporate social responsibility are important manifestations of mature 
approaches to corporate governance and are, accordingly, germane in attracting 
finance.  Such a position is consistent with both Stakeholder Theory and the view 
of practitioners as stated in the preamble contained within the Institute of 
Directors’ Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles or Unlisted 
Companies in the UK which states that, 
“Good governance can also play a crucial role in gaining the respect of key 
external stakeholders - even unlisted companies have to devote attention 
to their stakeholder responsibilities.”  (Institute of Directors 2010, p.6). 
However, directors of small companies tend to view corporate governance as 
being of limited importance or relevance compared with the imperatives related 
to survival (Uhlaner et al. 2007b; Clarke and Klettner 2009).  Yet Crossan et al 
(2015) point out that a lack of governance in small companies is a contributory 
factor in business failure stating,  
“Many of these failures can be mitigated by the introduction of robust 
governance structures that would potential[ly] provide better planning and 
management structures”(Crossan et al. 2015, p.3).   
Steier et al. (2015) state that  
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“Governance is widely recognised as a key determinant in the success 
and failure of all organizing activity” (Steier et al. 2015, p.266). 
The literature in this respect points towards a lapse on the part of owner-
managers to recognise, appreciate and act upon the issue of causality that links 
failures of corporate governance to business decline and mortality.  Seeking to 
unwrap this fundamental contra-intuitive paradigm that appears to be the 
antithesis of rationality represents a challenge to owner-managers concerning the 
nature, scope and adoption of corporate governance in small companies. 
In spite of limited awareness and widespread antipathy by directors of small 
businesses towards corporate governance (Lane et al. 2006), the Institute of 
Directors (IOD) are nevertheless promoting and encouraging the boards of small 
companies to adopt appropriate forms of governance procedures that go beyond 
a mechanistic, box-ticking approach that assumes the agency problem. 
Barker (2008) in an IOD Briefing Paper notes a fundamental issue,  
“However, the governance of SMEs is not subject to the same sort of 
dialogue with institutional investors as is the case with larger 
companies.”(Barker 2008, p.7). 
The IOD goes on to observe that, referring to the Combined Code, “An alternative 
approach would be to develop an alternative code of best practice for smaller 
companies”(Barker 2008, p.8).  The IOD then concluded that smaller companies 
would gain benefit from a bespoke corporate governance code in preference to 
the Combined Code (Barker 2008). 
Adding to Barker’s words, Clarke and Klettner (2009) refer to the pervasive 
governance model which for many smaller operators is an unwanted imposition 
whilst Uhlaner et al.(2007) use contingency theory to propose that “the 
appropriate governance design for a particular firm likely depends on the context” 
(Uhlaner et al. 2007b, p.227). 
In the foreword to Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted 
Companies in the UK (2010), the director general of the IOD states that,  
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“The IOD is convinced that appropriate corporate governance practices 
can contribute to the success of UK companies of all types and sizes, 
including those that are unlisted or privately held.”(Institute of Directors 
2010, p.5).  
Prior to November 2010, the launch date of the IOD’s Corporate Governance 
Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK, the UKCGC and its 
antecedents, together with the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) AIM code – 
first published in 2005, were the only UK reference sources for companies 
wishing to adopt a recognised national governance code.  (Others codes such as 
the Belgian Code Buysse (Buysse 2009) had however been published outside 
the UK).  Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted 
Companies in the UK does not have at its heart a “comply or explain” requirement 
but seeks to promote appropriateness based on practices and processes that 
add value, ensure resilience, profitability and sustainability.  This notion is 
expanded by the IOD referring to corporate governance codes serving the twin 
role of “watchman and the pilot” and in the case of the SME, the dominant role 
being that of the “pilot” (Barker 2008, p.3). 
Despite a fanfare launch of the IOD Principles, little is known as to the up-take of 
codes of governance of any kind within small companies either prior to or since 
the launch of Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted 
Companies in the UK in 2010 (Barker 2014).  Additionally, according to 
Ponomareva and Ahlberg (2016) and Seidl (2006) there is a paucity of research 
that supports the normative assumptions that underpin codes of corporate 
governance raising thereby an opportunity for further investigation. 
Reflecting a murmuring of interest in corporate governance amongst small firms 
and the need for relevant and appropriate processes, the British Standards 
Institution (BSI) publish a code of practice, BS 13500:2013 for delivering effective 
governance of organisations stating, 
“In a small organisation, there may be only a sole trader who owns, 
governs and manages their business.  Complex, formal arrangements are 
not necessary, but applying the principles of good governance is still 
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important for sustainable success” (British Standards Institution 2013, 
p.2). 
The notion of good governance as expressed by BSI would appear to reflect a  
growing ideology that seeks to maximise shareholder value and promote 
stakeholder engagement which according to Ponomareva and Ahlberg (2016) 
has increased attention in, and subsequent adoption of, what might be called 
good corporate governance.  Drawing on Institutional Theory, this paradigm shift, 
Pieper (2003) claims, has led to the growth of a dominant institutional logic that 
exhorts small companies, and especially family businesses, to adopt corporate 
governance codes and its associated processes and practices. 
The literature therefore would appear to conclude that corporate governance 
codes of an appropriate, relevant and meaningful nature can contribute to the 
performance and resilience of small companies and that an overarching “one size 
fits all” is not a practicable approach to guide and enable directors of smaller 
companies to conduct effective governance (Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki 2011). 
Agency Theory 
Berle and Means (1932) point towards the uneasy relationship that exists, and 
continues to exist, between owners, (the principals) and the managers, (who may, 
in some cases, have the title of “director”) (the agents) appointed to control and 
manage the company, and underline the differences that can occur between 
parties with differing and competing interests and goals.  The work of Berle and 
Means (1932) is developed by others who later call the issue raised by them the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 
1983).  Agency theory, as it is widely known, is described in simple terms by 
Eisenhardt (1989) as, 
“The ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work.  
(Eisenhardt 1989a). 
Figure 5 illustrates the essence of this seemingly uncomplicated agency 
relationship as described by Eisenhardt (1989).  In Figure 3, the agents are 
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exemplified as “directors”.  Such “directors” are synonymous with the “managers” 
as referred to by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  However, the neat lines and 
straightforward relationships belie a gallimaufry of dysfunctionality reflecting in 
large part the complex, self-serving and acquisitive nature of the human condition 
(Fama 1980; Clarysse et al. 2007; Smith 2007; Letza et al. 2008; Wellage 2011; 
Schneider and Scherer 2013).  
Figure 3 Principal-Agent Relationships 
 
Source: kfknowledgebank.kaplan.co.uk 
Mallin (2004), citing Blair, reflects both the de jure and de facto roles of the 
agents, but in recognising the frequently contentious nature of the relationship, 
emphasises the need for monitoring and control based on an a priori assumption 
that an abuse of power is likely to occur.  She writes that managers (for which 
also read directors) are “supposed” to act as agents of the shareholders (who 
own a bundle of rights related to the company), but recognises that such 
managers must be monitored and proper arrangements must provide “checks 
and balances to make sure they do not abuse their power.” (Mallin 2004, p.11). 
Mallin’s use of the word “supposed” could be interpreted as a pejorative term 
reflecting the default position of the agent as being that of a proclivity towards 
self-interest, excess and covetousness, conditions therefore that require policing. 
Over one hundred and fifty years before scholars in the twentieth century were 
ruminating on the issue of principal and agent, and, with what may be considered 
remarkable prescience, Adam Smith, in 1776, wrote that,  
“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
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be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own.  Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider 
attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it.  Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company”.(Smith 2008Book 5, Part 3 Article 1). 
Scholars such as Mallin (2004), Zahra (2009) and Hillman et al. (1989) are united 
in their view that Agency Theory is the most commonly cited phenomenon within 
the context of corporate governance.  Mallin (2004) however, adds that within an 
agency relationship there is an additional risk.  She refers to a risk beyond the 
abuse of power to a risk of the agent adopting an attitude of cautiousness and in 
so doing failing to exploit commercial opportunities.  She writes, that beside the 
risk of abuse of power there is also a risk that “the agent is not sufficiently 
adventurous” (Mallin 2004, p.11). 
Mallin (2004) also articulates a further problem related to the relationship between 
agent and principal as being that of information asymmetry whereby the agent 
has access to more detailed information than the principal and furthermore, the 
agent can decide on what information to give to, or withhold from, the principal.  
This asymmetry thereby creates an unbalanced dyadic relationship of 
dependency on the part of the principal.  The agent is thus in a position, as 
controller and arbiter, to determine the information provided to principals upon 
which they depend in order to make decisions (Nordberg 2011). 
However, such concerns have only limited and tangential relevance to owner-
managed small businesses where, in many instances, the owner-manager is the 
sole shareholder, the sole manager and is frequently the sole director acting as 
the thinking and controlling mind of the entity (Abu-Bulgu 2007).   
In contrast, it can be argued that whilst Agency Theory, in its generally accepted 
sense, is not prevalent in small companies, the control role of the board in 
companies with concentrated ownership and associated high levels of hegemony 
can nevertheless result in internal agency issues relating to minority owners, 
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dormant owners and non-shareholder directors.  Equally, at such a time when 
additional, non-shareholding directors are appointed there is a risk of an agency 
situation arising where goals and objectives may diverge and information 
asymmetry occurs (Huse 2007).   
This issue is compounded as the Companies Act 2006 deems that risk and 
liability can be apportioned to all directors equally, whilst, in practice, executive 
directors, who are both shareholders and non-shareholders, have more 
information and knowledge than NEDs who seek to add value through their 
independence.  If, however, NEDs have the same information as executive 
directors that very independence for which they are appointed is, ipso facto, 
weakened and the likelihood of “going native” increases.  
Eisenhardt (1989) summaries the features of Agency Theory, see Table 1, and 
like Mallin (2004), she appears to use conditionality whilst expressing the main 
idea that the principal-agent relationship “should” rather than “does” reflect 
efficacy (Eisenhardt 1989a). 
Table 1: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest, Bounded Rationality, Risk Taking and Risk Aversion 
Organisational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants.  Efficiency as the 
effectiveness criterion. Information asymmetry between principal 
and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression management, whistle-blowing) 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989)  
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Likewise, her unit of analysis, the contract between the principal and the agent, 
is similar to Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) description of this relationship using the 
metaphor of a contract. 
Transaction Cost Economics  
Closely associated with Agency Theory, is Transaction Cost Economics (Coase 
1937; Dewald 2007) which “views the firm as a governance structure whereas 
agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts” (Mallin 2004, p.12).  It 
describes governance frameworks as being based on the net effects of internal 
and external transactions, rather than as contractual relationships outside the firm 
such as those with suppliers.  Transaction Cost Economics refers to the a priori 
assumption that views managers as seeking certainty and preferring to remain 
within a comfortable bounded reality.  Hence there is a cost incurred to limit the 
detrimental actions of managers and the associated incongruence of interests 
that reside outside the formal strictures of the contract that exists between the 
company and the manager. 
Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship Theory emanates from the field of organisational behaviour 
research (Donaldson 1990) and “emphasises the performance function of the 
board or its strategic role” (Hung 1998, p.106).  It offers a contradictory view of 
the role of agents from that proposed by exponents of Agency Theory (Donaldson 
1990) and just as Agency Theory may be aligned to McGregor’s Theory X 
perspective of the economic, self-serving and mercenary person, so might 
Stewardship Theory be aligned to a McGregor’s Theory Y perspective of the 
altruistic, engaged and philanthropic individual (McGregor 1957).   
Likewise, the dominant motives of managers as stewards relate less to 
Herzberg’s Hygiene Factors of dissatisfaction (Teck-Hong and Waheed 2011) 
that comprise such as company policies, supervision, relationship with supervisor 
and peers, work conditions, salary, status and security and are more aligned to 
his concept of Motivators, where achievement, recognition, the work itself, 
responsibility, advancement and growth take precedence over economic 
considerations and personal gain (Donaldson 1990; Hunter 2012).  Stewardship 
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Theory is based on altruism (Garratt 2010) or on what Donaldson refers to as the 
“ethereal hand of management” (Donaldson 1990, p.379).  The theory holds that 
managers are the stewards of the company’s assets and that, as such, they are 
predisposed towards acting in the best interests of the shareholders (and not of 
themselves).  Garratt (2010) views Stewardship Theory as being closely aligned 
with the Bantu concept of Ubuntu - which is underpinned by a notion of - I am, 
because we are – that incorporates service, connectivity and fairness - the polar 
opposite to the self-seeking nature of “economic man” so reflected in Agency 
Theory.  
Both Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory, one may surmise, have the 
shareholder as the principal actor, albeit that the relationships between the 
shareholder and the agents appointed to act in their best interests are quite 
different in the respective theories.   
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder Theory, (Freeman and Evan 1990), and promoted by the Royal 
Society of Arts’ (RSA) sponsored think tank “Tomorrow’s Company”, (Tomorrow's 
Company 2016) argues, contrary to Milton Friedman’s view of shareholder 
primacy (Friedman 1970), that the company should be managed not solely in the 
interests of shareholders, but that it should take into account the legitimate 
interests of a wider congregation or stakeholders.  Nwanji and Howell (2007) 
believe that the hypothesis relating to stakeholder theory is both deontological 
and teleological and, 
“underlies the assumption that organisations, as well as individuals, 
possess moral status and therefore should act in a morally responsible 
manner.” (Nwanji and Howell 2007, p.348). 
They argue that such an approach involves two principles, the first of which 
involves harming the rights of others and is premised on deontological ethical 
reasoning. The second involves being responsible for the effect of the 
organisation’s actions and is based on teleological ethical reasoning.   
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Nwanji and Howell (2007) go on to add that whilst corporate governance is based 
around ethical theory, the normative sense of stakeholder theory is prescriptive 
and specifies what managers should do, but an instrumental approach assumes 
that if managers wish to maximise the objective functions of the firm they must 
consider stakeholders interests as part of a broader narrative in the life of the 
corporation.  Letza et al (2008, p.20) support this view when they define a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives” Letza et al (2008, p.20) and, within the terms 
of their definition, it can therefore be argued that they ascribe legitimacy to a 
mutual relationship with the firm that extends beyond the notions of ownership 
and contractual engagement.  Such “goodwill” (Kant 1987, p.17) is brought about 
in human beings by them acting rationally in accordance with the principles laid 
down by the “categorical imperative” (Kant 1987, p.31).  Moral duties are 
categorical because they are duties. “The only answer to why one should do their 
duty is, because it is one’s duty” (Nwanji and Howell 2007, p.354). 
Stakeholder theory posits that legitimate contractual and non-contractual 
interests and relationships exist between the company and a plethora of internal 
and external factors that may include colleagues, suppliers and customers in 
addition to local communities, government and society at large, see Figure 4. 
Proponents of stakeholder theory hold that such an approach to business leads 
to superior performance due to higher levels of engagement and motivation of 
those enjoying a relationship with the firm.  One may conclude that such an 
example is that of The John Lewis Partnership model with its strong ethical stance 
and its goals more widely defined than the pursuit of profit maximisation (Dandy 
1996). 
Referring to a stakeholder approach, Tomorrow’s Company, a think-tank with a 
transparent agenda designed to promote a specific business model, 
encapsulates the social model and states on its About Us web page that, “This 
approach focuses on purpose, values, relationships and the long term that offer”: 
(Tomorrow's Company 2016)  
 
57 
 
Figure 4: Stakeholders and their relationship with the firm 
 
Source: Friedman and Miles (2006) 
Table 2: Tomorrow’s Company’s Social Model 
Purpose A purpose beyond profit and a set of values that are lived 
through the behaviours of all employees to create a self-
reinforcing culture. 
Collaboration Collaborative and reciprocal relationships with key 
stakeholders – a strong focus on customer satisfaction, 
employee engagement and, where possible, collaboration 
with suppliers, alongside working with society. 
Long Termism A long-term approach that embraces risk – investing long 
term and embracing disruptive innovation.”  
Source: Tomorrows Company (2016) 
High profile media attention related to business ethics has raised added 
awareness and interest in matters concerning the purpose of the firm that 
encapsulates the shareholder/stakeholder debate.  Recent examples of this 
media interest in business ethics include the case of Primark and the conditions 
of workers in Bangladesh resulting in deaths caused by a major fire (Gayle 2013); 
Nike’s use of child labour (Lutz 2015) and the BP pollution of the Everglades 
(Koch 2010) along with others less well reported matters.  These events have all 
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been instrumental in bringing to the surface the question that asks “What is the 
purpose of the firm?”  
Handy (2002) addresses this matter in an article in the Harvard Business Review 
(HBR) which later appeared on the HBR web site stating, “We cannot escape the 
fundamental question, Whom and what is a business for?”.  Handy’s comment 
aligns with the views of Tricker (2011), both of whom strike at the heart of the 
debate between the shareholder and the stakeholder approach.  In so far as the 
UK’s Companies Act (2006) is concerned however, it would not be difficult to 
conclude that the overarching legal position is a fait accompli in favour of the 
stakeholder model.  As to whether that legal position is translated into actions 
and behaviours by boards of directors is still nonetheless, open to question and 
interpretation (Tricker 2011). 
Shareholder Theory   
In contrast with the stakeholder, or so-called enlightened shareholder approach, 
Milton Friedman (1970) expresses a mechanistic, somewhat Machiavellian, 
(Howell and Letza 2000) view that the corporation is an entity designed solely to 
maximise profits for those who have invested in the business, taken on risk and 
as a consequence, should be adequately rewarded.  Friedman (1970) adds that 
the actions and behaviours of agents must however be constrained to that 
allowed by law, but that acts involving charitable giving, community support, 
virtuosity and the likes are matters for individual shareholders and not for the 
corporation per se.   
Within the current legal framework of corporate governance in the UK, one may 
reasonably assume that Friedman’s view carries limited currency and has been 
effectively superseded by the weight of contemporary thinking and the 
requirements of the Companies Act (UK Government 2006a, p.S172) which that 
states, 
“A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to— 
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(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and 
the environment” 
This obligation upon directors is contextualised as “Enlightened Shareholder 
Value” (ESV) and reflects the change of direction in the UK towards a stakeholder 
model of governance (Keay 2007).  Letza et al. (2008) however, see the tension 
between the poles that are represented by an “either or model” of the Shareholder 
and Stakeholder Theories of the firm as a factor that limits an understanding of 
corporate governance and state that, 
“the underlying assumptions of existing models and regulatory frameworks 
for governance are misplaced and it is suggested, with reason, that a 
pluralistic view and framework are better than the current dualistic 
approach to provide a better understanding of corporate governance in 
today’s dynamic business environments” (Letza et al. 2008, p.17). 
In addition to rejecting the dyadic and binary nature of the 
shareholder/stakeholder debate, Letza and Sun (2004) state that a long-term 
perspective is required from boards of directors [that of necessity involves both 
step change and incremental change]; (author’s parentheses) and that 
shareholder activism should be a feature of any re-thinking of corporate 
governance in the modern corporation.    
In view of the stance taken by Letza and Sun (2004) it could be claimed that they 
have positioned themselves in an ontological position based upon a processual 
model of corporate governance that has at its basis the notion of mutability, 
uncertainty and the acceptance of flux.   
These ideas are grounded in a Heraclitean cosmological orientation that rejects 
stasis whilst embracing fluidity, an eternal sense of becoming and of perpetual 
invention and re-invention.  This notion, of which Letza (2004) is a proponent, 
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moves from the idea of governance to governing and from management to 
managing.  It also transfers the governance debate to an interpretivist perspective 
and from a noun to a gerund, thereby reflecting the dynamic and vigorous nature 
of the process that proceeds from the entitative to the reflexive and leans towards 
a mutual relationship with the firm that extends beyond the restrictions of 
ownership and contractual engagement. 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Moving away from what may be imprecisely described as “ownership” models, 
the basic premise of resource dependency theory (RDT) was expressed by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in their research related to the Tennessee Valley 
Association (TVA), in their article “The External Control of Organizations - A 
Resource Dependence Perspective”.  Bryant and Davis (2012) state that RDT 
may best be seen through the lens of organisational power that is derived from a 
multiplicity of resources that in turn combine to create competitive advantage and 
hence contribute to both resilience and survival.  They write, 
“Organizational power, from this perspective, arises from the ability to cope 
with uncertainty and minimize uncertainty for other organizations, the 
control over scarce resources, and the substitutability of the controlled 
resources.”(Bryant and Davis 2012, p.6). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view the role of the board as being dyadic in nature 
and fulfilling both an administrative function and an environmental linking 
responsibility.  The role described by them as administrative duties is fulfilled 
through the provision of expert advice and counsel to the company’s managers, 
and the wider environmental role refers to a monitoring function and the exercise 
of oversight of executive managers.  Contemporary attitudes however, 
concerning the duties and obligations of directors, would tend to consider this role 
as both limited in scope and limited in imagination (Ashraf 2012; 2013; 
Heenetigala et al. 2013; Institute of Directors 2016). 
Whilst Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) book deals with a range of topics related to 
legitimacy, control, monitoring and oversight, Hillman et al (2009) claim that its 
greatest assertion is that directors enable firms to minimise dependence or gain 
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resources.  Directors, they claim, are recruited to boards as a consequence of a 
particular knowledge or skill, their ability to lever finance or to gain entry to a 
valuable network.  Hillman et al (2009) describe the various roles of directors 
within three categories as “business experts,” “support specialists,” and 
“community influential” (Hillman et al. 2009, p.1409) with each role corresponding 
to a particular resource that a director may bring to the board either singly or en 
masse.   
Bryant and Davis (2012) emphasise an additional resource that NEDs in 
particular can provide especially “in regards of boundary spanning and 
environmental linking” (Bryant and Davis 2012, p.2).   
Mace (1971) argues that this resource takes on a special significance in times of 
crisis where the role of directors becomes “operational rather than strategic and 
hands-on rather than supervisory” (Mace 1971, p.27).  Mace also notes that 
managers frequently view such a role shift as both a threat to their own positions 
and as an unwanted interference with less than benign intentions at its inception.  
Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Managerial Hegemony Theory (MHT) exemplifies continuing focus on the internal 
roles of internal “agents” in corporate governance.  Huse (2007) defines MHT as 
a descriptive theory that builds upon the work of Berle and Means (1932) and is 
closely linked to the practical consequences of the separation of ownership and 
control.  
Managerial power, MHT claims, is based upon a multiplicity of sources, for 
example, control over board nominations (Kosnik,1987; Mace,1971), the limited 
time allocated to board work by non-executive directors (Patton and Baker 1987); 
greater expertise than that of the non-executive directors,(Finkelstein 1992) and 
the culture in the boardroom with its potential to subjugate the voice of non-
executive directors (Mace 1971; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995).  Accordingly, the 
CEO as the link between the board and senior management has the ability to 
influence the flows of information and exercise hegemonic power.  
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MHT posits that the board and its committees, where constituted, are under the 
control of managers and exist as little more than a fig leaf in order to fulfil a 
statutory requirement (Mace 1971; Kosnik 1987; Khlif 2015).  Cornforth (1999) 
argues that whilst Agency Theory views boards of external directors as one 
mechanism to ensure managers act in the shareholders best interests, in 
contrast, MHT chronicles the rise of managers’ authority in the Anglo-Saxon 
governance model and suggests that it is managers, not directors, who have the 
expertise, time and resources to influence and affect the normal operations of 
corporations.  Commenting on this assertion, Stiles and Taylor (2002) conclude 
that whilst that the board is the de jure authority, it is managers that comprise the 
de facto governing body within the organisation.  In this context, it may be argued 
that the role of the board is effectively what the CEO determines it to be. 
Khlif (2015) however, offers a more interventionist view of the role of directors 
and claims that boards with little more than an affirming role can nevertheless 
add value through advice, debate and mediation. 
Notwithstanding that the legally and formally ascribed processes offers primacy 
to shareholders in the election and re-election of directors, it may be reasoned 
that even the “slate”, a shortlist of candidates proposed for election to the board, 
is developed by managers.  MHT posits that senior management endorses and 
proposes like-minded individuals from a limited talent pool for scrutiny by the 
Nominations Committee and its subsequent recommendations for election as 
directors.  The nominees, it may be argued, are those who are unlikely to limit or 
curtail the actions of managers.  MHT goes on to aver that such directors, on their 
part, tacitly consent to be passive actors in the governance process, dependent 
on the company management for information and insights about the firm and its 
industry and act as little more than the holders of the rubber stamp.  To this end, 
Epstein and Palepu (1999) found that 87% of business analysts believed that the 
board of directors allied themselves to the interests of senior managers inhabiting 
the C-Suite to the exclusion of other stakeholders. 
This approach may be viewed as largely symbolic governance (Mace 1971; Stiles 
and Taylor 2002; Huse 2007) that has at its heart an ersatz board that meets 
regulatory requirements rather than fulfilling a substantial role in promoting the 
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success of the business, monitoring organisational change or providing 
meaningful oversight of management.  Consequently, from a perspective of MHT, 
the board’s functions are limited to such as ratification, compliance, and 
compensation.  
Despite widely differing perceptions concerning the role of the board and 
managerial hegemony Cornforth (1999) points out that “there have been few 
studies that have managed to ‘get inside the boardroom’ and actually observe 
what happens there” (Cornforth 1999, p.2). 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory recognises the crucial nature of behaviourism and seeks to 
appreciate and understand the substance and antecedents of the interactions 
between different actors within corporate governance processes and structures 
(Lynall et al. 2003a).   
The relevant and connected parties use, at times, symbolic systems and gesture, 
relational systems, routines, rituals, artefacts, garb and activities to maintain, 
support and embed the normative frameworks and rules that act as organisational 
bulwarks in guiding, inhibiting, and empowering behaviour (Marquis and Tilcsik 
2016).  
Both overt and subliminal institutional activities Scott (2008) categorises as “three 
types of ingredients that underlie institutional order: regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive elements” (Scott 2008, p.428).  Scott (2008) asserts that 
regulative elements underscore rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning 
activities whilst normative elements “introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and 
obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott 2008, p.428).  The third element, that 
of cultural-cognitive elements, emphasises the shared ideas that constitute a 
broadly accepted ontology and the structures though which and by which 
meaning is constructed. 
Building on Scott’s third element, Tricker (2011) notes the evolution of culturally-
determined ideas that over time become integrated into the corporate DNA and 
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sees the word “meme”, coined by evolutionary biologist and leading humanist 
Richard Dawkins (2006), as being analogous to the replication of genes.   
Dawkins references genes as the archetypal biological replicator and suggests 
that just as genes transmit coded information from generation to generation so 
memes act in a similar way, albeit that, 
“the details may wander idiosyncratically, but the essence remains 
unmutated” (Dawkins 2006, p.193).  
as replicators of ideas, beliefs, values and societal norms.  In view of the above, 
such memetic influences are likely to comprise sub-elements, some of which may 
be defined as constituting a cocktail of benign, neutral and malignant phenomena 
with a concomitant implication for corporate governance that monitoring and 
managing cultural elaboration both within and beyond the boardroom becomes 
de rigeur. 
Accordingly, Lynall et al (2003) suggest that by implication, 
“organizations' quests for legitimacy and the process of structuration result 
in the homogenization of organizations with respect to their most visible 
attributes (e.g., board composition)”.(Lynall et al. 2003a, p.419). 
Based upon Lynall et al. (2003), it could be construed therefore, that as board 
members tend to derive from similar backgrounds, they will accordingly adopt a 
normative mantle of structuration and a reluctance to challenge each other or the 
management (Cohen et al. 2008).  
Such convergence of attributes may not however necessarily result in efficient 
organisations and can be viewed as the antidote to diversity and the bedfellow of 
groupthink.   
Peters and Waterman (1982) note the danger of a such a homogeneous culture 
in their book, “In Search of Excellence”, and used terms such as “mavericks” and 
“skunk works” to describe attempts to create informal, counter-cultural sub-sets 
that would act as agent provocateurs in the pursuit of innovation and thinking 
beyond the prevailing norm.   
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It may therefore be argued that the culture of Cadbury’s so-called “somnolent 
boards” would have little in common with Foucault’s notion of parrhesia, the act 
of speaking truth to power, and that directors would be unlikely to transgress their 
ontological paradigm of acquiescence.  
Huse (2007) offers a systematic summary of the various theories related to 
corporate governance and in a novel taxonomy he categorises them as 
comprising, “aunts, barbarians, clans” and finally, the somewhat more prosaic 
term of “value creation theories”(Huse 2007, p.50).   
Table 3: Summary of Huses’ Board Theories  
Barbarian Theories Value Creation Theories 
Agency Theory Resource Dependency Theory/ 
Competence view of the firm 
Stakeholder Theory; Stewardship Theory Value Creation in the firm 
Value creation for external stakeholders  
Aunt Theories Clan Theories 
Managerial Hegemony, Property Rights, 
Law 
Institutional Theory and Social Network 
Theory 
Value Protection, but no value creation Value Creation internal actors and 
business elites 
Source: Huse (2007) Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side 
of Corporate Governance 
The terms relate to perspectives on corporate governance definitions and 
accountability whereby “Barbarians” are outsider actors and are independent of 
the managers; “Aunts” focus upon the formal elements of legal and structural 
board issues; “Clans” relate to social networks and the resultant social capital the 
arises therefrom and “Value Creation” refers to a Resource-Based View of the 
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board.  Huse accepts, however that these groupings are contingent on a range 
of endogenous and exogenous factors. 
The Role of the Board 
The board is a pivotal element in the cocktail of endogenous resources that 
enable the company to function and, as such, the role of the board has been a 
central theme of research in corporate governance (Zahra 1989; van den Heuvel 
et al. 2006; Khlif 2015) with the literature referencing a multiplicity of roles, here 
identified as aggregated tasks, that boards of directors undertake in conducting 
the affairs of the business and in their decision making processes.   
Nordberg (2011) states that the various roles of the board have developed more 
as a consequence of imitation rather than as a result of prescription.  This, he 
claims, has led to a wide range of roles that are “often with overlapping and even 
conflicting aims and objectives” (Nordberg 2011, p.126).   
Nordberg (2011) then goes on to specify four key board roles namely those of 
Setting Direction; Marshalling Resources; Controlling and Reporting, and finally, 
Evaluating and Enhancing.   
These have some correspondence with the taxonomy proposed by Khlif et al 
(2015) that comprises four aggregated tasks relating to what they refer to as a 
Strategic Role, a Service Role, a Control Role and a Mediation Role.  
Hung (1998), however, proposes a typology, see Figure 5, which is then 
developed in order to demonstrate six board roles, each of which pays particular 
heed to a relevant theory related to corporate governance.  Hung (1998) then 
illustrates the relationships between two competing perspectives concerning the 
board that link to, on one hand, a view that believes board actions and decisions 
are contingent upon extrinsic factors, (Minzberg 1983) whilst the opposite view 
points towards intrinsic factors as the key determinant of its decision making 
(Eisenhardt 1988).  
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Figure 5: Board Roles and Corporate Governance Theories 
 
Source: Hung (1998) A typology of theories of the role of governing boards 
 
The major theories of corporate governance described above, and the associated 
aggregation of tasks that coincide with those theories, suggest a stasis and a 
sense of permanence.  These theories are however contingent upon, and subject 
to, seismic shifts in perception with regard to not merely the role of the board, but 
the nature and purpose of the company itself, the socio-legal landscape and the 
vagaries of individual motivations reflected in a fluctuating “sitz-im-leben” 
(Donaldson 1990) that corresponds with pre-Socratic ideas of eternal change and 
becoming (Urmson and Ree 1992; Kahn 1999).   
The literature suggests that as corporate governance moves ever closer to centre 
stage in the public discourse, it would not be unreasonable to assume that both 
incremental and step changes will occur in the way in which corporate 
governance, in its widest context, will be perceived from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective, not least of which may be the introduction of universal 
application coupled with proportionality according to size and complexity. 
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Codes of Corporate Governance 
According to Cuomo et al. (2016) interest from researchers into codes of 
corporate governance has increased significantly since the early years of the 21st 
century.  They state that in the year 2000 there were no articles published in 
academic journals on matters related to governance codes, compared with 2011 
when over 100 papers were published see Figure 6.  
Figure 6 Evolution of Research on Corporate Governance Codes (1992–2014) 
 
Source: Cuomo et al (2016) 
Kirkbride and Letza (2003) state that corporate governance codes are at the 
interface between the legislative framework and company policies, see Figure 7, 
and provide a common model of best practice (Chizema 2008) designed to 
protect stakeholders and offer “openness, communication, involvement and 
anticipation” (Kirkbride and Letza 2003, p.481) 
Figure 7: Onion Model of Corporate Governance 
 
Source: Kirkbride and Letza (2003 p.482) Establishing the Boundaries of Regulation in 
Corporate Governance: Is the UK Moving Toward a Process of Collibration? 
 
According to Chizema (2008), a corporate governance code is, 
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“a voluntary set of principles, recommendations, standards, or best 
practices, issued by a collective body, and relating to the internal 
governance of corporations within a country”(Chizema 2008, p.360).  
 
Whilst Chizema (2008) defines a code as being “voluntary” and collibrational 
there are, inter alia, codes such as Sarbanes-Oxley that Anand et al. (2005) point 
out are mandatory with other codes inhabiting a continuum that varies from the 
quasi-coercive to the laissez faire.  Anand et al (2005), and others (Cuomo et al. 
2016) describe a global increase in the uptake of governance codes but note that 
in many instances, whilst the governance practice is entirely voluntary, the 
disclosure of a company’s business activities tends to be mandatory. 
 
In contrast to Chizema (2008) whose definition reflects the control role of the 
board associated with Agency Theory, Haskovec (2012) defines a code as being 
allied to institutional theory as it references the norms and mores of the thinking 
and controlling mind of the business.  He sees the board as,  
 
“a set of best practice recommendations with regard to the behaviour 
 and structure of the boards of directors of a firm” (Haskovec 2012, p.7). 
Despite differing emphases concerning the definition of a corporate governance 
code by both Haskovec (2012) and Chizema (2008), current debates related to 
both corporate governance theory and praxis in the UK and beyond, have been 
given expression via a variety of codes of practice.  Emanating from the so-called 
Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992) codification is now an omnipresent feature of the 
business landscape across jurisdictions albeit almost totally within the province 
of the public company (European Corporate Governance Institute 2015).  Mallin 
(2004) points out that the Cadbury Report not only made a significant contribution 
to corporate governance in the UK but “had a fundamental impact on the content 
of codes across the world” (Mallin 2004, p.27) with The European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) listing 96 countries as having a total of 156 codes 
of corporate governance (European Corporate Governance Institute 2015).  
Cuomo et al. (2016) however, identify the existence of 345 codes, including 91 
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first versions and 245 revisions, 174 of which were issued by European countries, 
see Figure 8.  
In addition, there are regional and international codes such as The Baltic States 
Code, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Code, The Commonwealth Association Code, The International Corporate 
Governance Network Code, The Pan European Codes, The European 
Confederation of Director Organisations’ (ECoDA)  Guidance and Principles of 
Corporate Governance for Unlisted Companies and the United Nations Code 
(European Corporate Governance Institute 2015).   
Figure 8: Diffusion of National Corporate Governance Codes (1992–2014) 
 
Source: Cuomo et al. (2016) 
Cuomo et al (2016) identify both the growth in the number of transnational codes 
as well as the rise in institutions promoting such codes from 1992 until 2014, see 
Figure 9.   
Codes pertaining to unlisted companies are still rare and carry little weight due to 
their voluntary nature and non-existent validation and monitoring. 
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Figure 9: Diffusion of Transnational Corporate Governance Codes (1992–2014) 
 
Source: Cuomo et al (2016) 
The question that emerges from the issuance of transnational codes relates to 
the culture of governance at a socio-political level, in addition to the nature of 
policies and practices in both national and local governance.  How transmutable, 
for example, is a corporate governance code across jurisdictions and across 
cultures where social practices, political institutions and religious influences 
combine to create a unique society that has ethical and moral values peculiar to 
its national psyche?   The issue may also take on differing perceptions according 
to trading patterns and scope of markets.  
Several studies have tracked the growth of codes relating to corporate 
governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Gazurra 2004; Wymeersch 2006; Nordberg 
and McNulty 2013; Cuomo et al. 2016) many of which extend beyond listed 
companies to small enterprises, family businesses and the third sector (Ansong 
2013; Durst and Henschel 2014b; The Charity Governance Code Steering Group 
2016).  
Subsequent to the Cadbury Report and following a series of iterations, reviews 
and associated reports, The Combined Code and ultimately The UK Corporate 
Governance Code emerged, (Financial Reporting Council 2014).  Above and 
beyond a core requirement of all codes, namely that of active engagement with 
current shareholders, UK legislation in the form of The Companies Act, 2006, 
resulted in the formalising of specific requirements related to the roles of Directors 
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and in so doing placed an onus on directors to take account of both existing and 
potential shareholders in line with a stakeholder model of corporate governance.   
The UK Code of Corporate Governance contains a “comply or explain” clause 
that reflects the contingent nature of the code and allows for limited flexibility 
although compliance is an integral element within the London Stock Exchange 
Rules.  Other than financial reporting matters however, boardroom behaviour 
suggests that regulatory and non-regulatory efforts may have had limited impact 
on the initiation of a change, defined by the author as an act or process through 
which a phenomena differs from its previous manifestation,  in attitudes toward 
the adoption and enforcement of higher ethical standards by boards. (Holder-
Webb and Cohen 2012; Nordberg and McNulty 2013). 
Whilst the key drivers at the inception of codes of governance were largely 
concerned with shareholder protection from corporate failure, accountability and 
transparency (Aguilera and Cuervo-Gazurra 2004), more recent codes such as 
the 2016 edition of the UK Code of Corporate Governance and The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance adopt the language and tenor of a 
Stakeholder/Stewardship model (Brennan and Solomon 2008).  The OECD code, 
for example, states that,  
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises.”(Johnston 2004, p.46). 
History and development of codes 
It was those corporate failures and the resulting chaos that gave rise to codes 
that were, according to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW), established “in response to continuing concern about standards 
of financial reporting and accountability” (Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales).  Spira (2013) supports the view that it was the aberrant 
behaviours of boards of directors and self-serving executives that prompted the 
development of codes.  Nordberg (2011) however points out that the alternative 
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to codification would have been the imposition of legislation and, as such, it could 
be reasoned that for businesses a “comply or explain” protocol would be a 
preferable option to an additional administrative and compliance burden. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argue that a dyadic relationship exists in the 
development of codes of corporate governance in that exogenous forces seek 
legitimation whilst endogenous forces seek to enhance efficiency and that, 
together, those twin drivers are the stimuli of code adoption.  Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) claim that the endogenous forces lead to governance 
codes that reflect a deficiency in the legal system within a given jurisdiction, 
whereas the exogenous forces, they aver, seek to create systems that are 
socially legitimate and are regarded by stakeholders as effective constraints and 
safeguards.  They add that the key impetus for change is however exogenous 
pressure which acts as a catalyst and facilitates change in an organisation where 
a culture of inertia dominates. 
In his book “Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View”, Sir 
Adrian Cadbury refers to the culture of inertia in terms of “somnolent boards” 
(Cadbury 2002, p.8) as being the norm during the years after the conclusion of 
the Second World War where he claims that poor performance and little 
accountability to shareholders is the default position.  It is possible therefore to 
conclude that, whilst there was more heat than light in the debate that eventually 
led to change, that change was laborious in both the conception and the 
gestation. 
The “Cadbury Committee” was established in May 1991 by way of response to 
institutions calling for more accountability, reliability in reporting and a high 
standard of corporate governance in the light of well publicised corporate 
scandals such as the Polly Peck, Maxwell and BCCI affairs in addition to 
burgeoning levels of executive remuneration (Cadbury 1992, p.9; Kirkbride and 
Letza 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-Gazurra 2004; Nordberg and McNulty 2013).  
The three sponsoring bodies of the report, a mixture of an investor association, a 
stock exchange and a professional association, respectively The Financial 
Reporting Council, The London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession, 
with UK Government backing,  asked Sir Adrian Cadbury to chair a committee of, 
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according to Seidl (2006), self-proclaimed expertise, to examine financial 
reporting and accountability and to offer recommendations on good practice on 
various matters relating to corporate governance.  These included, amongst 
others, director responsibilities for reporting performance to shareholders and 
other interested parties; the case for audit committees; the responsibilities of 
auditors and their links with boards and “any other matters”.  
Whilst the impetus for the Cadbury Report came from financial institutions, the 
Institute of Directors (IOD) and Confederation of British Industry (CBI) were only 
represented in a personal capacity despite the fact that members of both bodies 
would be those charged with code implementation post publication. 
Further committees were convened after Cadbury concluded its work, the first of 
which was the so-called Greenbury Committee that examined the setting and 
disclosure of director’s remuneration.  “Greenbury” was followed by the Hampel 
Committee that developed a combined code incorporating the work of both 
Greenbury and Cadbury.  Some six years following the publication of the Cadbury 
Report, The Combined Code was published in June 1998 bringing together a 
flotilla of governance reports and, with a staged implementation programme, 
became fully effective in late December 2000.  A key tenet of the code was that 
of “comply or explain” which, in the opinion of Dewing and Russell (2000)  
provided a “get out of gaol” card too readily.  Additional work on internal financial 
control was undertaken by the Turnbull Committee that reported in September 
1999 and that Kirkbride and Letza (2003) describe as “a watershed” stating,  
“as for the first time in all the investigations into the practice of corporate 
governance in Britain risk is specifically included and articulated”. 
(Kirkbride and Letza 2003, p.474). 
Figure 10 below demonstrates the cycle that Kirkbride and Letza (2003) see as 
linking corporate governance with risk and managing and mitigating of crises. 
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Figure 10: Linking Corporate Governance, risk and crises  
 
Source: Kirkbride and Letza (2003 p476) Establishing the Boundaries of Regulation in 
Corporate Governance: Is the UK Moving Toward a Process of Collibration? 
Turnbull appreciated the importance of culture as a factor in risk management 
and in so doing moved close to a holistic or collibrational view of risk 
management.  Pursuing the time-line of code development, Derek Higgs 
examined the effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (NED’s) in 2003 together 
with an updating of The Combined Code, whilst at the same time Sir Robert 
Smith’s committee was developing revised guidance for Audit Committees within 
the context of the Combined Code. 
In 2004, Paul Myners chaired a committee that reported after considering the way 
in which financial institutions invested in non-listed companies.  Five years later, 
The Walker Committee convened in 2009 to examine the financial crisis and the 
role of institutional investors, resulted in the publication of the Stewardship Code.  
In 2014 the UK Corporate Governance Code with its 18 main principles was 
published and remains the subject of regular review and updating. 
In spite of the growth in codification, Nordberg and McNulty (2013) suggest that 
the evidence as to the efficacy of codes relating to improved performance is 
inconclusive, yet nevertheless the ubiquity of codes is such that they are now 
institutionalised, affording at the same time, both constraints and legitimacy as a 
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consequence of adherence.  Nonetheless, despite two decades of code 
development, Nordberg and McNulty (2013) conclude that, “the goal of better 
boards remains elusive.”(Nordberg and McNulty 2013, p.349). 
Whilst the undoubted focus of the UK Code of Corporate Governance is the listed 
company, within a section of the Cadbury Report entitled “The Code of Best 
Practice” there is an overt desire to see the adoption of the code beyond its 
primary constituency.  The report states, 
“The Code of Best Practice (on pages 58 to 60) is directed to the boards 
of directors of all listed companies registered in the UK, but we would 
encourage as many other companies as possible to aim at meeting its 
requirements.” (Cadbury 1992, p.16). 
In contrast with the Cadbury Report, practitioner organisations such as the ACCA, 
(ACCA. 2015) realised that universal application of the code is unlikely to receive 
a great welcome from the serried ranks of SMEs who would be likely to view it as 
another needless and irrelevant bureaucratic intervention in its current form 
(Clarke and Klettner 2009; Gibson et al. 2013).    
Shifting its focus away from listed companies, the IOD, in association with The 
European Confederation of Director Associations (ECoDA) published “Corporate 
Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK”.  This 
Code was launched in November 2010 and includes many of the elements 
contained within the “Buysse Code 2” first published in Belgium in 2005, and 
specifically directed towards companies that are unlisted as defined by the 
Belgian Companies Code.  The “Buysse Code 2” states that in the 
implementation of the code, “Particular attention should be paid to the nature, 
size and growth phase of the enterprise” (Buysse 2009, p.7) thereby suggesting 
that a homogenous approach towards would be inappropriate and, by extension, 
unworkable and irrelevant. 
This point is further developed in “Corporate Governance Guidance and 
Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK” which places an emphasis upon the 
need for an “appropriate” code for unlisted companies and, contradicting 
Cadbury, tacitly acknowledging that “one size does not fit all” but nevertheless 
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enshrining the principle of encouragement, encapsulated in the Cadbury Report, 
rather than one of compulsion.  In a briefing document, the Institute of Directors 
states,   
“It also presents a set of governance principles that can be followed or not. 
This remains a voluntary decision of each unlisted company”. (Institute of 
Directors 2010, p.6). 
Unlike the UK Code of Corporate Governance, the code for unlisted companies 
is loose fit and there is no requirement to either “comply or explain” and the word 
“appropriate” suggests a contingent approach such that board of an unlisted 
company can modify, adapt and incorporate elements of the code as it sees fit.  
Leblanc et al (2012) support the view that small and medium sized enterprises 
require a governance regime that is neither “stifling nor burdensome” and that 
across Europe the ECoDA principles “should be implemented in a way that is 
both proportionate and realistic”(Leblanc et al. 2012, p.6).  Leblanc et al’s 
endorsement of the ECoDA/IOD principles of governance for unlisted companies 
would appear to be a positive indicator as to its efficacy.  Although there is an 
alternative and competing code developed by The British Standards Institution, 
the evidence of a broad consensus as to the value and impact of codes for 
unlisted companies is scarce and offers opportunities for further research. 
Purpose of Codes 
Codes establish processes and procedures designed to bring about a means by 
which boards of directors could effectively transact their business to a standard 
set by peers; a standard that for many would become progressively prescriptive 
albeit without the authority and consequences of jurisprudence.  It can be claimed 
that such prescriptions do however encounter limits related to the spirit, rather 
than the letter, of the code resulting in furthering the debate on board behaviours 
and ethics beyond merely the transactional and functional aspects of governance 
(Holder-Webb and Cohen 2012). 
The theme of non-statutory, collibrational governance is taken up by Haskovec 
(2012) who states that codes are “meant to begin where the law stops”.  Codes 
have been described as “soft standards” (Haskovec 2012, p.8) rather than a set 
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of rigid and prescriptive requirements based upon legislation with a concomitant 
threat of prosecution for non-observance.  The use, therefore, by the OECD and 
by ECoDA of the term “Principles” points towards acceptance of the purpose of 
a code as that of offering a flexible framework within which boards of small 
companies may operate and a benchmark to evaluate performance that is both 
transparent and meaningful (Institute of Directors 2010).  
Content of Codes  
According to O’Shea (2005) a code of good governance can be thought of as an 
implement stipulating a set of best practice policies and procedures designed to 
address defects in the corporate governance structure and to enhance the 
company’s long term success.  Although he would appear to omit reference to 
the board’s specific obligations towards shareholders, O’Shea (2005) adds that 
most codes contain recommendations, see Table 4:  
Table 4: Core content of Corporate Governance Codes 
Posture Evidence 
Pro-active engagement a strong, involved board of directors 
Composition a balance of executive and non-executive directors, 
including independent NEDs 
Power distribution clear division of responsibilities between the chairman 
and the chief executive 
Communication timely, quality information for the board 
Processes formal, transparent procedures for the appointment of 
new directors 
Openness Balanced, understandable financial reporting 
Resilience maintenance of risk oversight and internal control 
Source; Author, with reference to O’Shea (2005) 
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In contrast, and again following O’Shea (2005), the OECD Principles address five 
general areas related to governance that give primacy to the obligations and 
duties towards shareholders, see Table 5. 
Table 5: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Posture Evidence 
Externality Shareholder rights and ownership 
Equity Equal treatment of all shareholders 
Community The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
Openness Disclosure and transparency polices 
Tasks The role and responsibilities of the board 
Source: Author, based upon OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
A brief examination of each of the five postures and the associated evidence that 
supports the posture sheds light upon the core principles the code is seeking to 
promote as representing a normative approach to the effective corporate 
governance of publicly traded corporations.  
Externality – The OECD code accepts that there is no single model of corporate 
governance and that the code seeks to embrace a range of models across the 
globe.  The code is not overly concerned with internal process but has the 
shareholder and investor’s interests at its focus when it states that its purpose is 
to foster,  
“a sound legal, regulatory and institutional framework that market 
participants can rely on when they establish their private contractual 
relations” (OECD Code 2015, p13). 
This theme of externality is further developed when the code states that, 
“The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to 
its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the 
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incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of 
transparent and well-functioning markets”. (OECD Code 2015, p14). 
Equity – The OECD code is unequivocal in its view of the rights of shareholders 
stating, 
“The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders.  All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights.” (OECD Code 2015, p18). 
The OECD code devotes 10 pages to the rights of shareholders and specifies in 
detail the arrangements that need to be in place to meet the requirements of the 
code in respect of such as consultation on critical issues of strategy and fund 
raising, voting procedures, anti-takeover measures, disclosure, audit, minority 
shareholders, conflict of interest matters and capital structure. 
Community – The OECD code recognises that there are others beyond principals 
and agents who have legitimate interests in the company and as such need to be 
recognised and considered within the overall process of governance.  In support 
of this principle that embraces the stakeholder model in both a legal and 
collibrational context, the code states, 
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises.” (OECD Code 2015, p34). 
Openness – The OECD code recognises that disclosure and openness need to 
be balanced with the requirement for commercial confidentiality and effected at a 
reasonable cost to the business.  It states that disclosure requirements are not 
expected to place unreasonable administrative or cost burdens on enterprises, 
nor are companies expected to disclose information that may endanger their 
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competitive position unless disclosure is necessary to fully inform the investment 
decision and to avoid misleading the investor.  The specific principle states,  
“The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership and 
governance of the company” (OECD Code 2015, p37). 
Tasks – The role of the board and director duties are a feature in all codes 
whether national or trans-national (ECGI 2015).  The OECD code specifies these 
roles stating that,  
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. (OECD Code 2015, p45). 
The code follows a prescriptive approach in its call for directors to behave in such 
ways that would be deemed as ethical and located within a fiduciary relationship 
with the company itself.  It is also prescriptive in outlining the specific tasks 
required of directors that include reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major 
plans of action, risk management policies and procedures, annual budgets and 
business plans; setting performance objectives; executive remuneration, 
nominations and committee structure, monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance; as well as overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and 
divestitures. 
Thus, within the 54 pages of the code there is a narrative as to what corporate 
governance should look like, what it should do and how those charged with its 
implementation should behave.   There are however, a number of questions  that 
follow from these onerous requirements concerning firstly, the adequacy of the 
time allowed for (mainly non-executive) part-time directors to carry out the tasks 
to a satisfactory standard given they may work just two days a month in the 
company.  For example, The 2016 Annual Report of J Sainsbury plc shows that 
if the NEDs attended every board and the sub-committees of which they are 
members the maximum days commitment would be fifteen although the report 
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adds that other meetings with executive directors do take place from time to 
time(J Sainsbury plc 2016, p.53).  Secondly, as the board is guided and informed 
by a process that is mediated through the CEO the question must be asked as to 
how it is possible for independent directors, whose information is also mediated, 
to act as both pilot and watchman in any meaningful way? 
The OECD code mentions leadership only once (on page 29) which contrasts 
with the UKCGC  where the word leadership is mentioned eight times and is far 
more explicit in its calls for the board to provide a leadership role than is the 
OECD code.  There is a widespread view that a board without leadership is sub-
optimal.  Standards for the Board, published by the Institute of Directors, specifies 
the leadership role of the board stating, “The board should exercise leadership, 
enterprise and judgement combined with prudent control” (Institute of Directors 
2002, p.23). Nordberg (2011) describes these multiple roles as “the steering 
wheel, the brake and the accelerator” (Nordberg 2011, p.7).  The IOD adds that 
quality and integrity of an independent chairman is an essential ingredient in 
ensuring effective leadership that contributes to successful corporate governance 
in practice(Institute of Directors 2010). 
Dutra (2012) states that,  
“The definition of board effectiveness has shifted dramatically over the 
past decade. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and numerous 
corporate scandals, a director now confronts not only complex oversight 
accountability, but also personal risk and liability” (Dutra 2012, p.1). 
In research conducted to re-define board effectiveness, Dutra found that boards 
tend to progress from good-to-great along a four-phase continuum: 1) 
foundational, 2) developed, 3) advanced, and 4) strategic. Dutra uses Maslow’s 
Theory of Needs to demonstrate the move from a transactional board that fulfils 
legal obligations to board that is transformational and functions in a self-
actualising capacity. 
The literature on board effectiveness is considerable and diverse and the 
expression itself is well established in the literature as a keyword or term of 
reference. A search for “board effective*” yields 5,343 academic papers 
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published between 1992, the year of the publication of the Cadbury Report, and 
July of 2018. In theorising board effectiveness, Nordberg and Booth (2017) 
suggests that boards differ from conventional groups not only in their size 
(typically a dozen or more) which is larger than operational workgroups, but they 
have distinct characteristics.  Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that they tend 
to be, 
“large, elite, and episodic decision-making groups that face complex tasks 
pertaining to strategic-issue processing”. (Forbes and Milliken 1999, 
p.492). 
Due to the nature of the role of the board as the thinking and controlling mind of 
the company and the personal risk that directors face, as mentioned by Dutra 
(2012), the board, not only as a matter of good practice, but as a matter of self-
interest must adopt a measure of self-reflection and introspection in assessing its 
effectiveness through evaluation whether internally or externally conducted.  In 
determining what effectiveness means in practice, the UKCGC is specific in its 
guidance concerning the “comply or explain” principle.  The full requirements of 
the code regarding the criteria for effectiveness are contained in Appendix 13. 
In assessing board effectiveness, Nordberg and Booth (2017) warn of the 
limitations of relying on structures and board composition elements in 
understanding effectiveness of boards and draw attention to the social skills of 
directors as being of particular importance.  Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill (2013) 
call for more attention in research to human and social capital of directors as 
determinants of board effectiveness.  Kim and Cannella (2008) for example, 
suggest that social capital is an important factor in director selection as it 
contributes to later board effectiveness. Nordberg and Booth (2017) add that 
these are elements that are much more difficult to assess with publicly disclosed 
information.  [Having participated in some 500 board meetings, this corresponds 
with the authors view concerning the poorly understood dynamics of personal 
interactions and power politics that are ever-present within the boardroom and 
the influence of behaviours and social capital upon board cohesion.] 
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The primary duty of the board is towards the company itself although the 
Companies Act 2006 specifies a wide variety of constituencies to whom the 
directors are accountable beyond those it bears internally.  The UKCGC requires 
boards to “present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects” (UKCGC 2016, p5). 
The remainder of the section of the code dealing with accountability refers to risk 
management and calls for the board to determine “the nature and extent of the 
principal risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives” (UKCGC 
2016, p5).and to engage in the exercise of internal control principles and to 
maintain an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors, thus reflecting 
concern at the cosy relationship [see Arthur Anderson and Enron] that has at 
times existed between auditors, who act on behalf of shareholders, and boards 
of directors and who “remain the most important of the outside voices in corporate 
governance” (Nordberg 20011, p56). 
In common with the OECD code, the 2016 version of the UKCGC code contains 
references to accountability and openness see Table 6. 
Table 6: Core Content of UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 
Posture Evidence 
Section A: Leadership 
The Board should ensure long-term 
success of the company 
 
There is a clear division of responsibilities 
of the chairman and the CEO 
 
Executive directors should constructively 
challenge and help develop proposals on 
strategy. 
Section B: Effectiveness 
The board and its committees have 
appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge 
 
Formal procedures are in place for the 
appointment of new directors 
 
Directors should allocate sufficient time to 
discharge their responsibilities effectively 
 
All directors should receive induction on 
joining the board and should regularly 
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update and refresh their skills and 
knowledge 
 
Board is supplied in a timely manner with 
information in a form and of a quality 
appropriate to enable it to discharge its 
duties 
 
The board should undertake a formal and 
rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees 
and individual directors 
 
Re-election of directors tale place at 
regular intervals, subject to continued 
satisfactory performance 
Section C: Accountability 
The board must give a fair assessment of 
the company’s position and prospects 
 
The board is responsible for determining 
the nature and extent of the principal risks 
it is willing to take in achieving its strategic 
objectives 
 
Establish formal and transparent 
arrangements regarding corporate 
reporting, risk management and internal 
control principles and maintain an 
appropriate relationship with the auditors 
Section D: Remuneration Remuneration to promote long-term 
success 
Section E: Relations with 
shareholders 
There should be a dialogue with 
shareholders based on the mutual 
understanding of objectives 
Source: Author, reference (Financial Reporting Council 2016, pp.5-6) 
Whilst the essence of the UKCGC bears close resemblance to many other codes 
across the globe, an analysis of the balance of recommendations within the UK 
code reflects the various board roles of control, service, strategy and mediation 
(Khlif 2015) as illustrated, see Table 14. 
Whilst the development of codes has been on a steep trajectory since the early 
1990’s, the focus of those who devise, manage, monitor and amend the codes 
has been the large corporation.  The following section of this review goes on to 
consider the applicability and relevance of corporate governance in the small 
company with an assumption that “pret-a-porter” is neither viable nor desirable. 
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Table 7: Board roles and functions 
Role/Function Leadership Effectiveness Accountability Remuneration Shareholder 
Control Role 
(conformance 
and regulatory 
compliance) 
Duality Information 
supplied 
timely. Board 
appointments 
and re-election  
Risk oversight 
Internal Control 
Corporate 
reporting 
Determination 
of 
remuneration 
 
Service Role 
resources to 
the board and 
offers advice 
and counsel) 
 Evaluation 
Induction and 
Skills updating 
Skills, Time 
Independence 
Knowledge 
and 
experience 
   
Strategic Role 
(contribution 
based on skills 
and 
experience) 
Promote long 
terms 
success and 
contributes to 
strategy 
    
Mediation Role 
(competing 
claims 
between 
organisation 
and external) 
    Dialogue with 
shareholders 
Source: Author, with reference to Khlif (2015) 
 
Corporate Governance and Risk 
A universal element contained within corporate governance codes is that of risk 
management.  Nordberg and McNulty (2013) state that codes came about in 
response to crises that were in turn precipitated through failures in risk 
management that include executive excess, accounting and audit weaknesses 
and strategic blunders (Nordberg and McNulty, 2013) all of which may be 
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reasonably characterised as failures of governance.  Such an assertion suggests 
that the authors, inter alia, (Kirkbride and Letza 2003; Joshua and Charles 2007; 
Moore and Juenemann 2008; Henschel et al. 2012; Smith 2012; van Essen et al. 
2013; Stein and Wiedemann 2016) perceive a causal relationship between 
governance and risk and between risk and governance.  According to Ellul (2015) 
there is a death of research in this area. stating that, “significant gaps exist in our 
understanding of the risk management function and how it relates to governance 
structures”(Ellul 2015, p.2).   
Furthermore, and moving away from the quoted company, Gao et al.(2013) and 
Falkner and Heibl (2015) point to significant gaps in the literature with regard to 
risk in small companies in particular.  Falkner and Heibl (2015) claim that many 
small companies are specifically at risk as,  
“they do not – or not adequately – apply risk management practices, 
mostly because they cannot afford to rededicate resources because of 
their constraints” (Falkner and Hiebl 2015, p.123). 
Following their study of 80 small companies in the Slovak Republic, Sira et al 
(2016) argue that in spite of the resources issues related to implementation, 
“wider use of risk management in smes will decrease business failure” (Sira et al. 
2016, p.71).   
The standing attached to effective corporate governance as the umbrella under 
which risk is managed and controlled is reflected as a universal requirement 
within codes of governance and is an essential part of the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) requirements for good governance in 
family businesses (International Finance Corporation 2011).   
A sampling of the 156 corporate governance codes featured on the website of 
the European Corporate Governance Institute (European Corporate Governance 
Institute 2015) shows that risk awareness and risk management is the sine qua 
non of corporate governance that concurs with notions of best practice within 
codes pertaining to every region of the world.  The IOD stress the linkage 
between effective corporate governance and managing risk when it states that,  
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“…managing risk is an essential aspect of good corporate governance 
today. Surprisingly, however, many still fail to do so, [and] some remain 
blissfully unaware of the nature of the risks they face.”(Malachowski 2006, 
p.5). 
Van der Walt and Ingley (2008) and Belinskaja and Velickiene (2015) examine 
the issue of risk from an exogenous view and draw attention to the volatility and 
complexities of the business environment postulating that the role of the board in 
risk oversight (and management) is critically important.  Van der Walt and Ingley 
(2008) go on to identify the quintessential tasks of the board’s as being those of 
oversight, monitoring and challenging management decisions and the associated 
risks.  Raber (2003), likewise, views risk management as an umbilical of 
corporate governance, and defines it as,  
“the systematic process of handling an organization’s risk exposure to 
achieve its objectives in a manner consistent with public interest, human 
safety, environmental factors, and the law” (Raber 2003, p.11). 
Raber (2003) further contends that it is a prime responsibility of the board to 
exercise risk oversight and review management’s plans for risk management as 
an integral component of a directors’ fiduciary duty of care.  Whilst, Bostrom 
(2003), for example, moves beyond the legal requirement of fidelity with regard 
to risk oversight and stresses the necessity to embrace additional moral and 
ethical obligations, writing,  
“managing risk and corporate governance at the board and management 
level is critical.  It creates a clear message that these issues are not just 
legal requirements but ethical and cultural imperatives as” (Bostrom 2003, 
p.21).  
The UK Office of Government Commerce (OGC) also stresses the need for a 
cultural and ethical dimension concerning risk management.  The OGC state that 
a more formalised approach to risk management, see Table 8, has been due in 
large measure to a greater focus on corporate governance as a consequence of 
questionable behaviours and managerial failure. 
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Table 8: Determinants of effective risk management 
Elements Responsibility Identifier 
External Influences NEDs Robust financial controls 
Scrutiny Internal Risk Committee Regular reviews of risk 
Strategic perspective Board Risk Register/Action Plan 
Culture Board/Senior Managers Polices and Ethics 
Capabilities Board/Senior managers Competence framework 
Source: Author, with reference to Management of Risk: Guidance for 
Practitioners, UK Government (2007) 
Chapman (2013) summarises the issue stating that,  
“For any business, governance means maintaining a sound system of 
internal control….[and] the appropriate management and control of risks”  
(Chapman 2013, p.19). 
Chapman’s model (Chapman 2013, p.13) illustrates the links between corporate 
governance and risk, see Figure 11, and places corporate governance as the 
essential impetus relating to oversight and internal control, both of which are 
advocated as pre-requisites of effective corporate governance by the plethora of 
reports (Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel, Turnbull) that gave rise to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and acted as the stimulus for the production of 
codes relating to corporate governance in smaller companies.   
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Figure 11: Linking Corporate Governance with Risk Management  
 
Source: Chapman (2013) Simple tools and techniques for enterprise risk 
management  
One such code of practice designed for use by small companies is BSI PD 
6668:2000, Managing Risk for Corporate Governance, which contests that risk is 
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an essential ingredient of corporate governance adding that it is not the preserve 
of large corporations but applies equally to smaller companies.  In a multiplicity 
of risks, the standard considers reputation risk, a critical concern of small 
companies, and identifies diminishing of organisational credibility as having 
“catastrophic effects in the short term and long term”. (British Standards 
Institution 2000, p.19). 
Janney and Dess (2006) align with the BSI code and state that risk is a 
multifaceted concept containing polysemic meanings, some of which are 
appropriate only in a specific risk context that can be viewed as one of a trio of 
high level themes viewing risk as a variance, as a downside loss or in a positive 
denotation, as being an opportunity-driven phenomenon.  
Belinskaja and Velickiene (2015) however conclude that 
“risk is defined and measured in different ways  - but that one unanimous 
definition of risk cannot be offered”(Belinskaja and Velickiene 2015, p.32). 
In common parlance however, the word “risk” normally refers to situations in 
which some undesirable event may occur (Hopkin 2013).  Beyond its everyday 
usage, the word has several more specialised uses and meanings that are 
context specific within particular disciplines such as finance, insurance, medicine 
and engineering (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2011).  
The On-Line Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (OxfordDictionaries. 2016) 
however chooses to define risk as both noun and verb in that it can be either a 
phenomenon or an undertaking.   
With a lack of agreement in the literature concerning the nature of risk, see Tables 
9 and 10 that contextualise risk and offer evidence by way of descriptors to 
illustrate the diverse nature of the term all of which have relevance to businesses. 
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Table 9: Context and Descriptors of Risk 
Contents Descriptors 
Potential for harm A situation involving exposure to danger 
No pre-determination 
The possibility of an unwanted event which 
may or may not occur 
External trigger 
A person or thing regarded as a threat or 
likely source of danger 
Loss with limitations 
A possibility of harm or damage against 
which something is insured 
Positive or negative outcomes 
A person or thing regarded as likely to turn 
out well or badly in a particular context or 
respect 
Pecuniary impacts Possibility of financial loss 
Source: Author based upon OED 
Belinskaja and Velickiene (2015) suggest a risk classification that divides 
business risks into three distinct groupings, see Table 10. 
Table 10: Business Risk Distribution 
Speculative Risk Investment risk; Yield reduction risk; Inflation risk: Deflation risk: Currency 
exchange risk: Liquidity risk: Interest rate risk: Market risk; Selective risk 
Partly Speculative Risk Political or country risk: Legal risk: Operational risk: Risk of loss of profit: 
Commercial risk: Bankruptcy risk: Credit risk: Systematic risk: Export credit 
risk. 
Pure Risk Property risk: Production risk: Natural disasters: Personal risk: Civil liability 
risk: Third party liability risk. 
Source: Belinskaja and Velickiene (2015) 
Whilst their paper used trading SMEs in Lithuania as its focus, it may be argued 
that some risks are included that would be unlikely to affect all but the larger 
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SMEs and such risks would be on the outer periphery of the directors’ concerns 
when considering likelihood and impact.   
Jaeger (2010) alludes to the matter of context in determining what he describes 
as the “definitional maze that has grown up around the concept of risk”(Jaeger 
2010, p.14) and argues persuasively that within socio-ecological systems there 
are grammars that enable participating actors to make a distinction between risks 
that are “normal state” or “emergencies”.  Jaeger (2010) uses the example of a 
child cutting his sibling with a knife at dinner as being likely to trigger an 
emergency, whilst the surgeon cutting the skin of a patient is regarded as a 
normal, everyday event.  This point illustrates the salient feature of context within 
the risk management literature that is concerned with perturbations and their 
impact at differing magnitudes from, for example, a small house fire affecting one 
family to raised sea levels around the world that threaten to eliminate a 
population.  Thus, risk as a negative event can simultaneously infiltrate from the 
domestic context to a global plane. 
The Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and the Office of Government 
Commerce (2007) (OGC) both state that one common method that can be used 
to gauge the impact of a possible negative event is the product of its probability 
and some approximated measure of its severity – likelihood multiplied by potential 
impact (Institute of Risk Management 2002; Office of Government Commerce 
2007)  Whilst news media frequently use the number of killed or injured persons 
as an indicator of the gravity of an incident (Reuters 2016) or an extreme weather 
event (Leathead 2015) this may be viewed as mono-dimensional and failing to 
reflect a holistic perspective in the context of business perturbation.  
According to Brustbauer (2016), a paradigm shift has occurred in recent times 
regarding the holistic nature of risk management.  Rather than evaluating risks 
from an individual perspective, there is a shift towards a wider and more universal 
perspective –known as enterprise risk management (ERM).  The aim of this 
holistic framework is the “identification, assessment and monitoring of all threats 
and opportunities facing a company” (Brustbauer 2016, p.71). 
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Despite most risks and their aftermaths occurring within the business sphere 
being of a prosaic nature, Helsloot (2011) claims that it is cataclysmic extreme 
natural events that dominate the public perception of risk.  Fraley (2010) writes 
that for some three hundred years, tort law has included such risks as emanating 
from so-called Acts of God - events unanticipated by humans - that are usually 
applied to extraordinary demonstrations of the forces of nature in the form of 
tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, meteorite strikes and volcanic eruptions.  
Fraley (2010) goes on to state that as understanding and appreciation of the 
nature of the cosmos, climate and geological activity has changed, in much of the 
world causality has moved beyond the realm of the supernatural and of 
malevolent intent and pernicious intervention by the hands of distant, invisible 
deities.  Although, whilst Gundel (2005) views climate change as a risk 
attributable to humans, he nevertheless reverts to a non-rational posture and 
chooses to describe a tsunami as an act of a god (Gundel 2005a).  The literature 
more generally now refers to such phenomena as Natural Hazards (Krausmann 
2016) or Extreme Weather Events (Wedawatta 2010) and is deep-seated in the 
school of hermeneutic phenomenology that is closely associated with 
Heidegger’s observations on vision, distance and dwelling (Kafle 2011).  
Hopkin (2013) accepts the premise that risk is normally associated with negative 
outcomes and adverse consequences but that risk-taking in business can be a 
function of the entrepreneurial and innovative, both of  which are linked to 
optimistic and positive consequences (Hopkin 2013).  However, his book, in 
common with the literature, proceeds on the basis that a risk is a term widely 
associated with negative outcomes. 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2011) states that risk is associated 
with a decision that is reached based upon a range of probabilities that are 
known, rather than a decision made on the basis of uncertainty.  The risk based 
upon known probabilities can be described as a calculated risk and can refer to 
either a subjective probability as well as an objective component (Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2011).  It would appear therefore, that the 
relationship between the notions of “risk” and “uncertainty” corresponds with 
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ideas of “truth” and “belief” thereby making issues of risk especially complex from 
an epistemological perspective. 
High Reliability Theory (HRT) 
Smith and Elliott (2006) draw attention to a critical issue associated with the 
epistemology of risk as being that of limited appreciation of complex systems 
such as climate, ecology, technology and economics, each of which contain a 
multiplicity of variables and potential interactions that largely render them, in spite 
of scientific advances, unpredictable.  High Reliability Theory (La Porte and 
Consolini 1991) seeks to address the nature of instability and vulnerability in 
complex systems such as those found in air traffic control, nuclear power plants 
and military organisations where both process aberrance and human or structural 
failure present significant and potentially disastrous outcomes (Smith and Elliott 
2006).  
Perrow (1999), an opponent of HRT, claims that the levels of reliability are best 
achieved through the design and management of organisations where substantial 
effort is required to overcome the inherent limitations of humans through robust 
system structures.  Hillson and Murray-Webster (2007) allude to the limitations of 
those involved in risk complexity and aver that the most critical success factor in 
effective risk management is “an appropriate and mature risk culture” (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster 2007, p.xvii).  Hillson and Murray-Webster’s (2007) comment on 
risk culture lends itself to the literature concerning risk attitudes and risk appetites 
that are unique to an individual in spite of the expressed polices and processes 
of the organisation.  Their view underscores the needs to recognise the 
contribution of Checkland and Scholes (1990) to soft systems methodology 
where complexity interacts with humanity (Reynolds and Holwell 2010) and 
where a differing  weltanschauung or “world view“ prevails.   
Figure 12 illustrates those differing perspectives pertaining to a given situation 
whereby risk potential arises due to differing world views from those within the 
group.  
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Likewise, Weick and Roberts (1993) also refer to the collective mind and the 
value of connections that link distributed acivities as the way in which groups 
function and as such have the capacity to limit the potential for accidents. 
Figure 12: Differing world views 
 
Source: Checkland in Reynolds and Holwell (Eds.) 2010, p199 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) 
In contrast to HRT, Normal Accident Theory (NAT) Perrow (1999) purports that 
no matter the level of input and energy designed to prevent catastrophe, the 
characteristics of complexity are such that, despite best efforts, failure will 
eventually occur at a systems level as opposed to mishaps at the more 
ubiquitous, workaday component level of operator error or equipment 
malfunction. 
Perrow (2006)  supports NAT and is a critic of La Porte and Consolini (1991), in 
concluding that bounded rationality and group interests will prevail and thereby 
the likelihood of a systems failure will occur as close-coupling and technological 
complexity challenge human comprehension (Smith and Elliott 2006).  Perrow 
(2006) does however refer to the examples of Union Carbide, Chernobyl and the 
Challenger space craft disasters as component failures rather than as a “normal 
accident” due to managerial complacency and the remoteness of controlling 
elites in each instance (Smith and Elliott 2006). 
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For most small companies, limited resources constrain notions of high reliability 
and both normal and abnormal accident or incidents occur despite varying 
degrees of amelioration (Doern 2016).  It may be argued that whilst Perrow (2006) 
refers to accidents and risks, potential and actual, of biblical proportions and 
earth-shattering magnitude, small businesses operate within a very different 
dynamic where direct and personal consequences pertain that situate the owner-
manager as either instigator or victim, both of which may have disastrous, life-
changing downstream outcomes at the local or individual level (Pachter 2001; 
Doern 2016).  Hence risk, for the owner-manager of a small company takes on a 
close and personal guise. 
Risk Assessment 
It is at the local and personal level that Doern’s (2016) research into the 
consequences to small companies of the London riots of August 2011 highlights 
the impact of unanticipated external events on small businesses, most of whom 
had not conducted any meaningful assessment of risk and had failed to prepare 
a plan for minimising such risk and managing the aftermath, including the 
resultant psychological and emotional damage. Doern writes,   
“It has been asserted that effective crisis management planning begins 
when businesses identify all possible adverse situations that might occur 
not only in their industry but also in the greater environment (Fink, 1986; 
Simbo, 1993; Spillan and Hough, 2003; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
However, in this study, there was no indication that owner–managers had 
done this.”(Doern 2016, p.282). 
Doern’s (2016) study appears to establish a clear link between effective risk 
assessment and crisis management planning.  She adds,  
“Findings suggest that a lack of anticipation, limited experience and 
resources may have made these small businesses and their owner–
managers more vulnerable to the effects of the riots” (Doern 2016, p.290). 
From the findings of Doern’s study, Robert Baden-Powell’s simply stated advice 
to “Be Prepared” (Baden-Powell 1908, p.20) would seem to be the watch-words 
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buttressing effective risk assessment but as Doern (2016) and others (Drummond 
and Chell 1994; Bodmer and Vaughan 2009; Calabro 2009; Herbane 2013b; 
Brustbauer 2016) have established, there are operational imperatives that 
demand time and resources to meet the immediate and proximate and as such, 
planning for a negative event that may be unlikely to occur is seen as a peripheral 
matter of limited import. 
According to Hopkin (2013) such risk assessment is the core process by which 
an organisation defines how it will identify the impact of events on finance, 
infrastructure, reputation and its marketplace.  Hopkin (2013) refers to the scope 
of risk assessment as a “bow tie”, see Figure 13, interlinking the consequences 
of an event on strategy, tactics, operations and compliance. 
Figure 13: Risk Assessment Bow Tie  
 
Source: Hopkin (2013 p.55) Risk Management  
It could, however, be said that Hopkin’s model appears to be somewhat clinical 
and detached as it makes no reference to the impact and consequences on the 
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individuals involved, such as loss of housing over the shop, which in the case of 
a resource-starved small business is the owner-manager with a personal stake 
in the enterprise extending beyond the financial and the commercial. 
Hopkin’s (2013) model also does not appear to recognise that beyond an 
organisational perspective each individual has a peculiar attitude towards risk 
that relies in part on their history and background but also functions within 
perceived levels of social capital that either detracts or enhances the chance of 
positive outcomes.  
For example, owner-managers with strong networks embedded in communities 
of knowledge and support are less likely to experience catastrophic failure.  Thus, 
they have greater propensity to take risks than those whose networks are 
somewhat tenuous and fragile (Janney and Dess 2006).  
Taking a more process-based view, The Institute of Risk Management (IRM) 
propose that risk assessment be considered in a dyadic context with the internal 
and external threats overlapping in part within the four risk domains of Financial, 
Strategic, Operational and Hazard.   
Figure 14 illustrates the IRM framework for risk assessment and whilst it may be 
said that the framework over-simplifies the risk assessment process, it 
nevertheless has an appeal for small business in that the checklist approach 
provides an accessible ready-to-wear template and recognises the need for 
action-focussed tools.  Falkner and Heibl (2015) place significance on the need 
to identify risks, such as those shown on the IRM model, as a “necessary 
prerequisite for later risk management”. (Falkner and Heibl 2015 p.125) and 
categorise risks according to those most frequently mentioned in the literature.  
Risk Taxonomy 
Chapman (2013) uses a similar approach to the IRM in describing risks as 
comprising those that are related to internal processes and those that are linked 
to the business operating environment (Institute of Risk Management 2002), see 
Tables 11 and 12. 
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Figure 14: Institute of Risk Management (IRM) Internal and External Risk  
 
Source: Institute of Risk Management (2002) 
Table 11: Risk Taxonomy - Internal Processes 
Financial Operational Technological Project Ethical Health & 
Safety 
Liquidity Strategy IT Risk 
 Management 
Source H&S System 
Credit People Communication Team Recognition Work 
hazards 
Borrowing Processes Controls Optimism Ethical issues Human error 
Currency External IT Governance Tools Risk events Reliability 
Funding Outsourcing Investment Techniques Implementation Best practice 
Foreign Inv.  IT Projects    
Derivatives      
Source: Chapman (2013) 
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The comprehensive categorisation of the business operating environment that 
Chapman (2013) uses would appear to bear similarities to the PEST LIED model, 
an extension of PEST Analysis created by Aguilar in his book, “Scanning the 
Business Environment” (Aguilar 1967).   
The specific elements omitted by Chapman are “International” and 
“Demographic” but these are nevertheless incorporated within the “Political” and 
“Social” groupings. 
Table 12: Risk Taxonomy - Business Operating Environment  
Political Environmental Social Legal Market Economic 
Contracts Energy sources Education Corporate 
law 
Structure Macro 
Transitions Resource use Population Property Life cycles Micro 
Fiscal 
policy 
Pollution Socio- 
econ 
Employment  Strategies Gov. Policy 
Activism Global warming Crime Contracts Acquisition Demand 
Terrorism Emissions Lifestyles Liability Game 
theory 
Supply 
Tariffs Sustainability Attitudes IT misuse Elasticity Employment 
  House 
prices 
 Distribution Inflation 
     Interest 
     Currencies 
Source: Chapman (2013) with minor adaptions by author 
Practical application of the internal element of Chapman’s model is evident in the 
“International Finance Corporation Governance Review - The Report Generator 
for SMEs” (International Finance Corporation 2015).  This diagnostic tool 
addresses five key areas of risk in the context of corporate governance as part of  
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Table 13: IFC Governance Risks Review for SMEs 
Key Risk Risk Description Evidence Requirement 
1.No demonstration of 
commitment to good 
governance 
No tone at the top; 
Organisational structure 
unclear; Key polices not 
formalised  
Written mission and vision; 
Code of ethics; Employee 
handbook; Governance plan; 
Org. Chart; 3-year business 
plan; mgt ToRs 
2.Concentrated decision 
making and no oversight of 
strategy & performance 
1 or 2 individuals make all 
decisions; No outside views on 
strategy and performance;  
ineffective board 
Mgt Committee ToR and 
minutes; Authority matrix; 
Crisis management/ Business 
Continuity plan; CPD plan; 
Articles of Association; KPIs; 
Board Charter, papers and 
minutes; board calendar 
3.Risk management and 
internal controls inadequate 
Owner and business assets 
not differentiated; Oversight of 
controls weak; Internal 
processes flawed 
Board resolutions; 
Procurement policy; Internal 
control and risk; Regulatory 
reports; External Auditor input 
4.Financial and non-financial 
disclosures are poor 
Poor quality and review of 
financial statements; Improper 
non-financial disclosures 
Financial statements; Info. 
Disclosure policy; Annual 
report; Corporate website; 
Communications Policy 
5.Shareholder rights 
inadequate or abused 
Unequal treatment of 
shareholders in decision 
making; Family governance 
issues not addressed 
Articles of Association; 
Shareholders Agreement; 
Succession policy; Dividend 
policy; Family Council and 
minutes of meetings 
Source: Based on IFC with author summaries   
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a decision process concerning investment and investment security, see Table 13. 
In examining the IFC criteria, risk, as part of governance, is seen in large part as 
an internal issue and thus it may be argued the approach is lacking in balance by 
side-lining such matters as supply chain risk, market risk, currency risk and the 
other external risks illustrated in the IRM model and in Chapman’s taxonomy. 
Risk Management Process 
Smit and Watkins (2012) state that whilst owner-managers are fully engaged with 
the companies they operate, they tend towards heightening the significance of 
external factors, while underrating internal weaknesses.  Smit and Watkins 
(2102) conclude that owner-managers’ of small companies tend to adopt a 
restricted mind-set regarding risk processes that is focussed upon “loss control 
programmes in areas of fire, safety, security, health, and quality assurance” (Smit 
and Watkins 2012, p.6328).  Smit and Watkins (2012) add that, in many small 
companies, the risk management process is largely re-active and it is only at the 
point where a potential risk transmutes into a crisis that action is taken to manage 
and mitigate the event and in effect closing the stable door after the horse has 
bolted. 
Falkner and Heibl (2015) have also established that, based upon case-study 
research, risk management processes in small companies “may be very informal, 
which, in turn, inhibits sharing and thus also building of risk management 
capacity” (Falkner and Hiebl 2015, p.133).  Others, (Bruns and Fletcher 2008; 
Ellegaard 2008; Sukumar et al. 2011) maintain that, in particular, financial and 
HR resources are limited in small companies as is an ability to manage 
concurrent crises.  In contrast, Brustbauer (2016), finds several examples of small 
companies adopting a proactive approach to risk management (Brustbauer 
2016).  Falkner and Heibl (2015) however, appear to recognise that risk 
management practices are heterogeneous across the small company sector 
when they conclude that,  
“Thus, in the published literature, there are incidences both of rather 
informal risk management and of more formalized and proactive 
approaches” Falkner and Heibl (2015 p.133). 
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The Risk Rainbow 
Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki (2011) and Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) both argue 
for a wider and more comprehensive overview of business risk that incorporates 
a gamut of sub-sets across a range of linked literatures.  They add that “there is 
fragmentation and a lack of conceptual clarity within these literatures” (Sullivan-
Taylor and Branicki 2011, p.5566) yet it may be ventured that the analogy of a 
rainbow as a multi-levelled spectrum, concurrent, with common beginnings and 
conclusions adequately represents the inter-related nature of what Sullivan-
Taylor and Branicki (2011) describe as organisational resilience - the ultimate pot 
of gold.   
The overlapping and associated streams of a disunited literature contain for 
example, enterprise risk management, crisis management, incident 
management, emergency planning management, disaster recovery, business 
continuity planning, business continuity management, business impact, 
contingency planning, and threat management.  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) define resilience as “bouncing back from errors and 
about coping with surprises in the moment” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001 p.107) and 
contend that resilience is achieved through the application of internal and external 
resources that include such as networks, skills, knowledge, attitudes associated 
with mindfulness and perception.   
The application of these attributes would seem to accord broadly with the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm  and correspond with the findings of the 
Government of Australia publication “Organisational Resilience Good Business 
Guide”, see Figure 15, that synthesises the elements that enable a company “to 
survive a crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty” (Australian Government 2016, 
p.6). 
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Figure 15: Resource application and organisational resilience 
 
Source: Australian Government (2016) 
Crisis Theory, Models and Frameworks 
Just as crises differ according to context, so Lalonde and Roux-Dufort (2012) 
point out that, “a crisis cannot be viewed as a homogeneous concept” (Lalonde 
and Roux-Dufort 2012, p.21) and state that crisis management is a paradoxical 
expression in that “a crisis is unique, exceptional, and, a priori, impossible to plan 
or to manage” (Lalonde and Roux-Dufort 2012, p.22).  This assertion would 
appear to be stating that a fundamental principle of any given crisis is that of a 
distinctive event and as such, the management thereof can be neither 
predetermined, formulaic or exercised as a “ready meal” model.  This view, 
therefore, brings into question the validity of many of the current models and 
frameworks where the prevalent paradigm is one of advance response planning, 
to varying degrees of sophistication and intensity, in order to prevent or mitigate 
disruption. 
Nevertheless, Turner (1978) argues that, as the pursuit of rationality within 
organisations increases and the associated attempts to control complex 
technologies prevail, so rational structures themselves will produce unintended 
consequences that will be oblivious to managers due to the dysfunctionality 
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inherent within convoluted information systems.  A further paradox therefore 
emerges, in that, in the quest for rationality, the rational organisation magnifies 
the errors generated that in turn create the crises that the system is designed to 
prevent.  The corollary to this view, therefore, is that it is the rational and efficient 
and organisations that are at greatest risk.   
Perrow (1999), in his work related to Normal Accident Theory (NAT), described 
earlier, highlights the vagaries of complex technology and its associated tight 
coupling as presenting a challenge to those charged with the responsibility of 
operating a system, the design of which, leads to the inevitability of “normal 
accidents” (Perrow 1999, p.150).  Concerning crisis management, if there is an 
assumption that Perrow’s NAT theory is valid, the question that requires an 
answer relates to the role of managers in unearthing potential crises in a timely 
fashion and engaging in subsequent learning to further the incidence of reliability 
and diminish the opportunities for aberrance.  
Proposing an opposing view to that of Perrow (1999), La Porte and Consolini 
(1991), use High Reliability Theory (HRT) to portray organisations that have been 
free of accidents despite complexity and tight coupling and reference the USA 
nuclear submarine programme as an exemplification of such a system.  
Perrow’s belief is that HRT is an example of misplaced optimism; that such 
systems have been coincidentally “lucky” and that, in essence, “time will tell” 
thereby concluding that it is not a case of “if” but “when” the inevitable accident 
occurs that will give rise to a crisis.   
Fouda and Agrius (2013) in their paper on the impact of a crisis upon managers 
agree with Perrow (1999) and state that ”it will never be possible to mitigate the 
chance of catastrophes occurring” (Fouda and Agrius 2013, p.21).   
Recognising the inevitability of crises, Adams (1995) uses a homeostatic model 
to suggest that an instinctual and unconscious need to engage with, and create, 
risk will counteract all attempts to limit or prevent risk and hence, Adams (1995) 
proposes that resources should be invested in response rather than in prevention.   
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This would seem to be a counter-intuitive view that conflicts with a widespread 
understanding that supports effective planning in order to optimise resource 
utilisation.  This is particularly the case in eliciting a timely response to natural 
hazards where, for example, the USA authorities were heavily criticised for 
planning failures pre and post Hurricane Katrina. 
Hurricane Katrina and other high profile, spectacular crises, such as the Tylenol 
poisoning incident, the Challenger Spacecraft explosion, the Three Mile Island 
nuclear plant meltdown, the Deep Water Horizon oil spill and the Union Carbide 
chemical gas cloud in Bhopal have all occurred within large organisations in both 
the private and public sector and have tended to dominate the crisis management 
literature (Herbane 2015).  They have been analysed extensively in academic 
circles (and in committees of enquiry) through the lenses of a number of 
theoretical standpoints (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Smith and Elliott 2006; 
Crandall et al. 2010).   
Lagadec (2003), in common with much of the literature, addresses crises such 
as the 9/11 Twin Towers terrorist attack and the “Mad Cow” disease outbreak 
from an internationalist, far-reaching and socio-political perspective.   
To suggest, however, that in order to determine a crisis event, there must be a 
strategic and extended component would be to deny the subjective nature and 
perception of such an occurrence.   
It could be claimed therefore, that the term crisis is amorphous in its denotation 
and can be employed across a continuum of unanticipated and generally 
undesirable events encompassing at one extreme the commonplace and 
personal, such as receipt of a redundancy notice, and at the opposite extreme, 
the extraordinary effects of a widespread influenza virus for example.   
Gundel (2005), over ten years ago, produced a matrix designed to isolate the 
nature, frequencies and complexities of crises and proposes a typology of crises 
in order to enable effective mechanisms for prevention and response.   
Gundel (2005) distinguishes four types of crises; “conventional crises, 
unexpected crises, intractable crises and fundamental crises” (Gundel 2005b, 
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p.110) and gives examples of such, see Figure 16, based upon his criteria of 
each sub-set.   
Figure 16: Gundel’s Crisis Typology Matrices 
 
Source: Gundel (2005) 
As such, Gundel (2005) makes a fundamental statement concerning the diverse 
and unique circumstances that apply to each crisis – that there is no common 
blueprint and accordingly each event will in turn require a bespoke response the 
mechanics of which reside within a flexible framework.   
Gundel (2005) proposes that, as heterogeneity pervades the current, somewhat 
myopic taxonomy, an alternative to the imprecise approach to classification is 
needed that is more akin to the hierarchical model of kingdom, phylum, classes, 
order, families, genus and species that is used in the natural sciences.  
A summary of the theoretical models pertaining to crises, see Table 21, and 
serves to demonstrate that there is no dominant general theory relating to crisis 
management but rather a segmentation of the sub-elements of a crisis and a sub-
division of the taxonomic variances within the field of study. 
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Scholars propose that prior to the commencement of a crisis, it is possible to read 
the runes of an impending event and to detect the nuances, omens and warning 
signals in advance (Pearson and Mitroff 1993; Richardson 1994).  Hale (2005) 
describes these warnings signals, both subtle and ostensible, as “trigger points” 
(Hale et al. 2005) whilst Fink (2002) refers to the “pro-dromal phase” (Fink 2002, 
p.20) - the stage prior to a crisis itself occurring where an appreciation of the 
portents is critical.   
It is possible to conclude that the failure to act upon these signals, however 
subliminal they may be, is an abdication of management responsibility and a 
collapse of imagination resulting from, amongst other factors, denial and 
disavowal (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000).  
To illustrate the progress and diversity of thinking related to crises there is a range 
of frameworks developed by Smith (1990), Richardson, (1994) Myers (1993), 
Fink (2002), Pearson and Mitroff (1993) and Crandall et al,(2010) all of whom 
adopt a sequential structure that runs through a varying number of identifiable 
phases, see Table 14, (Mitroff and Anagnos 1988; Smith 1990; Myers 1993; 
Pearson and Mitroff 1993; Richardson 1994; Fink 2002; Crandall et al. 2010).   
Indicative of the sequential planning models is the twin track model proposed by 
González-Herrero and Pratt (1996) which highlights the consequences of 
planning failures 
The question the González-Herrero and Pratt (1996) model, see Figure 17, and 
other similar models raise, concerns the nature of the relationship between 
“crisis” and “no crisis” and outcome dependency and is based upon the degree 
of planning intensity prior to the pro-dromal phase.   
Can, for example, high levels of resource input lead to reduced impact and 
interruption or indeed to the complete elimination of a crisis which of course can 
never be recognised?  
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Figure 17: Development of issues with and without Intervention 
 
Source: González-Herrero and Pratt (1996) 
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Table 14: Sequential Frameworks for Crisis Management  
3-Stage 
Framework 
Generic 
Phases 
3-Stage 
Framework 
Smith, 1990 
 
3-Stage 
Framework 
Richardson 
1994 
4-Stage 
Framework 
Gonzalez- 
Herrero and Pratt 
1996 
4-Stage 
Framework 
Myers,1993 
4-Stage 
Framework 
Fink, 2002 
5-Stage 
Framework 
Pearson & 
Mitroff,1993 
4-Stage 
Framework 
Crandall et al, 
2010 
Pre- Crisis 
Crisis of 
Management 
Pre-crisis Phase Issues 
Management 
Normal 
Operations 
Prodromal crisis 
stage 
Signal Detection Landscape Survey 
   
Planning 
Prevention 
  
Preparation 
Prevention 
Strategic Planning 
During Crisis 
Operational 
Crisis 
Crisis impact 
Rescue Phase 
Crisis 
Emergency 
Response 
Acute crisis stage 
Containment 
Damage 
Limitation 
Crisis Management 
    
Interim 
Processing 
Chronic crisis 
stage 
  
Post Crisis 
Crisis of 
Legitimation 
Recovery/Demise 
Phase 
Post crisis or no 
crisis 
Restoration 
Crisis Resolution 
Stage 
Recovery 
Learning 
Organisational 
Learning 
Source; Author with acknowledgement to Crandall et al (2010).   
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In contrast to the prevailing linear and sequential approach, Mitroff et al. 
(2000) propose an “onion model”, see Figure 18.   
The outer layers or “tables” closest to the perimeter of the model are 
attributes of an organisation that have visibility and a measure of 
transparency and are accordingly in the upper levels of consciousness. 
Figure 18: “Onion Model” of crisis management 
 
Source: Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) 
“Table 3” “Table 4” within Mitroff’s onion model include the formal procedures 
and policies related to crisis management.  Conversely, the two inner tables, 
particularly the central core, have invisibility and are subliminal, yet Mitroff 
and Anagnos (2000) argue that, above all, it is these deep-seated factors that 
are often the determinants of action concerning attitudes and behaviours 
related to crisis management.  For example, one of the sub-sets within 
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“Table1” - the innermost ring - contains behaviours and organisational 
defensive routines such as denial; disavowal; idealisation; grandiosity; 
projection; intellectualisation; compartmentalisation; splitting and repression. 
It can be argued therefore, that if the core of an organisation is unstable and 
its values corrupted, then the surface-based activities such as the prevailing 
behaviours and policies of an organisation will be largely irrelevant, and 
possibly offer a false dawn, with regard to their impact upon crisis 
management. 
Mitroff et al. (1989) comment that, 
“The organization can put together formal crisis manual after crisis 
manual and issue formal directive after directive and still little of a 
positive nature will result.  At best, it will have the illusion of preparation 
and control”. (Mitroff et al. 1989, p.273). 
The clear implication of the model is that successful crisis management is a 
sectional cross-cut in which the causes - hidden assumptions, values, 
policies, programmes, and plans - are unearthed and raised to the surface.  
The conclusion drawn by Mitroff et al. (1989) would seem to align with the 
memetic and cultural attitudes that underpin corporate governance 
(Richardson 1994; Rejchrt and Higgs 2014) leading Mitroff et al. (1989) to 
state that it is attitudes and culture that are the determinants of an 
organisational status that leans towards being either “crisis prone” or “crisis 
prepared” (Mitroff et al. 1989, p.269).   
A further contribution from Mitroff and Anagnos (1988) underlines the value 
of a pro-active posture that advocates attention to early warning signals.  His 
model entitled “A crisis creation model or “Design for Disaster.””, see Figure 
19, represents the antithesis of good practice attributes.  The model shows a 
lack of attention to signals; a failing to engage in self-reflective learning 
regarding historical precedents and complacency in righting earlier wrongs.  
The culmination of these basic failings, Mitroff and Anagnos (1989) claim, 
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together with feelings of invulnerability contribute to an increase in crisis 
potential. 
Figure 19: A crisis creation model- “Design for Disaster” 
 
Source; Mitroff and Anagnos (1988) The structure of man-made 
organisational crises 
Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) move on from the internal scripts related to 
managerial shortcomings to structural matters and state that crises 
themselves are increasing in frequency due to complexity, tight coupling of 
systems, scale and scope of operations, the speed at which business occurs, 
and the visibility and transparency resulting from a ubiquitous media.  They 
build upon the earlier work of Mitroff and Pauchant (1989) and offer a systems 
approach to posit that, once again, using an onion model, organisational 
factors are the determinants of successful crisis management.  The layers in 
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this particular onion are firstly, Technology on the outer skin followed by 
Structure, Human Factors, Culture with “Top Management Psychology” at the 
core (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000).  
Chaos Theory 
The neat columns, linearity and precise geometry of models and frameworks 
proposed by Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) and Gundel (2005), might suggest 
that there is an underlying order, structure and process that seamlessly 
enables a crisis to be managed, the outcome of which is that disruption is 
limited and damage averted or contained and all lived happily ever after.  
Murphy (1996) however, offers a model of a crisis event that is the antonym 
of order.  Her paper considers the role of Chaos Theory, “the study of 
complex, nonlinear, dynamic systems” (Levy 1994, p.168), in crises and 
criticises the processual frameworks that, she claims, do not recognise the 
rapid and varying levels of discombobulation experienced during a crisis by 
actors and publics alike or the need for responses that are pre-determined, 
prescriptive and formulaic.  She writes,   
“Typically a crisis forms as a sequence of events that seems, over 
time, to gather volume and complexity with increasing speed.  Its 
dynamic therefore resembles that of a chaotic system as it iterates 
through increasingly complex phases toward a disordered state.” 
(Murphy 1996, p.105). 
Chaos Theory attempts to understand the behaviour of systems that do not 
develop in a linear, predictable, conventional cause-and-effect manner over 
time and can be seen as congruous with the postmodern paradigm, which 
questions a deterministic and positivist ontology as it recognises the 
convoluted and diverse nature of experiences and perceptions. 
Murphy (1996) asserts that chaos theory stresses that, “cataclysmic 
moments are not random”, (Murphy 1996, p.106) but rather the product of 
aggregated cacophony within the system.   
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Thus Murphy (1996) would appear to be pointing to inherent flaws within the 
organisation that amplify over time and hence inevitably generate crises 
independent of exogenous factors.  As chaotic systems do not reach a stable 
equilibrium, so Murphy’s (1996), view co-exists alongside that of Topper and 
Lagadec (2013) whose theory of fractal crises states that a dynamic event 
“does not fit into conventional references, formats or codes ” (Topper and 
Lagadec 2013, p.8).  Topper and Lagadec (2013) go on to refer to Mitroff’s 
categorisation of normative managerial responses whereby organisations fall 
prey to executive shortcomings as a result of denial strategies that pay 
homage to history and are obsequious to optimism until such time as 
managerial complacency has bred a bastard mantis that threatens or 
consumes the host.  Such is the case in many small companies. 
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Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Overview of the chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is offer a critical and systematic review of the 
extant literature with particular reference to the contingent and collibrational 
nature of meaningful, appropriate and relevant (MAR) corporate governance, 
risk and crisis management in small companies.  The review contextualises 
this study within the literature and is the basis from which the research 
question emerges, see Figure 20.   
Figure 20: Collibration Model of Corporate Governance for small companies 
 
Source: Author 
The review commences with an exposition of the systematic approach taken 
in the literature review, followed by an exploration of the nature and traits of 
small companies and the emergence of corporate governance theories and 
practices that have been formulated and subsequently developed during the 
last thirty-five years. 
The review then goes on to examine the way in which the tenets of corporate 
governance have begun to embrace a realm beyond its original focus on the 
listed company, and investigates the growth of codes of practice relating to 
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corporate governance leading to a recognition that a “one size fits all” is not 
a viable approach (Corbetta and Salvato 2004; Karoui et al. 2014; Khlif 2015).   
The review further explores the role of corporate governance in small 
companies and the coexistent areas of risk and crisis management planning 
– viewed as essential defensive elements within the concept of effective 
corporate governance (Zinn 2008; Henschel 2010; Ansong 2013; Crossan et 
al. 2015).   
The review then concludes with a summary of previous research, its 
contribution to the body of knowledge and gaps within the literature.  The 
chapter then specifies the research problem and outlines the justification for 
this study. 
Aim of the literature review 
According to Tranfield,   
“The aim of conducting a literature review is often to enable the 
researcher both to map and to assess the existing intellectual territory, 
and to specify a research question to develop the existing body of 
knowledge further.” (Tranfield 2003, p.208).    
Tranfield (2003) however, points out that literature reviews are frequently little 
more than a descriptive narrative, lacking in critical assessment and with a 
plethora of references that contain implicit biases that confirm the views of 
the researcher.  Vázquez-Carrasco and López-Pérez (2013) acknowledge 
the view taken by Tranfield and state that the purpose of a systematic 
literature review is “to provide a portrait of existing research on a given 
subject.” (Vázquez-Carrasco and López-Pérez 2013, p.3207) and that the 
researcher must utilise scrupulous filtering techniques to sift the search and 
“evaluate each related study in a critical, justified way” (Vázquez-Carrasco 
and López-Pérez 2013, p.3207).   
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The literature referring to the review process concludes that the goal of a 
review is to provide a clear, objective and critical study that summarises the 
evidence and where search and analytical bias is minimised.  Scholars are, 
nevertheless, divided in terms of the ontological and epistemological 
perspectives concerning the nature of literature reviews.  Davies et al (1999) 
for example, argue that these divergences arise as a consequence of the 
nature and traditions of particular fields of study that range from the positivist 
and quantitative approach largely adopted by science, to the qualitative, 
phenomenological or post-modern perspective adopted by many researchers 
in the social sciences where there is a “general distrust of any notion of 
objective evidence” (Davies et al. 1999, p.4).  Irrespective of ontological and 
epistemological positions, a literature review involves large amounts of 
information that must be analysed and categorised in order to enable 
synthesis, comprehension and understanding to take place.  Rousseau et al 
(2008) expand on this point and note that a systematic review involves a 
structured accretion, analysis and thoughtful “interpretation of the full body of 
relevant empirical evidence related to a question” (Rousseau et al. 2008, 
p.475). 
In the case of this study, the “question” is concerned with corporate 
governance and its contribution to risk and crisis management in small 
companies. 
Planning the review 
This literature review has three aims, firstly, to screen, evaluate, interpret and 
summarise the existing evidence related to the nature and characteristics of 
corporate governance, risk and crisis management in small companies.  
Secondly, to identify, through a comprehensive understanding of the extant 
literature, gaps in current research in order to ascertain areas for further 
investigation and thirdly to provide a framework that assists the researcher in 
positioning and contextualising new research.  
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The review follows Tranfield (2003) who proposes a three stage structural 
methodology.  Stage 1 involves planning the review; stage 2 is concerned 
with conducting the review and, finally, stage 3 relates to reporting and 
dissemination. 
Within the three stages, the literature review falls neatly into eight modules, 
see Figure 21.  Whilst the model in Figure 21 appears processual and neat, 
the reality is that the process involves differing rates of progress, cul-de-sacs, 
re-visiting, discarding, procrastination, flashes of inspiration and illumination 
as well as periods of confusion and disquiet. 
Figure 21: Three Stage Literature Review Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, based on Tranfield (2003) 
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Conducting the review 
The literature review, in the first instance, comprises a broad key word search 
of peer reviewed academic journals published between 2000 and 2017.  The 
search criteria for the first group of key words, using Boolean logic, has as its 
primary focus “small compan*” AND “corporate govern*”.  Variations of these 
key themes includes the use of operator OR with respect to “small firm*” OR 
“small business*” OR “small enterprise*” OR “sme”.  The second group of key 
words includes a mix of “risk” OR “manage* risk” OR “risk manage*” AND 
“cris* manage*” OR “manage* cris*”.  These categories are considered to be 
the most relevant and fruitful sources of quality information in the first 
instance.  The search is however, extended to journals and other credible 
sources prior to 2000 where a wider reading of the literature suggests that 
such papers, reports and publications are judged to be of particular 
relevance, of a seminal nature or of ground-breaking significance. 
A further search concentrates attention on scholarly works including 
conference proceedings, publications, and books dealing with corporate 
governance, crises and risk.  The focus of the search is that of literature 
dealing with “corporate govern*” “crisis manage* in small company*” OR 
“crisis manage* in smes”.  The term “companies” is interchanged with “firms”, 
“enterprises” and “businesses” whilst the term “crisis” is likewise 
interchanged with “disaster”, “crises”, “contingencies”, “risk” and “incidents” 
using the asterisk to include variants of the terms. 
As an adjunct to the word search approach, the review adopts a targeted 
method based upon the Association of Business Schools (ABS) literature 
ranking structure whereby highly rated journals published over the previous 
ten years are interrogated in the interests of excellence of scholarship, 
relevance and currency.   
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Furthermore, specialist journals, such as The Journal of Crises and 
Contingencies, may not however be ranked by ABS, but nevertheless provide 
highly focussed, peer-reviewed papers and as such are relevant to this study. 
At a secondary level, the search has at its focus, reports, pamphlets and 
publications from central and local government, professional organisations 
such as the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) and other august 
bodies such as the Institute of Directors (IOD) and The Institute of Risk 
Management (IRM).   
A search at a tertiary level is conducted to review articles in publications, 
newspapers and magazines emanating from trade bodies, commercial 
concerns, consultants and practitioners.  The tertiary level search also 
includes relevant articles, comment, opinion and news items found on-line 
and in media channels such as the BBC. 
The nature and dynamics of small companies  
UK-based small companies are, in common with much of the rest of the 
world, a significant element within the national economy (Hiebl 2012; Hong 
et al. 2012; Yiannaki 2012; Verbano and Venturini 2013; Vrečko and Širec 
2013; Farooq 2014).  Summarising their significance, Tilley (2000) states,  
“it is possible to conclude that small firms can no longer be viewed, 
individually or collectively, as an insignificant component of the 
economy or the environment.” (Tilley 2000, p.33). 
The extant literature reveals that within the overall typology of Small to 
Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), into which micro and small companies 
are bracketed together as a sub-sector, there is a pronounced heterogeneity 
where, for example, management style, resources, planning capabilities and 
skills differ widely between companies that vary in size from a sole trader to 
a business deploying significant tangible and intangible assets (Ang 1991; 
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Brunninge et al. 2007; Uhlaner et al. 2007b; Kohler and Deimel 2012; 
Blackburn et al. 2013; Karoui et al. 2014).  Blackburn et al (2013) state that 
those differences are evident between those “small companies” segregated 
as a sub-set within the overall SME sector.  The differences occur largely as 
a consequence of the aspirations and gender of the founder, antecedent 
attributes, prior experience, education levels, industry sector and location 
Blackburn et al. (2013).  As such, it could be argued that there is a need to 
recognise that definitions and characteristics that are frequently based upon 
employee numbers, as is the case in the UK, offer a one-dimensional 
perspective and a somewhat crude basis for analysis. 
Lobontiu and Lobontiu (2013) concur with this view and aver that a small 
business has a series of fundamental features that differentiate it from a 
medium-sized or large company.  The first of these is an absence of 
functional managers where, in many cases, control of a small business is 
vested in one person.  Lobontiu and Lobontiu (2013) go on to add that there 
are also thresholds and discontinuities in a small business that limit growth 
and capacity due in part to both restricted working capital and market 
incoherence.  Finally, Lobontiu and Lobontiu (2013) see the owners’ socio-
emotional identification with the business and his or hers’ associated beliefs, 
attitudes and values as a key differentiator between small companies 
themselves, and between small companies and their larger counterparts.   
Bannock (2005) however defines small companies in terms of characteristics 
that comprise; a small market share; managed in a personalised way and 
independence in the exercise of management responsibility.  This leads him 
to conclude that “each small business is unique”(Bannock 2005, p.7). 
Despite these differences of approach, the literature identifies a 
homogeneous trait pertaining to all small companies as being that of fragility 
and a limited capacity to withstand unwanted business interruptions (Spillan 
and Hough 2003; Betts et al. 2012; Clancy et al. 2013).  Herbane (2015) and 
others, for example, point out that vulnerability is inversely proportional to 
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size, hence, as organisational size decreases so susceptibility to adversity 
and perturbation increases (Corey and Deitch 2011a; Asgary et al. 2012).  
Despite the inherent flexibility of small companies, their widespread use of 
relatively simple technology, limited resource requirements and high levels of 
social capital, the impact of acute business interruptions can be severe and 
constitute an existential threat (Irvine and Anderson 2004; Lampel et al. 2014; 
Kurschus et al. 2015).   
A potential threat that subsequently morphs into to a business interruption in 
a small company differs fundamentally from a similar disruptive event 
occurring in a large business (Budge et al. 2008a).  In the case of a small 
company, the impact of the disruption goes beyond what might be called the 
business sphere and has the potential to impinge directly upon the income, 
lifestyle and personal assets of the owner-manager (Drummond and Chell 
1994; Bodmer and Vaughan 2009; Hiebl 2012).  Whilst small companies tend 
to be agile and able to adapt to changing and unforeseen circumstances 
(Doern 2016) they nevertheless have little slack and are resource-limited 
(Verbano and Venturini 2013).  As such, Doern (2016) concludes that in view 
of the high mortality rate within the small company sector, improving 
resilience, competence and capability in small companies is both a 
macroeconomic imperative as well as a social benefit to the communities in 
which those businesses are located.  
Definition of small companies 
Definitions vary as to what is, and is not, included within the largely 
meaningless umbrella term SME or within the “small company” sector (Clarke 
and Klettner 2009; Berisha and Pula 2015).  Scholars and practitioners use 
criteria emanating from international institutions, national legislation, industry-
derived metrics, or by a melange of measures such as revenue or asset value 
(Ayyagari et al. 2007; Berisha and Pula 2015).  This multi-dimensional 
approach contrasts greatly with the Bolton Report on small business in 1971 
that uses only employee numbers as its definitional base (Berisha and Pula 
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2015) and which continues to be the critical measure prevalent in 2018 
despite its inherent flaws. 
Reflecting the lack of consensus concerning the definition of an SME, Karoui 
et al (2014) contend that, even within the SME sub-sector of “Small”, there 
are wide disparities and whilst a measure of employee numbers within 
specified ranges is a convenient approach to labelling, it could be argued that 
a more rigorous categorisation is required based upon criteria such as, 
industry sector, finance, attitudes and governance structure.  Brooksbank 
(1991) supports this widening of criteria and proposes a mix of quantitative 
(employees and revenue) and qualitative (scope and products) benchmarks.  
Gibson and Van der Vaart (2008) however conclude that, “we are far from an 
international consensus on what constitutes SMEs” Gibson and Van der 
Vaart (2008 p.8), thereby echoing the view of Berisha and Pula (2015) and 
Tommaso (2000) both of whom concur that the typology is not a scientific 
division based on macroeconomic indicators, but rather a statistical 
arbitrariness designed to facilitate comparable performance and a common 
classification.  
In spite of the claim that the typology is arbitrary and the author’s view that 
the term SME is meaningless, at the end of 2017, the UK Governments’ 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills determines that small 
companies (including micro businesses) comprising 0-49 employees account 
for 99.3 per cent of all private sector businesses in the UK, 48 per cent of 
private sector employment and 37 per cent of private sector turnover (UK 
Government 2017a). 
However, it could be claimed that this seemingly discrete and precise 
categorisation can lead to confusion.  An enterprise, for example, towards the 
upper decile of the definition of “small” is likely to have a relatively developed 
infrastructure and internal management systems.  It may own premises as 
well as significant fixed and current assets (Pal 2013).  Such a business, one 
of which the author chairs the board, may also have external directors, 
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shareholders and investors and hence, according to Karoui et al (2014) the 
assumption of homogeneity within the sub-sector is misplaced.  Herbane 
(2010) however, notes the particular importance of the micro and small 
company sectors in the UK but does not however distinguish between the 
“Micro” and “Small” classification in his definition and by conflating the two 
groups may, as Karoui et al. (2014) argue, be failing to recognise a self-
evident truth, that the internal dynamics of a sole trader working in a garden 
shed or from the back of a van have little in common with a business 
employing 49 staff. 
Gibson and van der Vaart (2008, p.16) disagree with Karoui et al (2014) and 
adopt a collectivist view believing that it is time to move from a de facto 
merger of “small and medium” to a de jure recognition of SME as a single-
size group, or developmental asset class.  Gibson and van der Vaart (2008) 
underscore their argument when they point out that at a global level the broad 
umbrella SME classification, using employee numbers varies from an upper 
limit of 500 in the USA to a ceiling of 99 in Tanzania (OECD 2005). 
Given the assortment of approaches, the UK Government generally defines 
the size of a business by the number of employees, but does choose, in 
specific circumstances, to use revenue as an alternative measure.  The 
Companies Act 2006 sections 382 and 465 define a small company as one 
that has a turnover of less than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of less than 
£3.26 million and not more than 50 employees.  (To be so defined, a medium-
sized company must have a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a 
balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 
employees). 
For statistical purposes however, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), now known as the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS), tends to use the following definitions:(UK Government 
2006b).  Table 15 defines small companies in terms of employees and 
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therefore it is this definition that, despite its vagaries, is used throughout this 
study. 
Table 15: UK Definition of company size using employee numbers 
Micro firm: 0-9 employees;  Small firm: 10-49 employees  
Medium-sized firm: 50-249 employees;  Large firm: over 249 employees 
Source: UK Government (2014) 
Whilst the European Union (EU) states that the definition of company size is 
a non-binding recommendation, it classifies companies in the following terms,  
Table 16: EU classification of company size 
Descriptor Employees Turnover €m B/Sheet €m 
Micro <10 <2m     or  <2m 
Small <50 <10m    or <10m 
Medium <250 <50m <43m 
Source: User Guide to SME Definition 2015.(European Union 2015, p.11) 
Characteristics of small companies 
Although small companies account for a significant proportion of business 
activity in the UK and across the globe (Hiebl 2012; OECD 2015b; UK 
Government 2015a), see Table 17, research relating to small firms is 
relatively scarce when compared to that pertaining to quoted companies 
(Tommaso and Dubbini 2000; Lynall et al. 2003a; Bennett and Robson 2004; 
Torres and Julien 2005; Carney et al. 2013).   
Accordingly, there is a rich stratum to be mined in order to explore, and 
thereby develop, our understanding of the dynamics of this critical and 
growing sector. 
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Table 17: Estimated number of businesses in the UK private sector, 
associated employment and turnover (by size of business at December 
2017).  
 Number of 
Businesses 
Employment    Turnover 
(£bn) 
All businesses 5,695,000 26,723,000 3,739 
All SMEs (0-249 
employees) 
5,687,000 16,147,000 1,905 
Small and micro 
businesses (0-49 
employees) 
5,653,000 12.849,000 1364 
1-9 employees 5,445,000 8,790,000 824 
10-49 employees 208,000 4,059,000 540 
50-249 employees 34,000 3,297,000 541 
250+ employees 7,000 10,576,000 1,834 
Source: UK Government, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills: 
Business population estimates for the UK and regions December 2017 
Acs et al. (1996) refer to a speech given in 1939 by Winston Churchill when 
they choose to liken small companies to “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside 
an enigma” (Churchill 1948, p.403) and in so doing reflect and amplify the 
complex and diverse nature that pertains to small companies (Culkin and 
Smith 2000; Haugh and McKee 2004; Kotey and Slade 2005).  This so-called 
“riddle” encapsulates the personality-driven, reactive and loosely structured 
nature of small companies and whilst much of the literature views small 
companies through the formal lenses of structure, process and strategic 
orientation, researchers frequently assert that it is the influence, attitudes, 
idiosyncrasies and behaviours of the founding owner-manager that 
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determine the character and culture of a small company (Deakins and Freel 
2006; Uhlaner et al. 2007c; Lobonţiu and Lobonţiu 2014). 
Yet whilst management structures in small companies are frequently ad hoc 
and reactive (Coulson-Thomas 2007), the vagaries of unitary control in a 
personality-dominated structure seem to offer contemporaneous contrasts of 
opportunity and risk, simplicity and complexity and dynamism and stagnation 
(Hmieleski and Baron 2009).  Hence Gibb and Davies (1992) note that the 
personal goals, beliefs and attributes of the founding owner-manager of a 
small company are instrumental in establishing the culture of the company, 
its orientation and its vision (Gibb and Davies 1992).  However Gibb and 
Davies (1992) resist over-emphasising a characteristics model and propose 
a contingency approach “that concentrates not upon the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur-social, psychological, or economic - but his/her 
behaviours”(Gibb and Davies 1992, p.8).  In so doing they acknowledge that 
different types of behaviour, traits, skills and competencies are required due 
to the degrees of uncertainty and intricacies in the marketplace.   
Gibb and Davies (1992) add that knowledge and skills are underdeveloped 
in small companies and that as money invested in the business is, in some 
measure, derived from personal resources rather than from distant and 
impersonal investors this results in a parsimonious attitude towards 
expenditure that is not perceived as a direct profit-related expense.  Training 
and development may be one such example where the returns on 
expenditure are viewed as uncertain and distant when compared with 
purchases of raw materials.   
It is possible to conclude that Acs et al (1996) choose to liken small 
companies to an enigmatic conundrum as a consequence of a key 
characteristic of such enterprises: namely that of opaqueness and its 
resemblance to a black, impenetrable box.  Small companies are not subject 
to external audit nor detailed reporting and disclosure in the wider public 
arena.  Changes in reporting requirements with effect from January 2016, 
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requires that most small companies need only submit abbreviated financial 
information to Companies House in the form of a signed balance sheet 
although more detailed information must be provided for HMRC and the 
shareholders, who are in many cases the directors themselves (UK 
Government 2016).  Consequently, in part due to restricted publicly available 
documents, empirical research into the inner workings and dynamics of small 
companies is limited and accordingly a pre-requisite to empirical research 
into these enterprises is the open-handed participation of the owner-
manager. 
Research published in “The Small Business Survey, 2014: SME employers”, 
suggests that small companies display particular structural characteristics, 
see Table 18 below.  BISS survey 1,714 small enterprises, all of whom 
employ fewer than 50 people, from which a snapshot emerged regarding 
ownership, legal structure, resource management and financial performance.  
Rather than a focus upon the hygiene factors, others would stress the 
importance of the behaviours of the owner-manager and assert that these 
are a fundamental determinant of the culture and ethos of the business 
(Carter and Jones-Evans 2006; Deakins and Freel 2006; Uhlaner et al. 
2007c). 
Table 18: Key characteristics of Small Enterprises 
Key characteristics of small 
enterprises 
86% registered for VAT 71% Ltd company 
61% family owned 
Key characteristics of their 
owners and leaders 
9% work from home 33% have 2 owners 
61% with a women owner 
Recent turnover and 
employment growth 
86% level or growing in past year. 
90% forecast to grow 
79% were profitable in 
current year 
Capabilities (ability to 
innovate, export, train) 
83% had innovated new product or 
process in past year 
26% had exported in past 
year.  80% had training 
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Accessing finance 69% had not sought finance in the 
past year.  72% had a good 
relationship with the bank 
21% were unable to 
access finance in the past 
year.   
Use of business support 59% aware of LEP as a support 
vehicle. 13% used mentors 
51% sought business 
advice regarding growth 
Source: The Small Business Survey 2014: SME employers, BISS 
In contrast with the mainly quantitative data in the Small Business Survey, 
Deakins and Freel (2006, p.167) adopt an interpretivist perspective and posit 
that small firms are driven by three interrelated components of firstly, the 
entrepreneur, secondly the firm itself and thirdly through strategy, see Table 
19.  The characteristics approach advocated by Storey (2011) deals with the 
formal, objective, and visible aspects of the company but does not however 
see the axiological perspective of the owner-manager as a significant 
influence.  Others however assert the primacy of the owner-manager’s values 
as the dominant factor in determining the nature of the enterprise (Haugh and 
McKee 2004). 
Table 19: Characteristics Approach 
The Entrepreneur The Firm Strategy 
Motivation Age External Equity 
Education Legal Form Market Positioning 
Managerial Experience Location New Product Introduction 
Teams Size Management Recruitment 
Age Market/Sector  
 Ownership  
Source: Author based upon Deakins and Freel (2006) 
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Researchers find that owner-managers, whose values, “defined as the moral 
principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group” 
Collins Dictionary (2018a), are embedded within each and every element of 
a small firm can rarely be detached from the role of key decision-maker, for 
which read “owner-manager” (Haugh and McKee 2004; Kotey and Slade 
2005; Carter and Jones-Evans 2006).  Given that it is the owner-manager 
who ultimately decides upon such matters as the legal form and location of 
the business as well as funding and product related issues, it is axiomatic 
therefore that the lynchpin around which everything revolves is the owner-
manager themselves, and as Culkin and Smith state, “the heart of the small 
business decision-making unit is essentially the owner/manager” (Culkin and 
Smith 2000, p.148).  Culkin and Smith (2000) do however acknowledge that 
as the enterprise grows, decision-making and leadership will become 
decentralised and distributed as other directors and senior managers are 
appointed but nevertheless note that for the owner-manager and principal 
risk-taker, the business and personal spheres remain interlinked, see Figure 
22. 
Figure 22: Overlapping spheres in small companies 
 
Source: Culkin and Smith (2000) 
Overlapping of the twin spheres of “business” and “personal” is exemplified 
by the close coincidence of ownership and management interests residing in 
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the hands of the owner-manager (Long et al. 2005), or the cadre of owner-
managers, which, in practice, limits the likelihood of behaviours associated 
with the widely-accepted notion of agency theory (Bennett and Robson 2004; 
Karoui et al. 2014).  Hence, in view of the foregoing it may be argued that 
there is little need for outside directors to exercise the control function of the 
board.  Nonetheless, Bartholemeusz and Tanewski (2006) point out that 
there is however an agency issue within small companies that adopts a 
different guise to the traditional model proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976).  What may be called “the issue of internal agency” occurs when 
salaried directors are appointed in addition to shareholder directors and 
notwithstanding their equal status in law, a de facto dyadic relationship is 
created where the two conjoined parties may assume differing attitudes on 
matters such as remuneration, expense allowances, pension provision, 
transport, socio-economic wealth, commercial objectives and matters of 
asymmetry of information.  In particular, the question of deciding upon 
dividend distribution is a sensitive matter due to the intimate working 
relationships existing between shareholding-directors and non-shareholding-
directors.  
A further issue of overlap concerns the dual roles of ownership and control 
performed as both shareholder and director where limited liability status does 
little to protect the owner-manager who will, in either the role of shareholder 
or director in many cases, have given personal guarantees as loan collateral 
thereby increasing exposure to risk (Ang 1991) unlike his fellow salaried 
directors. 
An additional and ever-present characteristic of small companies relates to 
the issue of specialisation.  Unlike large enterprises, where specialists are to 
be found in areas such as Human Resource Management, IT, Marketing and 
Purchasing, small companies tend to be resource limited and accordingly 
owner-managers are intimately engaged, often as an enthusiastic and well-
intentioned amateur, in a wide range of activities from the mundane and work-
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a-day to matters of compliance and strategy (Culkin and Smith 2000; Carter 
and Jones-Evans 2006, p.419).  This “Swiss Army Knife” approach is the 
norm in many small companies as Kotey and Slade (2005) note that In small 
companies, owner-managers undertake “most business activities themselves 
or directly supervise the performance of these activities.” (Kotey and Slade 
2005, p.19). 
Wright and Ashill (1998) identify a further characteristic of small companies - 
that of identity, whereby owner-managers exhibit a widely-held perception of 
uniqueness that in turn can lead to a fortress-like mentality where reversion 
to personal experiences is used to resolve threats and challenges.   
Researchers recognise a further characteristic of small companies; that of 
the widespread use of support and information exchange networks in both a 
real and virtual sense (Karoui et al. 2014; Kitching 2015).  Advice and 
information is sought from a variety of sources that include friends and family, 
staff, customers, suppliers, peers, professionals (Kuhn et al. 2016) and 
bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce (London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 2016) and the Federation of Small Business (Federation of 
Small Business 2016).  Virtual networks may include special interest groups 
on Linked in and Facebook or more specialist advice from such as the Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Governance Insight Center website (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2015) and professional bodies such as The Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries (ICSA The Governance Institute 2016).  Given that 
sole directors in small companies are, ipso facto, constrained in seeking 
internal advice, it would appear that the value of formal, virtual and “pop-up” 
networks offers a potentially inexpensive and supportive bulwark to the, at 
times, beleaguered entrepreneur (Burn-Callander 2016).  
Fragility and vulnerability of small companies 
Whilst the overall tenor of The Small Business Survey 2014 is positive and 
reflects the natural optimism of the entrepreneur (Hmieleski and Baron 2009; 
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Storey 2011) small companies along the spectrum of size have significant 
weakness in infrastructure, systems and processes (Sullivan-Taylor and 
Branicki 2011; Gao et al. 2013) and are, according to Drummond and Chell 
(1994), fragile and lacking in resilience.  They state that “Of all organizations 
at risk, small businesses are the most vulnerable.” (Drummond and Chell 
1994, p.37).  Atherton (2003), also commenting on the fragile nature of small 
companies, makes specific reference to owner-managers whom, he claims, 
perceive a high level of impotence with particular regard to events driven by 
the external environment and the consequential impact created by 
unforeseen hazards (Atherton 2003).   
The literature furthermore suggests that, born from the inherent fragility of 
small companies, there is a widespread and recurring concern at the 
temporality and survival rate of such enterprises (Ricketts-Gaskill et al. 1993; 
Perry 2001; Spillan and Hough 2003; Runyan 2006; Vargo 2011; Kraus et al. 
2013; Lampel et al. 2014; Herbane 2015; Kurschus et al. 2015).  From start-
up to demise is, for many, no longer than five years (Jones 2009; Storey 
2011; Smit and Watkins 2012).  Herbane (2015), reflecting upon the business 
interruptions on the limited lifespan of SMEs and the associated social 
consequences for particular sections of society, writes, 
“The impact of acute business interruptions on SMEs is beyond doubt 
– not least given the continuing importance of SMEs in terms of 
economic growth, employment, innovation and opportunities for 
economic migrants and black and minority ethnic groups” (Herbane 
2015, p.585). 
Relatively few small and fragile businesses trading in an environment of 
complexity (Santana 1997; Perrow 1999) grow and develop to become 
medium-sized companies either through, in some cases, lifestyle choices 
made by owner-managers, or due to other factors such as investment and 
working capital limitations, (Ayyagari et al. 2007; Storey 2011) external 
hazard events or matters such as weak governance, strategy, skills, and 
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managerial incompetence (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Smith 2007).  
Highlighting what he refers to as a “one way bet” related to the high chance 
of business failure (Storey 2011, p.307), concurs with Frankish et al (2010) 
whose research into UK start-up companies and survival rates, based upon 
bank data, shows the temporal nature of many small companies,  This is 
summarised in Table 20.  
Table 20: New firm closure rates 
 Year1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Closure rate % 14.9 25.1 22.3 14.1 13.2 
Source: (Frankish et al. 2013) 
Bodmer and Vaughan (2009) further underline the fragility of the small 
company and note how the business sphere and the private sphere are 
intrinsically intertwined thereby adding another layer to an already complex 
issue when they write that, with regard to family controlled companies,  where 
crisis management planning is not a routine activity,  
“Close relations between the entrepreneurial and the private sphere of 
the entrepreneur’s life are usual and can be an additional source for 
crisis emergence (e.g. the threat of a divorce).” (Bodmer and Vaughan 
2009, p.41). 
Expanding upon the link between the business and private spheres in small 
companies, Carter and Jones-Evans (2006) state that the penalties of failure 
in such enterprises vary with the degree of personal commitment, the 
availability of other income streams or employment opportunities and the 
nature of social provision.  They stress that risk is a distinctive feature of a 
small company and that failure “usually involve[s} high personal cost”(Carter 
and Jones-Evans 2006, p.35). 
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Jones, referring to SMEs (which includes small companies) in the USA 
states, 
“The history of SMEs is one where many have gone but few have 
succeeded.  The average lifecycle of many SMEs is in the region of 
five years or less” (Jones 2009, p.3). 
In a similar view of small businesses in the UK, the RSA Insurance report 
“Growing Pains” reflects the situation described in the USA by Jones and 
states that in the UK around 55% of new businesses do not survive beyond 
five years (RSA Insurance 2014).  Likewise, Gray et al. (2013) state that after 
five years, fewer than 45% of businesses will have survived.  They add that 
“small firms are more likely to die than larger firms”.(Gray et al. 2013, p.1).  
Alluding to survival rates, a Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HCFCE) report concerning small companies situated in Dorset, a rural 
county in the UK, states that between 2011 and 2014 there were 1,988 start-
ups with 57%, (2% greater than the UK norm), remaining in business after 
three years had passed (Bonner et al. 2015).  A total of 5.8% of companies 
within the same time period reached a turnover in excess of £1.0m thereby 
suggesting that there are significant barriers relating to achieving growth 
within the small company sector (Lee 2011). 
Other researchers aver that such rates of attrition are not only destructive at 
a personal level (Drummond and Chell 1994; Bodmer and Vaughan 2009) or 
at the level of the enterprise itself, but, agglomerated have far-reaching 
implications for employment, wealth creation, supply chain fragility (Sterling 
2011) and wider society (Spillan and Hough 2003; Kurschus et al. 2015).  
Emphasising this point, a UK Government briefing document reflects concern 
regarding the resilience of small companies, half of whom have no plan for 
managing a crisis or for recovery post-crisis event. (UK Government 2006c).  
Pedone (1997) states that 90% of businesses without a plan for recovery will 
fail within two years of a crisis event.  Whilst undated evidence from the 
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website of Cross Sector Safety and Security Communications, (CSSSC) a 
national charity, asserts that commercial fire losses are on the rise and that 
85% of SMEs suffering a serious fire never recover or cease trading within 8 
months (The Cross Sector Safety and Security Communications Partnership 
2014).   
The 80% figure is referenced by Penrose (2000), citing Brown’s article in the 
edition dated 1st October 1993 “Management Today” which posits that 
around 8 from 10 businesses will fail within two years after encountering a 
crisis.  There is however little agreement in the literature, the relevant 
professional institutions and the trade bodies as to the veracity of this claim.   
Summarising the status of small companies and their tendency towards 
fragility, the literature concludes that managers default to a reactionary 
posture (Budge et al. 2008); resources tend to be scarce(Aleksić et al. 2013); 
planning is weak (Corey and Deitch 2011); and that business skills (Minichilli 
and Hansen 2007) and governance are lacking (Ricketts-Gaskill et al. 1993; 
Herbane 2010; Faghfouri 2015).  Finally, with regard to the possibility of a 
crisis event, denial and disavowal trump any attempt to embrace reality and 
to acknowledge the consequences of a crisis (Mitroff 1989; Mitroff and 
Anagnos 2000).   
Defining Corporate Governance 
Having reviewed the nature of fragile small companies, the context in which 
this research is undertaken, the study moves on to consider the definition of 
corporate governance and the issues related to both its theory and practice.   
Corporate governance (CG), the derivation of which is the Latin verb 
“gubernare” meaning to steer, is the broad term that describes the processes, 
customs, policies, laws and regulations that directs the boards of companies 
and organisations with regard to the means by which they administer and 
control their business.  It is the processes by which boards of directors seek 
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to achieve the aims and objectives of the organization and manage often 
complex relationships with a wide range of internal and external stakeholders.  
Whilst the foregoing paragraph seeks to summarise a plethora of definitions, 
amongst researchers, scholars and practitioners, there is a wide range of 
views as to the nature and scope of corporate governance.  Some definitions 
focus upon the legal aspects, (Johnston 2004) others emphasise the 
relationships of the entity with a wider stake-holding and corporate social 
responsibility (Mason and O'Mahony 2008) whilst a third stream of thinking 
on corporate governance references the internal processes as a schema 
within which the board is encouraged, or required, to operate (Seidl 2006; 
Wymeersch 2006). 
Pieper (2003) distinguishes between “goal-orientated” definitions which strive 
to determine the aim and outcomes of corporate governance whilst “task-
orientated” definitions focus upon the tasks that must be undertaken in order 
to meet the ultimate goal.  Pieper (2003) adds that within the nature of the 
tasks to be undertaken there is a dimensional aspect relating to scope that 
he identifies as being either “narrow” or “broad”, (Pieper 2003, p.3) the former 
of which are allied to a shareholder model whilst the latter is aligned to a 
stakeholder model.  Table 21 illustrates the components of task, goal, narrow 
and broad within a two-by-two matrix and illustrates the nuances related to 
definitional terminology. 
The absence of a clear and common definition of corporate governance is in 
part due to the differing national systems across a range of jurisdictions 
where corporate law affords specific and unique rights and obligations 
(OECD 2015a).  Additionally, the weight of research into corporate 
governance rests upon the separation of ownership and control in a 
distributed shareholding with principals and agents as the central actors.  
However, La Porta et al (1998) claim that this model is a rare phenomenon 
and that it is concentrated ownership within and beyond families that is the 
dominant structure.  Hence, there are structural limitations relating to 
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definitions of corporate governance that assume a model largely based upon 
the thinking of Berle and Means (1932).  Such restricted cognition has failed 
to appreciate the subsequent and developing diversity of business ownership 
structures, management, direction and governance. 
Table 21: Corporate governance orientation and scope 
Orientation                  Scope Narrow Broad 
Goal-Orientated “CG can be defined as 
how owners’ interest is 
organized and exercised 
in order to influence in the 
strategy process” (Melin 
and Nordqvist 2002) 
“CG is a system of 
structures and 
processes to secure the 
economic viability as 
well as the legitimacy of 
the corporation” 
(Neubauer and Lank 
1998) 
Task-Orientated “A good governance 
structure is one that 
selects the most able 
managers and makes 
them accountable to 
investors” (Tirole, 2001) 
“Corporate Governance 
is the system by which 
companies are 
controlled and 
managed” (Cadbury 
1992) 
Source: Pieper (2003) 
According to Mason and Mahony (2008) the term corporate governance is 
first mentioned in 1981 although Sicoli (2013) states that it is used to indicate 
the structure and functioning of company policy.  Irrespective of its 
antecedent, Becht et al. (2007) argue that, 
“the term corporate governance derives from an analogy between the 
government of cities, nations or states and the governance of 
corporations”. Becht et al. (2007, p.834). 
Whilst the early literature in this field views such “representative government” 
(Mead 1928, p.31) as an important advantage of the corporation when 
compared with partnerships, there appears to be little agreement on the 
purpose of corporate governance and the question of whose interest it serves 
in practice.  
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Despite the debate concerning its purpose, corporate governance has 
nevertheless become a commonplace term in the discourse of business 
(Keasey et al. 2005) and following the financial scandals involving companies 
such as Enron, Worldcom, Maxwell Communications, BHS, ( and more 
recently Carillion) and others engaged in abuses of corporate power, interest 
in corporate governance has grown significantly (Becht et al. 2007; Webster 
2007; Monks and Minnow 2011; Nordberg 2011; Tricker 2011).  The financial 
crash of 2008 drew further attention to matters related to corporate 
governance and triggered, according to the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC), 
“widespread reappraisal, locally and internationally, of the governance 
systems which may have alleviated it”(Financial Reporting Council 
2012, p.2).  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (UKCGC), first published in 2014 and 
previously known as “The Combined Code”, emphasises the key features of 
corporate governance as being those of temporality, innovation and risk 
management together with its orientation towards goals and positive 
outcomes when it states that, 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-
term success of the company.” (Financial Reporting Council 2014, 
p.1).  
A shift in focus can be seen from the current version of the code when set 
alongside the task oriented view of its antecedent, “The Report of the 
Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance”, published 
in 1992 by the so-called Cadbury Committee, that defines corporate 
governance in more prosaic and direct terms as, 
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“the system by which companies are directed and controlled.  Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies” 
(Cadbury 1992, p.12). 
Irrespective of its terse tone and length of service, much of the literature 
continues to use this “classic” definition offered by Cadbury (Financial 
Reporting Council 2014, p.1) although the Institute of Directors points out that 
governance priorities today bear little resemblance to those under 
consideration at the time of the deliberations of Sir Adrian Cadbury and his 
committee (Institute of Directors 2016).  A reader of this comment may well 
conclude that, notwithstanding the oblique and genteel language of the IOD, 
the underlying message clearly asserts that this definition has long-passed 
its “sell-by-date”. 
In contrast to the UKCGC, the definition of Corporate Governance proposed 
by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has at its focus, relationships and structural matters as the means of 
achieving and scrutinising performance objectives, stating that,  
“Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and how the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.”(Johnston 2004, p.11).  
The OECD does however, concede that, “There is no single model of good 
corporate governance”(Johnston 2004, p.13).   
Differing from the OECD, The World Bank posits that a twin approach to 
corporate governance is needed with the first category highlighting the lived 
behaviour of companies, their performance, use of resources, innovation, 
financial structure, and relationships with shareholders and the wider 
stakeholders.  The second category relates to the normative framework - the 
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rules under which companies operate.  Those rules derive from the legal 
system, professional and institutional practices, market directives, and local 
regulations. (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank 2005).  Referring to the World Bank’s view of 
corporate governance, McNutt (2010) describes corporate governance as, 
“more of a process and less of an obligation on individuals to perform 
in an ethical way, that is, to be held responsible for their actions by 
fulfilling their duties” (McNutt 2010, p.742).   
With this view, McNutt (2010) places the onus not upon the company, thought 
of by some as a legal fiction (Schane 1986), but upon individuals within the 
company, and as a consequence, the governance regimen is defined by a 
code of ethics and ingrained values, and not by an ethos of accountability 
and compliance. 
Millstein (2014) in the preface to a Global Governance Forum publication 
offers a comprehensive definition based upon legal and compliance 
obligations whilst acknowledging the wider stakeholder model.  He states 
that,  
“Corporate governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and 
appropriate voluntary private sector practices which enables the 
corporation to attract financial and human capital, perform efficiently 
and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long-term economic value 
for its shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and 
society as a whole.” (Millstein 2014, p.Preface). 
The Institute of Directors (IOD) reflecting, in part, the Cadbury Report, differs 
from Millstein (2014) and chooses to emphasise a prescription of managerial 
oversight, skills and ethical considerations that go beyond concern for 
shareholders alone and acknowledge that effective governance, whilst being 
multi-dimensional, does have, at its core, a compliance component,  
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“‘Governance’ means rigorous supervision of the management of a 
company; it means ensuring that business is done competently, with 
integrity and with due regard for the interests of all stakeholders.  Good 
governance is, therefore, a mixture of regulation, structure, best 
practice and board competency.” (Institute of Directors 2004, p.5).  
Given that the majority of IOD members run SMEs, this definition leans 
heavily towards the large corporation and appears to have little in common 
with the needs of its membership.  The Financial Times offers yet another 
definition of corporate governance that incorporates a range of specific 
elements, some of which reflect the thrust of the Companies Act 2006 and in 
particular pay heed to the requirements of sections 171-177 of the act with 
regard to director duties.  It defines corporate governance in terms of,  
“How a company is managed, in terms of the institutional systems and 
protocols meant to ensure accountability and sound ethics. The 
concept encompasses a variety of issues, including disclosure of 
information to shareholders and board members, remuneration of 
senior executives, potential conflicts of interest among managers and 
directors, supervisory structures”. (Financial Times 2014). 
Nordberg (2011) summaries corporate governance “in the narrow sense” as  
“the mechanisms put in place inside companies to guide their actions 
and monitor their performance” (Nordberg 2011, p.5).  
However, Nordberg (2011) adds a series of specific elements upon which 
scholars tend to focus when considering the nature of corporate governance 
– matters such as the role of the board, creating strategy, appointing 
managers, accountability and performance.  Nordberg (2011) then goes on 
to assert that a central tenet of corporate governance is the relationship 
between shareholders, who have invested in the company, and the board of 
directors who are charged with a duty of care related to the efficient utilisation 
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of the capital supplied by shareholders.  This definition, however, bears little 
relevance to most small companies. 
Durst and Henschel (2014b) agree with Nordberg (2011) in that seeking a 
concise definition of corporate governance is difficult.  They conclude that as 
corporate governance is a concept without clarity, it is preferable to use 
context-based variables to assess the optimum configuration.  Where a 
degree of homogeneity of corporate governance standards exists such as in 
public markets, they contend that an appropriate, industry-driven code offers 
a practical solution to the question of definition.  However, where no such 
homogeneity prevails, as is the case in the small company sector, a less rigid 
definition of corporate governance is required that is contingent and fit for 
purpose.  Durst and Henschel (2014) therefore propose a sector-specific 
definition in respect of small private companies and, as such, acknowledge 
that corporate governance is not simply a means of control but also acts as 
a mechanism for the future health of the business, stating,  
“the corporate governance system involves the structures, processes 
and relationships with relevant stakeholders that help owner-managed 
firms not only to control the firm but also to facilitate strategic change” 
(Durst and Henschel 2014b, p.18). 
This view is analogous to Nordberg’s (2011) notion of corporate governance 
involving a triumvirate of the “steering wheel, the brake and the accelerator” 
(Nordberg 2011, p.7) and the IOD’s contention that corporate governance 
fulfils a dual role of both “watchman and pilot” (Barker 2008, p.3).   
In summary, the UKCGC is the (non-statutory) instrument that sets the 
governance parameters to which companies with a premium listing of equity 
shares, regardless of whether they are incorporated in the UK or not, must 
adhere.  Aguilera et al (2008) point out that the text of the code itself also 
makes a clear statement that corporate governance is not about “box ticking 
compliance” (Aguilera et al. 2008, p.488).  Listing rules require companies to 
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either comply with the terms of the code or explain their non-compliance.  The 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), custodians of the UKCGC, summarises 
a definition of corporate governance in terms of a value-driven approach and 
makes clear the difference between governance and operational 
management, an issue that is particularly germane to unlisted, smaller 
companies (Abor and Adjasi 2007). 
“Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a 
company does and how it sets the values of the company.  It is to be 
distinguished from the day to day operational management of the 
company by full-time executives”. (Financial Reporting Council 2014, 
p.1). 
 
Corporate Governance in Small Companies - as one size does not fit all! 
Levrau and du Bus (2014) challenge the normative view of corporate 
governance as a valuable resource and pose the question as to why 
corporate governance, if it has intrinsic value, is largely viewed with negativity 
within small companies and suggest that it is often linked to, 
“establishing order where there is none; integrating discipline where 
there seems to be confusion; infusing fairness where there is 
egregious greed; and protecting shareholder interests where there is 
abuse”  (Levrau and du Bus 2014, p.1). 
They argue that for companies that view themselves as well-managed, 
ethical and vanilla in their purpose, corporate governance appears to be 
associated with bureaucracy, inefficiency and waste and as such, codes 
which are fundamentally designed for listed companies, and which appear to 
have failed in curtailing executive excess, offer an uninviting prospect.   
In spite of referring to negative attitudes by owner-managers of small 
companies, Levrau and du Bus (2014) present the view that there is an 
inherent relationship between good governance and the long term success 
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of small companies.  They claim that the purpose of appropriate governance 
models is,  
“not to disarm the capable entrepreneur of his/her ability to take good 
decisions, but rather to strengthen those elements” (Levrau and du 
Bus 2014, p.1). 
Levrau and du Bus (2014) see the value and contribution of corporate 
governance in a small enterprise as that of a stepping stone to business 
development and growth and preparation for the day when the capacity of 
the owner-manager will be such that a single-handed approach will not be 
sustainable and to continue as such could be a pre-cursor of failure.  They 
suggest that the output of the resource that is corporate governance will be 
“increased discipline, professionalism and long term survival”  (Levrau and 
du Bus 2014, p.1).  This statement may appear to some to be an axiomatic, 
self-evident truth, yet in spite of the advantages claimed by proponents of 
corporate governance, amongst owner-managers of small companies there 
nevertheless remains a stubborn resistance towards the adoption of 
corporate governance principles at any level (Miller et al. 2013).  In an article 
published by the Institute of Directors entitled “Why good governance is a 
must for SMEs” in its February 2017 edition of “The Director”, the contributor, 
Estelle Clark, counters the resistance that prevails in small companies 
concerning corporate governance and writes that “ it is as relevant for a 
company of five people as it is for 5,000.” (Clark 2017, p.17).  Clark (2017) 
adds that she would like to see governance in small companies to be on “the 
agenda for every company, not just those listed on the Stock Exchange.” 
(Clark 2017, p.17). 
Whilst much of the corporate governance literature is concerned with public 
companies, the vast bulk of UK businesses, both incorporated and 
unincorporated, are private companies (UK Government 2015a), the majority 
of which are small companies and sole traders.  They operate in a variety of 
guises and are registered, in many cases, at Companies House as Limited 
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or Limited by Guarantee, Partnerships, Limited Liability Partnerships, 
Community Interest Companies, Industrial and Provident Societies or as 
unregistered, unincorporated Sole Traders.  
Both the UK Corporate Governance Code and the abridged, less demanding, 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) Code are primarily designed for, and 
apply to, listed public companies.  These codes are an integral part of listing 
rules.  Accordingly, Lane et al (2006) and Saxena and Jagota (2015) believe 
that adoption of such codes by a small company would be inappropriate and 
would likely incur a burdensome and bureaucratic overhead.  Relating to 
small companies in the USA, Lane et al. (2006) pose a rhetorical question 
and ask,  
“What is the significance of these governance reforms, de jure and de 
facto, for the publicly held corporation’s distant, smaller but 
economically robust brethren – namely the closely-held, family-owned 
business?  Should these family owned entities be held to the same 
governance guidelines and standards that apply to those firms making 
up the ranks of the Fortune 500 for example?”(Lane et al. 2006, 
p.147).   
Gibson et al. (2013) and Torres and Julien (2005) likewise note that there are 
consequences of ignoring the differences between small business and 
publicly quoted firms when considering matters of corporate governance due 
to the contextual differences and the economic inefficiencies generated,  
(Torres and Julien 2005; Gibson et al. 2013).  Clarke and Klettner (2009), 
referring to codes designed for quoted companies support this view and 
argue that there is an inequitable financial burden through transaction costs 
related to corporate governance activities foisted upon smaller companies 
that creates economic inefficiencies, and that widely differing contexts do not 
warrant such an imposition, (Clarke and Klettner 2009). 
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Beyond the uncertain world of early stage growth when (or if) a company, 
having survived the pains of birth and infancy, moves through the cycle from 
“micro” to “small”, more formal corporate governance arrangements are 
however likely to feature as a matter of increasing interest to the board as a 
means of managing and mitigating risk (Ansong 2013).  The adoption and 
implementation of an appropriate set of corporate governance principles “in 
toto”, or amended if need be, can be a critical tool in creating and enhancing 
resilience, developing resources and contributing to competencies (Abor and 
Adjasi 2007).  The 2012 Chartered Management Institute survey into 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) concludes,   
“Corporate governance remains the biggest external driver of BCM, 
with 42 per cent of managers highlighting it as a catalyst for their 
organisation implementing or changing BCM. ” (Pearson and 
Woodman 2012, p.4). 
Despite the number and disparity of small companies and their productive 
contribution to the economy, there is comparatively little research into 
corporate governance in this sector (Lane et al. 2006; Uhlaner et al. 2007b; 
Siebels and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012; Saxena and Jagota 2015).   
Furthermore, Lane et al (2006) claim that not only is there a general lack of 
research into small companies but that, in particular, there is also a paucity 
of research relating to the usage and application of corporate governance 
codes within small companies (Lane et al. 2006).  
The Paradigm of Elasticity in Small Companies 
Despite the claims of limited research into the functioning of codes, 
researchers have nevertheless seen small companies as being somewhat 
homogeneous in their operating mode, (Brooksbank 1991) intuitive in their 
approach and dominated by the owner-manager (Torres and Julien 2005) 
thereby implying a universal yet informal modus operandi as to governance 
and strategy.  However, Curran and Blackburn (2001) state unequivocally 
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that this is not the case, and tacitly support the paradigm of the elasticity of 
small companies and their concomitant fuzzy characteristics.  They write,  
“Small enterprises have an extreme range of forms. They operate in 
every sector of the economy, from computer software to candle-
making and from insurance broking to instrument manufacturing.  
Entrepreneurs and owner-managers come from different genders 
and/or a wide range of ethnic, cultural and educational backgrounds 
and from every age group.”(Curran and Blackburn 2001, p.6). 
Thus, corporate governance for this array of small companies represents 
something quite different in both meaning and application compared to the 
onerous and costly compliance requirements and standardised obligations of 
large organisations and the associated implications of agency theory (Pieper 
2003; Gibson et al. 2013).  Contingency theory proponents such as Aguilera 
et al (2008) and Uhlaner et al (2007) argue however that the governance 
regime for any given entity needs to be appropriate and relevant to both its 
circumstances and context (Uhlaner et al. 2007b).  Uhlaner et al (2007) also 
point out that there are few formal contracts in small companies and that 
social control behaviour amongst directors and managers is prevalent.  
Hence they propose that governance procedures are based around 
stewardship assumptions rather than exercised through an alternative, 
prescriptive model (Uhlaner et al. 2007c).   
Relationships and Socio-Economic Wealth 
Vandekerkhof et al (2011) lend weight to the argument proffered by Uhlaner 
et al (2007) when they state that small businesses, and especially family 
firms, display normative isomorphism as a consequence of intimate 
relationships and, as such, the relevance of formal corporate governance 
such as that propounded across codes is diminished.  Vandekerkhof et al 
(2011) however, point out that as the business grows and outside managers 
are recruited, so the significance of personal relationships and socio-
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economic wealth diminishes as professionalism takes on the mantle of 
moderator and hence a new and more structured corporate governance 
paradigm emerges.  Yet, preferring relevance and relationships to rigidity, 
Durst and Henschel (2014b) argue for a definition of corporate governance 
that is fit for purpose with regard to small companies and call attention to the 
danger of using concepts of corporate governance related to large 
corporations.  Durst and Henschel (2014) then go on to define corporate 
governance in small companies as a system that, 
“involves the structures, processes and relationships with relevant 
stakeholders that help owner-managed firms not only to control the 
firm but also to facilitate strategic change” (Durst and Henschel 2014b, 
p.18). 
Stressing the need for a pro-active engagement in corporate  governance 
practices in small companies, Saxena and Jagota (2015) believe that 
“governance is critical for smaller firms” (Saxena and Jagota 2015, p.55).  
However, other researchers challenge this view and claim that empirical 
evidence has failed to confirm that in family controlled small businesses in 
particular, there is a positive impact on performance as a consequence of 
good corporate governance (Seidl 2006) . Researchers point to the distinctive 
characteristics of small, family-controlled companies that differ from those of 
managerial-controlled small companies (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Chrisman 
et al. 2013) where, in the former, the importance of socio-economic wealth 
establishes legitimacy and can override the goal of economic gain. 
 
Risk Management in Small Companies 
Evidence from the literature strongly suggests that both the creation and 
management of a small company carries with it considerable risk and as 
such, there is a widespread and repeated consensus concerning the 
likelihood of business failure due to the inherent fragility of small companies 
(Ricketts-Gaskill et al. 1993; Perry 2001; Spillan and Hough 2003; Runyan 
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2006; Vargo 2011; Kraus et al. 2013; Lampel et al. 2014; Kurschus et al. 
2015) where from inception to demise is, for many, no longer than five years 
(Jones 2009).  Therefore, the question that such fragility raises is concerned 
with causality; it asks why and how unforeseen risks become a reality that 
precipitates a crisis which in turn leads to disruption and the potential demise 
of the business. 
In what may be considered as a dismal and depressing comment on the 
resilience and longevity of small companies, Jones, referring to SMEs in the 
USA states, 
“The history of SMEs is one where many have gone but few have 
succeeded.  The average lifecycle of many SMEs is in the region of 
five years or less.” (Jones 2009, p.3). 
Expressing a similar view of small businesses in the UK, the RSA Insurance 
report “Growing Pains” reflects the situation described in the USA by Jones 
(2009) and states that “in the UK the majority (55%) of new businesses don’t 
survive beyond five years”. (RSA Insurance 2014, p.7).   
More recently, in the foreword of the report “Success in challenging times: 
Key lessons for UK SMEs”, Gray et al. (2012), state that, “Put simply, small 
firms are more likely to die than larger firms” (Gray et al. 2012, p.6). 
In common with the work of Gray et al, (2016) a report from the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) concerning Dorset-based 
SMEs (Bonner et al. 2015) states that between 2011 and 2014 there were 
1,988 start-ups with 57%, (2% greater than the UK norm), remaining in 
business after three years had passed.  Other researchers (Drummond and 
Chell 1994; Bodmer and Vaughan 2009) aver that such rates of attrition are 
not only destructive at a personal level or at the level of the enterprise itself, 
but agglomerated, have far-reaching implications for employment, wealth 
creation, supply chain fragility (Sterling 2011) and wider society (Spillan and 
Hough 2003; Kurschus et al. 2015).   
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Researchers studying business failure from an organisational perspective, 
generally argue that firms fail as a direct consequence of poor management 
decisions when faced with unanticipated events occurring in the external 
environment (Williams 2014) rather than the exogenous factors per se.  Thus, 
the corollary to this premise is one of an internal management failure that 
may be attributable in part to an “information underload” (Bornstein 2007, 
p.40) and a subsequent failure to interpret and act upon that information. 
In contrast with this view of failure as a function of internal disruption, others 
attribute causality to the volatility of a turbulent external environment that 
creates unbearable pressure on the firm resulting in its collapse (Zou and 
Stan 1998).  Using the Schumpeter’s thesis of creative destruction, it may be 
argued that environmental turbulence emanating from technological change, 
economic or geo-political upheaval, legal and socio-economic mutations [see 
Aguilar (1967) PEST LIED analytical tool for wider application] are factors 
over which managers have little or no control and hence challenge the firm’s 
assumptions and plans, leading to its ultimate failure.  
Williams (2014) claims that these opposing schools may be reconciled 
through an analysis of business failure using the lens of the RBV of the firm 
that posits, once a firm has acquired resources that are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable such resources will confer competitive 
advantage that, in turn, will ensure the survival of the firm (Barney 1991).  
Hillman et al (2009), in their review of resource dependency theory, point out 
that resources however, are not only restricted to the internal operations of a 
company but can be found in the external environment.  Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) with extensive social networks and resultant significant 
social capital that could be utilised to enhance as well as protect the interests 
of the business serve as one such example of an external resource (Long et 
al. 2005; Clarysse et al. 2007).  Membership of, and engagement with, trade 
and professional organisations could represent a further external resource 
with the potential to offer valued information and contacts (Uhlaner et al. 
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2007c; Gao et al. 2013) although in their study of Greek farmers Koutsou and 
Vounuki (2012) found a prevalence of insular attitudes and a reluctance to 
participate with the role of the network broker being a crucial factor in 
fostering involvement.   
From the literature, it could be claimed that once resources are not 
considered primarily as pertaining to the internal assets of the firm, the 
resource-based view of the firm could reconcile both perceptions as to the 
causes of business failure.  From the analyses conducted by Lobontiu and 
Lobontiu (2014) relating to the predominance of tasks carried out by the 
owner-manager, the evidence points towards that key individual as a multi-
functional resource and as such, in the event of demise or extended absence, 
such resource concentration could represent a threat to the business.  
Therefore, axiomatic to this issue is an imperative to ensure that a collective 
management team is functional. 
However, the evidence that emerges from the literature points 
unambiguously towards a widespread failure in small companies to introduce 
an appropriate governance regime; to analyse, consider and take 
preventative actions to minimise the risks faced and to prepare and test a 
crisis management plan (Gerber and Feldman 2002; Hough and Spillan 
2005a; Budge et al. 2008a; Herbane 2013b).  
Gumbs and Qian (2012) summarise the relationship between corporate 
governance, risk and crisis management and refer to failures in risk and crisis 
management.  These failures, they claim, have heightened the attention 
given to risk and crisis management plans.  They add that, in considering risk 
management, a company should adopt a holistic approach that incorporates 
risk management into its governance, and operational structure.  They 
conclude that risks such as a product recall, loss of data, sudden illness or a 
natural event illustrate the interaction between risk and crisis management.   
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“A crisis is a risk that materializes and that has significant operational, 
financial, and reputational consequences.  Where risk management is 
largely about identifying and managing risks, crisis management is a 
unique, distinctive concept that relates to the process by which 
companies prepare for crises before they occur and manage them 
when they do occur.” (Gumbs and Qian 2012, p.6). 
Fouda et al. (2013) like both Gumbs and Qian (2012) and Borodzicz (2005) 
acknowledge that a crisis together with its managerial implications and 
offshoots is associated with a comprehensive risk management policy when 
they write that “Crisis is also a facet of Risk Management” (Fouda and Agrius 
2013, p.21), echoing the earlier Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Collibration Model of Corporate Governance for small companies 
 
Source: Author 
Sapriel (2003) illustrates this point in greater detail using modular step 
linkages between risk and crisis management, see Figure 23 overleaf, and 
employs a step-stage model to assess the level of crisis capability and 
preparedness (see also Mitroff and Anagnos 2000).   
This shows a set of risk management activities occurring below the line in the 
role of pre-liminal underpinning, together with a further sub-strata involving 
constant issue monitoring of the internal and external environments.   
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In a tip of the hat to sedimentation theory the model also shows the overlay 
of managerial activity. 
 
Crisis Management 
Figure 23: Risk and Crisis Management Process 
 
Source: Sapriel (2003)  
Sapriel (2003) concludes that risk and crisis management must be 
institutionalised as a key business function and “embedded into the 
organisation’s corporate management system” (Sapriel 2003, p.2).  Whilst 
Sapriel (2003) chooses to use the term “corporate management system”, 
Stein and Wiedemann (2016) propose a clear differentiation between risk 
management and risk governance and suggest that, “Risk governance 
bridges corporate governance and risk management”(Stein and Wiedemann 
2016, p.1).   
Stein and Wiedemann (2016) make the point that risk management is 
expanding from its origins in finance and now incorporates a diverse range 
of managerial and behavioural perspectives concerning risks.  Consequently, 
they argue, a more universal view is needed that is akin to Enterprise Risk 
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Management (ERM) whereby risk management and risk governance are 
integrated and where ERM contributes to improved governance of the risk 
management system itself. 
This is an area where further research would help to clarify the conceptual 
understanding and interrelatedness of corporate governance and risk that 
extends the notion of risk oversight as a function of corporate governance 
that is delegated to management for executive action rather than it be seen 
as an integrated close-coupled and holistic system that permeates the 
organisation throughout. 
In spite of the most sophisticated risk management policies and procedures, 
organisations are likely, at some stage, to face a crisis where an event occurs 
that circumvents systems, that vary from the complex to the rudimentary, that 
are designed to eliminate such a possibility (Borodzicz 2005).  Such crisis 
events are not infrequent occurrences and can create significant financial, 
commercial and reputational damage.  For example, in 2016 alone, high 
profile cases appearing in the media include the VW emissions scandal 
(Magee 2016); Samsung’s new phone igniting (Solon 2016); the corruption 
uncovered in world football’s governing body, FIFA (Critchley 2016; Willgress 
2016); the fine imposed for data breaches in Talk-Talk (Willgress 2016), and 
the treatment of workers at Sports Direct (Goodley 2016). 
Due to the nature of the incidents and the stature of the those involved, the 
organisations in question face not only an internal operational crisis but are 
subject to media scrutiny, wide public condemnation and reduction in value 
(Shadbolt 2016).  It is at this stage where much of the literature maintains 
that a planned response to the crisis is required and as Paraskevas (2006) 
argues, the question of crisis response is a topic that within the crisis 
management literature has received little attention.  Bernstein (2017) 
summarises the contribution of pre-crisis denial to reputation and states on 
his website that, 
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“No person, no organization, has a reputation so fine it is immune to 
reputation threats from within or without.  The arrogance inherent in 
denying this reality has been a major contributing factor to 
innumerable crises.”(Bernstein 2017). 
Definition of a Crisis 
The On-Line Oxford Dictionary defines a crisis as “a time of intense difficulty 
or danger” and “a time when a difficult or important decision must be made” 
(OxfordDictionaries. 2016) thereby furthering the notion of great pressure 
coupled with a significant threat that requires weighty action.  The word crisis 
has its roots in the Greek word “krisis” meaning a judgement, choice or 
decision.  The meaning varies depending upon the context and the academic 
discipline within which the term is used (Preble 1997).  Whilst the trope is 
entrenched in mythological lore concerning re-birth and renewal such as the 
phoenix arising from the ashes, it is likewise etched in language.  The original 
ancient Greek word "krisis" also translates into “opportunity”.  In 2009, the 
White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel was reported in “The Daily 
Telegraph” as commenting to such effect stating that "You never want a 
serious crisis to go to waste: [it's] an opportunity" (Conway 2009).  Although 
the preponderance of literature views a crisis as a negative event, Ouedraogo 
and Boyer (2012) in their work on small companies suggest that, on the basis 
of “what does not kill you makes you stronger”, a crisis can be a spur to 
enhanced resilience and an event upon which companies can capitalise as, 
[“or if” - authors text], they emerge from the turbulence they have 
weathered.(Asgary et al. 2012; Ouedraogo and Boyer 2012). 
James A Robinson (1968) chooses to dismiss the idea of attempting to define 
“crisis” and opines that “Crisis is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning” 
(Robinson 1968, p.510).  Topper and Lagadec (2013) concur and conclude 
that seeking a definition is akin to chasing shadows and state, 
159 
 
“In essence, crisis is, and will remain, a wild and maverick reality, 
impossible to understand and grasp within frameworks shaped and 
built and stamped to contain stable and repeated 
phenomena.”(Topper and Lagadec 2013, p.8). 
Topper and Lagadec (2013) go on to aver that the constant quest to deliver 
a typology concerning a stochastic phenomenon is an erroneous objective 
and appear to advise scholars to avoid imprisoning themselves inside gaols 
without walls.  They state, 
“To insist therefore on agreement as a pre-condition for studying ill-
structured problems, is to ignore and to deny their basic nature.  It is 
to misinterpret them ontologically.” (Topper and Lagadec 2013, p.8). 
The scholars who are dismissive of prescriptive definitions of a crisis would 
appear to be disruptive outliers who are challenging the normative stance.  
Nonetheless, what appears to be a loose consensus concerning the definition 
of a crisis maintains that a crisis involves a period of discontinuity; that a 
particular system is under threat and that an urgent response by leaders is 
required under conditions of uncertainty.  Within the ambit of these generic 
conditions, Boin (2006) concedes that it is possible to analyse and compare 
crises of a widely differing nature and within a variety of contexts. 
Roux-Dufort and Lalonde (2013) and Pearson and Clair (1998), point out the 
problem of both defining a crisis and refining crisis theories due to the variety 
of perspectives scholars have taken and, accordingly have approached the 
issue from a range of disciplines that include history, economics, political 
science, psychology, medicine and philosophy.  Shrivastava refers to these 
myriad definitions and perspectives as a “Tower of Babel” (Shrivastava 1993, 
p.33) opining that, “It also impedes development of consensus over policy 
and practical issues”(Shrivastava 1993, p.33).  Shrivastava does however go 
on to define the characteristics of a crisis when he states that a crisis involves 
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“urgency of decision, large impacts, and system restructuring” (Shrivastava 
1993, p.25).   
Shrivastava (1993) also notes that in addition to a deluge of definitions there 
is a proliferation of “concepts, typologies, taxonomies, models, and 
frameworks for studying crises”(Shrivastava 1993, p.31).  Such eclecticism 
may of course simply reflect what is claimed by researchers to be a growing 
interest in crisis management (Verbano and Venturini 2013).  Zeik (2015) 
states that Shrivastava’s position remains valid and supports the view that” 
there is no universally accepted definition of a crisis” (Zeik 2015, p.37) 
pointing out that most of those who have attempted to so define have taken 
an organisational perspective that focus upon effects.  Khodarhrami (2009), 
in contrast, contextualises the issue of crisis definition stating that,  
“Definition of crisis management (CM) may differ from country to 
country and organisation to organisation due to variations in level of 
turbulence in different situations in different corners of the 
globe.”(Khodarhrami 2009, p.523).  
From the perspective of those concerned with, and involved in, a crisis, 
Pearson and Clair (1998) who state that, 
“[T]he crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is 
undergoing it.”(Pearson and Clair 1998, p.62).   
Following Pearson and Clair (1998), it could therefore be readily construed 
that the ontological perspective associated with such a view is particularly 
germane to small business owners-managers’ who are party to the personal 
and intimate relationship that exists between the business and the individuals 
involved (Herbane 2013b). Budge et al. (2008) prefer to adopt a more 
existentialist view of a crisis that focusses on survival as well as incorporating 
notions of perception, and state that a crisis is, 
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“any action or failure to act that interferes with an organisation’s 
ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of its objectives, its 
viability or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as 
perceived by the majority of its employees, clients or 
constituents.”(Budge et al. 2008a, p.3).  
Whilst Pearson and Clair (1998) define a crisis as an event that involves 
unexpectedness, subjectivity and perceived impact to both the corporate 
entity and the individual, stating that crises are, 
“low probability, high-impact situations that [are] perceived by critical 
stakeholders to threaten the viability of the organization and that [are] 
subjectively experienced by these individuals as personally and 
socially threatening’ (Pearson and Clair 1998, p.66).  
A convincing argument could be made that this definition takes into account 
both an objective and subjective perspective that acknowledges the 
importance of personal ontologies and recognises that individuals will define 
a crisis through an intimate lens.  In other words, one person’s major crisis is 
another person’s minor incident.   
The individualisation of crisis perception could be seen as an extension of the 
overlapping terminologies that pervade the literature.  Herbane (2010), and 
Drennan and McConnell (2007) posit that there is not a universally accepted 
definition of the term “crisis”, with Boin (2006) suggesting within a chapter of 
an edited book that the term is “used in an oddly offhand manner” (Smith and 
Elliott 2006, p.86) preferring to consider a disaster as a form or outcome of a 
crisis.  Herbane (2010) furthermore acknowledges that the lexicon is 
nebulous, varied and ill-determined in prescribing the boundaries of the term, 
but accepts that it may encompass “disasters, business interruptions, 
catastrophes, emergency or contingency” (Herbane 2010, p.46).   
Drennan and McConnell (2007) attempt to delineate the language of risk, 
crises, disasters and associated terms writing, 
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“Risk – the chance of something happening that will have an impact 
on objectives; often specified as an event or set of circumstances 
and consequences (both positive and negative) that flow from this.  
Risk management – the processes involved in managing risk in order 
to achieve objectives, by maximizing potential opportunities and 
minimizing potential adverse effects.   
Risk management process – the systematic application of 
management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of 
communicating, establishing the context, identifying, analysing, 
evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.   
Business or service continuity planning – the element of risk 
management designed to enable organizations to recover quickly 
from an adverse event and ensure customers or clients continue to 
receive expected services.   
Crisis – a situation or episode in which different actors and groups 
seek to attribute meaning to a particular set of circumstances which 
pose extraordinary threats to an individual, institution and/or society.   
Disaster – a crisis with a bad ending (Boin 2005)” (Drennan and 
McConnell 2007, p.2). 
The definitional dilemma is further compounded as writers offer solutions to 
questions related to the meaning of the term that encapsulate causality, 
internal and external processual dynamics and the manner in which the crisis 
is managed.  For example, Irvine and Anderson (2004) argue that a “disaster” 
becomes a “crisis” when management believe they are unable to deal with 
the situation.  In contrast, both Fink (2002) and Davies and Walters (1998) 
state that the ability to manage a crisis will limit the chance of a disaster 
occurring.  Exemplifying the interchangeability of terms, Gerber and Feldman 
(2002) use “crisis” “catastrophe” and “disaster” as synonyms when they write, 
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“No matter how large or small the catastrophe, the key to success in 
developing a good crisis management plan is to assemble a disaster 
management team.” (Gerber and Feldman 2002, p.61). 
With this and other examples of confusion, it is possible to conclude that the 
imprecision throughout the literature regarding the definition of a crisis has 
resulted in the transposition, mutability and interchangeability of a congeries 
of terms that include issue, incident, disaster, dilemma, catastrophe, tragedy, 
calamity, upheaval, contingency, emergency and misfortune (Preble 1997).  
Britton (1986) alludes to types or levels of different kinds of “social crises 
periods”, or “collective stress events” where entire communities are affected 
using terms such as ’disasters’, ’emergencies’ and ’accidents’.  Such a 
multiplicity of terms demonstrates the inability to distinguish one type or 
severity of event from another.  In an attempt to create a typology and 
delineate the definition and criteria pertaining to a crisis and a disaster Shaluf 
et al (2003) conclude that the two terms are not interchangeable but are 
related, stating that “a crisis is more comprehensive than a disaster” (Shaluf 
et al. 2003, p.31)  This definitional issue offers opportunities for further 
research in order to seek clarification, demarcation and a broad paradigmatic 
consensus or, if not, an acceptance of imprecision. 
In addition to definitional diversity, the extant literature is equally imprecise in 
circumscribing the nature and characteristics of a crisis.  t’Hart et al. (2001) 
state that, 
“Crises are no longer written off as freak incidents, but become 
labelled increasingly as symptoms of underlying problems.  With 
‘chance', ‘nature' and ‘God' no longer accepted as excuses, crises 
become policy fiascos almost by definition.” (t Hart et al. 2001, p.184). 
and in so doing t’Hart et al. (2001) signal their view of an emerging 
phenomenon involving macro-shifts in the perception of crises that place 
them alongside managerial and governance policy failures as instruments of 
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causality ahead of those attributable to catastrophic externalities.  
Contrasting with the view of t’Hart et al. (2001) and taking a somewhat 
fatalistic perspective regarding causality, González-Herrero and Pratt (1996) 
follow Perrow (1999) and state that  
“not every crisis can be avoided.  Some accidents or natural disasters 
are impossible to avert” (González-Herrero and Pratt 1996). 
The French academic Patrick Lagadec is highly critical of current crisis 
models believing that, in essence, they reflect a view reminiscent of 18th 
century naturalists whereby residual risks only develop once risk controls 
have been breached hence resulting in residual accidents.  He argues that 
the crepuscular risks have largely been defeated but the complex and volatile 
world we now inhabit demands models that integrate with “panta rhei”, 
shifting sands and intrinsic mutability to address the cataclysmic crises that 
will occur and summarises that “in a nutshell, rupture becomes the name of 
the game” (Lagadec 2017).  Topper, writing with Lagadec (2013) propose an 
ontology that is dismissive of a linear and stable vision of the world that they 
claim is inconsistent with current thinking related to crises and go on to aver 
that top-down or bottom-up linear models based upon control and command 
should be superseded by an approach that embraces fractal theory.  Fractal 
theory considers invariants, the elements that have not changed, and what 
elements remain dynamic thereby leading to a managerial approach that is 
led by first responders rather than dominated by the functional hierarchy and 
normative decision making.  This new area of research appears to offer 
opportunities for greater understanding of the nature and management of 
crises and whilst it is not within the parameters of this study, this novel 
approach nevertheless offers interesting possibilities. 
Crises and Small Companies 
The literature is in broad agreement, but with dissenters not absent, 
suggesting that, firstly, crisis management planning is under-researched in 
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small companies (Spillan and Hough 2003; Runyan 2006; Herbane 2010; 
Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki 2011; Herbane 2013b; Vrečko and Širec 2013); 
secondly, that there is a lack of research into corporate governance and risk 
and crises in small companies (Lampel et al. 2014) and thirdly, that once a 
risk becomes a reality, crisis management planning aids chances of survival, 
(Conant and White 1999).  Daily et al (2003) state categorically that across 
firms of all sizes,  
“Relatively little research has been devoted to the effective 
management of the firm in crisis, financial or otherwise.” (Daily et al. 
2003, p.377). 
As has been described in detail earlier in this review, the literature further 
concludes that a crisis disproportionally affects small businesses (Sterling 
2011; Vargo 2011; Herbane 2013b; Verbano and Venturini 2013; Doern 
2016) and that they are more exposed in the event of a major perturbation 
than are their larger counterparts (Koontz-Traverso 2001; Corey and Deitch 
2011b).  Yet paradoxically, despite their vulnerability, small companies tend 
not to have formalised crisis management planning processes (Perry 2001; 
Runyan 2006).  Penrose (2000) concludes that, “The penalties, however, for 
complete unpreparedness can be catastrophic to any company” (Penrose 
2000, p.157). 
Gumbs and Qian (2014) add to the view expressed by Penrose (2000) and 
state that,  
“A well-managed crisis is not only a disaster avoided, but also an 
opportunity captured.  As oversight of risk management structures 
continues to evolve and become embedded in corporate governance 
structures, boards also should focus on crisis management, which 
relates to how companies plan for the occurrence of risks that cannot 
be eliminated.” (Gumbs and Qian 2012, p.1). 
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Their view accords with the original meaning of “krisis” and would seem to 
incorporate the notion of a crisis as a phenomenon that is dyadic in nature 
and offers opportunity and enhancement as well as the potential for 
significant harm.  It also suggests that planning for a crisis should be an 
embedded element of board activity.  
In support of this view, the extant literature finds that, when managers take a 
pro-active approach to crisis management planning, both crisis prevention 
and post-crisis survival rates lead to better outcomes (Fink 2002; Spillan and 
Hough 2003; Vargo 2011).  According to Chrisman et al. (2013), one such 
better outcome is related to family firms who tend to have greater survival 
rates compared with non-family firms due to weightier social capital, lower 
agency costs and superior efficiencies (Chrisman et al. 2013).  The 
implications of Chrisman’s (2013) view therefore suggest that small, non-
family companies should invest more time and energy in developing their own 
social networks and in so doing build communities of common practice 
leading to appreciating social capital that Chrisman’s (2013) research 
appears to show is an effective defence mechanism.   
Spillan and Hough (2003) express concern at the lack of crisis management 
planning in small companies in their study of 162 SMEs of which 94 of the 
sample employed fewer than 25 people.  They and others (Hollman and 
Mohammad-Zadeh 1984; Miller 1992; Falkner and Hiebl 2015; Brustbauer 
2016) refer to the paradox that reveals small companies view crisis planning 
as a matter of minimal concern, despite the volume of evidence suggesting 
that unpreparedness is likely to lead to significant disruption and possible 
dissolution.   
Summary of the literature review 
It could be argued that, with relatively few exceptions, the literature is 
focussed upon corporate governance in large organisations, agency theory, 
“top management psychology” (Ricketts-Gaskill et al. 1993; Spillan and 
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Hough 2003; Runyan 2006; Vargo 2011; Herbane 2013b; Parnell 2014) and 
high profile crises.  Current research tends to ignore corporate governance, 
risk and crisis management in small companies where directors function at 
an operational level and often lack the planning abilities and resources of 
those in larger companies.  To view “risk and crisis management” as being 
homogeneous in scale, scope, quality, preparedness and structure would be 
a failure to recognise the differences in resources across between the large 
enterprise and the small company.   
The limited literature paints a bleak picture of unpreparedness, denial and 
ineffectual leadership in small companies regarding both the assessment and 
recognition of risk and the prevention and management of crises where 
powerful memes pervade the surface and sub-structures of management and 
organisational culture.  Memes in this instance are defined as elements 
within, a culture or system of behavioural norms that pass from one individual 
to another by imitation, peer pressure, beliefs, memories, practices and 
history.  Memories describe such history, values and beliefs as contributing 
towards the fatalistic attitudes exemplified by denial (Mitroff and Anagnos 
2000).  They add that such memetic influences can, and do, limit and 
constrain creative paradigm shifts towards crisis management and reflect 
Smith’s (1990) view that the starting point is more a “crisis of management” 
rather than the “management of a crisis” (Smith 1990, p.271).  
A review of the relevant literatures leads the researcher towards a conclusion 
that there are clear and distinct gaps in the body of knowledge related to the 
application and functioning of corporate governance in small companies.  
Furthermore, gaps are also evident in our understanding of how corporate 
governance contributes to risk and crisis management in small companies.  
The rationale related to these gaps is detailed below and a table of milestone 
contributions to areas of research relevant to this study is contained in the 
appendices. 
 
168 
 
Research gap 1: corporate governance in small companies  
Despite the significant contribution made by small companies to economies 
across the globe (Maassen 2004; van den Heuvel et al. 2006; Kushnir et al. 
2010; Farooq 2014; Falkner and Hiebl 2015; Herbane 2015) relatively few 
studies have been completed that examine corporate governance and its 
functioning within small companies (Huse 2000; Lane et al. 2006; 
Voordeckers et al. 2014; Ediriweera et al. 2015; Ediriweera 2015; 
Ponomareva and Ahlberg 2016).   
Unlike their larger counterparts, small companies tend to adopt a dismissive 
attitude towards corporate governance and its associated functions (Bannock 
2005) preferring to focus upon operational imperatives (Faghfouri et al. 2015; 
Faghfouri 2015) and, constrained through limited resources, they incline 
towards vulnerability (Drummond and Chell 1994).  However, the 
marginalisation of corporate governance by directors of small companies 
(Clark 2017) prevails despite widespread agreement that the implementation 
of appropriate governance procedures within a business is, as Steier et al. 
(2015) suggest, “a key determinant of success” (Steier et al 2015 p.266).   
In spite of the need for greater research into the theory and practice of 
corporate governance in small companies, the literature points to limited 
interest from researchers due in part to the problems of access and an 
unwillingness on the part of owner-managers to invest time in what they 
perceive as non-productive activities.  This study therefore seeks to penetrate 
and illuminate the umbrae, penumbrae and antumbrae enveloping corporate 
governance in small companies. 
Research gap 2: corporate governance and risk in small companies 
The literature contains an abundance of research related to corporate 
governance and risk with the dominant themes being those of insurance and 
the economic risks facing large corporations and institutions within public 
markets (Belinskaja and Velickiene 2015).  The nature of public markets is 
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such that listing rules requires compliance with a code of corporate 
governance (or in the UK, an explanation of any deviances) in which risk 
management is a universal requirement.  That is not the case regarding small 
companies where owner-managers’ tend towards ambivalence regarding 
both corporate governance and risk management.  This area of research 
receives relatively little attention from either practitioners or researchers.  
Research conducted by Ansong (2013), Brustbauer (2013), Gao et al.(2013), 
Lukianchuk (2015) and Falkner and Heibl (2015) points to significant gaps in 
the literature with regard to the relationship between corporate governance 
and risk across a wide typology in small companies in particular (Garg and 
Weele 2012).  This study explores owner-manager and director attitudes to 
the corporate and personal risks they face. 
Research gap 3: corporate governance and crisis management in small 
companies 
Appreciation of the fragile character of the small company sector is widely 
acknowledged, yet corporate governance and its contribution to crisis 
management remains a peripheral research stream (Bennett and Robson 
2004; Gilmore et al. 2004; Lane et al. 2006; Al Lahham 2015; Sunjka and 
Emwanu 2015; Doern 2016).  Alpaslan et al. (2009) recognise the link 
between corporate governance and unanticipated events and comment upon 
the gap in the literature, stating that, 
“scholars know little about corporate governance approaches that 
enable firms to prevent crises from happening or to recover from them 
successfully” (Alpaslan et al. 2009, p.38).  
This study explores the reasons why crises occurred within the four 
enterprises taking part in this multiple case study and delves into the attitudes 
and beliefs of executives responsible for the long-term success of the 
business and the cognitive dissonance that places crisis management 
planning on the shelf of peripherality.  
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Justification for the study and contribution to the body of knowledge 
There are gaps in the literature that require addressing related to the issue of 
how corporate governance, (a term rarely appearing in the lexicography of 
owner-managers in small companies (Crossan et al. 2015)), can contribute 
to addressing areas of potential risk, and in the event of a crisis occurring, to 
prompt a comprehensive response repertoire aligned to a short-circuit cycle 
from the pro-dromal phase to crisis resolution (Fink 2002).  There are no 
current studies that take a holistic view of corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management.  Furthermore, the literature does not scrutinise the 
structural relationships that exist between corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management together with the invisible halters that bind this critical 
triumvirate.   
Given that there is a lacuna, this study makes a substantive contribution to 
the body of knowledge in three areas.  Firstly, it identifies the varying 
dispositions of owner-managers within small companies concerning the role 
of corporate governance; secondly this study offers an insight into the 
functioning of corporate governance in small companies and the means by 
which boards analyse and manage risks; and finally, the study sheds light 
upon the owner-manager’s attitude towards crises and their ability to make a 
timely and planned response to a crisis event. 
Research Problem 
The literature review has been central in the development of a provisional 
conceptual model, see Figure 24, and the subsequent research questions.  
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Figure 24: Provisional Conceptual Model for Corporate Governance, risk and 
crisis management in small companies– the endogenous and exogenous 
landscapes. 
 
Source: Author 
In developing this conceptual model, that is specific to small companies, the 
broad backdrop of the collibrational approach remains as the strategic 
context within which corporate governance is examined.  The literature points 
towards widespread failure on the part of small companies to introduce good 
practice corporate governance, with or without a code as guide, (Drummond 
and Chell; Crossan 2015) and to analyse, consider and take preventative 
actions to minimise the risks faced or to prepare and test a crisis 
management plan (Gerber and Feldman 2002; Hough and Spillan 2005a; 
Budge et al. 2008a; Herbane 2013b).  The provisional model which emerges 
from the literature, see Figure 24, shows that at the beating heart of a small 
company is the owner-manager whose beliefs and attitudes are ubiquitous 
within the business (Curran and Blackburn 2001; Kotey and Slade 2005; 
Torres and Julien 2005; He 2008; Bridge and O'Neill 2013; Smit and Watkins 
2017).  In a small company, it is neither a code nor a protocol that drives 
governance, but rather it is those same beliefs and attitudes that are the 
impetus behind the level of intensity and engagement with corporate 
governance and its constituent elements of risk and crisis management 
(Lobontiu and Lobontiu 2014; Spiers 2017).  
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Although the internal perpetual dynamic determines effective governance, 
associated with the process, there are peripheral factors that impact upon 
those quadrangular linkages.  There are societal values that, through 
osmosis, influence the tenor of the company (Haugh and McKee 2004; Carter 
and Jones-Evans 2006) as do commercial pressures that foster primacy upon 
operations and process designed to ensure survival (Crossan et al. 2015; 
Falkner and Hiebl 2015).  Likewise, the pace of change and the nature of 
cultural context touches the epidermis of the company (Gibb and Davies 
1992; Deakins and Freel 2006) as does the legacy of memories which are 
defined as,  
“the power or process of reproducing or recalling what has been 
learned and retained especially through associative mechanisms and 
the store of things learned and retained from an organism's activity or 
experience as evidenced by modification of structure or behavior or by 
recall and recognition” Merriam Webster on line dictionary (2018b).  
It is memories that both consolidate and contribute to changes in behaviours 
and perspectives (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Topper and Lagadec 2013; 
Hopkins 2013).  Brandström et al. (2004) add that when faced with 
uncertainty, people will search their memories and their knowledge base for 
situations that can inform and illuminate a given situation.  They claim that 
both policy-makers and organisations will draw upon the past, however 
idiosyncratic the current predicament may seem, to find hints about what to 
do and what to avoid.  In that sense, they govern by looking back. 
(Brandstrom et al. 2004). 
In summary, small companies are fragile and are particularly threatened as 
a result of weak or non-existent governance systems and a strong reliance 
upon the owner-manager whose disposition, attitudes, beliefs and values 
permeate the business.  His or her disposition is the key endogenous factor 
that have led to the development of the model that emerges from the literature 
review.  Other factors, such as the influence of memories, contribute to 
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policies and procedures that are rooted in experiences, often with negative 
associations, and are as such significant drivers of change.  The impact of 
wider changes in society illustrated in the model have a slow-burn impact on 
a small company some of which are attitudinal in nature, some driven by 
technological change and others by a shift in legal and quasi-legal matters. 
Wrapped within these exogenous and endogenous influences and an 
increasingly complex environment is the need for stable yet appropriate 
governance structures. The over-arching research question therefore, is 
"How can corporate governance contribute to risk and crisis management 
planning in small companies?”   
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Chapter 3-Research Philosophy, Strategy and 
Methodology 
“Values inhere in every human project; objectivity is a chimera.” Lincoln and Guba (2016 
p.41) 
Overview of the chapter 
This chapter introduces the research philosophy, research strategy, research 
methodology and methods used to undertake this study and describes how 
these elements have informed and guided data collection, analysis and the 
development of a “temporary construct” or substantive theory.   
The essential background and fundamental thinking regarding different 
approaches to case study strategy are outlined and interrogated.  
Subsequent sections re-state the research aims that have evolved over the 
writing of this thesis and describe the data collection processes for this study 
which comprise semi-structured interviews, document analysis, observation 
and a preliminary exploratory questionnaire.   
The chapter concludes with an exposition of the analytical approach taken 
regarding the empirical data. 
Research Philosophy 
According to Howell (2013),  
“Research involves understanding the relationship between theory, 
philosophy (ontology and epistemology), methodology and methods” 
(Howell 2013, p.32). 
Research philosophy is aligned with an epistemological view concerning the 
development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge together with a 
recognition that the researcher approaches the subject with a unique 
ontology that incorporates a series of “philosophical assumptions” (Creswell 
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2013, p.19) and distinctive beliefs about the nature of reality that underpin the 
research strategy and methodology.   
Coexisting with those assumptions, the researcher’s axiological stance – his 
or her values, beliefs and ethics - will influence the research (Creswell 2007; 
Farquhar 2012) as the assumptions and ideals of the researcher are 
considered to be contributory factors to “researcher positionality” (Sikes 
2004) and, dependent upon the type of research, may be germane to the 
research question and the nature of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (Denzin and Lincoln 1998).  As such, there is widespread 
agreement amongst scholars that researchers acknowledge the dominant 
philosophical paradigm of inquiry will strengthen the rationale for the chosen 
methodology (Jackson 2013). 
According to Rose et al.(2015), the debate regarding the merits of differing 
philosophical approaches has been a divisive issue amongst scholars for 
centuries.  Remenyi et al (2009) concur with Rose et al. (2015) and assert 
that, for millennia, the dominant research philosophy is that of empiricism 
which combines the notion that knowledge can be tested and must comprise 
observable and recurring patterns.  For Howell (2013), this doctrine 
incorporates the underpinnings of positivism, a term used to describe 
experimentation and scientific discovery techniques albeit the emergence of 
the term was some while after the birth of the modern science that many 
associate with the work of Galileo (b.1546), Kepler (b.1571) and Newton 
(b.1643).   
Around 1844, Comtè (b.1798), identified the term positivism (Howell 2013), 
that when used in the social sciences, looks to apply the hypothesising and 
experimental methods of the natural scientist and seeks to establish causality 
and consequential immutable laws through observation and measurement 
using deductive testing.  Comtè contested that just as the physical world 
operates within the confines of gravity and other absolute laws, so does 
society operate.  Accordingly, positivism is closely associated with 
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objectivism, quantitative techniques and experimentation and is frequently 
used synonymously with empiricism, an exegesis which has been the subject 
of criticism from both philosophers (Hobbes b1588; Hume b1711) and 
researchers’ (Cloke et al. 1991; Hume 1993; Howell 2013; Duncan 2017). 
The philosophical basis of positivism can by summarised as follows; that the 
social world exists externally and its properties can be measured through 
objective methods, rather than inferred subjectively, through sensation, 
reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  A “positivist” researcher 
views the world as an external and objective reality and thus seeks to ensure 
that research undertaken is value-free, a point underscored by Kieran (1997), 
“Positivism is marked by the final recognition that science provides the 
only valid form of knowledge and that facts are the only possible 
objects of knowledge; philosophy is thus recognized as essentially no 
different from science” (Kieran 1997, pp.115-116). 
Habermas (1992) is, however, critical of those physical and natural scientists 
who are dismissive of approaches other than positivism and who claim that 
social science research is therefore lacking in rigour.  The incessant 
allegations of the positivist schools arise as a consequence of social science 
researchers frequently assuming a non-positivist ontology that views the 
world through a prism that is subjectivist and attributes meaning through the 
perceptions and subsequent behaviours of social actors.  Remenyi et al. 
(2009), like Habermas (1992), are also critical of the positivist attitude 
towards non-positivism and make a barbed riposte to the natural scientists 
when reminding them of some of their less than glorious antecedents, 
included amongst which are phlogiston theory, alchemy and astrology!   
Preceding Remenyi et al. (2009), von Foerster (1981) claims that 
“observations affect the observed so as to obliterate the observer’s hope for 
prediction” (Von Foerster 1981, p.258) whilst von Glaserfeld (1995) adds that, 
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“Objectivity is the cognitive version of the psychological blind spot: we 
do not see what we do not see.  Invoking objectivity is abrogating 
responsibility – hence its popularity.”(von Glasersfeld 1995, p.149). 
Within social science research, the fractious debate relating to philosophical 
positionality is predicated upon fundamentally differing ontologies and 
epistemologies (Wahyuni 2012), the former being concerned with an 
individual’s perception of the nature of reality and the latter usually referring 
to the question of the validity of knowledge and how we know what we claim 
to know.  According to Farquhar (2012), the central question related to 
epistemology is: “What must be added to beliefs to convert them into 
knowledge?” (Farquhar 2012, p.17).  
This contentious deliberation can be further illustrated by the polarisation of 
the contrasting stances of objectivism and subjectivism and the 
corresponding nomothetic and ideographic ontologies.   In social sciences 
the nomothetic model tries to find independent variables that account for the 
variations in a given phenomenon (e.g. What is the relationship between the 
Resource Based View of Strategy and Free Cash Flow?) The idiographic 
model focuses on a holistic, in-depth understanding of a single case (e.g. 
What has brought about the failure of Company A?).  
An objectivist epistemology assumes that data collection takes place though 
value-free and theory-neutral observations, whereas a subjectivist 
epistemology asserts that knowledge of social phenomena is created from 
the unique perceptions and consequent behaviours of social actors (Maykut 
and Morehouse 1994).   
Hence,  Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that researchers are obliged to make 
core assumptions concerning the nature of science and the nature of society 
and accordingly position themselves within a philosophical dimension.  
Furthermore, Burrell and Morgan (1979) add that even within the parameters 
of core assumptions there are differing views of society which may range 
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from, for example, a Marxist perspective to a Neo-Conservative 
interpretation, and such a wide spectrum of opinion exemplifies and 
emphasises the extent to which individuality permeates the subjectivist 
paradigm. 
Easterby-Smith et al.(2008) however, choose to describe the contrasting 
traditions concerning the way in which social science research is conducted 
as being those of positivism and social constructionism which each, they 
claim, has been “to some extent elevated into a stereotype, often by the 
opposing sides” (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.57).  They define social 
constructionism, one of the group of approaches that Habermas (1970) refers 
to as interpretive methods, and a paradigm developed as a response to 
positivism, as, “the ways that people make sense of the world especially 
through sharing their experiences with others” (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, 
p.58). 
Pierre Bourdieu (1980), believes that the schism between the objectivist and 
subjectivist school could be overcome and that the antagonism between the 
two is an artificial construct as both exist within a dialectical relationship.   
In pursuit of this liaison, Bourdieu (1980) develops the notions of habitus -
(Bourdieu 1980, p.104) the disposition by which we view the world, capital – 
our economic, social and cultural wealth, field –societal rules and norms and 
doxa – the combination of the habitus, capital and field found in the natural 
attitudes and opinions encountered in everyday life.   
Bourdieu (1980) argues that the interactions of that triad, which contains both 
subjectivist and objectivist ideologies, works in tandem and produces a 
meaningful gestalt.  Despite his scholarly work, there still remains few touch 
points between the opposing schools of thought. 
Holden and Lynch (2004) summarise this polarisation and illustrate the 
commonly used, and interchangeable, nomenclature, see Table 22, 
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prevalent in identifying the paradigms that reside within objectivist and 
subjectivist philosophies. 
Table 22: Alternative Philosophical Paradigms 
Objectivist Subjectivist 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Positivist Phenomenological 
Scientific Humanistic 
Experimentalist Interpretivist 
Traditionalist Constructivist 
Source: Holden and Lynch (2004)  
Whilst Table 22 is not a comprehensive tabulation of objectivist and 
subjectivist paradigms  and research strategies, it serves nevertheless as a 
broad brush overview although it fails to encompass, inter alia, for example, 
empiricism, post-positivism, critical realism, critical theory, idealism, post-
modernism, post-structuralism, pragmatism, hermeneutics, constructivism (in 
a variety of guises), nominalism, voluntarism, social constructionism, 
grounded theory, ethnography, ethnomethodology and phenomenography. 
In Figure 25, Burrell and Morgan (1979), summarise the subjective-objective 
dimensions in terms of a continuum where infinite positionalities are possible, 
and appear to suggest that contextual fluidity is a pre-requisite within the four 
assumptive pillars of ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. 
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The first assumption, see Figure 25, that of Ontology, has been mentioned 
earlier and relates to the nature of reality and whether reality is an external 
truth or, at the opposite margin, is merely a solipsistic figment of our 
imagination (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  The researcher’s view of reality is 
the basis of all other assumptions and is instrumental in buttressing all other 
preconceptions.  The second assumption is Epistemology – the nature and 
validity of knowledge.  Indeed, Hughes and Sharrock (2014) ask how is it 
possible, if in truth it is possible, for us to acquire knowledge of the world and 
its complexities.  The third assumption, that of Human Nature, involves the 
views of the researcher concerning his or her perceptions of humankind as 
being the controller of both environment and of self, or as one who is 
controlled and manipulated by multifarious externalities (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979).  The final assumption, Methodology, refers to the means at the 
disposal of researchers in the social sciences through which, and by which, 
they are able to investigate phenomena. 
Figure 25: Scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social 
science 
 
Source: Author with adaptations from Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
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At one of the extremities of the ontological continuum is Nominalism that 
denies the existence of universals and abstract objects stating that these are 
merely names without a corresponding reality whilst at the opposing end is 
Realism that contends that entities have an existence independent of the act 
of perception, and independent of their names.  Epistemological Positivism 
posits that only observable phenomena can provide credible facts and 
proposes that, as such, generalisation is possible.  However, Anti-Positivism, 
also known as interpretivism, positions the social realm as comprising 
subjective meanings and social phenomena and has, at its focus, the sub-
texts of those meanings.  
Human nature may be defined in terms of perceptions that vary from 
Voluntarism, a perspective that prioritises the will and individual agency over 
and above that of reason, to Determinism which is the philosophical idea that 
every event, state and every human decision and action is the consequence 
of prior occurrences.  Determinism asks of us, “Are we resigned to remain 
prisoners of our past?”  This is not to be confused with Fatalism, but is 
concerned with the level to which humans have influence and agency over 
their future when it is dependent on present and past events.   
Finally, Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim that methodologies can range from 
the Ideographic which highlights the unique elements of a given phenomenon 
to the Nomothetic which seeks to provide a more general statement about 
social life emulating techniques employed in the natural sciences. 
It appears to be incumbent upon the researcher therefore, to analyse his or 
her research philosophy and associated assumptions in arriving at a view 
concerning the nature of reality; to determine what is considered to be 
acceptable knowledge and finally, to appreciate the status of the researcher’s 
values and beliefs that influence the research.  The options available are not 
dualistic, but can be considered more as a multi-dimensional set of continua 
rather than separate positions (Niglas 2010).  
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Research Approach: Deduction, Induction and Abduction 
According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), research approach, or 
research logic, determines whether the research moves from the general to 
the specific or vice-versa It comprises three constituents, namely those of 
induction, deduction and abduction.  
The deductive approach is closely associated with what may be thought of 
as scientific research and positivism that typically involves a theory based 
upon existing literature.  This is then followed by the development of a 
hypothesis and subsequent rigorous testing through a number of iterations 
that ultimately leads to the confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis and the 
rejection or creation of new theory.  Such hypotheses are tested using data 
sets and quantitative techniques to measure the concepts or variables that 
are designed to either prove or to disprove the original hypothesis.  
Deductive research seeks to explain causal relationships and leads to a 
general theory capable of replication as a consequence of a structured 
methodology.  
The inductive approach however functions in opposition to deductivism and 
moves from data collection via specific observations towards broader, 
context-based frameworks, models and substantive theories (Creswell 2007) 
and thus theory emerges through induction (Rose et al. 2015).  In an inductive 
approach, theory may be said to be an output whereas in a deductive 
approach, theory may be considered an input. 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) state that the third of the research 
approaches, abduction, includes both inductive and deductive research logic 
and involves an interplay of observation and theory during the research 
process (Rose et al. 2015).  The term is associated with the philosopher 
Charles Pierce who used it to refer to a type of reasoning related to inference 
to the best explanation.  Abduction is required when the researcher 
encounters surprising, anomalous observations that do not fit existing 
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theories.  Accordingly, there is a need to advance a new theory to 
accommodate these observations.  Abduction is the most creative form of 
theorizing and for qualitative researchers, it offers methodological guidance 
on how to structure research and to work with such observations to generate 
theoretical insights. 
However, as this study focuses on substantive theory building or as Jenkins 
(1992) describes it, a “temporary construct” (Jenkins 1992, p.67) and gaining 
a deep understanding of the processes and dynamics of corporate 
governance, risk and crisis management through four case studies of small 
companies, inductive logic is considered to be appropriate research 
approach for this study where qualitative methods such as semi-structured 
interviews, observation and document analysis are used extensively.   
Prior to interviews taking place, participants complete an exploratory 
questionnaire containing 61 statements to which they had to respond on a 5 
point Likert scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree.  The purpose of 
the questionnaire is more about triangulation and verification of interview 
responses than seeking to create statistical generalisation.  The small sample 
size (N=9), despite being the population of the four case studies, would not 
produce results of a significant nature although a case can be made that the 
use of a questionnaire, whatever its purpose and limitations, defines the 
overall research approach as being abductive, the vast bulk of the research 
approach is however inductive. 
Research Design: Exploratory, Descriptive, Analytical and Predictive 
Research design may be classified according to its purpose and can be 
labelled as being descriptive, analytical, exploratory or predictive.  
Descriptive research is conducted in order to describe phenomena and their 
characteristics and frequently uses the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions.  Analytical 
research, however, goes beyond mere description to analyse how and why 
phenomena are happening, whereas the aim of exploratory research is to 
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seek patterns and ideas with the objective being to develop a hypothesis, 
substantive theory or construct.  Hence, the purpose of exploratory research 
is that of discovering patterns, ideas, theories or hypotheses, rather than the 
testing or confirming of hypotheses.   
Predictive research advances in complexity beyond explanatory research 
and involves predicting the likelihood of something happening elsewhere, 
whilst exploratory research is conducted when there is little or no information 
about the issue or problem.  Predictive research often uses the ‘what if” 
question.   
This study is concerned with corporate governance and how it contributes to 
risk and crisis management in small companies, an area in which relatively 
few studies have been conducted, and consequently the researcher seeks to 
inquire into, and then understand the phenomena.  Hence this work falls 
within the ambit of exploratory research. 
Author’s Assumptions 
The ontological perspective of the author concurs with the view that the 
nature of reality is subjective; the epistemological stance of the author is 
consistent with an interpretivist philosophy and the axiological stance of the 
author is such that research, ipso facto, involves varying degrees of 
interaction with the phenomena being examined.   
Furthermore, the author has undertaken the HARP (Heightening Awareness 
of your Research Philosophy) diagnostic (Bristow and Saunders 2015) which 
confirms his strong leaning towards interpretivism with regard to ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, purpose of research, meaningfulness of data and 
structure/agency.  (See Appendix 6 for details of the HARP diagnostic and 
the outcomes for the author.) 
Building upon the previous paragraphs, a diagrammatic representation of the 
positioning of this study within the philosophical continuum, see Figure 26.  
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Based on the work of Creswell (2007) it articulates the philosophical 
positioning of the author as being that of the subjective/interpretivist, using a 
logic that is inductive and adopting an exploratory process along with a 
qualitative methodological choice for this research. 
Figure 26: Philosophical positions and paradigms 
Objectivism    Ontology    Subjectivism 
Positivism    Epistemology   Interpretivism 
Value-free    Axiology    Value-laden 
Position  
Source: Author  
Subjectivism asserts that social phenomena are created as a consequence 
of perceptions relating to the behaviours of the social actors engaged in a 
particular setting that is in a state of constant flux (Denzin and Lincoln 1998).  
Hence, in order to understand the reality and dynamics of phenomena within 
a specific context, it is necessary to study the details of the situation that gives 
rise to events and incidents.   
This view is closely associated with constructionism or its sub-set, social 
constructionism, which views reality as being socially constructed , a concept 
eloquently encapsulated by physician Alcmaeon of Croton (born c510BC), 
and a pupil of Pythagoras, who, cited by Snell (1982), whilst writing on the 
issue of conjecture, stated that, “The gods have certainty, whereas to us as 
men conjecture [only is possible]”, (Snell 1982, p.146).  (From the author’s 
atheistic perspective, the notion of polytheistic episteme is risible, yet 
notwithstanding this aberration, the broad interpretivist argument appears to 
have been postulated some 2,500 years ago.)  
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From its early origins in Greece, notions of conjecture and constructivist 
thinking became a feature of post-enlightenment thought in realms of both 
scholasticism and creativity.  During the 19th century and beyond, a 
burgeoning tide of intellectuals across a wide spectrum of thought, artists, 
writers, musicians and poets were prepared more than ever to challenge the 
hitherto received wisdoms of powerful elites whose world view dominated and 
prescribed the intellectual and cultural zeitgeist together with its creative 
parameters.  Lucie-Smith (1992) refers to this period as “one of dizzyingly 
rapid physical and intellectual change” (Lucie-Smith 1992, p.395).  In the 
world of art, for example, this is clearly visible within the rise of the various 
“isms”, not least of which is Impressionism, which challenged and shocked 
the conservative thinking of the Salon – the French artistic establishment.  
Movements such as Symbolism, Post-Impressionism, Fauvism, 
Expressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Suprematism, Constructivism and 
Surrealism were influential in furthering thinking founded upon subjectivist, 
interpretivist ontologies.  Aurier (1891) writing in an Arts and Culture digest 
“Mercure de France”,  promulgates the ideas of subjectivism stating that since 
the object will never be considered as an object, but rather an indication of 
the idea perceived by the subject and exemplified by the subject of his piece 
Paul Gaugin, for example, was described as a “Fauve” – a wild beast - due 
to his outlandish depictions of the human form (Aurier 1891, p.157). 
Almost half a century after Aurier’s writing, the infamous exhibition “Entartete 
Kunst” held in Munich in1937 became a failed attempt to ridicule so-called 
“degenerate art” deemed contrary to the ruling National Socialists 
prescriptive formula as to what art and creativity should be and where any 
attempt to interpret the world through a different lens was discouraged or 
proscribed. 
Around the same time the totalitarian left in Russia prescribed Soviet Socialist 
Realism as the only acceptable means through which the socio-political and 
187 
 
cultural world could be interpreted in art with a spell in the Gulag beckoning 
for those who desisted. 
In contrast to prescription, Ruskin (1858) promoted subjectivism and refers 
to the disposition of impermanence and states that nature with all its 
imprecisions held empirical truths that could offer insight through artistic 
rigour and meaningful interpretation stating that an original perception was 
valid,  
“the innocence of the eye…..that is to say, a sort of childish perception 
of these flat stains of colour without consciousness of what they say” 
(Ruskin 1858, p.22).  
 
Ehrensweig (1967) summarises the idea of interpretation referring to the 
“uncompromising democracy of vision” that promotes an alternative to over-
zealous scholastic rigour through encouraging a syncretistic approach to the 
means through which knowledge may be acquired.   
 
What is widely referred to as “modern art” is in large measure the creative 
world's response to the positivist practices and perspectives of the new lives 
and ideas provided by the technological advances of the industrial age that 
caused contemporary society to manifest itself in unconventional ways 
compared to the strict diktats of the past.  Writers and artists worked to 
represent and interpret their experience of the world as they saw it in 
appropriately innovative ways.  An example of such innovation is Picasso’s 
opus magna, the representation of the bombing of Guernica (Picasso 1937). 
 
The art commentator Wolf (2017) offers a succinct summary of this tectonic 
shift in thinking about perceptions and interpretations in the online Story of 
Art web pages, stating that, 
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“modern art is characterised by the artist's intent to portray a subject 
as it exists in the world, according to his or her unique perspective.” 
(Wolf 2017). 
 
Figure 27: Guernica 
 
Source: Museo Reina Sofia, Madrid 
 
As if extrapolating from Ruskin and developing the notion of the innocence of 
the eye as outlined by Wolf (2017), Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) state that 
social constructionist research has a base assumption “that there is no 
absolute truth” (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.93) and that the researcher’s 
task is to establish how reality has been constructed in daily lives within a 
real world setting.  Creswell (2007) however, uses the term “social 
constructivism” in a way that is often synonymous with social constructionism 
(Young and Collin 2004), although Howell (2013) points out that the two terms 
incorporate different perspectives as to the way in which reality is understood, 
writing that social constructivism, 
“considers that individuals develop and give meaning to the world 
while [social constructionism] argue[s] that meaning is developed 
through social amelioration and agreement” (Howell 2013, p.89). 
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Continuing the nuances, Reigler (2012) asserts that there is a variety of 
paradigms within paradigms that use the term constructivist and accordingly, 
nuanced meanings are associated with respective versions.  Reigler (2012) 
writes that, 
“Constructivism is not a homogenous paradigm.  Various strands of 
empirical insights and philosophical reflections have led (and are still 
leading) to the formulations of a number of constructivisms.”(Reigler 
2012, p.237). 
Included within these “strands” are, for example, phenomenological 
constructivism (Mach 1959); biological constructivism (Maturana and Varela 
1980); cognitive constructivism dualistic approaches (Piaget 1954); radical 
constructivism non-dualistic approaches (von Glasersfeld 1995); social 
constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1991); postmodernist constructivism 
(Lyotard 1984) and social constructionism (Vico 1858). 
Reigler (2012) who, given the miasma that envelops the paradigmatic soup, 
appears to be resigned to an etymological concrescence and chooses to use 
the catch-all term “constructivist approaches” that refers to the idea that the 
world and the associated experience of reality is actively constructed and that 
the observer is an instrumental element within the interpretation of 
phenomena. 
Young and Collin (2004) concur with Howell (2013) and state that,  
“Constructivism proposes that each individual mentally constructs the 
world of experience through cognitive processes” (Young and Collin 
2004, p.375).   
However, both Howell (2013) and Young and Collin (2004) go on to 
acknowledge that whilst each perspective has a unique starting point, there 
is congruency in the belief that reality is not external to human existence but 
rather is defined through social exchange.  Creswell (2007), a social 
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constructivist, supports the idea of meaning being negotiated through 
interaction and to that adds the twin influences of historical and cultural 
norms.  These influences are far from peripheral and feature as a significant 
factor in the governance of small companies (Evans 2012; ACCA 2017). 
Lincoln and Guba (2014) express the constructivist view in succinct and 
insightful language when they write that,  
“In the human sciences, entities are matters of definition and 
convention; they exist only in the minds of the persons contemplating 
them.  They do not “really” exist.  That is, they have ontological status 
only insofar as some group of persons (frequently, social scientists, 
but often the rest of us, also) grants them that status.”(Lincoln and 
Guba 2013, p.39). 
Earlier, Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to constructivism and epistemology 
and state that knowledge accumulates through the formation of increasingly 
informed and sophisticated constructions.  They assert that an important 
mechanism for the transfer of knowledge across contexts is the idea of 
vicarious experiences that are contained within the case study method. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the author prefers to use the term 
“constructivism” as in the case of small companies it is frequently the primacy 
of perception of the individual owner-manager or “the tone at the top” (ACCA 
2017, p.2) that determines the nature of reality that pertains within the culture, 
management and governance of the company (Spiers 2017) and to which 
others tend to subscribe albeit with varying levels of enthusiasm and 
commitment.   
 
Pertaining to the nature of reality, this study incorporates a deeper 
fundamental philosophical position adopted by the author that reflects the 
thinking of the Process Philosophy School the foundations of which were 
established by the Pre-Socratic scholar Heraclitus (535bc-475bc), with his 
concept of the omnipresence of shifting sands, or panta rhei (“everything 
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flows”) as he compared the nature of reality with the element of fire, asserting 
that change is reality and stability is illusion.  Although western–based 
thinking dominates the antecedents of process philosophy, ancient Japanese 
aesthetics relate to the traditions of “Wabi Sabi”, a practice that continues to 
modern times, which celebrates impermanence, transience and imperfection.  
It prefers the twisted driftwood to the precision and angularity of Piet 
Mondrian and the Bauhaus, the “rough ground” of Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 
2009, p.107) to the engineered paviour and applauds the imprecision of the 
discovery as expressed by TS Eliot in his poem “Little Gidding” part of which 
reads, 
 
“We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
Through the unknown, remembered gate 
When the last of earth left to discover 
Is that which was the beginning.” 
From Four Quartets, (Eliot 1942). 
 
Process philosophy emphasises the notions of “becoming” and the 
omnipresence of change surpassing and superseding stasis.  Though 
present across a wide range of historical and cultural epochs, “process 
philosophy” within a modern context is largely associated with the work of the 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead who wrote,  
“That ‘all things flow’ is the first vague generalization which the 
unsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced. … 
Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral 
experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that 
experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of 
things is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our 
philosophical system”. (Whitehead 1929, p.317). 
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Process Philosophy was particularly vibrant in 19th and 20th century North 
America and according to Hustwit (2017),  
 
“Process philosophy argues that the language of development and 
change are more appropriate descriptors of reality than the language 
of static being”(Hustwit 2017, p.3).  
 
Other significant contributors to the debate surrounding Process Philosophy 
in the twentieth century include Charles Hartshorne, William James, Samuel 
Alexander, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, who argued that no belief 
should be considered final, as human knowledge is in a constant state of 
revision and development and C.S. Peirce who defined truth as an eternal, 
unattainable quest involving an abductive process of inquiry that engaged 
with the meaning of signs, all of whom contributed to the subjective 
impressions made by the sign upon mankind. 
 
Peirce and Dewey along with others such as Mead and James were also 
closely associated with Pragmatism that took the view that philosophy had to 
be less concerned with ethereal ideas and to appreciate that culture is not a 
fixed point but is an on-going series of interactions and debates – a view 
shared with process philosophers.  Howell “2013) defines Pragmatism in the 
following terms,   
 
“Pragmatism defines truth as those tenets that prove to be useful to 
the believer or the user.  Pragmatists assert that objective truth cannot 
exist because it needs to relate to practice”(Howell 2013, p.132). 
 
This relationship with practice acknowledges the Socratic notion of wisdom 
in the form of phronesis.  Rorty, a neo-pragmatist, expresses this idea in 
constructivist terms and advocates that the role of philosophers should 
change from foundation-layers to interpreters.   
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Process philosophy is not concerned with the process of reality but process 
as reality and assumes a world view that reality is in flux albeit that the pace 
of such flux may, at times, be imperceptible within the temporal parameters 
in which most human beings function.  Such process thinking gives priority to 
becoming over being, change over permanence, novelty over continuity and 
activity over substance.   
The debate as to the nature of reality and its fluidity in construction continues 
into modern times as can be witnessed as Seibt (2016) citing Hegel (b.1770), 
expressed a dialectical view consistent with that of Heraclitus describing 
reality as “a self-unfolding of dynamic structures or templates” (Seibt 2016).  
That is in marked difference to the Parmenidean view of stability and 
recurrence “where there can be no cosmogony because plurality and change 
are inadmissible conceptions” (Guthrie 1996, p.5) citing Parmenides 
(c.540bc-475bc).  Heraclitus believed that reality was a concrescence of 
transfers and that it was not to be identified with any particular substance, 
“but rather consists of a law-like interchange of elements, an ongoing 
process governed by a law of perpetual change, or Logos” (Mastin 
2017). 
In this respect, the aphorism often attributed to Heraclitus, namely, that 
everything is in a state of flux, remains a powerful summary of his views on 
the problem of change and the temporal nature of being.  Heraclitus is often 
quoted as saying that a person cannot step twice into the same river, thereby 
suggesting that, whilst rivers can create an illusion of stasis over time, and 
like “Old Man River - he just keeps rollin’ along” (Sidney 1951performed by 
Paul Robeson), yet the waters that are contained within their parameters and 
the wider environment are nevertheless in a constant state of change.   
Despite his convoluted monologues, oracular language and denigration of 
those with whom he disagreed, Heraclitus “saw the unity of the world in its 
structure and behaviour rather than in its material”(Urmson and Ree 1992, 
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p.131).  Those structures and behaviours comprised a state of “becoming”, a 
term attributed to Heraclitus yet not contained within his writings according to 
some (Przybyslawski 2002), rather than in a state of permanence that Cox 
(1999) claims has contemporary relevance.  This notion transcends millennia 
and accords with Nietzschean interpretations of becoming and with 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and concepts of dasein (Howell 
2013; Olafson 2017).   
The ontological view of the author corresponds with the ideas of “becoming” 
and panta rhei and hence the notion of immutability is rejected in favour of 
temporality and contingency and accordingly the author does not concur with 
the monism of Parmenides who viewed the senses as being illusive, 
mendacious, and deceitful, accepting only the validity of logic and rationality.  
Palmer (2013) citing Guthrie (1965), states that, 
“Parmenides presumed reason must be preferred and sensory 
evidence thereby rejected as altogether deceptive” (Palmer 2013).   
This ontological position is in direct juxtaposition to the “weltanschauung” - 
the world view, of the interpretivist researcher. 
A second train of philosophical thought lays claim on this study, and is 
reflected in the Aristotelean concepts of sophia and phronesis.  Contained in 
Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics Book 6”, sophia is usually thought of as 
theoretical wisdom that combines discernment and knowledge, whereas 
phronesis is the notion of practical wisdom and judgement (Fitzpatrick 2011) 
that enables humankind to reach the mean of moral virtue (Greeff and Rennie 
2016) albeit, according to Aristotle, phronesis is lower in status than sophia 
(Urmson and Ree 1992).   
Phronesis is, however, concerned with instances because it is related to 
responses and behaviours in particular situations and, as such, Aristotle 
argues that a person can learn the principles of action, but application in the 
real world, where situations that could not have been envisaged requires 
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experience of the world and in the world.  Shotter and Tsoukas (2014) in their 
view of phronesis reflect the Heraclitean notion of becoming and state that, 
Phronesis inheres in the ability to allow for the fluid, indeterminate 
nature of the circumstances in which we must act, and to accept that, 
each time we act, we must, in a sense, start afresh.” (Shotter and 
Tsoukas 2014, p.240). 
Greef and Rennie’s (2016) study into phronesis in health research concurs 
with this view and concludes that accepting and managing surprise, 
ambiguity and dissonance is an integral element of research, stating that,  
“The capacity of practical wisdom as a crucial decision-making skill 
should be assimilated into a researcher’s everyday reality” (Greeff and 
Rennie 2016, p.170).   
In the context of this study that has small companies as its focus, it is 
phronetic wisdom, “tacit knowledge” (Maykut and Morehouse 1994) and 
practical judgement that inhabits the company’s leadership mind set (Gibson 
2008) and addresses the questions “what” and “how”, rather than an 
orientation that relates to the more ethereal wisdom of sophia.  Thomas 
(2016) supports this view stating that, 
“[Phronesis] is judgement made on the basis of experience and has 
no pretensions to lead us to the kind of external guide that theory is 
supposed to provide….phronesis is about understanding and 
behaviour in particular situations” (Thomas 2016, p.72). 
Thus, this study examines the notion of corporate governance, risk and crisis 
management via the lens of phronesis in a “Lebenswelt” – real-world setting, 
with all its inherent uncertainties and rough ground, through an interpretive 
and subjective philosophy.   
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In summary, subjectivist philosophy is grounded in the thinking of Protagoras 
of Abdera (c.485-415 BC) who is considered to be the first to promote the 
philosophy of subjectivism (Mark 2009), which argues, in contradiction to both 
Plato and Socrates, that all interpretation of reality is relative to the individual 
(Cavalier 1990).  It is upon such a philosophy that subjectivism and 
interpretivism are considered to be best suited to the nature and context of 
this research. 
Methodological Choice 
The features of an interpretivist paradigm are the use of small samples; the 
research is situated in a natural location; the objective is that of theory 
generation; the process involves the production of rich subjective data; the 
production of findings with low reliability but high validity and finally the 
research is concerned with enabling findings to be generalised from one 
setting to another similar setting (Collis and Hussey 2009).   
Thomas (2016) however profoundly disagrees with both the third and final 
points concerning generalisation in respect of case study research and 
believes that whilst the researcher “cannot generalise” within its usual 
meaning it is possible to elicit insights, patterns and “bridges between 
ideas”(Thomas 2016, p.221).   
Jenkins (1992) is also critical of this approach with regard to the traits of the 
interpretivist paradigm and questions the importance of theory generation as 
an end product, preferring to view it as disposable and as a “temporary 
construct” (Jenkins 1992, p.40). 
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Characteristics and Defining Features of Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is based on the adoption of a phenomenological stance 
and is holistic in that it takes account of the unique contexts within which 
human experiences occur and is accordingly associated with distinct 
instances, situations or cases.  Qualitative research seeks to reveal hidden 
perceptions and their meaning in order to understand, describe, and explain 
phenomena from the perspective of the actors involved.  Such an approach 
does not assume a hypothesis that is to be tested and proved, but has at its 
heart a focus of inquiry that seeks to understand and explore using an 
inductive approach to data analysis.  The research outcomes are not the 
broad generalisations that may emerge from positivist research but rather are 
contextual findings; capable of transferability [also known as external validity 
in positivist research according to Lincoln and Guba (2013)] from one context 
to another rather than seeking to postulate a generalisable theory.  Lincoln 
and Guba (2013 also state that, 
“In interpretivism, generalizability is not the aim; instead, the 
applicability of the findings and interpretations is to be determined by 
those who want to apply the findings and interpretations.  In 
interpretivism, this transferability is possible through thick 
descriptions….so that the researcher can determine whether the 
findings apply to his or her context”(Lincoln and Guba 2013, p.104).  
It may be that triangulation may be sought to determine transferability but 
without using the strict techniques of the positivist and rather relying upon the 
triangulation of methods used and the nature of observations made. 
Maykut and Morehouse (1994) point out that, 
"words are the way that most people come to understand their 
situations; we create our world with words; we explain ourselves with 
words; we defend and hide ourselves with words"(Maykut and 
Morehouse 1994, p.17).  
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Hence, in qualitative data analysis and presentation: the researcher is 
seeking, patterns within those words and to present those patterns for others 
to interpret whilst “staying as close to the construction of the world as the 
participants originally experienced it” (Maykut and Morehouse 1994, p.18). 
The work of maykut and Morehouse (1994) with caveats, substantiates this 
research taking the form of an interpretivist study that uses a qualitative 
methodology in which the researcher interacts with the phenomenon which 
is being researched and hence the reality is subjective.  According to 
Creswell (2007), qualitative research takes an inductive approach and builds 
general themes from the particular with the researcher subsequently 
interpreting the meaning of the data collected.   
This study corresponds with these stipulations and accordingly the work of 
Creswell (2007) offers further legitimacy for this research to use a qualitative 
methodology.  The research takes place within the specific context of 
corporate governance in small companies based in the UK.  Remenyi et al. 
(2009) refer to the “primacy of context” when using a qualitative methodology 
and add that, 
“the context within which social action or behaviours occurs is of the 
utmost importance in understanding actions or behaviours” (Remenyi 
et al. 2009, p.97).   
Thus a third affirmation supports the assertion that the appropriate 
methodological choice for this research is qualitative.   
According to Silverman (2015), methodology refers to the overall approach 
to the research process and he points out that, “Like theories, methodologies 
cannot be true or false, only more or less useful” (Silverman 2015, p.2).   
Within the context of Silverman’s relativist argument, Rose et al. (2015) 
identify and summarise the distinctive nature of qualitative research 
methodology and assert that such research comprises the particular features, 
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see Figure 28.  Qualitative research therefore involves the collection of non-
numeric data, it seeks to build theory, albeit that this may be temporary, 
through inductive research and is conducted in the context of a case or cases.   
In this particular study, the researcher engages in direct and deep 
conversations with the directors of small companies at their places of work, 
and in one instance at home, and accordingly, it possesses each of the 
characteristics identified by Rose et al. (2015) and by Creswell (2007). 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that the research methodology can further 
be clearly identified as qualitative. 
The methodological choices open to the researcher include both mono and 
multiple methods of data collection that are applicable to both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies.  The mono method uses a single means by which 
data are collected and analysed whereas, in contrast, a multiple methods 
strategy will involve more than one data collection technique such as, for 
example, interviews and observation.  
The methodological choice considered to be appropriate for this study is that 
of a multi-method qualitative research project involving more than one form 
of data gathering techniques. 
Figure 28: Distinctive features of qualitative research 
 
Source: Rose et al. (2015 p.85) 
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Concerning data gathering this study follows Wacquant (2008) who advises 
that scholars should adopt a contingent view and take account of Bourdieu’s 
methodological polytheism, a term used to promote the notion that the 
researcher should “deploy whatever procedure of observation and 
verification [that is] best suited to the question at hand” (Wacquant 2008, 
p.266). 
Research Strategy 
Strategy, in a business context, is the term widely used to refer to the means 
by which a goal is to be achieved, although according to Whittington (2001), 
it can be defined as a structured plan, an evolutionary and unstructured 
meander, a process and a system.  In the context of research however, 
strategy has been defined as the “overall direction of research, including the 
process by which the research is conducted” (Remenyi et al. 2009, p.44) 
thereby embedding the twin attributes of direction and process.  Saunders et 
al. (2012) take a wider view and state that research strategy is the 
methodological link between philosophy and the subsequent choice of 
methods for data collection.  The research strategy also depends on practical 
considerations such as the extent of contemporary knowledge and the time 
and resources available to the researcher.  
A research strategy, it could be claimed, is therefore an element within an 
integrated system and is developed and contained within the researcher’s 
ontological and epistemological paradigms (Creswell 2007) and the chosen 
methodology.  Creswell (2007) in support of this view writes that a close link  
exists between the philosophy that one brings to the research act and adds 
that it also impacts upon “how one proceeds to use a framework to shroud 
his or her enquiry.” (Creswell 2007, p.15). 
Howell (2013) gives added support to this link and summarises the need for 
the researcher to understand the relationship between philosophical 
positions and paradigms stating,  
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“Building an understanding between the philosophical positions and 
paradigms is an essential part of the research process and integral in 
deploying methodology and methods best suited for a research 
project”(Howell 2013, p.Back cover). 
Taking Howell’s (2013) view on the integration of philosophical positions with 
the most appropriate methodologies and methods, Table 23 indicates a range 
of research strategies and their links to the philosophical bases of Objectivism 
and Subjectivism.   
As has been stated earlier, this study is conducted within the subjectivist 
paradigm and accordingly, the strategies that are most appropriate to the 
research are shown in a bold typeface.  
There are a number of commonly used research strategies which can be 
exercised as either a singular or multiple strategy residing within the 
subjectivist paradigm.   
Table 23: Research Strategies and their Philosophical Bases 
Research Strategies Objectivism Subjectivism 
Action Research  Strictly Interpretivist 
Case Studies Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Ethnographic  Strictly Interpretivist 
Field Experiments Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Focus Groups  Mostly Interpretivist 
Forecasting Research 
Strictly positivistic with room for 
interpretation 
 
Futures Research Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Game or Role Playing  Strictly Interpretivist 
In-depth Surveys  Mostly Interpretivist 
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Laboratory Experiments 
Strictly positivistic with room for 
interpretation 
 
Large-scale Surveys 
Strictly positivistic with room for 
interpretation 
 
Participant-Observer  Strictly Interpretivist 
Scenario Research  Mostly Interpretivist 
Simulation Modelling 
Strictly positivistic with room for 
interpretation 
 
Narrative Research  Strictly Interpretivist 
Grounded Theory Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Source: Author, as adapted from Remenyi et al. (1989)  
According to Yin (2014), the choice of research strategy is influenced by three 
conditions.  These are, 
“(a) the type of research questions posed, 
(b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behaviour 
events, and  
(c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events”. (Yin 2014, p.9) 
These conditions are portrayed, see Table 24, and relate to the research 
question, the control of behavioural events and the focus on contemporary 
events within a limited number of research “strategies”, but referred to as 
“methodologies” by Collis and Hussey (2003, p.60) and as “methods” by Yin 
(2014 p.9).  Strategies related to Interpretivist research are shown in bold 
text. 
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Table 24: Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods 
Method Form of research 
question 
Requires control 
of behavioural 
events 
Focus on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiment How? Why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/No 
History How? Why? No No 
Case Study How? Why? No Yes 
Source Yin (2014 p9) 
Mills et al. (2010), editors of the “Encyclopaedia of Case Study Research” 
refer to case study as a research strategy rather than a method or 
methodology.  They conclude that method implies a research tool, e.g. 
surveys, interviews, or observations, and as such, a case study cannot be 
reduced to a single method.  Methodology, they believe, can refer to the use 
of a particular method or methods together with the theoretical framework in 
which it resides.   
This confusion would appear to be overwhelming for Burns (2010) who writes 
that, “Mutlivocality is at times too raucous for the listening ear”(Burns 2010, 
p.36)!  As Burns (2010) infers, within the corpus of literature relating to 
research, there is considerable interchangeability between the terms used 
and hence, for the purposes of this study the author refers to the case study 
as a research strategy with methods referring to data gathering techniques 
such as interviews and document research. 
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This study is based upon clear ontological, epistemological and axiological 
perspectives that align with an interpretivist position, an inductive, 
ideographic approach and a qualitative methodology.  Accordingly, the 
subjectivist nature of the research will tend towards strategies, (Yin’s so-
called methods), that relate to that particular paradigm and hence for the 
purposes of this section of the thesis, strictly positivistic methods have been 
discounted and are deemed to be inappropriate.  
The qualitative methodology that is acceptable accords with Creswell (2007) 
who believes that such research is concerned with an approach that begins 
with a set of assumptions and is conducted through what he describes as,   
“an interpretive/theoretical lens, and the study of research problems 
exploring the experiences of a single individual …or the lives of a small 
number of individuals” (Creswell 2007, p.73).   
Kincheloe and Berry (2004) argue however, that, just as defining the rationale 
for a methodology is an integral part of research rigour, so too is the choice 
of method and the determinant that they propose is that of the best fit with 
the research question (Kincheloe and Berry 2004).  
In justifying the most appropriate research method, “the means by which data 
are collected and/or analysed” , for use within this study, the methods, see 
Table 25, are considered across a range of appropriateness criteria.  
Table 25: Characteristics and Appropriateness of Strategies in Qualitative Research 
Primary Research  
Method 
Characteristics Appropriateness 
Action research 
Applied research, collaborative, 
interventionist, based in single case study, 
respondent time and input is considerable 
Not relevant - linked with consultancy 
and access can be problematic.  Can 
involve a long period of time.  May be 
lacking in rigour 
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Ethnographic 
Field observations to study a culture in 
a particular society, longitudinal, 
multiple data sources 
Not relevant – requires long term 
research programme.  Access would 
be problematic 
Focus groups 
Not used as a single source of data but 
as validation.  No consensus required.  
Require facilitation and moderator. 
Partly relevant – but issues of 
confidentiality and data sharing could 
limit openness 
Game or role-playing 
Participants play a role in a high-level 
simulated scenario and actions and 
reactions are observed 
Not relevant – this research is based 
on actual events that have taken place 
in recent times 
In-depth surveys 
Small number of participants in series of 
structured interviews.  Rich deep data 
with emergent stories 
Partly relevant – as a tool for collecting 
basic functional and attitudinal 
information prior to more detailed 
interviews 
Participant-observer 
Researchers are members of the 
observed organisation and part of the 
phenomenon being studied 
Not relevant – but as a non-participant, 
observation of the board at work gives 
an insight into the power dynamics 
prevailing amongst directors 
Scenario research 
Researcher elicits views of experts 
relating to a theoretical scenario within a 
focus group setting 
Not relevant as this research seeks to 
elicit the views of internal participants 
on actual events 
Narrative Enquiry 
Deals with a personal account which 
interprets an event or sequence of 
events in the form of a story that gives 
meaning 
Relevant -  as small businesses 
have a strong personal element that 
informs the way in which crises are 
handled 
Grounded Theory 
Refers to a theory that is grounded in or 
developed inductively from data sets to 
develop theoretical explanations of 
social interactions 
Partly relevant – only in terms of 
Charmaz who recognises that the 
researcher may have a past history 
that renders pure grounded theory 
difficult 
Archival research 
Utilises contemporary and historical 
administrative records and documents 
Relevant - as board minutes, 
policies, procedures are part of the 
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with research questions that focus on 
the past 
picture painted with regard to 
corporate governance 
Case study/studies 
Explores a phenomenon within its 
context and a specific boundary.  
Generates answers to the why, how and 
what questions 
Relevant – as the research is 
concerned with a number of 
dynamic elements and takes place 
in a natural setting of the boards of 
four companies as the units of 
analysis 
Hermeneutics 
Concerned with the interpretation of 
texts and documents normally in a 
historical or scriptural setting 
Partly relevant - in understanding the 
meaning of the text in its context 
Source: Remenyi et al. (2009) and Creswell (2007) 
As explained earlier in this chapter of the study, the philosophical stance of 
the author is that of the subjectivist viewing reality as being socially 
constructed and as such, using constructivism to interpret and understand 
the world in which the individual research participants work.  Therefore, in 
determining the most suitable data collection methods within the 
subjectivist/interpretivist paradigm, action research in which the researcher 
acts as an agent of change within the research environment and seeks to 
influence and adapt current behaviours and practices has been eliminated.  
As this study is reflexive and requires participants to consider the recent past 
with regard to governance, risk and crisis management an interventionist 
approach is therefore of little relevance.  Furthermore, action research is 
conducted in an environment where researcher control is required and hence, 
this form of dynamic engagement renders it unsuitable for this study.  
Ethnography is holistic research in which the researcher is a participant 
observer of the research environment.  Ethnographic studies are often 
conducted for a prolonged period that involves intimate interaction with social 
groups in order to understand the phenomenon in considerable depth.  An 
example of such is the iconic longitudinal study Argonauts of the Western 
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Pacific, published in 1922, which is an account of indigenous creativity and 
adventure in the archipelagos of Melanesian New Guinea (Malinowski 2014). 
The study was conducted over a period of two years by Bronisław 
Malinowski, considered by many as the founding father of this form of 
research.  Since the time and resources available for this study are limited, 
ethnography is not considered to be a suitable method.  
Game or role-playing and scenarios are not relevant to this research although 
at some future time the respondents may choose to engage in such activities 
to test their crisis preparedness and business continuity plans. 
Constructivists Lincoln and Guba (2013) state that the researcher, once 
having accepted a subjectivist ontology and epistemology, must adopt 
appropriate methodology and methods consistent with that philosophical 
position.  They propose therefore, that the researcher seeks deep meaning 
in a partnership of equals and uses both interpretive hermeneutics and 
dialectic argumentation as the means of uncovering individual constructions 
and then comparing, contrasting and confronting.  These twin methods have 
merit with regards to this particular study and can add to its authenticity. 
In assimilating the views of Lincoln and Guba (2013) and the range of 
methods consistent with the philosophical underpinning, the author 
concludes that case study as a research strategy would appear to be best 
suited to answering the research question in which “complex phenomena” 
(Baxter and Jack 2008, p.544) are studied within their contexts.   
According to Perren and Ram (2004) the use of case study in research has 
a long and respected history with, for example, classic works such as the 
Allison and Zeliko’s (1999) study on the Cuban missile crisis engendering 
great interest.  The rationale is constructed around a number of salient points, 
namely that this research takes place within a real life and contemporary 
situation (Pettigrew 1973; Stake 1995; Bakker 2010; Farquhar 2012; Yin 
2014); it is time-bounded and involves multiple sources of information that 
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may, at a primary level, include observations, interviews, archival research, 
documents, minutes, agendas, reports and other collateral in addition to a 
range of secondary sources (Kulatunga et al. 2007).  The case study 
research strategy can involve a single case or multiple cases and can utilise 
hermeneutics, narrative enquiry and focus group methods in order to achieve 
triangulation (Eisenhardt 1989b; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Farquhar 2012; 
Miles et al. 2014; Yin 2014) and thereby ensure effective corroboration of the 
evidence.  Triangulation in the context of research is a metaphor based upon 
surveying and geometry and is used to indicate a requirement of rigour to 
provide evidence of a phenomenon from several differing perspectives or 
what Foucault (1986) calls a “polyhedron of intelligibility” (Foucault 1986, 
p.104) an advance from a three-dimensional view to a multi-dimensional 
construct of validation.  Mason (2002), in contrast, criticises the logic of 
triangulation as a means of research validation, in part because “it implies the 
existence of an objective and knowable reality that can be grasped through 
the use of multiple methods” (Mason 2002, p.190). 
De Massis and Kotlar (2014) conducted research into small family 
businesses using a case study strategy and stress that the use of case 
studies in research differs greatly from those used in a pedagogic context.  
However, the setting for their research is such that they describe it as 
heterogeneous and add that it encompasses several theoretical approaches 
which, they claim, makes a case study strategy well suited to deal effectively 
with diversity of their subject matter.   
They add, “we view case studies as a powerful methodology that can be used 
in a rigorous, creative and a wide–ranging variety of ways”(De Massis and 
Kotlar 2014, p.16). Gibbert et al. (2008) add legitimacy to the case study 
strategy when they conclude that case studies represent a “methodology” 
[strategy in this study] “that is ideally-suited to creating managerially-relevant 
knowledge” (Gibbert et al. 2008, p.1461) which in the instance of this study 
is germane. 
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The case study, as defined by Yin (2014) is,  
“an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
(the case) in depth and within a real-world context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context may be clearly 
evident” (Yin 2014, p.16). 
whilst Plakoyiannaki describes the case study approach as ”a road less 
travelled” (Plakoyiannaki 2017, p.5) and chooses to define a case study as,  
“a research strategy that investigates a phenomenon in its real-life 
context, relating it to theory and seeking to understand what the 
empirical phenomenon is a case of in theoretical terms” 
(Plakoyiannaki 2017, p.9). 
As such, the case study as defined by both Yin (2014) and Plakoyiannaki 
(2017), can be considered as an appropriate method for the elicitation of 
answers to the “what” and “how” form of research question (e.g. What are the 
ways in which the values and beliefs of the owner-manager influence 
corporate governance? and How do you determine risk in terms of transfer, 
acceptance or mitigation?) and it is acknowledged by Yin (2014) that the 
method does not require the researcher to control the behavioural events.   
In this study the researcher does not control the behaviour of directors (both 
de-jure and de-facto), owner-managers and other stakeholders in terms of 
activity or beliefs.  Rather, the study focuses on both contemporary events 
and events that have occurred within the recent past and seeks, as Stake 
(1995) states, “to understand the human experience”(Stake 1995, p.38).  
Hence, according to the views of Yin (2014), Pettigrew (1973); Stake (1995); 
Bakker (2010) and Farquhar (2012) the author concludes that case study is 
the most appropriate research strategy through which data collection can 
take place and the following section explains, in further detail, the case study 
design.  
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Case Study Design  
As alluded to in a previous paragraph, some scholars view case study as a 
strategy or as a methodology whilst others regard a case study as a method 
(Yin, 2014).  For the purposes of clarity and the avoidance of doubt, in this 
research, the case study is considered to be a research strategy within the 
context of a qualitative methodology using a number of research methods 
which include semi-structured interviews, observation and document 
analysis, all of which may be considered to be multiple sources of evidence 
through which the case study is “strengthened” (McDonald 2010, p.51). 
Case study research design is, according to Farquhar (2012) founded upon 
the research tripod, see Figure 29, that links the conceptual framework with 
the remaining “legs” and establishes a rationale for the research strategy 
which, in this instance, is that of the case study. 
The research design may be thought of as a plan or blueprint that deals with 
issues of what to study, what are considered to be relevant data; how can the 
data be collected and finally, how can the data be analysed.  In the application 
of the plan, case study design comprises five components (Yin 2014) relating 
to firstly, the case study questions, secondly, any propositions/objectives, 
thirdly, the unit or units of analysis, fourthly, the linking of data to 
propositions/objectives and finally, the interpretation of findings.  
Although Yin (2008), an enthusiast of multiple case studies, structures his 
model in a linear and logical manner, Plakoyiannaki (2017) states that case 
study research can be dynamic and unpredictable, the corollary of which is 
that the researcher should be aware of, and respond to, the opportunities that 
may not have been foreseen within the original design parameters. 
The research questions and the provisional conceptual model emerge from 
the literature review (Farquhar 2012) and, as this study takes a qualitative 
approach, there are, consequently, neither hypotheses nor forming 
propositions that will be tested through experiment or survey.  Instead of 
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propositions, this study contains objectives against which its efficacy will be 
measured.   
The unit of analysis addresses the fundamental problem as to how the case 
is to be defined which Creswell (2007) describes as, “Studying an event, a 
program, an activity, or more than one individual” (Creswell 2007, p.104) and 
what Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) refer to as that which “forms the basis of 
any sample” (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.102).   
The unit(s) of analysis can be an organisation, a group of workers, a 
management team, an event or a process and can involve one or more 
organisations in either a single case study or as a study involving multiple 
cases.  Bleijenbergh (2000) claims that there is general agreement that a 
multiple-case study design offers the best opportunities for testing theories 
and frameworks as it enables researchers to systematically compare 
variation between the cases in such a way that theory testing is conducted 
with due process and rigour (Herriott and Firestone 1983). 
Figure 29: The research tripod 
 
Source: as adapted from Farquhar (2013) citing Yin (2014)  
The continuing debate amongst scholars concerning the selection of case 
studies references the 1843 publication, A System of Ratiocinative and 
Inductive by John Stuart Mill, in which he considers the systematic 
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comparisons of social phenomena.  In describing the “method of agreement” 
and “method of difference” (Stuart Mill 1843, p.462), it can be claimed that he 
was instrumental in laying the foundations for contemporary case selection 
in multiple-case study research.  In using the “method of agreement”, the 
researcher selects two or more instances where the same social 
phenomenon occurs, but in very different circumstances and through 
comparing the two cases, the researcher can eliminate all contextual 
variables that are not necessary for the phenomenon to occur.  The 
researcher is therefore able to infer that the variables which the two 
phenomena have in common are probably instrumental to the event that 
occurred. 
In contrast, using Mill’s method of difference, researchers choose instances 
that have similar or comparable circumstances, yet differ in the presence or 
absence of the phenomenon being studied.  Consequently, researchers can 
isolate the variation in circumstances of the multiple cases.  
The case study is relevant to researchers wishing to gain a rich 
understanding of the context of the research (Kulatunga et al. 2007), the 
views of the actors and the associated phenomena within a flexible 
arrangement and, accordingly, an exploratory or explanatory approach may 
be adopted with the former being appropriate where existing theory and a 
conceptual framework is used to inform data collection.  Farquhar (2012) 
makes the case for this, writing,  
“The collection of the evidence that forms the empirical method should 
not be collected without reference to underlying concepts.  In case 
study research, the role of theory, according to Yin (2009) is part of 
the blueprint structure.” (Farquhar 2012, p.35). 
Irrespective of whether the research is of a positivist, critical realist or 
interpretivist nature, scholars accept that theory forms one leg of the tripod in 
case study research and Yin (2014) recommends that the case study method 
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needs a theoretical perspective at the beginning of the investigation as it 
affects the research questions, analysis and interpretation of findings.  
Farquhar (2012) concurs with Yin on this matter pointing out that the 
conceptual framework emerges from the literature review to guide the study 
and subsequent data analysis.  This approach differs from that of other 
qualitative research strategies such as grounded theory and ethnography, 
which do not use a theory to guide the study (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Gioia 
and Chittippedi 1991; Glaser and Strauss 1999).  
Eisenhardt (1989) also states that an a priori specification of constructs can 
also help to shape the initial design of theory building research but cautions 
that “preordained theoretical perspectives or propositions may bias and limit 
the findings” (Eisenhardt 1989b, p.536).  Moreover, Yin (2003) points out that 
case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions but not populations 
or universes.  They do not represent a sample and hence the objective of 
conducting a case study is to expand and generalise theories through 
analytical generalisation (Curtis et al. 2000) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin, 2003).  
Burns (2000) states that from within the positivist paradigm researchers are 
required to study human phenomena in an objective manner.  Burns (2000), 
however, goes on to argue in relation to theory and frameworks, that the 
framework can only ever be a momentary glimpse or snapshot of reality in 
that such objectivity is impossible because objective reality and the subject 
are always in the process of what Heraclitus describes as becoming, (Kahn 
1999).  Accordingly, they “can never be apprehended other than through 
preconceived and always partial frameworks or paradigms” (Burns 2000, 
p.35).  Burns (2000) concludes therefore, that all research is infected by 
researcher subjectivity and acceptance of truth must ultimately reside within 
an interpretivist paradigm.  McGinn (2000) echoing the views of Burns (2000), 
adds that the research methods adopted in any particular case study depend 
upon the guiding frameworks for the research.  She adds that,  
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“credibility is a relative judgment taken from a particular perspective, 
rather than a definitive claim about the case study as a whole” (McGinn 
2000, p.244). 
Godfrey and Hill (1995) in their classic paper on the subject of observing the 
unobservable, criticise realist research stating that qualitative methodologies 
that feature multiple case studies, event histories, and ethnographic inquiries 
that involve interpretation may offer the most appropriate means by which 
researchers may observe the effects of otherwise unobservable, idiosyncratic 
effects.  In making this statement, Godfrey and Hill (1995) allude to syllogistic 
conclusions that can, and do, occur in the absence of deep understanding of 
phenomena. 
The Theoretical Grounding for a Multiple Case Study  
Within the literature related to research methodology there has been a vibrant 
debate as to the nature of the case study and its relationship with theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989b; Gibb-Dyer and Wilkins 1991).  Eisenhardt (1989) 
proposes an approach to building theory that Gibb and Wilkins (1991 p613) 
argue is a hybrid form of case research that is overly focussed on construct 
development and has, as a consequence, marginalised context and the rich 
background that results in restricting theory development.  Gibb and Wilkins 
(1991) suggest that the telling of good stories is the essence of a case study 
(in the singular) and posit that a multiple case study can only offer thin 
descriptions with a focus on surface data rather than “deeper social 
dynamics” (Gibb and Wilkins 1991 p615).  In contrast Yin (1981) states that 
conclusions may be drawn from a group of cases, and that multiple case 
studies “are appropriate when the same phenomenon is thought to exist in a 
variety of situations” (Yin 1981, p.101) and advises that the use of three or 
four cases are sufficient once the phenomenon has been demonstrated to 
occur in each case.  This study follows Yin (1981) as a combination of 
evidence from the literature and author insight points towards corresponding 
phenomena across cases. 
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Case Study Protocol 
According to Yin (2013 p. 84) a case study protocol is a pre-requisite of 
effective case study research and is instrumental in establishing research 
procedures as a series of sequential steps and rules designed to enhance 
the reliability of case study research and furthermore acts as a guide to 
researchers whilst carrying out data collection from cases.   
The protocol for this study is shown in full in Appendix 7 and offers an 
overview that includes the aim and objectives of the research, the data 
collection procedures, the data collection questions and a guide to the 
findings and outcomes within the unit(s) of analysis.  Table 26 outlines the 
stages of the case studies together with modes of analysis and the 
associated objectives. 
Table 26: Stages of the Case Study 
Stage Mode of Analysis Objectives 
Preliminary  Questionnaire survey a)      Explore context and respondents background, 
beliefs and attitudes 
Stage 1 Semi-structured interviews, 
document, web site and 
Companies House reviews 
observation of board meeting 
a) Identify attitudes to corporate governance and its 
value 
b)       Identify corporate governance practices in the board 
c)      Identify owner-manager attitudes to risk 
d)      Identify links between governance, risk & crises 
Stage 2 Reflection and analysis of 
data from Stage 1 
a) Assess the standard of  governance as practiced 
b)     Evaluate attitudes to risk and crises and  continuity 
Source: Author 
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Planning the Research  
Case study research according to Thomas (2016) can involve what he refers 
to as a “Key Case” such as the Bhopal chemical discharge from the Union 
Carbide plant; an “Outlier Case” where the incident is noteworthy due to its 
unusual characteristics, an example of which examined the phenomena of 
longevity amongst the residents of the state of Kerala in comparison with the 
remainder of India, or a “Local Knowledge Case” that is “an example of 
something in your personal experience about which you want to find out 
more” (Thomas 2016, p.99).  This study is firmly rooted in the third of Thomas’ 
descriptors.   
The proem to the design of this study was a pilot study developed from the 
creation of a story-board that emerged from the literature, the pilot study, a 
pre-interview questionnaire and from the direct experience of the author as a 
director of several small businesses.  The a priori assumption within the story-
board (see Appendix 5) is the idea of the board as the thinking and controlling 
mind of the company set within a complex arrangement of internal and 
external drivers and a core value set that emanates from the owner-manager 
in and around whom the practice of corporate governance is enacted to a 
greater or lesser degree. 
The story-board identifies the heterogeneity and scope of the internal and 
external drivers, phenomena and actors that influence and bear upon boards 
operating within small companies and highlights the respective outputs in 
terms of the board’s function as either “pilot” or “watchman”.  It also 
underscores the way in which the risk management process functions, albeit 
to varying levels of sophistication.  Whilst the complexity reflected in this 
storyboard may, at first glance, appear to be considerable and possibly over-
stated, the inter-related activities in which a small company engages vary 
little from large companies other than in scale.  A small company must 
operate within the terms of The Companies Act (2006) with few exemptions; 
it must operate within the terms of the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) 
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and comply with Companies House requirements, the demands of HMRC, 
inspections and directives from public authorities and from specifiers and 
customers.  In meeting all these obligations, a key difference between a small 
enterprise and a large company is however the disparity in resource 
availability.  That scarcity is a key component to understanding this thesis. 
Case Study Conceptual Model and Research Questions 
Yin (2014) describes five components of case study research design as being 
“especially important” (Yin 2014, p.29) namely,  
1. The study questions 
2. Propositions–if any [which in this study are absent] 
3. The unit(s) of analysis 
4. Linking data to propositions  
5. The criteria for interpretation 
Taking up the first point, and arising from the literature review the theory and 
study questions are based upon a provisional conceptual model for corporate 
governance, risk and crisis management in small companies, see Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30: Provisional Conceptual Model for Corporate Governance, risk and 
crisis management in small companies:   
 
Source: Author  
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The provisional model is developed for two reasons: firstly, because it begins 
to reveal the complex relationship between corporate governance in 
whatever form it is manifested, the influence of the owner-manager in the 
practice of corporate governance and the board’s attitude relating to risk and 
crisis management.  Secondly, the model is intended as guide to data 
collection and analysis.  The model is not however without limitations, but 
nevertheless it identifies key contributory components such as beliefs, 
attitudes, memories, culture, change and process considerations. 
The model is not intended to represent a hypothesis to be tested, but rather 
serves as a platform for increased understanding of corporate governance in 
small companies.  This is by no means a unique approach as other 
researchers have created conceptual models not for the purpose of testing 
but with the aim of illustrating possible relationships between concepts prior 
to empirical work (Elo and Kyngäs 2008). 
The model is underpinned by three critical assumptions refined from those 
leading to the storyboard.  The first assumption is that owner-managers in 
small companies tend towards a default position of volitional reactivity and 
the phronetic and are frequently vague as to intentionality concerning vision 
and strategy(Minzberg and Waters 1985; Clarke and Klettner 2009). 
Secondly, that operational and practical imperatives related to commercial 
survival will invariably take precedence over issues related to corporate 
governance and ethics which are perceived as being located in the rear 
support echelons rather than positioned at the front line of the business. 
(Crossan et al. 2015; Falkner and Hiebl 2015).  The third underpinning 
assumption is that the owner-manager’s personal disposition is the 
determinant of the risk profile of the business (Gilmore et al. 2004; van den 
Heuvel et al. 2006).  
Wengraf’s Three-Stage Pyramid Model (Wengraf 2001) is deployed in the 
structuring and conduct of the semi-structured interviews, see Figure 31, a 
critical element of case study research, that were undertaken.  Prior to the 
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conducting of the semi-structured interviews a pilot study (N=6) was 
conducted and from that, interview questions were modified and refined.  As 
a means of triangulation, and to achieve an understanding of context and 
respondent background, beliefs and attitudes a “61-statement” exploratory 
questionnaire was distributed and completed (see Appendix 9) and returned 
to the author prior to interviews taking place.  To inform the interview 
questions, the responses to the statements contained within the 
questionnaire were analysed with a view to testing validity and consistency 
of responses given during the interviews. 
The structures of the semi-structured interviews followed Wengraf (2001) 
who states that the interviewing model is based upon the primacy of the 
research question and upon the distinction between the theory-language 
used in research questions and the language used in interview interventions 
where a vernacular that is appropriate to the respondent is necessary.  
Figure 31: Research questions model following Wengraf (2001) 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Research Aim 
To investigate the contribution of corporate governance to risk and crisis 
management in small companies 
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In preparing the interview protocol, Mason (2002) suggests that in the first 
instance the researcher must decide on the content of the interviews and the 
nature of the interview questions.  Accordingly, and following Mason (2002), 
the interview questions, as previously stated, were founded upon the 
literature review, the conceptual model and in addition, the author’s thirty 
years of experience in chairing the boards of small companies.   
This is a factor considered to be an additional resource upon which to draw 
according to Myles L. Mace who confirms that he leans heavily upon his 
twenty-five years of experience gained as a serving director on various 
boards. The abstract of his book states that,  
“As a result of his experiences, he [Professor Mace] concluded that 
there was a considerable gap between what directors in fact do and 
what the business literature said that they do” (Mace 1971, p.1 
Abstract). 
Hence the author, following Mace, considers his own insight into the workings 
of the boards in small companies to be a unique and valuable source of 
information and knowledge that can add authenticity and value to this 
research.  The research aim has morphed in its nuances and gradations 
during the development of knowledge and ideas associated with this thesis.  
To reiterate, the research aim is to investigate the contribution of corporate 
governance to risk and crisis management in small companies.   
Based upon the literature and lived experience, the research question is 
"How can corporate governance contribute to risk and crisis management 
planning in small companies?”   
Table 27 summarises the progress and development of activities and events 
that result in the formulation of the research and the way that issues that are 
either apparent or emergent are addressed.  
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Table 27: Progress towards defining and realising the research aim 
1. Identification of the phenomenon 
The limited research into corporate governance in small companies concludes that meaningful practices are, in 
many instances, non-existent and that directors pay little more than lip-service to this element of boardroom 
activity.  The pilot interviews reveal that owner-managers are largely unaware of the constituents that comprise 
corporate governance and its dual role of pilot and watchman.  This preliminary research displays a dearth of 
knowledge of the most rudimentary structures of managing risk and the policies and practices that may assist 
the company in avoiding a crisis or in the event of such an event occurring, its management and containment. 
2. Identification of gaps in the literature 
This research is set in the context of small companies, an area that is widely acknowledged as being under-
researched.  Likewise, corporate governance in small companies is under-researched with most studies 
examining various aspects of corporate governance in listed companies.  This corpus of work has limited 
relevance to small companies as its theoretical basis is frequently related to agency theory and dispersed 
ownership. The literature ignores the phenomena related to corporate governance as a consequence of the 
overlapping spheres of the private and the business and the significance of owner-manager dominance in 
decision making. 
3. Focus of the study  
From the pilot study and the pre-interview questionnaire a fundamental issue is evident in that whilst owner-
managers and other directors agreed with best practice governance as expressed in an appropriate code, their 
corresponding behaviour is that of the marginalisation of industry developed guidelines.  The tautological 
matter of poor governance leading to added personal as well as business risk and the associated 
consequences was met with nonchalance. Prior research cannot adequately explain this form of denial.  
4. The philosophical journey 
Drawing from the origins of Process Philosophy and the concept of phronesis, the research questions address 
a period of five years as the timeframe in which a crisis had occurred as a determinant of inclusion with in the 
research sample and the way in which the practical issues of governing and managing had been addressed.  
The idea of constant change, of renewal and re-invention is a theme that runs throughout the research 
adjacent to questions asking how directors have acted in crisis situations 
5. The research paradigm 
This research is situated with in the constructivist interpretive paradigm that seeks to understand the 
constructions and reconstructions held by the respondents that embraces a subjectivist epistemology.  The 
role of the researcher in this study is such the researcher’s background and experience may shape 
understanding of the phenomena (Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
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Source: Author 
The interview questions coalesce around three broad categories; firstly, 
questions concerning the perceptions relate to the respondent’s notions of 
the concept of corporate governance; secondly, questions which explore the 
respondent’s view on where risk is situated in the context of corporate 
governance and thirdly questions about the contribution of corporate 
governance to risk and crisis management.  The questions are framed in an 
open manner to encourage the respondents to talk freely and expansively 
and where it is evident that there is evasion and obfuscation, prompts and 
clarifications are given. 
The questions used are of open-ended character “that are typically used in 
exploratory studies” (Remenyi et al. 2009, p.152) and of a “how, what, why, 
and who” nature.   
Other questions include experiential and behavioural questions concerning 
actions and reactions, beliefs, values, attitudes and feelings.  These 
questions seek to elicit responses as to what happened and why and to 
determine what the respondents did in terms of implementation.  “Opinion 
and values questions” help to determine what the respondents see as the 
benefits and drawbacks of the corporate governance and risk management. 
In contrast, “feeling questions” help to discover the attitudes of the 
respondents towards the corporate governance and associated matters. The 
details of the interview questions, see Table 28, are shown below. 
The Multiple Case Study  
The literature points towards a multiple case study as comprising a small 
number of cases with Yin (2014) suggesting that in small business research 
“three or four cases might be selected” (Yin 2014, p.58).  
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Table 28: Theory and Purpose Interview Questions 
TQ1 Questions relating to purpose of corporate governance                                  15-20 minutes 
The purpose of this section is to determine the nature of governance in the company and the policies, 
practices and processes related to the functions of the board.  The questions reflect the issues raised 
in the literature associated with governance in small companies  
IQ1a What do you understand by the term corporate governance and IQ1b What added value does 
corporate governance contribute to a small company like yours? 
IQ2 In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager influence corporate governance? 
TQ2: Corporate Governance and Risks                                                                       15-20 minutes 
The purpose of this section is to determine the links between governance, risk and crisis management 
IQ3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk management in your 
company? 
IQ4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the company has faced recently? 
IQ5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or mitigation?  
TQ3: Risks and Crisis Management Planning                                                           15-20 minutes 
The purpose of this section is to determine how the attitudes and beliefs of the owner-manager influence 
governance, risk and crisis management 
IQ6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a risk taker or risk averse?  
IQ7 What plans are in place to ensure business continuity post any crisis? 
Source: Author 
Following Yin (2014), four cases are selected for this study, a number which 
is also in line with the suggestion of Eisenhardt (1989) and Gibbert et al. 
224 
 
(2008), who propose that four cases are adequate in order to make relevant 
cross-case comparisons and enable a sound basis for analytical, not 
theoretical, generalisation.  
The aim of a case study, according to Remenyi et al. (2009), is “to provide a 
rich, multi-dimensional picture of the situation being studied”(Remenyi et al. 
2009, p.166).  They do however qualify this statement and offer a word of 
caution stating that in most circumstances, “a single case study approach 
should be regarded as high risk by a business and management researcher”, 
(Remenyi et al. 2009, p.181) whilst accepting that there are both advantages 
and disadvantages related to the use multiple case studies.  One such 
disadvantage may be that of lack of depth, yet the major advantage of a 
multiple case study approach is that it confers robustness and validity 
(Farquhar 2012).  Using multiple cases also offers an opportunity to analyse 
the frequency or prevalence of phenomena across cases, see Figure 32, that 
may not lead to theoretical generalisation, which Thomas (2016) describes 
as a “pretty useless” pursuit (Thomas 2016, p.69) when applied to the social 
sciences, but towards a wider heuristic and the production of provisional 
knowledge that contributes more to the phronetic than to notion of sophia. 
Figure 32: Multiple case studies and comparisons within a common boundary 
 
Source: with reference to Yin (2014) 
In contrast to the argument proposed by Thomas (2016), Gummesson (1991) 
believes that within a phenomenological study it is possible to generalise from 
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both multiple and single case studies providing that the analysis has captured 
the interactions and characteristics of the phenomena being studied .  Taking 
a different approach, Howell (2013) states that generalisation is firmly 
associated with a positivist approach where a relationship can be established 
between a sample and a population but adds that, “this is not the case for 
phenomenological, constructivist or participatory studies”(Howell 2013, 
p.184) and that in qualitative studies it is more concerned with  
 “generalisation from one setting to another; the extent that theoretical 
frameworks developed in one setting can be applied to other 
situations” (Howell 2013, p.184).  
Yin (2014) however chooses to distinguish between statistical generalisation 
and analytic generalisation, the latter involving corroboration or rejection of 
the theoretical framework arising from the literature review or new concepts 
emerging from the research itself, either of which exist at a conceptual level 
above the practicality of the case.  Yin (2014) would appear, like Aristotle, to 
accord greater status to sophia than to phronesis.   
The author follows Thomas (2016) and Howell (2013) both of whom propose 
powerful arguments against generalisability within a case study approach.  
The author concludes that whilst a multiple case study does not lead to a 
general theory nor is it capable of generalisation, such research can result in 
the production of what Bourdieu termed a “thinking tool” (Wacquant 1989, 
p.50) and furthermore, Wacquant (1993), writing on Bourdieu, expanded this 
concept to “a theory of intellectual practice and [of its] inherent limitations” 
(Wacquant 1993, p.236).  Eisenhardt (1989), also suggests an ameliorated 
outcome arguing against those who would seek generalisable theory from 
case studies when she writes,  
“The final product of building theory from case studies may be 
concepts, a conceptual framework, or propositions or possibly 
midrange theory.” (Eisenhardt 1989b, p.545). 
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Accordingly, that view is adopted in this research with particular regard to a 
conceptual model that is furthermore associated with Bourdieu’s notion of a 
“thinking tool” as a practical instrument consistent with the concept of 
phronesis.  
Research Ethics 
Bell and Bryman (2007) conduct research amongst nine professional bodies 
engaged with the social sciences and subsequently identify a number of 
principles concerning ethical practice as defined by many of those bodies.  
Ten such principles emerged, see Table 29.  
Table 29: Ten key principles in research ethics 
 
1.Ensure no harm to participants 6. Ensure informed consent 
2.Honesty and transparent communication 7.Protect dignity of respondents 
3.Protect privacy of respondents 8.Ensure confidentiality of data 
4.Declare affiliation and conflict of interest 9.Avoid false reporting of findings 
5.Avoid deception and misrepresentation 10.Respect anonymity 
Source: Bell and Bryman (2007) 
This research has complied with these principles and in addition has been 
subject to the internal ethics validation process of Bournemouth University.   
Figure 33 numerates each of the principles espoused by Bell and Bryman 
(2007) and is followed by an affirmation that these requirements have been 
met in full.  See also Appendix 8 for additional details of research ethics. 
227 
 
Figure 33: Research ethics compliance 
1. The field research is conducted on respondent’s premises in an office, 
meeting room or at their home setting that was free from hazard and 
extraneous noise. 
2. A letter is sent to all participants explaining the aims of the research 
together with a participant information sheet and prior to each interview the 
respondents are reminded of their rights to terminate the interview or to 
refuse to answer any question. 
3. Interviews are recorded and transcribed by the researcher and allocated 
codes so as to anonymise data and this assurance is included in the letter 
sent inviting participation and in the participant information sheet. 
4. Respondents are selected on the basis that there is no material 
relationship with the researcher that may result in a conflict of interest and in 
preliminary meetings they are advised that the research was not sponsored. 
5. Respondents are assured that the research is for academic purposes only. 
6. All respondents are required to sign a consent form based upon fully 
disclosed information contained in a participant information notice. 
7. The research does not involve any human contact other than a handshake 
and is conducted in a professional manner and in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect. 
8. Data is stored in password protected files and in locked drawers accessible 
only to the researcher. 
9. The data and findings are subject to scrutiny by two senior academics and 
an external examiner 
10. Respondents are allocated codes to ensure that no individual 
organisation or person may be identified  
Source: Author 
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Chapter 4-Data Collection and Methods of Analysis 
Overview of chapter  
This chapter outlines the criteria for the selection of participant companies.  It 
then summarises the fieldwork undertaken and considers a range of data 
collection methods and forms of analysis.   
The research uses Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis as the preferred 
method to analyse systematically data from a series of semi structured 
interviews that are conducted following an exploratory questionnaire.   
The chapter concludes with an explanation of data reduction and the themes 
that emerge from the analysis that was carried out with the assistance of 
NVivo software.  
The Unit(s) of Analysis 
Case studies in business and management research have an inbuilt and 
recurrent issue with regard to the establishment of boundaries that delineate 
both the starting point and the end point (Remenyi et al. 2009) and thus 
defining the unit of analysis is critical in specifying boundaries, focus and 
direction.   
In this study the unit of analysis within all four cases is the board of directors 
within the context of a small company and within that unit resides a further 
embedded sub-unit of analysis relating to how the application of corporate 
governance contributes to risk and crisis management planning, see Figure 
34.  
Selection of Cases and Respondents 
Curtis et al. (2000) in their own interpretation of the criteria for sampling state 
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Figure 34: Case embedded as a secondary unit of analysis  
 
Source: With reference to Yin (2014) 
that sampling needs to be relevant to the conceptual framework and research 
questions; should be capable of generating rich data related to the 
phenomena to be studied; should enhance generalisability – although many 
do not accept the validity of this notion (Howell 2013; Thomas 2016); produce 
believable descriptions; maintain ethical standards and should be feasible in 
its execution and resource requirements.  
This checklist may be considered by some to be highly prescriptive and 
pedagogic but nevertheless it presents a useful framework designed to apply 
rigour, process and structure.  
The “checklist” was used judiciously as broad guide to sampling and the wider 
research protocol.  
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Table 30 illustrates the relevance of the criteria proposed by Curtis et al. 
(2000). 
Table 30: Sampling criteria 
Criteria Sampling Parameters Criteria Met 
Relevance to conceptual framework Yes – using pre-existing theory and extant literature 
Potential to generate rich data Yes-this is an under-researched area 
Analytic generalisability Yes- but not theoretical generalisation 
Believable explanations Yes – an important validating criterion 
Ethical Yes- fully compliant with the university policy 
Feasible Yes-access was possible, however board observation 
was a matter of concern to some 
Source: with reference to Curtis et al (2000)  
In order to produce depth of evidence, this study uses four cases.  Each case 
is a “small company” so defined by UK Government company criteria.  Each 
of the participating companies met specific and detailed criteria related to 
location, sector, shareholding and history of crises. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) state that case (or cases) selection need not require 
a representative and structured sample, which is the norm in a quantitative 
study where the sample is reflective of a given population, as the purpose of 
qualitative case study research is not concerned with statistical 
generalisation.   
Accordingly, the selection of cases is made on the basis of non-probability, 
purposive maximal sampling (Creswell 2007) using size, sector and the 
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incidence of a crisis, self-defined by the owner-managers, having taken place 
within the past five years so as to allow meaningful cross-case analysis.   
Given the research purpose and the subsequent research questions, it is 
recognised that access to the inner workings of boards may present an issue, 
as Daily et al. (2003) point out, directors are reluctant to invite researchers 
into the board’s deliberations and state that this “is understandable” (Daily et 
al. 2003, p.379). 
Daily et al. (2003) add that at the time of writing, boards have been largely 
unwilling to provide such access due in part to additional shareholder scrutiny 
and the risk of lawsuits in the case of plc boards.  Langevoort (2001) evinces 
another explanation of this reticence, writing that,  
"increasing the liability exposure for directors who fall down on the job 
and fail to prevent some form of misbehaviour by insiders" (Langevoort 
2001, p.800). 
According to Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) and specific to this study, the 
prospects of access to boardroom for firms experiencing a crisis are 
extremely low as directors of these companies are unlikely to expose 
themselves to unnecessary scrutiny beyond their immediate professional 
advisors.  It was therefore of little surprise that, whilst individual directors 
agreed to participate in interviews, and despite assurances regarding 
confidentiality, consent was given in only one case for the researcher to be 
“a fly on the wall” in the boardroom during a meeting of the directors.   
Data Collection  
According to Vissak (2010), “case study data can be collected from multiple 
levels, perspectives and sources” (Vissak 2010, p.373) and hence, the data 
collection medium should facilitate the gathering of differing views and 
opinions of respondents and the additional use of secondary data from other 
sources.  To that end, the sources used in this study are many and varied 
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with the main stream of data emanating from a series of semi-structured 
interviews which, as noted by Silverman (2006), seek to “generate data which 
gives an authentic insight into people’s experience” (Silverman 2006, p.118) 
and as such enable an exploration of the lebenswelt of the directors of small 
companies and how corporate governance contributes to risk and crisis 
management planning.   
Yin (2014) also states that the data for a case study should come from a 
range of sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation and physical artefacts.  Such diversity of 
sources of evidence, it is claimed, enhances the strength of the study and 
can add to “new insight” (Farquhar 2012, p.79).  Abeysekera (2015), 
developing this theme, suggests that the benefits of such multiple sources of 
evidence can be optimised by maintaining a database in which all the data 
are stored in a systematic fashion and as such offers an opportunity to revert 
to primary data thereby resulting in greater reliability (e.g. Yin, 2009).  Such 
a database is created as part of this research and acts as a repository of the 
multiple sources of evidence and a range of associated external and internal 
data. 
Data collection takes place in two distinct stages.  In the first instance, data 
from the directors of the four companies participating in the research are 
collected through a “61 statement” questionnaire, details of which are 
contained in the latter parts of this chapter, and by an initial fact-finding visit 
that also involves the author responding to questions and concerns from the 
owner-managers.  This information is used to fine-tune both the conceptual 
framework and research questions.  In the second stage, data are collected 
from directors and owner-managers of the companies concerned through 
one-to-one semi-structured interviews and in once instance through 
observation.  Corporate websites, Companies House, marketing collateral 
and public databases provide secondary data.  
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As this study is exploratory in nature and aims to gain rich insights into the 
role of corporate governance, risk and crisis management in small 
companies, semi-structured interviews using a pre-prepared framework 
(Maykut and Morehouse 1994) is considered to be, amongst others, an 
appropriate method for primary data collection.  Martin et al (2009) state that 
the purpose of such interviews is,  
“to yield insights about less researched concepts that can guide theory 
development and/or future research and hence can be empirically 
verified in subsequent research.” (Martin et al. 2009, p.98). 
Patton (2002) likewise, states that the semi-structured interview enables the 
researcher to gather data in great detail and to create a conversational style.  
Such a style assists in developing an atmosphere that is conducive to 
expansive answers  thereby enabling the researcher to collect deep-mined 
data whilst covering a topic of interest to both parties (Gill et al. 2008).   
Additional secondary data are collected through company policies, product 
brochures, on-line resources, observation, a personal letter in one instance 
and an array of government and non-governmental reports that provided 
useful information as a backdrop to the field research. 
Due to the open-ended nature of the inquiry, the data gathered from the 
interviews are that of unstructured text which at times comprised lengthy and 
meandering paragraphs.  It is a non sequitur that in a semi-structured 
interview the interviewee responds in a precise and focussed manner.  
Rather, the respondent may frequently answer questions in advance of the 
asking and as a result, the response to a particular question may reside 
elsewhere in the text thus creating hermeneutical complexity in conducting 
the analysis.   
Accordingly, the task of the researcher is to create order and structure from 
the unstructured data and discover meaningful and analysable themes 
thereby facilitating conclusions as the study progresses.   
234 
 
In three cases, the semi-structured interviews are conducted on a one-to-one 
basis in private offices at the company premises.  In the fourth case, the 
interview is held at the respondent’s home.  In each instance around 80 
minutes is spent with the respondent, the first 15-20 minutes being 
unrecorded conversation about their role in the company designed to act as 
an “ice-breaker” and to establish rapport.  Some weeks prior to the interview 
the respondent companies were visited by the researcher and upon agreeing 
to participate then received an information briefing document and a letter 
explaining the nature of the research.  Prior to the interview respondents 
signed a document confirming that they fully understood the nature of the 
research; that participation was voluntary; that they were free to refuse to 
answer a question and to withdraw from the interview and to permit recording.  
(Appendix 8) 
Fieldwork  
For a summary of the fieldwork conducted, see Table 31. 
Table 31: Summary of Fieldwork 
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 
Dates of visits 
and interviews 
3 Nov 16, 22 Mar 
17 
24 Mar 17, 26 April 
17, 1 June 17 
17 Dec 16 
25 Jan 17 
16 Feb 17 
21 Oct 16, 22 Dec 
17 
27 Jan 17, 15 Mar 
17 
20 Dec 16 
22 Feb 17 
No interviews 4 2 2 1 
Duration (hrs) 8 6 7 4 
Data collected Interviews, 
observation, 
premises tour, 
questionnaire 
Interviews, 
premises tour, 
questionnaire 
Interviews, 
premises tour, 
questionnaire 
Interviews 
questionnaire, 
personal 
correspondence 
Source: Author 
In conducting a semi-structured interview, the author is aware that it is 
possible that interviewer bias may impact on the reliability of the findings and 
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hence both verbal and non-verbal actions on the part of the interviewer 
should remain neutral and any manifestations of personal values and beliefs 
should remain suppressed throughout the interview.  In spite of maintaining 
neutrality, a perceptive respondent may however detect subtle and sub-
conscious body language agreeing with, or disapproving of a particular 
answer. 
Respondent bias is also a possibility regarding sensitivity to questions that 
may imply or suggest weakness or a failure on their part, or on the part of the 
company, that could lead to socially desirable responses.   
Likewise, behavioural indicators that suggest discomfort, embarrassment, 
obfuscation and evasion must be noted.  Where there is a lack of clarity in 
any answer, it is incumbent upon the interviewer to probe more deeply until 
a sense of unease is evident in the respondent at which point progress should 
be made. 
The author is also aware that the interviewer should engage in active listening 
and desist from interjections, interruptions and leading questions.  
Furthermore, the interviewer should be cognisant of the respondents dress 
and appearance, cultural sensitivity and the need to present a professional 
demeanour.  
Further issues which the interviewer should recognise and react to may result 
from a low level of engagement or disinterest by respondents.  Interviewers 
must also guard against lengthy answers that ramble into irrelevance, role 
reversal and where the respondent asks for interviewer advice, comment and 
opinion.   
Respondent aggrandisement and status enhancement; emotional overload 
on the part of the respondent and the process of interviewing itself fracturing 
the narrative are all potential hazards to an effective interview.   
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Instances of these matters do arise during the interviews and accordingly 
appropriate measures are taken to then return to the interview’s core 
purpose.  
Transcription 
All audio recordings are transcribed to facilitate data coding and analysis.  
Both audio recordings and transcriptions are imperfect representations or 
records of what was originally communicated.  Consequently, all the 
interviews are audio-recorded and transcribed by the author and whilst this 
is a time-consuming exercise, it nevertheless ensures the researcher 
remains close to the text and feels both its rhythm and cadence.  Each 
interview is saved as a separate file using a filename that preserves 
confidentiality yet is recognisable by the researcher.  In a similar fashion, the 
researcher’s name is changed to a code as is the name of the respondent.  
All questions are numbered at the start of the question to ensure consistency.   
Where there are instances of hesitation, laughter, discomfort, sighs, head 
rolling, emotion and other non-verbal cues, these are noted in brackets within 
the transcribed text.  To ensure the accuracy of the transcription process, a 
guide is devised for transcribing the audio recordings and this is shown in 
Appendix 11.  Although authenticity is paramount, Mason (2002) states that 
information can be distorted or can vanish in the transformation from one 
media to another such as for example, from face-to-face communication to 
audio recordings and from audio recordings to transcriptions.  
Mason adds that, 
“A transcription is always partial partly because it is an inadequate 
record of non-verbal aspects of the interaction (even if you try to insert 
these in the form of field notes into the transcription afterwards), and 
also because judgments are made (usually by the person doing the 
transcription) about which verbal utterances to turn into text, and how 
to do it” (Mason 2002, p.77). 
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Despite the chance of a very small measure of degradation of data quality, 
the transformation from audio recordings to transcriptions is however 
necessary, and due to the amount of data collected, the support of NVivo 
Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) is required 
to assist with analysis.  Self-memos are written to record ideas, comments 
and observations as the research progresses and during categorisation of 
the data.  Miles and Huberman (2014) suggest that such memos are filed 
separately and are cross referenced, where appropriate, to transcribed text. 
Analytical Techniques 
Table 32: Data Analysis and Representation  
Data Analysis & Representation Case Study 
Data Organisation Create and organise files for data 
Reading and Memoing Read text, make notes and form initial codes 
Describing data into codes and themes Use categorical aggregation to establish 
 themes or patterns 
Classifying data into codes and themes Describe the case and context 
Interpreting the data Use direct interpretation and develop “bridges between 
ideas” 
Representing, visualizing the data Present in-depth picture of case(s) 
 using narrative, tables and figures 
Source: with reference to Creswell (2013) and Thomas (2016) 
As this research is inductive in nature, the analysis explores common themes, 
patterns and categories as they emerge from the research in order to 
discover new concepts and to find points of congruence and similarity.   
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Whilst the basis of inductive research lies within grounded theory (Corbin and 
Strauss 1990) which posits that theory emerges from the data, Remenyi et 
al. (2009) point out that preconceptions derived from practical knowledge and 
from the literature review cannot be avoided.   
Hence this study has used a conceptual framework in order to act as a 
conjecture that, in turn, informs the research purpose and research questions 
with a “nod of the head” to the enlightened thinking of Charmaz (2014) and 
broadly following Creswell’s (2013) model for case study analysis and 
representation, see Table 32 and Figure 35.  Although Creswell’s model for 
case study analysis is related to the research strategy adopted in this study, 
other process models dealing with greater depth as to data analysis offer 
route-maps through the maze of approaches to coding.  Table 33 
summarises the stages and processes involved in qualitative analysis 
according to Ritchie and Spencer (1994), Maykut and Morehouse (1994) and 
Van Kamm (1994). 
Figure 35: Coding structure for case study analysis 
 
Source: with reference to Creswell (2013 p.209) 
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Table 33: Analytical stages for data analysis 
Authors Process Stages Application in 
NVivo 
Strategic 
Objectives 
Ritchie and Spencer 1.Familiarisation 
2.Identify thematic framework 
3.Indexing 
4.Charting 
5.Maping and interpretation 
 
1.Open coding 
2.Categorising codes 
3.Coding on 
4.In case and cross case 
analysis 
5.Data reduction 
Data Management 
Descriptive accounts 
Explanatory accounts 
Moustaka as modified by Van 
Kaam 
1.Listing and initial grouping 
2.Reduction and elimination 
3.Clustering and thematising  
4. Identify invariance relating 
to a thematic label 
5. Construct textual 
descriptors 
6. Construct textual structural 
descriptors 
7.Construct meanings of 
textual descriptors 
1.Open coding 
2.Categorising codes 
3.Coding on 
4. Data reduction and 
consolidation 
5.Analytical memos and 
summary statements 
6.Validate and synthesises 
analytical memos 
Data Management 
Explanatory accounts 
Explanatory accounts 
Maykut and Morehouse 1.Compare units of meaning 
for inductive category coding 
2.Refine relationships 
3.Expolore relationship 
patterns 
4.Integrate data to write 
findings 
1.Open coding 
2.Categorising codes 
3.Coding on 
4.In case and cross case 
analysis 
5.Data reduction 
6.Analytical memos 
7.Validate memos 
7.Synthesise memos 
Descriptive accounts  
Data Management 
 
Explanatory accounts 
Source: with reference to Ritchie and Spencer (1994), Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994) and Van Kaam (1959)  
All three of the models contained, see Table 33, suggest that qualitative data 
can be coded using a systematic approach irrespective of the methods used 
to collect the data and in spite of the free-flowing nature of semi-structured 
interviews that engender responses liberally and with spontaneity.  The 
responses to questions, documental text and other source matter are 
categorised according to saliency of meaning rather than to a pre-determined 
template or a formulaic assemblage.  (See Appendix 12 for the codebook 
used to manage node categories.)  Such is the nature of coding that Miles 
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and Huberman (1994) state that “coding is analysis”(Miles and Huberman 
1994, p.56) whilst Creswell (2009) offers an alternative approach writing that 
coding,  
“involves taking text data or pictures gathered during data collection, 
segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and 
labelling those categories with a term” (Creswell 2009, p.186). 
Crang (1997) adds a fine point in crystallising the essence of coding 
commenting that what is generally of interest is, 
“not so much the codes as the text they denote, not how often they 
occur but what is in them” (Crang 1997, p.188). 
The following detailed review of qualitative analysis methods enables a 
deeper understanding and appreciation of the nuances between the various 
approaches to data analysis and as a consequence the rationale for method 
selection that is both systematic and detailed. 
Thematic Analysis  
Thematic analysis is the most commonly used method of analysis in 
qualitative research analysis (Thomas and Harden 2008; Guest et al. 2011) 
and is used for identifying, analysing, and reporting (themes) within data 
(Braun and Clarke 2006).  The method of analysis should be driven by both 
theoretical assumptions and the research questions.  Thematic analysis 
provides a flexible method of data analysis and allows for researchers with 
various methodological backgrounds to engage in this type of analysis.  
Critics argue that reliability with this method is of concern because of the wide 
variety of interpretations that arise from the themes, as well as applying 
themes to large amounts of text.  Increasing reliability may occur if multiple 
researchers are coding simultaneously, which is possible with this form of 
analysis (Guest et al. 2011).  In addition, Thematic Analysis is sometimes 
over reliant on the presentation of themes supported by participant quotes as 
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the primary form of analysis rather than as an outcome of rigorous data 
analysis processes (Bazeley 2009).  
Content Analysis 
Content Analysis is the analysis of texts of several types including writing, 
images, recordings and cultural items.  It tends to focus at a detailed level, 
often providing word frequency counts and enabling quantitative analysis of 
what had initially been qualitative data (Ryan and Bernard 2000).  The 
themes are frequently quantified and the unit of analysis tends to be a single 
word or a particular phrase.  In this research the themes are not quantified 
and the unit of analysis is the board of directors and accordingly this method 
was rejected as inappropriate. 
Discourse Analysis  
Discourse Analysis covers a range of approaches to aid analysis of written, 
vocal, or sign language usage or other semiotic activity.  It resides in a 
number of guises that includes dialects and sociolinguistics.  It also requires 
a detailed theoretical and technological knowledge of semantics, syntax and 
etymology. 
Narrative Analysis  
Narrative Analysis emerged from within the broader field of qualitative 
research (Riessman 1993) and uses a wide range of sources that include 
texts, written and orally transmitted stories, autobiographies, diaries, field 
notes, letters, informal conversations, interviews, family stories, photographs 
and objects as the units of analysis to research and understand the way 
people create meaning in their lives as narratives.  Narrative analysis is a 
commonly used technique in ethnographic research.  Boje (2001) argues that 
whereas narrative analysis supports the idea of interpretivism it is however 
deficient in its theoretical perceptions.   
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis  
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is a relatively recent 
qualitative approach with its roots in psychology.  Its idiographic focus aims 
to offer insights into how a particular person, in a unique context, makes 
sense of a specific phenomenon.  Drawing upon the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
Husserlian phenomenology and the later work of Martin Heidegger related to 
existentialism and hermeneutics, IPA is concerned with exploring the detailed 
understanding of people's direct experience of reality thus gaining a rich 
understanding of the phenomenon in question.   
Merleau-Ponty (1964) acknowledges the complexity of phenomenological 
data analysis in his essay “Cezanne’s Doubt” and it could be concluded that 
the work of the French artist Paul Cezanne with its tolerance of ambiguity 
encapsulates the tenets of the “prototypic phenomenologist” (Maykut and 
Morehouse p.34).  Cezanne’s brush strokes and sensuous portrayals, 
Merleau-Ponty asserts, are akin to Wittgenstein’s “rough ground” with the 
subsequent contours that emerge uncircumscribed by a script to be followed 
or a formula to be adopted in the undertaking of qualitative inquiry.    
Figure 36: Cezanne’s interpretive work Mont Sainte-Victoire 
 
Source: Paul Cézanne, Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1902-04, oil on canvas, 73 x 
91.9 cm (Philadelphia Museum of Art) 
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Merleau-Ponty may have been gazing at Cezanne’s work “Mont Sainte-
Victoire”, (Cezanne 1902-1904) when he wrote, 
“His painting was paradoxical: he was pursuing reality without giving 
up the rough sensuous surface, with no other guide than the 
immediate impression of nature, without following contours, with no 
outline to enclose the colours, with no perspectival or pictorial 
arrangements” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.12) 
Accordingly, IPA is used to analyse the actors and their idiosyncratic 
behaviours, attitudes and beliefs within a case study where each individual’s 
perception of realty albeit subjective and ineffable, nevertheless may be 
synthesized to a meaningful whole (Pietkiewicz and Smith 2012).   
The small sample size of most IPA studies  
“then enables the micro-level reading of the participants’ accounts, 
which offers the possibility of some entree into the 
understanding”(Smith and Osborn 2012, p.42).  
The inquiry is sharpened by IPA’s inductive, interpretive analysis, providing 
an illumination of what is presented but importantly grounding that firmly in a 
close examination of what the participant has said and what can be inferred 
from both their words and actions.  
By way of criticism, Smith (2011b) warns of the need for the researcher to 
guard against allowing an a priori assumption to impose conceptual 
categories whilst using IPA.   
Given the conceptual framework that has been developed as part of this 
study, the author notes the advice of Smith (2011) and has been cognisant 
of the intrusion of personal bias leading to a potential distortion of the 
evidence and a manipulation of the data to support an a priori position.  
The stages of the analytical process using IPA are detailed, see Figure 37.  
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Figure 37: Phases of analysis using IPA 
 
Source: Author following Meehan (2017) 
IPA is the method of analysis chosen for this study as it is based upon sound 
philosophical foundations and moreover, IPA is suited to a small sample 
where the elucidation of personal meaning related to lived experiences can 
be ascertained.  The analytical strategy adopted in this study is informed by 
Ritchie and Spencer (1994) and derived from Pietkiewicz and Smith’s (2012) 
guidelines and the work of Meehan (2017). An example of the categorisation 
stage using IPA, see Figure 38. 
Figure 38: Screenshot of part of coding nodes categorisation used for 
question 2 
 
Source: Author 
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Pre-Interview Exploratory Questionnaire 
An exploratory questionnaire (see Appendix 9) is sent to all respondents two 
weeks prior to the dates set for the semi-structured interviews in order to 
prompt the respondents to think critically on issues related to the way 
corporate governance operates within the business and to discover practices 
and beliefs associated with risk and crisis management.  Respondents are 
asked to express a measure of agreement, using a five point Likert scale, in 
respect of 61 statements that are structured into four sections each dealing 
with a particular aspect of the research. 
 
Statements 1-19 are focussed upon corporate governance practices and 
processes that could be said to represent good practice for a small company 
based upon the IOD’s Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for 
Unlisted Companies in the UK (2010), The Non-Executive Directors 
Handbook (2007), The IFC Family Business Governance Handbook 
(Abouzaid 2011) and the BSI Code of practice for delivering effective 
governance of organizations (British Standards Institution 2013a).  Figure 39 
is a screenshot of part of the 19 statements relating to corporate governance 
and also illustrates the responses, based on a Likert Scale, to the various 
statements.  Cells highlighted in green show a measure of positive 
concurrence between respondents relating to the statement whilst cells 
highlighted in red show broad concurrence in the rejection of the statement.  
Concurrence is defined as an aggregation of “strongly agree” and “agree” or 
as “strongly disagree” and “disagree”.  Concurrence is also defined where the 
dominant response to the statement is “neither” in cells highlighted yellow. 
 
Statements 20-48 are concerned with risk and seek to elicit responses 
concerning the directors’ attitude to risk and the role played by the board in 
risk management and risk policy making.  The statements are derived from 
academic literature and professional organisations including the Institute of 
Risk Management Standard 030820 (Institute of Risk Management 2002), 
BSI PD 6668 Managing Risk for Corporate Governance (British Standards 
246 
 
Institution 2000) and BSI PD ISO/TR 31004 Risk Management Guidance for 
the implementation of ISO 31000 (British Standards Institution 2013b).  
 
Statements 49, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61 and 62 relate to crisis management issues 
and post-event business continuity.  The statements are based upon 
academic literature and BSI 11200, Crisis Management – Guidance and 
Good Practice (British Standards Institution 2014).   
 
Statements 53-59 seek to gain an understanding of the respondent’s 
attitudes towards crises and differ from the remainder of the statements in 
that “strongly disagree” and “disagree” suggests a positive view of crisis 
management planning and hence the highlighting is reversed from the bulk 
of the responses.  The statements are largely based upon the work of Mitroff 
and Anagnos (2000). 
 
Figure 39: Screenshot of a section of the questionnaire showing corporate 
governance statements, responses and analysis  
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 40: Screenshot of a section of the questionnaire showing risk 
statements, responses and analysis  
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 41: Screenshot of section of the questionnaire showing crisis 
statements, responses and analysis  
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 42: Screenshot of section of questionnaire showing crisis belief 
statements, responses and analysis   
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Semi Structured Interviews 
This section of the study begins with outlining the questions asked in the nine 
semi-structured interviews conducted with the directors of four small 
companies.   
The interviews comprise seven questions  as re-presented in Table 34 with 
the first question being divided into its two constituent parts.  Further details 
are contained in the methodology chapter.   
The transcribed text of each interview is then coded using NVivo.  
In order to analyse, categorise and synthesise the answers to the questions, 
see Table 34, in respect of case study analysis, Yin (2009) suggests that four 
general strategies and five particular techniques may be used.  These broad 
strategies and techniques are not mutually exclusive and accordingly 
researchers are free to use any or all in a number of combinations. 
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Table 34: Semi-structured interview questions 
Q1a What do you understand by the term corporate governance? and 
Q1b what added value does corporate governance contribute to a small company 
like yours? 
Q2 In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager influence 
corporate governance? 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk 
management in your company? 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the company 
has faced recently? 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or mitigation?  
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a risk taker or 
risk averse?  
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business continuity post any crisis? 
 
Source: Author 
The first of the four broad strategies Yin (2009) suggests researchers use in 
the process of analysis is that of dependence upon the theoretical 
propositions that led the case study.  The original objectives of the cases in 
this study, whilst not based on propositions, but rather upon a conceptual 
framework emerging from the literature review which in turn gives rise to the 
research questions, lead to new substantive theory or constructs.  This study 
therefore employs the conceptual framework as a basis for strategy of 
analysis.  
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Secondly, Yin (2009) proposes that developing a case description can be 
used when data has been collected prior to the creation of the initial research 
questions.  As the research questions related to this study precede the 
collection of data this strategy is not adopted. 
Thirdly, Yin (2009) states that both quantitative and qualitative analytical 
strategies could be required as some case studies may feature a 
considerable amount of quantitative data, in spite of qualitative data 
remaining as the focus of the study.   
Accordingly, researchers may require computer software such as SPSS to 
analyse numerical data.  Although this study uses a questionnaire, due to the 
small sample, subsequent analysis does not require significant data analysis 
capabilities and as such, quantitative analysis techniques were not used. 
The last of the strategies that Yin (2009) suggest researchers may use to 
conduct case study analysis is that of examining rival explanations.  It is 
axiomatic that even with in a single case there will be opposing and 
contrasting perspectives of respondents.   
Although this study does not have rival propositions it is however evident that 
there are rival perspectives and dissonance and hence this strategy is used.  
For example, the literature on crisis management is clear that a commonly 
held position of directors is one of denial, yet the findings of this research, 
whilst not generalisable, point to a cautious, realistic and thoughtful posture 
in some cases. 
The five techniques that Yin (2009) proposes for the analysis of data are 
explanation building, time series analysis, pattern matching, logic models and 
cross case synthesis. 
The first technique of explanation building is widely used in descriptive case 
studies although it is used in exploratory case studies as a part of the 
hypothesis-generating process.  Its objective is to develop ideas for further 
research.  As this study is exploratory, the explanation building technique was 
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used.  To illustrate, new data emerged from one of the case studies that could 
lead to further research regarding the impact of business failure on 
humiliation, private life, family security and inheritance. 
The second analytical technique Yin (2009) proposes is that of time-series 
analysis.  Time series analysis comprises various methods for analysing time 
series data in order to elicit meaningful statistics and other elements of the 
data.   
Time series analysis is used as a model to predict future values based on 
previously observed values and is a quantitative technique commonly 
employed in positivist research.  This technique was considered in 
appropriate in these cases, as the study is not dealing with time-related data. 
In qualitative research, pattern matching, the third of Yin’s (2009) techniques 
is at the core of any attempt to conduct IPA within the context a case study.  
The “theoretical pattern” is an assumption or set of assumptions concerning 
expectations arising from the data.  "Pattern matching involves an attempt to 
link two patterns where one is a theoretical pattern and the other is an 
observed or operational one” (Trochim 2006), see Figure 43.  
The theory, as referred to by Yin (2009), might originate from a formal 
positivist, deductive tradition, or may be the ideas, constructs or "hunches" of 
the researcher in the case of inductive, qualitative research.   
The lower part of Figure 43 indicates the cluster of observation, data and 
external sources including direct observation in the form of impressions, field 
notes, interview transcripts, as well as more formal objective measures if 
applicable. 
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Figure 43: Pattern Matching 
 
Source: Trochim (2000)   
The task of conceptualisation involves the translation of these ideas into a 
coherent pattern as indicated at the centre of Figure 43.  Accordingly, this 
study uses pattern matching as a technique to analyse the case studies.  An 
example of theoretical and observational matching is that of the dominant 
role of the owner-manager as expressed in Figure 44 for example, at one end 
of the Tannenbaum and Schmidt leadership continuum theory (Tannenbaum 
and Schmidt 1958) and his attitude to the collective responsibilities of the 
board and director independence where there may be a range varying 
between total congruence to chaotic dissonance. 
The fourth of the techniques advocated by Yin (2009), the logic model 
technique, is used in case study analysis when the case events are staged 
in repeated cause-effect sequences.  This technique not applicable to this 
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study as it is does not concern itself with byzantine chains of inter-related 
events. 
Figure 44: Tannenbaum and Schmidt leadership continuum theory 
 
Source: Harvard Business Review (1973) 
The last of the techniques advocated by Yin (2009) is cross-case synthesis.  
In this study, both within-case and cross-case synthesis is used and word 
clusters are created to display the data from the individual cases according 
to a common structure.  In qualitative analysis, the key common elements in 
the data are amalgamated into ‘themes’.  Themes can be common to all the 
cases or may vary across groups of cases depending on the nature of the 
data.  According to Creswell, (2007), cross-case comparisons are especially 
useful for external validation of individual case study findings.  Cruzes et al. 
(2014) state that,  
“The process of synthesis entails organizing the relevant evidence 
extracted from the included sources and then finding some way of 
bringing it together. The way the evidence is organized depends to 
some extent on the type(s) and scope of the evidence, the method(s) 
employed and on the preferences of the researcher”(Cruzes et al. 
2014, p.9). 
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Table 35 summarises the strategies and techniques used in data synthesis. 
Table 35: Strategies and Techniques used in data synthesis 
Strategies used Techniques used 
Reliance on conceptual model Pattern matching 
Examination of rival explanations Explanation building 
 Cross-case synthesis 
Source: Author with reference to Abeysekera (2015)  
Data Reduction, Data Display and Conclusions 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), data analysis comprises three 
elements of 1) data reduction, 2) data display and 3) drawing or verification 
of conclusions.  Data reduction “sharpens” data (Miles and Huberman 1994, 
p.11) and brings disparate into focus by summarising, condensing, 
organising and discarding in order that final conclusions can be drawn and 
verified.  In this study, data reduction is achieved through a detailed 
examination of the respondent’s answers and, through a forensic approach, 
to determine meaning from those answers.  The objective is not merely to 
compare data to find out similarities or differences but rather gain an 
appreciation of the phenomenon of the contribution of corporate governance 
to risk and crisis management in small companies. 
Data display involves organising and assembling data into summary 
diagrams or visual displays .  Miles and Huberman (1994) state that data 
must be displayed in order that the agglomerated information enables 
conclusions to be drawn and, if required, subsequent action to be taken.  The 
data in this study are predominantly qualitative although answers from the 
pre-interview questionnaire are shown on a spreadsheet.  As such, the data 
display is structured using the two methods advocated by Miles and 
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Huberman, (1994) – firstly through matrices and secondly through networks 
using an assemblage of ‘nodes’ connected by line-links.  
Finally, Miles and Huberman, (1994) aver that conclusion and verification are 
concerned with meaning and its implications. The researcher is therefore 
drawing out meaning and noting where, within the meaning, reside the 
commonalities, regularities, divergences, anomalies, patterns and 
explanations.   
Accordingly, in this study, conclusions are made through recognition of 
patterns, the development of explanations and cross-case synthesis through 
the lens of the conceptual model.  The process stages of data reduction are 
adapted from Cruzes et al. (2014), see Figures 45 and 46, using Q1a as an 
example. 
Figure 45: Example of the process of IPA synthesis 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 46: Example of moving from open codes to themes 
 
Source:  Author with reference to Cruzes et al. (2014) and NVivo 
Data analysis using NVivo 10  
NVivo 10 qualitative research software, developed by QSR International 
based in Australia, assists researchers to manage, shape and understand 
the meaning of unstructured data irrespective of the form of the data which 
may include audio, video, documents and pictures.  NVivo 10 is designed to 
ease the complex task of organising, analysing and sharing data, and acts as 
a common platform for a range of qualitative methods.  It is in effect a series 
of interlinking cardboard boxes into which data is dropped for subsequent 
analysis.  NVivo 10 uses a processual algorithm based upon a structured 
approach to the creation of cases and nodes into which data is housed.  
In this study, four cases are created in NVivo 10 representing the four 
companies studied and the interview transcripts from each of the nine 
respondents, which form the principal data sources, are imported and set up 
as a sub-set within the “company box”.   
The text of the nine interviews are then coded and allocated a particular node 
that describes the sentiment of a particular word, phrase sentence or 
paragraph.  Open or Initial Coding allows the researcher to classify the 
interview data into meaningful categories or themes.  
9 Open 
codes 
 
 
 
3 Themes 
 
The 2 Higher Order Themes are:                  
1. Doing the right things right                      
2. Complying with statutory instruments 
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Whilst auto-coding is valuable in positivist research in which ranging 
questionnaires are used with large samples, manual coding is more common 
in qualitative research when there is a relatively small data set and the study 
requires detailed and in-depth analysis.  The researcher using manual coding 
firstly identifies the themes based on transcripts and other sources and then 
creates “nodes” in NVivo 10.  Each node has a title and a descriptor in order 
to ensure that the researcher then allocates relevant text, for example, to the 
appropriate nodes.  For an example of this, see Figure 47.  A hierarchy is 
created in which so-called “child nodes” feature in the analysis in this study 
where the transcript contains deeper meanings than that shown in the so-
called “parent node”.   
A code book of 14 A4 pages is created that outlines the location, name and 
description of each node together with the number of sources cited and the 
number of coding references.  The code book is shown in Appendix 12. 
Table 36: The extended process of analysis and synthesis. 
Question 
Number 
Initial reading 
and noting of 
data/text 
Identify specific 
segments of text 
Label the 
segments of text 
as open codes 
Reduce overlap, 
categorise codes 
into themes 
Synthesise 
and create 
valid higher 
order themes 
1a  43 9 3 2 
1b  98 26 6 2 
2  124 37 5 3 
3  233 32 7 3 
4  118 22 5 3 
5  112 23 6 3 
6  77 19 4 3 
7  46 6 3 2 
Source: Author 
The analysed data in NVivo 10 is synthesised in the thesis using IPA and 
following constructs developed by Cruzes et al. (2014).  Table 36 uses the 
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structure, see Figure 47 to illustrate the extended process of analysis and 
synthesis. 
Figure 47: Example of node properties and description 
 
Source: Author 
Themes differ from codes in that they are phrases or sentences that identify 
the meaning of the data and are the product of coding that enables analytic 
reflection.  Themes comprise ideas and portrayals within a context that can 
facilitate explanation of causal events, statements, and ethical positions 
derived from the participants' narratives.  Through an iterative process, the 
researcher narrows down the initial themes to provide an overreaching or 
Higher Order Theme.  
This analysis enables themes to emerge from the sub-strata of the data such 
as the meanings arising from repetition of concepts; culturally defined 
shorthand, metaphors and analogies; shifts in emphasis; and the nuances of 
linguistics.  
The analysis addresses not only what is present in data, but also what is 
missing.  
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The Higher Order Themes that emerge, see Table 37, in some instances, 
reflect wide divergence in the responses given by participants to interview 
questions.   
Table 37: Higher order themes 
Research  
Question 
Higher Order Themes 
1a Doing the right things right 
Complying with statutory instruments 
1b Corporate Governance makes a positive contribution to success 
Corporate Governance adds limited value to a small company 
2 Dominance of owner-manager and family members 
Moderating effect of outsiders 
Quality earnings with ethical practices 
3 Risk is a key element of corporate governance  
Owner-manager’s attitude to risk over-rides governance policies 
Strong influence of past events influences decision making 
4 “Just do it” trumps safety first 
Operational crises are prioritised over strategic crises 
Post-crisis learning is of marginal interest 
5 Risk identification is poorly understood 
Due diligence is a burdensome time waster 
A belief that insurance cover will meet our needs 
6 A history of success precedes a mind-set of invincibility 
External impartial advice is valued 
Network membership is viewed as a great source of support 
7 Planning for the worst is unstructured and haphazard 
Come what may, we will sort it out  
Source: Author 
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Chapter 5-Introduction to Cases and Respondents  
 
Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter introduces the four cases, referred to as Companies (COS) 1, 
2, 3 and 4, and the respondent owner-managers’ and directors’ taking part in 
this study.  The introduction to each case includes a description of the 
structure of the company, the board and associated governance procedures, 
the nature of the products and services that are offered together with financial 
and performance data.  The findings from the preliminary questionnaire and 
the respective interviews conducted with the respondents from the four 
companies are contained in Chapter 6. 
  
Introducing the Four Cases 
 
Gaining access to directors is a key consideration in order to conduct 
business research and hence ensure the viability of the project.  In this 
respect the author’s position as a Fellow of the Institute of Directors proved 
to be of great value in getting beyond gatekeepers and arranging preliminary 
meetings with the companies that took place in both the pilot study and the 
main study.     
 
The criteria applied to those companies invited to participate in the main study 
comprises, firstly, size - the company has to be within the UK Government’s 
definition of a small company- between 10 and 49 employees.  The second 
criteria relates to location in order to avoid long distance travel but more 
importantly that the companies reside within the broad area of the author’s 
IoD network of Hampshire and Dorset.  The third criteria is that the four 
companies would not be in similar or related spheres of business.  This 
avoids suspicions of a conflict of interest, but also offers the opportunity to 
reflect upon cross-case similarities and differences that may arise as a 
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consequence of risk profiles.  The final criteria is that each of the selected 
companies had been engaged in a self-defined crisis within the recent past, 
a period that the author determines as being 5 years. 
 
All companies (and their owner-managers and directors) responding to the 
invitation to participate in this study are (and in one instance “were”), small 
businesses across a range of sectors so classified by Standard Industry 
Codes (The National Office of Statistics 2017), see Tables 38, 39 and 40 
Table 38: Characteristics of participating companies 
Ref. 
Code 
Legal 
status 
Sector 
SIC 
Code/s 
Business 
Type 
No. of 
Directors 
Directors 
interviewed 
CO1 Private 
Ltd 
Environmental 35110, 
35210 
46770 
Service and 
Manufacturing 
4 (3 de-
jure) 
4 
CO2 Private 
Ltd 
Construction 38220, 
81299 
Service 3 de-jure 2 
CO3 Private 
Ltd 
Security 27900 Manufacturing 3 (2 de-
jure) 
2 
CO4 Private 
Ltd 
dissolved 
Marketing 7440, 
7487 
Service 1 de-jure 1 
Source: Author 
Table 39: Standard Industry Classification (SIC) of participating companies 
SIC Classification No. Industry Sector Description 
35110 Production of electricity 
35210 Manufacture of gas 
46770 Wholesale of waste and scrap 
38220 Treatment and disposal of hazardous 
81229 Other building and industrial cleaning activities 
27900 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 
7440 Advertising 
7487 Other business activities 
Source: National Office of Statistics (2017) 
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From within the four cases, nine directors agree to be interviewed with one 
of the owner-manager directors declining to take part.  In this instance the 
particular “owner-manager director” has minimal involvement in the running 
of the business, his role being that of engaged shareholder and little else.   
 
In instances where a director is distant and disengaged from the business, 
as in the case of a spouse or family member where, despite legal 
commitment, involvement is at the margins, it is considered inappropriate to 
seek their participation in the research following advice from the operational 
directors.  
 
In the case of “CO4”, a business that was sold whilst in administration on a 
pre-pack basis, the respondent was the sole director at the time of the 
distress sale.  In the three other companies, in considering whether or not to 
seek interviews with operational managers, the advice, (for which, read 
instruction) given by the various managing directors in pre-interview visits to 
the company’s premises is twofold; firstly, that the managers are too busy 
running the day-to-day activities of the company and secondly that they are 
unable to offer meaningful insights into the subject of corporate governance 
and that any attempt to seek such data would lead to confusion and 
embarrassment.  
Table 40 Details of respondents 
 
Respondent Position Age Details 
CO1MD Managing 
Director 
& Owner-
Manager 
50-55 The founder and owner-manager and managing director 
of the company and very much the dominant influence in 
the business with his forthright personality.  He has an 
MBA and is a member of two professional bodies and has 
been a company director for 22 years. 
CO1FD Finance Director 40-45 He is the finance director of the business and has carried 
out that role for 14 years.  He is CIMA qualified with a 
Batchelor’s degree.  He takes a somewhat cynical 
attitude to the role of the board in this company that he 
sees as little more than a rubber stamp. 
CO1ComD  Commercial 
Director 
45-50 He is the commercial director and has been in post for 3 
years although has worked in the company for a number 
of years as a manager.   He has neither higher education 
nor professional qualifications.  He is street-wise and is 
focussed upon sales and marketing.  
CO1NED  NED Chairman 55-60 He is a de-facto director and acts as chairman of the 
board.  No information was forthcoming on qualifications 
however his experience relates to public sector 
organisations in the health sector.  He is an eloquent man 
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and a deep and reflective thinker and sees himself as a 
moderating foil to the owner- manager and as a sounding 
board to salaried directors. 
CO2MD  Managing 
Director 
40-45 He is the managing director although not a shareholder, 
and has been in post for 9 years.  He has a first degree 
and is currently undertaking a part time MBA.  He is 
Chartered Director and a Fellow of the Institute of 
Directors and proudly displays his various certificates on 
his office wall.  He has considerable knowledge 
concerning corporate governance and regularly speaks 
at events on the topic of boards and their role in small 
companies. 
CO2OPD  Operations 
Director 
45-50 He is the operations director and has a diploma in 
leadership.  He has moved to a director rule from “the 
tools” and has very little knowledge of corporate 
governance as his focus is on “doing the job”.  He is 
keenly aware of risk from an operational perspective.  His 
tattooed appearance and piercing gives him an aura of a 
site based manager and as such he readily relates to the 
operatives he manages. 
CO3MD  Managing 
Director & Owner-
Manager 
55-60 He is the founder owner-manager of the business with 13 
years as a director.  He has an MBA and is a member of 
the Institute of Directors.  He is something of a patrician 
and sees the business as an extended family enterprise 
CO3FD  Finance Director 45-50 He is the de-facto finance director, a member of the 
Institute of Directors and an ACCA qualified accountant.  
He has 10 years of service as a de-jure director most of 
which has been as MD in a manufacturing company and 
is well versed in the principles of corporate governance. 
CO4MD  Managing 
Director & Owner-
Manager 
70-75 This person was the MD, founder and owner-manager of 
a marketing and advertising agency based in Hampshire 
that went into liquidation after almost 40 years of trading.  
He is a charismatic and determined man and is a member 
of two professional organisations.  He is passionate 
about business and at times can be assertive, demanding 
and direct. 
Source: Author 
 
Introduction to CO1 and structure of the company 
 
CO1 operates in the environmental and energy sectors and was incorporated 
in October 1995.  The company is a private limited company registered in 
England and Wales.  In July 2017 the four serving de-jure directors ceased 
to be the individuals regarded as persons with significant control and were 
duly replaced by a holding company formed in February 2017 in which the 
Managing Director (MD) of CO1 is the sole person with significant control.   
 
Under the leadership of the MD who is the owner-manager, there are three 
department heads responsible for respectively, operations, commercial 
activity including sales and marketing, and for finance and HR combined.  
The Operations Director is not registered at Companies House.  Given the 
nature of the work undertaken by the company, health and safety compliance 
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is a critical function within the business and that manager, who is not a 
director occupies a position of importance and influence.  
 
The company operates from three establishments with its head office being 
located within a small area of its main production site.  The offices are single 
storey, compact and functional rather than grand, and reflect the “sleeves 
rolled up” culture of the company.  At the time the research is conducted there 
45 are people employed in the business. 
 
The board and associated governance procedures  
 
The company is directed and controlled by a board of four de-jure directors, 
two of whom are family members, one of which is the managing director.  
There is also a de-facto director who is not registered at Companies House 
and who fulfils the role of non-executive chairman. 
 
The overall structure of the company is functional and comprises leadership 
from a managing director to whom a finance director, a commercial director 
and an operations director, who is not registered as a director at Companies 
House, report.  The fourth registered director does not make a contribution to 
the management of the business and does not participate in this research.  
The finance director also acts as the company secretary.  
 
The board meet monthly and in addition to registered directors, a non-
registered director and operational managers are invited to attend all or some 
parts of the meeting.  The board has a formal agenda and the company 
secretary keeps detailed minutes which are reviewed and signed by the 
chairman as a correct record of the affairs of the board.  The agenda and 
minutes together with reports are sent out as a board pack in advance of the 
meeting.  The minutes are brief and contain action points that reflect 
decisions taken.  Two intriguing items on the MD’s report are entitled “Bright 
Ideas” and “Areas that keep me awake at night”.   
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The culture within the board meeting observed is polite, informal, technically 
focussed in large part and speakers are afforded uninterrupted time to make 
their point.  There is nevertheless a level of deference to the owner-manager 
and a measure of second-guessing as to what his response will be to any 
given issue.  In two instances there were outbursts of anger and frustration 
where the air was blue with obscenities as a result of unanticipated cost-
overruns!  The board, in common with many small companies, has an 
operational rather than a strategic focus, although during the observation this 
was moderated by a presentation of the annual accounts by the company’s 
auditor. 
 
The board does not conform to a recognised governance code such as the 
IOD’s corporate governance guidance and principles or unlisted companies 
in the UK or BSI 13500.  This is in contrast with a desire to comply with a 
range of external accreditations evidence of which is on display on the 
boardroom walls that are hung with certificates and approval letters from BSI 
and other validating organisations attesting to the achievement of industry 
standards and protocols. 
 
Products and Services 
 
CO1 offers three main products and services that the company specify as 
landscaping, recycling and the sale of energy derived from a solar farm.  Its 
business model involves both retail sales and business to business sales to 
public utility companies, local authorities and a number of private and public 
companies through term contracts. 
 
Financial and performance data 
 
At the end of the financial year ending December 2016 the company posted 
a turnover of £11.546m (2015 - £10.243m) and profit before tax of £1.134m 
(2015 - £1.367m).  The directors describe this in the report and accounts as 
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“another excellent year for the company”.  In FYE 2015 there was an 
exceptional cost of sales item of £606,000 which refers to the costs involved 
in losses and reinstatement after a fire on a dockside when a woodpile 
awaiting export was the subject of spontaneous combustion due to improper 
stacking.  The wood itself nor consequential loss and damage were not 
covered by insurance. 
 
Net assets have increased from £7.118m in 2005 to £7.139 at the end of 
2016 however the current ratio stands at 0.75 compared with 0.99 in the 
previous year suggesting increasing pressure on liquidity. 
 
Summary of CO1 
 
CO1 is a profitable business that lives out loud and proudly displays its 
muscularity.  It operates in a rumbustious environment of a constant train of 
heavy goods vehicles belching diesel fumes, the clatter of noisy machinery 
and an atmosphere full of dust, grime and pungent aromas that dominate its 
major operational site.   
 
The counterpoint to this highly industrialised setting is the calm and serenity 
of a large solar farm situated in an adjacent 38-acre site that supplies 
pollution free energy enough to service 60,000 homes.  The land beneath the 
solar panels is used for grazing.  This site was developed and operated by 
CO1 and was subsequently sold on in 2016 in order to raise working capital 
for other projects.   
 
The owner-manager’s forceful personality finds its way into every nook and 
cranny of the enterprise and whilst he is a great asset to the business, his 
demise, for whatever reason, would leave a very large hole in the governance 
and management of the company.   
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The board is seen by non-owner directors as something of a formality and 
akin to a placebo.  Although a number of sound governance practices are in 
place, the dominant over-riding voice related to decision-making at both 
strategic and operational levels is that of the owner-manager.  
 
The company is in a relatively high risk sector and previous crises have led 
towards a gradual de-risking of the business as the price paid for its 
oversights has been considerable and as such those incidents and their 
associated memories constantly inform current policy.  
 
Introduction to CO2 and structure of the company 
 
CO2 has its base in the south of England and operates in a highly regulated 
and potentially hazardous sector of industry removing and disposing of 
asbestos and other volatile materials.  Established in 1980, the company is a 
fully accredited asbestos removal contractor.  The company states that it is 
“Committed to safety and corporate governance” and that, “our vision is to be 
the safest asbestos removal contractor in the UK.”  By way of expanding on 
this statement, the keywords used in the company’s literature are 
“experienced, competent, and accredited”.    
 
At the time of the research, spring 2017, the lynchpin of the business is the 
managing director who has been in post since 2008.  He resigned his 
directorship in August 2017.  The current directors at the time of writing 
include the operations director, who is a working director in the business, and 
the owner-manager director who has for many years been on the periphery 
of the enterprise and is involved with the day to day management of the 
business.  The owner-manager’s wife is also a director and acts as company 
secretary but, like her spouse, does not work in the business at an operational 
level.  Significant control resides within a holding company that in July 2017 
underwent a name change.  The directors of the holding company are the 
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owner-manager and his wife and the total shareholding of the operating 
company is held by the holding company. 
 
The company operates from two buildings on an edge-of-town industrial 
estate.  The premises are located within 50 metres of each other and are 
unpretentious and functional.  In one of the buildings the company has 
invested in a staff gymnasium and such an act reflects the culture of the 
company that has staff welfare at its heart.  The company often help staff with 
short term loans and is working on a project to offer personal finance 
education to colleagues.  The company employs 35 people in operational and 
administrative roles.   
 
The board and associated governance procedures  
 
CO2 is directed and controlled by a board of four directors.  It operates to 
high standards of corporate governance driven by the managing director who 
is a Chartered Director of the IOD and is currently undertaking an MBA.   
Certificates and accreditations adorn the wall of the MD’s office and directors 
regularly engage in professional development activities.  CO2 could be 
reasonably described as an exemplar concerning the application of corporate 
governance in small companies and operates to the IOD’s Guidance and 
Principles for Corporate Governance in Unlisted Companies in the UK.  The 
board does not however participate in any external evaluation of its 
governance standards but in fulfilling its duties, the board is guided by a 
written charter.   
 
Board meetings take place on a monthly basis and feature a board pack sent 
out in advance containing minutes, agenda and director reports.  Board 
reports are based upon a standard template.  External consultants are invited 
to make presentations to the board on matters such as insurance and safety.  
Although the agenda contains detailed operational matters, adequate 
allowance is made to debate strategy, policy formulation, risk, compliance 
269 
 
and the external environment.  Unlike CO1 where the researcher was 
privileged to observe a board meeting that permission was not granted in the 
case of CO2.  The company did however provide copies of governance 
policies and practices that indicate the thorough and diligent approach taken.  
Specific polices comprise the Anti- Bribery and Bribery Risk Assessment 
policy, the Conflict of Interest policy, the Board meeting protocol and the 
Board Charter.  These policies are, upon examination, relevant, appropriate 
and meaningful within the specific context of the business and provided 
support and substance to the twin governance roles of pilot and watchman 
with emphasis on the latter. 
 
Products and Services 
 
The core business activities take place in both domestic dwellings, 
commercial and industrial premises, on construction sites and in buildings 
undergoing refurbishment.  In addition to the removal and disposal of 
dangerous substances the company also provides a specialist consulting 
service.  The customer base comprises householders, landlords and tenants, 
local authorities, public utilities, construction firms and demolition companies. 
 
Financial and performance data 
 
The company submits abridged accounts to Companies House showing 
balance sheet only.  Net assets for FYE 30 November 2015 stand at 
£713,663.  The corresponding figure for the previous year was £385,020.  
Current assets are £1,100,609 with current liabilities at £673,999 giving a 
healthy current ratio of 1.63. 
 
Summary of CO2 
 
As a small company, the corporate governance standards operating in CO2 
are high due in very large part to the beliefs and values of the MD who has, 
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since the interviews took place, resigned from CO2 in order to follow further 
opportunities.   
 
It remains to be seen if his successor, if any, will continue similar polices 
related to corporate governance.  Not only does CO2 function well at board 
level but its staff policies on training, staff welfare and staff education place it 
apart from many small companies.  Consistent with its concern for people, 
the offices and work spaces are spacious and well-designed despite the 
somewhat bland exteriors.  The introduction of a fitness suite adds a much 
appreciated benefit for the workforce. 
 
CO2 operates in a highly regulated environment and its greatest threat to 
continuity is the loss of its government licence that enables it to operate.  
Accordingly, the delegated authority given to site operatives is such that a 
single transgression or a momentary lapse in protocol could lead to the most 
severe of outcomes.  The company recognises this fragility and has moved 
from oppressive, close control and oversight to  a policy of training, trust and 
de-centralised decision-making having recognised the downside of hygiene 
factors and adopted the benefits of motivators as expounded by Herzberg et 
al.(2017). 
 
Introduction to CO3 and structure of the company 
 
CO3 is situated on a modern business park in the south of England and is 
surrounded by both retail outlets and other light manufacturing businesses 
many of which are in high tech industries.  The company also has an office 
in France.  The current owner-manager acquired the business from a large 
investment company following a management buy-out in 1996 and in 2005 
owned 100% of the shares.  The owner-manager proudly displays his 
bachelor’s degree and his MBA certificates on the wall of his office together 
with a number of quality standard accreditations and trade body 
memberships. 
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The owner-manager talks of the company in terms of a family and he is keenly 
aware of his responsibilities to ensure colleagues, as a consequence of 
working at CO3, are able to meet their financial and family obligations.  The 
company engages in charitable work and whilst the directors acknowledge 
that the company is in business to optimise profits they recognise it must 
operate within a robust ethical context.  There is however a view that ethical 
behaviour set in a global business environment may have differing 
interpretations and nuances and as such a contingent approach is needed 
albeit remaining compliant with UK laws such as the Bribery Act 2010.   
 
The company places great emphasis on technical and skills training and the 
owner-manager is actively involved with trade bodies in the promotion of high 
standards within the sector.  Since its inception in 1982, 30 directors have 
been appointed to serve in the company, 27 of whom have resigned.  The 
remaining three are the owner-manager, his spouse and a corporate director 
in the form of a wholly-owned holding company that qualifies as the person 
with significant control as it owns more than 75% of the shares.   
 
The company employs 25 people but this varies according to circumstances.  
In addition to employed staff, the company uses a number of self-employed 
agents across the globe.  The finance director is not registered at Companies 
House and functions as a de-facto director acting in every respect as a de-
jure director and is the nominated deputy in the absence of the managing 
director.  The organogram is based around a functional structure with 
departmental managers responsible for delivering the plan and its objectives.   
 
Research and Development plays an important part in the business and the 
company’s membership of specialist quality standards institutions features in 
its marketing and sales collateral.  The company has been accorded Beacon 
Company status for its high standard of leadership. 
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The board and associated governance procedures  
 
The company does not adhere to a recognised code of corporate governance 
although board meetings do take place on a regular basis.  An agenda and 
director reports are distributed prior to meetings and formal minutes are 
maintained.  Board meetings tend towards an operational focus.  There is 
nevertheless considerable reliance placed upon strategic advice from 
outsiders in the form of the company accountants and lawyers who acts as 
quasi non-executive directors and in whom the owner-manager places 
considerable faith. 
 
Products and Services 
 
The company designs and manufactures advanced access control and 
security systems and sells its products through a range of distributors and 
agents, in addition to direct sales, to construction companies as OEM 
equipment or for upgrades and retro-fitting.  Since its formation, the company 
claims to have installed over 100,000 systems worldwide.  The systems are 
widely used in government, education, financial services, and commercial 
premises.  The systems are also installed in the health, leisure, public utilities 
and transport sectors.  The company promotes the integrated capabilities of 
its systems and articulates the value proposition as that of “peace of mind” 
combined with ease of use.  The company’s website features the Union Flag 
and lays great store in its British heritage. 
 
Financial and performance data 
 
The company submits abridged accounts to Companies House showing 
balance sheet only which at 30 April 2017 confirms fixed assets at £1,013,068 
of which £858,964 represents intangible assets that reflect the nature of the 
business.  Net assets are £867,969, some £316,659 greater than the 
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previous year.  Current assets are £2,455,727 with current liabilities at 
£1,587,758 giving a healthy current ratio of 1.56.  
 
Summary of CO3 
 
CO3 operates in a specialist niche market that has a focus on advanced 
integrated technology but serves a customer base described by the FD as 
comprising mainly “hairy arsed builders”, a reference to what he sees as 
relatively unsophisticated buyers.  CO3 operates with a somewhat patrician 
style of management that combines a measure of refinement and distance 
with a genuine culture of caring for colleagues and customers alike.  Personal 
relationships feature strongly in the way that the company does business and 
due to the parts of the world in which trading takes place there are tensions 
related to the graduations as to what may be acceptable in country A that is 
not acceptable in the UK. 
 
The board is in effect an operational management team as there is only one 
de-jure director working within the business.  There is no formal corporate 
governance process in place nor does the board operate to a code for 
unlisted companies.  Board processes are simple but adequate for the size 
of the company.   
 
The board meetings do not feature a specific item on the agenda related to 
risk although the question of risk is discussed largely in the context of finance.  
The company does however have a risk register that considers a range of 
issues, their likelihood and impact.  These range from the consequences of 
a sales executive taking maternity leave to the impact of moving from fibre 
broadband to low altitude satellite provision. 
 
The owner-manager relates to the proverb “once bitten; twice shy” and 
accordingly his trust level has been severely tested in recent years through 
an incident of internal fraud by a senior manager.  Although the incident was 
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destabilising, the owner-manager and the FD both acknowledge that they 
have adapted little as a consequence suggesting a rather laissez-faire 
attitude to risk if this instance is a microcosm of a wider issue. 
 
Introduction to CO4 and structure of the company 
 
CO4, a “full-service” advertising and marketing agency based in the south of 
England, was dissolved in July of 2012.  The company was founded in 1980 
and operated from a small first floor office in a town centre location.  The 
company published its last accounts up to financial year ending August 2010 
and its final annual return in December 2010.  Prior to its demise, CO4 was 
based in a detached ground floor office on a small business park with a high 
profile frontage adjacent to a busy dual carriageway and employed 22 people.  
CO4 worked closely with a number of freelance designers and sub-contract 
specialist printers, exhibition stand designers and event management 
companies.  
 
The company enjoyed stellar growth during the 1990’s and counted as 
customers a number of high profile public companies in the UK and overseas 
but in its quest for business growth in the early years of the 21st century over-
extended credit to companies that foundered and hence CO4 could not 
survive.  In the early years of the current century, CO4 acquired an exhibition 
company based near the home of the owner-manager.  This move into 
exhibition stand manufacture was, according to the owner-manager, a 
contributory factor leading to the ultimate failure of CO4 with allegations of a 
director engaged in embezzlement resulting in his dismissal. 
 
The company was based around a functional management structure with key 
account executives responsible for clusters of customers and business 
development activities.  The owner-manager dominated every aspect of the 
business and did not suffer under-performance easily.  Departmental heads 
were responsible for public relations business, media advertising and 
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marketing campaigns with a general factotum taking charge of back office 
functions.  The owner-manager took great interest in the financial 
management of the company and was in effective control of that function 
within the business.  He would regularly work late on the preparation of 
invoices, statements and management accounts. 
 
The shareholding of the company as of the last Annual Return submitted in 
January 2011 shows the authorised capital of the company as being 11,000 
ordinary shares and 200,000 preference shares.  All the ordinary shares are 
in the ownership of a company under the sole control of the owner-manager 
of CO4 with the preference shares owned by a family holding company of 
which the owner-manager once again controls. 
 
The board and associated governance procedures  
 
The board comprised the owner-manager, and at one stage his ex-spouse 
who resigned in 2001.  There were two salaried directors both of whom 
resigned in 1993 and a non-executive director who was appointed in 1997 
and resigned in November 2004.  Accordingly, the owner-manager was the 
sole director and, upon his admission, corporate governance was not high on 
his agenda.  
 
Products and Services 
 
The company provided a “one-stop” range of marketing services that included 
design, print, website design and management, photography, marketing 
consultancy, public relations, media planning and advertising campaigns, 
exhibition design and stand construction (through a wholly owned associated 
business).   
 
The company won a number of long-term contracts with large corporates but 
maintained its focus on small to medium sized enterprises.  Specialist areas 
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of expertise included the leisure sector, motoring, defence, residential 
property and technology.  
 
Financial and performance data 
 
The last published financial data relates to August 2007 with the company 
showing Fixed Assets of £170,000, Current Assets of £77,325 and Current 
Liabilities of £50,000.  Creditors over one year were £200,000 resulting in 
negative balance of (£2,675) compared with £107,690 the previous year. 
 
Summary of CO4 
 
CO4 is a case of a highly-motivated owner-manager who now recognises that 
his success over a period of many years led him to believe that he was 
invincible.  He accepts that his hubristic and arrogant attitudes brought about 
his personal nemesis in addition to the downfall of his business. 
 
During the time the business was operating, the owner-manager lived 
something of a charmed life and was persuaded that this good fortune would 
continue ad infinitum.  He confesses to a belief that he thought that he “could 
walk on water”, a view borne out of, upon his own admission, a complete 
disregard of any substantial risk management policies when the business 
was solvent and trading. 
 
The consequences of the failure of the business is impacting upon his private 
life with a distress sale of a large residential property and a subsequent 
reduction in his personal assets that in turn compromises his ability to pass 
on a significant estate to his son and daughter.  His reluctance to delegate, 
the owner-manager acknowledges, was a contributory factor in the ultimate 
demise of the business combined with a culture that did not learn from 
mistakes due to being too busy doing or selling.   
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The lack of reflection and collective strategic thinking is considered by the 
owner–manager as a key governance failure and when the crisis hit, the 
resilience level of the business was inadequate to cope with the oncoming 
financial tsunami resulting from invoices that he knew the debtors would 
never settle. 
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Chapter 6-Analysis and Findings 
Overview of the chapter  
The chapter begins by briefly re-stating the research context; that of small UK 
companies, and then goes on to present the findings concerning corporate 
governance and its contribution to risk and crisis management.   
In the first instance, the responses to a pre-interview exploratory 
questionnaire are analysed prior to further analysis of the transcriptions of 
nine semi-structured interviews.  
The chapter then presents the findings of the study using two strategies for 
analysis and synthesis and four analytical techniques following Yin (2009).  
The research questions are answered at the conclusion of this chapter with 
a discussion of the findings and conclusions appearing in Chapter 7. 
Introduction 
UK-based small companies are, in common with much of the rest of the 
world, a significant and distinct element within the national economy (Hiebl 
2012; Hong et al. 2012; Yiannaki 2012; McNulty et al. 2013; Verbano and 
Venturini 2013; Vrečko and Širec 2013; Farooq 2014).   
However, a key differentiator between small companies themselves, and 
between small companies and their larger counterparts is that of the owners’ 
socio-emotional identification with the business and his or hers’ associated 
values (Lobonţiu and Lobonţiu 2014).   
Furthermore, Durst and Brunhold (2017) add that control, the exercise of 
almost unlimited power and the last word in decision-making are likewise key 
features of the owner-manager, hence, they claim, small companies, “cannot 
be understood without reference to the owner-manager,.”(Durst and Brunold 
2017, p.203). 
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A widely accepted feature of small companies relates to their fragility and 
their limited capacity to withstand even a minor crisis.  Accordingly, the failure 
rate and collapse of such entities is high.  The literature related to risk and 
crisis management in small companies (Drummond and Chell 1994; 
Smallman 1996a; Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Herbane 2010; Hong et al. 
2012; Mahzan and Yan 2014; Parnell 2014; Doern 2016) portrays a 
multiplicity of perturbations that may pose a threat to the long-term survival 
and growth of an already friable entity (Mette 2014).   
It is against this backdrop of vulnerability, resource scarcity and the limited 
resilience of small companies that this study seeks to explore the relationship 
between the manner in which the four small companies featured in the case 
studies are governed and the extent to which corporate governance 
contributes to risk and crisis management.   
The roadmap for this chapter, see Figure 48, references the conceptual 
model as its driver, but in so doing it offers up the opportunity for review and 
revision according to the findings of the research.   
The remainder of the chapter is structured into five sections as follows: 
 
1. Within and cross–case analysis and findings from the exploratory 
questionnaire  
2. Within and cross-case analysis and findings from the interviews 
3. Pattern matching and explanation building 
4. Re-visiting the conceptual model to seek similarities and rival 
explanations 
5. Data display and conclusions 
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Figure 48: Roadmap of Chapter 6 
Source: Author 
The responses to the statements in the preliminary questionnaire are of value 
not merely intrinsicaly, but also in that they prompt some nuanced changes 
to the footnotes in the semi-structured interviews that facilitated 
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supplementary challenges and probing on the part of the interviewer.  The 
responses demonstrate the extent to which corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management are largely matters of which directors know little and as 
such the interview questions are adjusted accordingly. 
Within–case analysis and findings from the exploratory questionnaire 
The statements and responses are grouped into four sections: 
1. Corporate Governance 
2. Risk Management 
3. Crisis management 
4. Respondent’s beliefs and attitudes concerning crises 
A complete list of the statements is contained in Appendix 9. 
Categorisation of the responses ranges from “wide agreement positive”, to 
“wide agreement negative”, and “no overall consensus”.  Each of those terms 
is defined, see Table 41. 
Table 41: Categories and definitions of analysis of questionnaire  
Description of response 
category 
Definition of response category 
Wide agreement positive 
The collective responses are either “strongly agree” or “agree” 
and represent a positive view regarding a statement that 
would be considered good practice in corporate governance 
according to IOD “Principles” and The Non-Executive 
Directors Association.  
Wide agreement negative 
The collective responses are either “strongly disagree” or 
“disagree” and represent a negative view regarding a 
statement that would be considered good practice in 
corporate governance according to IOD “Principles” and The 
Non-Executive Directors Association. 
No overall consensus 
The collective responses reflect a lack of consensus and 
suggest dissonant thinking amongst respondents  
Source: Author 
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Responses from directors of CO1 
1. Corporate governance as understood by respondents in CO1 
The board of CO1 comprises five directors one of whom is an absentee 
director and hence four directors completed the questionnaire including the 
non-executive interim chairman. 
Of the nineteen statements related to their perceptions and understanding of 
the nature of corporate governance practiced in their company the directors 
are in “wide agreement positive” with nine of the statements.  An example of 
such is statement 17 that says, “The board regularly reviews the external 
environment and business context”, a practice that represents a positive tenet 
of effective corporate governance, with which two of the directors “strongly 
agree” and the further two “agree”.  Hence, in response to this statement the 
respondents have “wide positive agreement”.  
Other areas in which the respondents in CO1 have “wide agreement positive” 
are statements 4,5,6,7,8,13,14,17 and 18 details of which are contained in 
Appendix 9. 
In contrast to the foregoing responses, statements 10 and 11 show “wide 
agreement negative” where respondents either “strongly disagree” or 
“disagree” with a statement and accordingly these responses suggest a 
weakness in the governance processes of the company.  The two such 
statements are: 
Statement 10 - Directors declare any conflict of interest at the start of 
each board meeting 
Statement 11 - The board conducts regular director and board 
evaluations 
The responses showing either “wide agreement positive” or “wide agreement 
negative” suggest a measure of consensus within the board.  The responses 
“wide agreement positive” and “wide agreement negative” contain both 
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objective and subjective positions adopted by the respondents.  In the case 
of statements 5, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 17 for example, there is an opportunity to 
self-define terms such as “regular”, “range” “appropriate” and “sufficient”.  In 
statements 10 and 14 however, the response is limited to either “true or false” 
in a positivist sense – there either is or is not an NED on the board. 
Responses to statements 1,2,3,9,12,15,16 and 19 reveal “no overall 
consensus” amongst the respondents and with regard to statement 19, 
relating to the use of a company secretary, each of the four respondents 
select a different option. 
2. Risk management as understood by respondents in CO1 
Respondents are asked to consider 29 statements relating to risk across a 
wide range of issues from risk policy as a sub-set of corporate governance to 
the detailed assessment and management of risk.   Of the 29 statements, the 
directors responding express “wide agreement positive” to 6, “wide 
agreement negative” to one and “no overall consensus” to 22.   
Respondents are in “wide agreement positive” with the following statements: 
26, 34, 35, 36, 41 and 43. 
Only statement 21 - There is a specific board committee that deals with risk, 
shows “wide agreement negative” and refers to the presence of a board 
committee tasked with examining risk and its implications for management.   
This “true or false” statement elicits responses that show a measure of 
consistency.  This is in contrast with other similar “true or false” statements 
such as 22 and 25 that state - The board has established a risk management 
policy and risk is a standard item on the board agenda, both of which show 
no overall consensus. 
The remainder of the responses to the statements regarding risk show “no 
overall consensus” and responses to seven of the statements show that 
either 100% or 75% of the directors “neither agreed nor disagreed” with the 
statement.  A subsequent verbal question clarifies that such a response 
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equates to a “do not know” rather than an expression of implied disinterest.  
A poignant example of “no overall consensus” can be seen in the responses 
to statement 20 - “The board has established a risk oversight policy” - which 
seeks to explore a fundamental policy issue.  The response to this statement 
was “agree” from two directors and “neither agree nor disagree” by two 
others.  
The Non–Executive Chairman of the board, in an additional comment made 
at the end of the questionnaire, offers a personal view concerning risk 
management policy, stating that, 
“I have not been made aware of the risk strategy adopted by [the 
company].  However, business risk is debated at every board meeting 
and runs through the thread of every discussion”.   
Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO1 
Of the seven statements in this particular section, there is no aggregated 
responses that could be considered as “wide agreement positive”. The 
responses reflect “no overall consensus” between the directors across all 
statements related to crisis management with many responses neither 
agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement thereby perhaps suggesting 
something of a vacuum in policy, procedures and scenario planning.  
However, documents collected as part of this study include what is referred 
to as “CO1’s disaster recovery plan” with a stated objective as being, 
“To ensure that a suitable plan is in place to minimise the cost incurred 
and time taken to recover from an incident giving rise to an interruption 
of the normal business operations of the Company”. 
 
The 12-page document, issue 006, includes sections on an initial response 
to the crisis, a recovery plan, actions to be taken and a number of contact 
lists.  As a result of the responses to statement 61, it could be reasonably 
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concluded that there is limited awareness of the “disaster recovery plan” 
amongst directors. 
3. Beliefs concerning crisis management by respondents in CO1 
The final grouping of statements seeks to discover respondent attitudes and 
beliefs concerning crises.  The responses that reflect an appreciation and a 
deep understanding of the nature of organisational crises, based upon the 
work of Mitroff and Anagnos (2000), are those found in responses that either 
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” – which are then aggregated as “wide 
agreement positive”.  For example, if a respondent agrees with the statement 
that “Crises only happen to others.  We are pretty invulnerable” this would 
suggest an attitude of denial and invincibility and the adoption of what may 
be thought of as the Cassandra syndrome which occurs when valid warnings 
or concerns are dismissed or disbelieved leading to a failure to recognise the 
need to plan for the unexpected and thereby neglect a basic tenet of 
corporate governance.    
Conversely if the respondent disagrees with the statement it demonstrates 
recognition of the potential risk and is accordingly categorised within “wide 
agreement positive”.  The statements are as follows: Statement 53, 54, 55, 
56, 57, 58 and 59. 
The responses to these statements concerning attitudes towards the 
likelihood and impact of a crisis both illuminate and inform our understanding 
of the board’s attitude towards the allocation scare resources towards crisis 
management.  
The responses to statements 53-59, other than statement 54, point towards 
board coherence regarding attitudes and beliefs relating to crises.   
It may of course be argued that a congruence of thinking suggests a “group-
think” culture within the board or conversely, that the perceptions within the 
boardroom related to crises are grounded in a reality that is not reflective of 
the common afflictions of “Denial, Disavowal, Idealization, Grandiosity, 
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Projection, Intellectualization and Compartmentalisation” postulated by 
Mitroff and Anagnos (2000, p.47) from which statements 53-59 respectively 
are derived. 
Responses from directors of CO2 
1. Corporate governance as understood by respondents in CO2 
The board of CO2 comprises four de jure directors one of whom is the owner-
manager who is in nearly all respects an absentee director.  The owner-
manager’s wife is also a director and acts as company secretary.  Like her 
spouse, she too is not an active and regular participant in the day to day 
operations of the company.   
The respondents completing the questionnaire are the Managing Director 
and the Operations Director.  Of the 19 statements concerning corporate 
governance in the company there is “wide agreement positive” to 12 of the 
statements relating to the governance of the business.   
Differences in perception regarding statements that may be considered as 
being matters of fact rather than matters of opinion, other than statement 11 
which allows interpretation of the term “regular”, can be observed in the 
responses to statements 10, 11, 15, 18 and 19. 
It is perhaps to be expected that with two directors engaged in the operational 
leadership of the business their responses might contain fewer dissimilarities 
that those of a larger board.  Nevertheless, responses to these five 
statements (26%) show “no overall consensus” despite a very close working 
relationship existing between the two directors involved in the operation of 
the business.   
The responses to statement 19 suggest a gap in governance awareness in 
that one respondent strongly agrees with the statement that “The board uses 
the services of a company secretary” (who happens to be a fellow director) 
whilst the other respondent strongly disagrees with the statement. 
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Responses to statement 14 The board comprises one or more non-executive 
directors and statement 16 There is a family governance mechanism (if 
applicable) show “wide agreement negative”, however given that there are 
four directors in the company, two of whom are not functionaries within the 
business, the perception of the operational directors could be interpreted as 
acceptance that the owner-manager and his wife are acting in the roles of 
“executive” directors.   
Responses to statement 16 are qualified in a later conversation with one of 
the two executive directors who states that the family governance mechanism 
exists in an informal setting rather than a prescriptive family governance 
charter. 
2. Risk management as understood by respondents in CO2 
Respondents show “wide agreement positive” in 20 of the 29 statements in 
this section of the questionnaire.  (This compares with a little over 20% in the 
remaining three companies.) There are no areas of “wide agreement 
negative”.  On what may be considered as a matter of fact, there is however 
“no overall consensus” regarding statement 21 which reads, “There is a 
specific board committee that deals with risk, with one respondent expressing 
“strongly agree”, the other expressing the opposite view of “strongly 
disagree”.  In such an instance there either “is” or “is not” such a committee 
in existence and hence the variance in perception is perplexing.  
Given the high risk nature of the company’s business activity and the board’s 
focus on corporate governance, the responses to statements 32, 33 and 34 
may be considered as counter-intuitive, although in the subsequent 
interviews the respondent’s comments differed from those shown in the 
questionnaire.   
From a company such as CO2, the responses to statement 34 do not appear 
to be consistent with the overall demeanour of the directors and their slavish 
adherence to safety matters.  Equally, the neutral response given to 
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statement 40 concerning insurance is inconsistent with the high standards 
adopted by the board and may reflect the division of work load amongst the 
directors and a well-intentioned, albeit possibly misplaced, desire not to load 
pressure on colleagues needlessly.  Likewise, the differing views as to the 
engagement and input from managers should be a matter of concern as can 
be seen in statement 39. 
CO2 is in many ways an exemplar of sound corporate governance in a small 
company but some of the responses to statements 32, 33, 34, 39 and 40 in 
this section of the research questionnaire have exposed gaps in the 
processes related to risk.   
Some months after this research was conducted, as has been mentioned 
earlier, the Managing Director resigned, and accordingly a great deal of 
expertise and knowledge regarding corporate governance and risk 
management departed the business.  Without the effective retention and 
application of his knowledge - “sophia” -and associated expertise - 
“phronesis”- or practical wisdom - the company is now facing a crisis that 
leaves it at considerable risk in the short to medium term as a consequence 
of his departure, a hole that, for the company, will be difficult to fill having lost 
the protection of the Shield of Achilles. 
3. Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO2 
Responses to statements related to crisis management planning show “wide 
agreement positive” in three of the seven statements in this section.  They 
are statements 49, 61 and 62. 
Whilst the directors of CO2 claim to use a framework upon which to base its 
crisis management plan, there no common understanding as to whether the 
company has adopted a recognised crisis management standard that is 
subject to external audit and verification.   
There is “no overall consensus” related to the remaining four statements, 50, 
51, 52 and 60.  
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The responses to statement 61 appear to be consistent with information 
contained within incidental documentary evidence collected as part of this 
study.  One such document is entitled “Business Continuity Plan” (BCP) and 
is dated four months prior to the completion of the questionnaires.  The 
opening page of the plan states,  
“Organisations that have a business continuity capability are far more 
likely to survive the effects of a major incident than those that do not.   
There is, however, no mention of a target for Maximum Time Outage (MTO) 
in the aforementioned Business Continuity Plan.  This objective is a critical 
element within a BCP and as such the plan requires amending.  
4. Beliefs concerning crisis management by respondents in CO2 
Of the seven statements concerning the beliefs of the respondents from CO2, 
the Operations Director chooses “neither agree nor disagree” with each 
statement, whereas the Managing Director takes a very different view in 
which the MD “strongly disagrees” with statements 53, 55, 57, 58 and 59 and 
accordingly his views largely accord with a position that represents the 
foundations of crisis preparedness. 
Responses from directors of CO3 
1. Corporate governance as understood by respondents in CO3 
The respondents in CO3 are in “wide agreement positive” with seven of the 
nineteen statements regarding corporate governance and are in “wide 
agreement negative” with six of the 19 statements.  Those seven “wide 
agreement positive” are statements 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 and 17. 
With regard to the “wide agreement negative”, the respondents acknowledge 
that the board neither operates to a recognised code nor does it have a board 
charter to specify its terms of reference.  There is “wide agreement negative” 
in statements 2, 3, 10, 11, 15 and 18. 
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The responses to statements 10, 11, 15 and 18, indicate “wide agreement 
negative” in that the board does not have processes in place for such as a 
conflict of interest declaration, board evaluation, induction training and an 
auditor selection policy.  On a more fundamental level concerning the role of 
the board in terms of the Companies Act 2006, section 172 which requires 
the board to focus upon the long-term success of the company, both 
respondents “neither agree nor disagree” with statement 6 - “The board 
largely focusses upon the long term success of the company”.  This lack of 
emphasis upon the long term success of the enterprise is frequently 
mentioned in the literature relating to corporate governance in small 
companies (Abor and Adjasi 2007; Clarke and Klettner 2009; Durst and 
Henschel 2014; Crossan et al. 2015).  This underlines the view held by 
researchers (Drummond and Chell 1994; Budge et al. 2008a; Falkner and 
Hiebl 2015; Brustbauer 2016; Doern 2016)  that short-term and operational 
imperatives supersede and over-ride the consideration, development and 
implementation of medium to long-term strategies.  
The remaining five responses to statements 1, 4, 12, 16 and 19 show no 
overall consensus. 
The “wide agreement positive” response to statement 14 namely that, “The 
board comprises one or more non-executive directors”, would seem to be 
made on the basis of the inclusion of the wife of the owner-manager as an 
NED.  Whilst she is a de jure director of the company being registered at 
Companies House, she has negligible involvement in the formal directorial 
processes of the company.  External advisors do however act in the capacity 
of quasi-NEDs and would appear to make valued contributions and hence 
they may be also viewed as occupying the role of a NED. 
2. Risk management as understood by respondents in CO3 
The risks faced by CO3 differ from the risks faced by CO2 in particular.  In 
addition to normal commercial risks, CO2 is faced with potentially serious 
environmental hazard risk issues, Health and Safety matters and compliance 
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inspections by government regulatory agencies.  Such risks are not viewed 
as critically by CO3 as evidenced by the fact that in only 5 of the 29 
statements in this section is there “wide agreement positive”. 
The respondents were in “wide agreement negative” relating to statements 
24, 25, 29, 32, 38, 39 and 43. 
Both respondents selected the option “neither agree nor disagree” with the 
statement that “The board has established a risk management policy”.  A risk 
management policy document is the key driver that establishes the entire 
company-wide assessment and managerial responses to risk in all its guises.   
As such, CO3 has not laid down the foundations of effective risk management 
and it may be argued that it is developing policy as events dictate based upon 
reactivity rather than a pro-active stance.  
3. Crisis management as understood by respondents in CO3 
The responses to crisis management have a predominantly negative aura 
with four of the seven statements being “wide agreement negative”, and the 
remainder being “no overall consensus”.  Of the responses to these seven 
statements there were none indicating either “strongly agree” or “agree”.   
Although the risks that may precipitate a crisis in CO3 do not position it as a 
business beset by potential threats, there are nevertheless significant gaps 
in both the policy and operational areas of the business that could lead to the 
conclusion that the company is crisis prone and accordingly, urgent action 
should be taken by the board to deal with this. 
4. Beliefs concerning crisis management by respondents in CO3 
The respondents in CO3 are united in their approach to thinking about the 
dynamics of crises and their beliefs concerning the attitudes towards them as 
articulated by Mitroff and Anagnos (2000).   
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The “wide agreement positive” suggests that the directors appreciate the 
nature of crises that does not however align with the stance taken on crisis 
management policies and practices.   
One response only selects “neither agree nor disagree” to statement 58 
which may reflect an ambivalent attitude of mind that Mitroff and Anagnos 
(2000) refer to as “Intellectualisation” where an individual may rationalise a 
view concerning the low likelihood of a crisis occurring as a reason for not 
engaging with crisis management planning. 
Responses from director of CO4 
1. Corporate governance as understood by respondent in CO4 
The responses to the statements from the one former director of CO4 are 
made in a context that differs from those of the other companies involved in 
this study and as the business no longer exists they are framed in the past 
tense rather than the present.   
The responses are the views and perceptions of one individual who was the 
owner-manager and sole director of the company in the years prior to its 
demise.  Although in this instance he represents a universe of one, this 
situation is not unusual within the small company sector where the values, 
attitudes and beliefs of the owner-manager tend to be paramount.  Whilst the 
company was trading there were, over a period of time, a number of both 
salaried de jure and de facto directors whose perceptions of the corporate 
governance as practiced within the company have not been part of this study. 
Of the19 statements concerning corporate governance, the respondent is in 
“wide agreement positive” with 14.  Only one response is that of “neither 
agree nor disagree”.  However, three of the “wide agreement negative” 
responses, statements 1, 2 and 6, it could be argued, relate to a failure of 
corporate governance practice at a fundamental level, 
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Whilst it is impossible to speculate, the responses to these three statements 
are such that the answer to the “What if the governance had been effective” 
question is left hanging.  The intriguing issue concerning the responses from 
the former MD and owner-manager of CO4 is that they indicate a belief that 
corporate governance as practiced is of a high standard in many areas. Yet 
in spite of this perception, the company failed.  
2. Risk management as understood by respondent in CO4 
Nineteen of the twenty nine of the responses to statements concerning risk 
management in CO4 are categorised as “wide agreement negative” with six 
show “wide agreement positive”.  The remaining four statements indicate “no 
overall consensus”.   
 
There are examples of “wide agreement negative” that could be viewed as 
indicators of both weak policy and weak practice.  These relate to the lack of 
board oversight of risk, the absence of a risk committee, the deficiency of 
policy relating to risk management, weak record keeping, no whistle-blower 
policy and a failure to include risk as a board agenda item.  The six responses 
that are in “wide agreement positive” are statements 26 and 34. 
 
In the light of the company’s demise and the reasons for its demise, these 
responses would appear to diverge from the reality of the life situation.  If, for 
example, the board was properly focussed upon risks that could have 
compromised its liquidity and appreciated the potential consequences of 
over-extending credit to new clients, why were appropriate corrective policies 
not enacted and why were risks not mitigated?  Likewise, what was the role 
of the external risk consultant and was the advice given acted upon? 
 
This apparent disconnect between policy and practice that is particularly 
evident in CO4 may be due in part to socially acceptable responses and 
confirmation bias as during the semi-structured interview with the 
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respondent, an admission was made that corporate governance was a 
concept largely unfamiliar to him. 
The respondent chose to “neither agree nor disagree” with statements 47 and 
48 which relate to the culture of the organisation.  This ambivalence may offer 
an insight relating to the culture and values in the company, both of which are 
critical elements in the assessment and management of risk.  
3. Crisis management as understood by respondent in CO4 
The respondent is in “wide agreement positive” with the statement that, “The 
company has appropriate crisis management framework to minimise the 
effects of a broad range of unanticipated events”.  With regard to the 
remaining six statements, the respondent each one indicates “wide 
agreement negative” once again suggesting disconnection between policy 
and practice.  The question may therefore be asked, how, for example, can 
a crisis management policy framework worthy of the name not contain 
reference to the business continuity plan?   
4. Beliefs concerning crisis management by respondent in CO4 
To all seven statements the respondent shows “wide agreement positive” in 
his rejection of each of the statements related to attitudes towards crises.  
The “wide agreement positive” is broadly consistent with that of the 
respondents in CO1, CO2 and CO3 in that the directors refute the “it will not 
happen to us” view of crises.  This view is not however consistent with the 
stance taken on crisis management policies and practices that are designed 
to minimise impact come the day.   
Summary of cross-case responses to the exploratory questionnaire 
Corporate Governance 
From the aggregations of the responses to the exploratory questionnaire, the 
question of corporate governance in the four small companies taking part in 
this study would appear to be a matter of interest and concern to owner-
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managers and key decision makers, irrespective of any form of distributed 
leadership at board level.  The implementation of sound governance 
principles is however generally weak and would appear to be determined by 
the level of commitment, knowledge and awareness of an executive in a 
position of power and authority.  Whilst the aggregation provides a useful 
overview, it should not be treated as being of statistical significance and it 
should be further noted that the number of respondents in each company 
differs thereby creating a skew. 
Of the nineteen statements that postulate sound corporate governance 
practices that are relevant to small companies(London Stock Exchange 
2004; Non Executive Directors Association 2007; Institute of Directors 2010), 
there is “wide agreement positive”, with eight of the statements amongst the 
four cases in this study, as shown below.  None of the statements relates 
directly to risk or crisis management.  Their focus is upon structure, 
processes, environmental scanning and communication. 
Statement 4 - There is a division of responsibilities between the 
running of the board and the running of the business 
Statement 5 - The board is of sufficient size and comprises people with 
a range of skills to ensure its responsibilities 
Statement 7 - The board meets sufficiently regularly to discharge its 
duties 
Statement 8 - The board agenda and papers containing appropriate 
information and are sent out in advance of the meeting 
Statement 9 - There is a standard template for board reporting 
Statement 13 - The board has a regular dialogue with shareholders 
Statement 14 - The board comprises one or more non-executive 
directors 
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Statement 17 - The board regularly reviews the external environment 
and business context 
The collective responses classified as “wide agreement negative” are three 
in number as shown below, 
Statement 10 - Directors declare any conflict of interest at the start of 
each board meeting 
Statement 11 - The board conducts regular director and board 
evaluations 
Statement 15 - New directors receive formal induction training 
One of the “wide agreement negative” responses alludes to the non-
performance of a declaration of any conflict of interest normally made prior to 
the discussion of a particular item or at the outset of the board meeting.  
According to the Institute of Director’s “Standards for the Board”, albeit 
published prior to the Companies Act 2006, such a positive affirmation is 
nevertheless in accordance with the requirements of Section 175 of the 
Companies Act (2016), (Renton 2001).  Such a declaration represents good 
boardroom practice (Webster 2007) and may serve as evidence of the board 
acting with reasonableness in its exercise of due skill, care and diligence in 
the case of any subsequent misdemeanour by an individual director.   
The remaining two responses that are classified as “wide agreement 
negative” relate to inadequacies in director’s performance, development and 
training.  Practices to the contrary are evident in the responses from CO2 
concerning director induction where the MD himself is a Chartered Director 
and who, after resigning, has since established a company which conducts 
director development training programmes.   
Responses to eight of the statements concerning corporate governance 
elicited “no overall consensus”, 
Statement 1 - The board has an established governance framework 
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Statement 2 - The board has adopted a recognised code such as the 
IOD code for unlisted companies or BS 13500 
Statement 3 - There is a board charter or written terms of reference 
for the board and for any board committees 
Statement 6 - The board largely focusses upon the long term success 
of the company 
Statement 12 - All directors engage in continuing professional 
development 
Statement 16 - There is a family governance mechanism (if applicable) 
Statement 18 - The company has a policy for the selection and 
appointment of the external auditor 
Statement 19 - The board uses the services of a company secretary 
Statements 1,2,3 and 16 in particular represent key components of effective 
governance (Institute of Directors 2010) and may be considered to be the 
core activities of a high performing board.  That there is not “wide agreement 
positive” related to these statements may be thought of as indicative of a 
weakness in the foundations of corporate governance within the four cases.  
Such a board that has its focus on the short-term, tends towards micro-
managing and lurches from crisis to crisis is labelled by the London Stock 
Exchange publication, “Corporate Governance A Practical Guide”, as “The 
Adrenalin Groupies” (London Stock Exchange 2004, p.11).  
A belief that “It’ll be alright on the night”, a statement of unfounded optimism 
uttered by a third rate thespian, is the very antithesis of effective corporate 
governance and a predictor of impending disaster.   
The responses from each individual case and from the aggregated responses 
are summarised, see Table 42 and Figure 49.  In three of the four cases, 
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areas of “wide agreement positive” exceed the sum of “no overall consensus” 
and “wide agreement negative”.   
Two of these three companies, CO1 and CO2, work in what may be 
considered high risk areas and the third, CO4, has experienced the trauma 
of going bust.  
Table 42: Responses (R) to statements related to corporate governance, 
R=171  
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 Total % 
Wide agreement positive 
44 26 15 14 99 58% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
15 3 8 1 27 16% 
Wide agreement negative 
17 9 14 5 45 26% 
Source: Author 
Figure 49: Aggregated responses to corporate governance statement 
 s 
Source: Author 
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Risk Management 
Aggregated responses related to risk management from all four cases show 
“wide agreement positive” with nine of the twenty nine statements, see Table 
43 and in Figure 50, 
Statement 20 - The board has established a risk oversight policy 
Statement 26 - The board ensures that any discussion around strategy 
considers the full range of key risks to which the organisation is 
exposed 
Statement 34 - The board focusses on those risks that, given the 
company’s current position, could threaten its business model, future 
performance, solvency or liquidity 
Statement 35 - The board approves how the key risks will be managed 
or mitigated and which controls will be put in place 
Statement 36 - The risk register is kept up to date through regular 
review 
Statement 40 - The company has adequate insurance for its level of 
operations and staff numbers 
Statement 41 - Staff are fully trained in their risk management 
responsibilities 
Statement 43 - The board engages the services of an external risk 
specialist 
Statement 46 - The directors are insured through a Directors and 
Officers Policy 
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Table 43: Responses (R) to statements related to risk management, R=261 
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 Overall % 
Wide agreement positive 43 47 19 6 114 44% 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
52 8 17 4 81 31% 
Wide agreement negative 
22 3 22 19 66 24% 
Source: Author 
Figure 50: Aggregated responses to statements related to risk management 
 
Source: Author 
There are four statements that show “wide agreement negative” with “no 
overall consensus” being found in sixteen of the statements related to risk 
management. These combined responses, totalling 147, are greater than 
the114 responses that are in “wide agreement positive” with the statements.  
This could suggest limited awareness of company policies and practices and 
a lack of knowledge related to risk or that risk is an issue that in practice is 
not a matter of great concern in the context of corporate governance.   
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From subsequent conversations with the respondents, this situation results 
from a case of prioritisation within the hectic, and at time chaotic, lives of 
directors in small companies struggling with day to day survival matters.  This 
phenomenon may be viewed through the parallel lens of Maslow’s theory of 
hierarchical needs in that before self-actualisation can occur, more basic 
lower needs of survival and security must be met.   
Survival and security in these instances are related to the core business 
activities of maintenance of the sales pipeline, order processing, cash 
collection and supplier payments.  The responses from the directors of CO2, 
the asbestos removal business, show a total of 47 in “wide agreement 
positive”, 8 in “neither” and 3 in “wide agreement negative”.   
Such responses could be interpreted as being a function of the industry in 
which the company is engaged and a reflection of the attitudes towards risk 
governance by the directors.  Their responses to statement 62, see Table 44, 
are set within the section of the questionnaire dealing with crises, - We have 
a relationship that links governance, risk and crisis management planning- 
would suggest the latter.   
This statement seeks to discover the extent to which the company has linked 
crisis management to risk management which itself is a core function of 
corporate governance.  
Table 44: Responses to Statement 62 - We have a relationship that links 
governance, risk and crisis management planning 
 
CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 Overall 
Wide agreement positive 0 2 0 0 2 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 0 0 0 3 
Wide agreement negative 1 0 2 1 4 
Source: Author 
302 
 
Crisis Management 
There are seven statements within this particular section of the questionnaire.  
Each statement asks the respondents to determine their perception of 
procedures and policies that are pertinent to a crisis event.  The responses 
show a divergence of views with 13 responses in “wide agreement positive” 
from a total of 63 responses to the statements, see Figure 51.   
With the exception of CO2, it could be concluded that the remaining three 
companies unprepared to deal with a crisis should one arise and have taken 
limited steps to prevent such an event occurring.  Table 45 summarises the 
responses to statements concerning crisis management and point towards 
three of the companies as being crisis prone to a greater or lesser degree 
with CO3 in a situation that, it could be argued, requires urgent attention.   
The one “wide positive agreement “by the sole respondent from CO4-We 
have a relationship that links governance, risk and crisis management 
planning- appears to be at odds with a company in which the owner-manager 
indicates in his response to statement 1 that there was no governance 
framework and in response to statements 20, 21 and 22 affirming that the 
company has neither risk oversight mechanisms nor risk management 
policies 
Table 45: Responses (R) to statements related to crisis management, R=63 
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 Overall % 
Wide agreement positive 5 7 0 1 13 21 
Neither agree nor disagree 
15 5 4 0 24 38 
Wide agreement negative 
8 2 10 6 26 41 
Source: Author 
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Figure 51: Aggregated responses to crisis statements  
 
Source: Author 
Beliefs and attitudes related to crises 
The responses to statements 53-59 show the greatest unanimity within any 
section of the questionnaire, see Figures 52 and 53.  These attitudes and 
beliefs largely represent what could be considered as sound and defensive 
attitudes and positions (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000).    
There does however appear to be a decoupling between the respondent’s 
attitudes and beliefs concerning crisis management and their lived 
behaviours.   
  
304 
 
Figure 52: Responses to statements related to crisis beliefs and attitudes 
 
Source: Author 
Respondents do not appear to be beguiled by a Disneyesque view of the 
world where “everyone lives happily ever after” and choose to adopt what 
may be called a realistic appreciation of a crisis event, see Table 46.  Yet 
despite this out-pouring of corporate nous, there is a wide antipathy and 
neglect concerning crisis management planning and preparation.   
The responses point towards a failure to give little more than cursory attention 
towards an appropriately structured framework to enable the either the 
avoidance or effective management of a crisis.  There is no appetite to test a 
plan and to engage in meaningful business continuity planning where there 
is limited agreement on the length of time the company could continue in a 
post-apocalyptic world.    
Table 46: Responses to statements related to crisis beliefs and attitudes  
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 Overall % 
Wide agreement positive 23 5 13 7 48 76 
Neither agree nor disagree 4 8 1 0 13 21 
Wide agreement negative 1 1 0 0 2 3 
Source: Author 
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Figure 53: Aggregated responses to crisis beliefs statements 
 
Source: Author 
Although shown as an aggregated level of disagreement of 76%, due to the 
nature of the statement this is captured as “wide agreement positive”- as the 
majority of respondents did not accept the statements as matters with which 
they concurred.  Only two responses show affinity with a statement.  Koontz-
Traverso (2001), by way of an explanation of this decoupling writes,  
“What small business, short on time, resources and cash, is going to 
spend days or weeks devising a quality response plan for its 
tomorrows when it is more concerned about keeping its bottom line 
intact throughout today?” (Koontz-Traverso 2001, p.4) 
Such is the balancing act required of the directors of small companies in 
maintaining the health of the business.  Yet despite the potential 
consequences of a crisis event, short term imperatives prevail over the need 
to prepare to meet a situation that directors recognise might one day arise. 
In the event of such an unanticipated occurrence and without even the most 
rudimentary planning, a crisis event will heap chaos on the business.  As 
Jaques (2017) states, 
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“Any manager who says, “Let’s not over-plan for a crisis. I am sure we 
can respond well” should consider a study of Australian crises over a 
ten-year period undertaken at Melbourne University.  It revealed that 
….more than 25 per cent of the organisations went out of business or 
ceased to exist in their current form.” (Jaques 2017, p.1). 
Within-case analysis and findings from the semi-structured interviews 
Introduction 
The responses from the questionnaire have illuminated the views of 
respondents regarding the core concerns of this study.  The following section 
of the chapter delves deeper and presents the findings of the semi-structured 
interviews based on a within-case analysis.  The results presented here are 
descriptive and focus on identifying and categorising responses to the 
research questions posed to the nine participant directors and owner-
managers during semi-structured interviews. 
This section relates directly to the research aim, namely: to investigate the 
contribution of corporate governance to risk and crisis management planning 
in small companies.  As discussed in Chapter 5, responses to the questions 
concerning the relationship between corporate governance and risk and 
crisis management perceived by owner-managers and board members forms 
the basis from which a full coding template, see Appendix 12, is created. The 
process involves several stages, see Figure 54. 
Figure 54: Phases of analysis using IPA 
 
Source: Author 
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Interviews are recorded and transcripts are read several times, after which 
sections of text are identified in which participants indicate their view related 
to a specific question.  These responses are then allocated a code category.  
Exclusive descriptions are written for each code.   
Once all transcript extracts are synthesised and summarised, key concepts 
(KC) or themes are identified through a process of interpretive reduction, a 
process that seeks to extract meaning from the text.  
This final stage is similar to what Kvale (1996) refers to as “meaning 
condensation”, an analytical technique based on the work of Giorgi (1975) 
who argues that qualitative data could be treated systematically without 
losing the richness and both the surface and subterranean meanings 
embedded within what he described as “ordinary language” Giorgi (1975, 
p.96).  
Table 47 illustrates sample extracts taken from interviews with the 
participants who identify corporate governance with “compliance”, the second 
of two Higher Order Themes (HOT) arising from question 1a.   
This higher order theme comprises two key concepts or lower order themes 
of “Legal perspective” and “Stakeholder perspective”.  Participants’ 
understanding of the term corporate governance in “compliance” terms are 
however, less common than a description based upon values and ethics 
described as “ethical behaviours”.  
The contents of table 47 show examples of how the responses to question 
1a, “What do you understand by the term corporate governance?  are 
synthesised and reduced to resultant higher order themes.  These themes 
are expanded at the conclusion of this chapter. 
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Table 47: Examples of test analysed from question 1a 
Sample text extract related to the question 
on the respondent’s understanding of 
corporate governance 
Resultant Higher Order Theme 
“complies with legislation, legally” Legal perspective/Compliance 
“manning or managing the company or 
organization for that matter in the correct legal 
way” 
Legal perspective/Compliance 
“Corporate governance in effect is about your 
laws” 
Legal perspective/ Compliance 
“Corporate governance, it's making sure we abide 
by the law” 
Legal perspective/Compliance 
“Yes, it's a business and it's set up under statute 
and under company law, but the feeling we have 
in the business- it's like a family. So we trust each 
other”. 
Legal perspective/ Compliance 
Stakeholder perspective/Ethical Behaviours 
“the benefit for all the stakeholders” Stakeholder perspective/ Ethical Behaviours 
“company is run well for the long term benefit of 
those stakeholders” 
Stakeholder perspective/ Ethical Behaviours 
“has due regard to stakeholders. corporate 
governance is that it is there to protect customers, 
clients, employees” 
Stakeholder perspective/ Ethical Behaviours 
Source: Author 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO1 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
The owner-manager director (CO1MD) responds to the question in an 
expansive and insightful manner choosing to recognise the collective 
oversight role of corporate governance as distinct from an operational 
function.  He adds that the process of corporate governance is a matter for 
the board although preferring to use the term managing rather than directing.  
He also sees a role for corporate governance as an assurance provider and 
as a guardian/watchman overseer hence incorporating the two Higher Order 
Themes within his understanding of the term. 
“Corporate governance is all about manning or managing the 
company. or organisation for that matter in the correct legal, moral 
[very long pause] yes, basically legal and moral will cover most things 
in a sound way.  [Hesitation] Yes, it, sort of, sits above the daily 
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operations although it can be part of the daily operations but it always 
sits above the daily operations and would be mainly vested in the 
board as a board responsibility.” 
The uncertainty of the Finance Director (CO1FD) is reflected in a 20 second 
pause preceding his response stating,  
“Now you are asking me. [very long pause] This is not so much a 
definition, but more of a general thing.”  
“Corporate governance in a company is when a company is run well – 
that’s quite loose, but it’s a term that means it complies with legislation, 
legally and basically is run for the benefit for all the stakeholders within 
and outside the company.” 
He concurs with the CO1NED concerning operational effectiveness and his 
stakeholder perspective but additionally draws attention to the compliance 
and legal elements of corporate governance.   
CO1FD adds a poignant comment when he refers to corporate governance 
as residing within the purview of the owner-manager and that the board is 
little more than a ceremonial rubber stamp that gives give legitimacy to the 
fluctuating decisions of the owner-manager and the resultant uncertainty 
brought about as a consequence of equivocation.  He states, 
“He [referring to CO1MD] is corporate governance.  We have a board 
which is toothless I would say, perhaps that’s too strong a word – it 
has its say and it has its opinion, but ultimately it will rest on [CO1MD’s] 
decision making decision over the course of time”. 
Exploring this issue in greater depth, the Commercial Director, CO1COMD, 
was asked, “How does that compromise your position as a legal director 
registered at Companies House where there is a requirement that you act 
independently?” 
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“I think to be fair to [CO1MD], I think people trust or accept most of his 
decisions anyway …. he is not a dictator, but invariably it’s [CO1MD’s] 
way more so than other people’s way.” 
Delving deeper into this rich seam of data, a further exploratory question was 
put to CO1COMD; “So, if I described the board say as largely a rubber 
stamping board, would that be accurate or not?”  He replied that, 
“[Hesitation] It would be accurate – yes.  But there are useful 
discussions and content comes out of it but for other things, for other 
parts for developing and going forward and bouncing ideas around – 
yes there is a degree of rubber stamping but you know we just need 
to get board approval sometimes.” 
In a less astringent mode, CO1COMD is aligning himself with the comments 
of the Finance Director in acknowledging that ultimately the board operates 
at the behest of the owner-manager and is subservient to his decisions. 
These responses would appear to confirm a key element of the conceptual 
model in that the owner-manager’s beliefs and attitudes are a significant 
influence on corporate governance as practiced in small companies.  Those 
beliefs and attitudes dominate the system of corporate governance, however 
tenuous or sophisticated it may be, and establishes a culture of personality 
governance that vacillates according to circumstances.  
The de-facto Non-Executive chairman (CO1NED) defines corporate 
governance in terms of doing the right things that are not dissimilar in 
essence to the definition given in the Cadbury report.  His understanding 
incorporates an eclecticism comprising operational and control perspective, 
an ethical perspective, a policy perspective and a stakeholder perspective. It 
does not however specifically address, compliance, strategy and risk issues.   
“Corporate governance I think is the sum total of actions and policies 
that essentially bring together the modus operandi of a company and 
ensures that it is both able to operate in an effective way, and in a 
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sustainable way, and in a safe way and in a way that has due regard 
to stakeholders which are within its remit – its area of influence.” 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute to a 
small company like yours?  
The response by the owner-manager (CO1MD) to the question of the added 
value offered by corporate governance suggests that the advantage is 
perceived as being one of external control based upon a code of behaviour, 
“saves you getting into trouble! [laughter] It’s very simple” 
CO1MD sees corporate governance as having greater relevance to larger 
companies, although he nevertheless maintains that the balance of 
advantage rests within its role of “watchman” rather than that of the “pilot”. 
“by having good corporate governance it keeps you on the straight and 
narrow and stops you getting into trouble.” 
When asked a supplementary question as to whether there is a role for 
corporate governance to act as “the pilot”, the answer followed a very lengthy 
pause, although the eventual response was some way from an unequivocal 
endorsement, 
“Well it could have because, you know, you could do everything and 
be steered by corporate governance and that’s not a bad thing. If you 
can find a business that fits with a good corporate governance - hey 
everyone’s a winner!”  
On being asked why small companies tended not to operate within a 
structured governance regime, CO1MD replies and comments on the role 
that NEDs can offer, albeit critical of their competence and values,  
“I think it is because there are not enough non exec directors on 
company boards or independent non exec directors.”   
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The Finance Director, (CO1FD) after once again making a lengthy pause, 
responds to question 1b that seeks to elicit the participants view on the value 
that corporate governance adds to the company, stating, 
“Very little if I am brutally honest, because….. I think it would add value 
to companies per se, but if you are talking about [this business]-
specific, I don’t think it adds a particular amount of value – no.” 
This response has specific application to CO1, although with regard to 
“companies per se” in a wider context he does however believe corporate 
governance adds value and sees it as a means by which long-term value can 
be created and short-termism avoided in that a strategic posture can be 
developed through the mechanisms of corporate governance.  He also refers 
to the need for strong NEDs having a role in moderating the behaviors and 
excesses of executives in achieving long-term benefits to stakeholders. 
“Yes, I think if a company is run well, then you will get long term value, 
long term benefit from that organisation - where if there is little or no 
corporate governance short termism may creep in for the sake of a 
few extra bucks here and there.  It will make sure that the company is 
run well for the long term benefit of those stakeholders, which I have 
mentioned” 
The NED Chairman perceives the added value that corporate governance 
offers as being that of process through a “framework” or a “checklist” within 
which the various activities of governance can take place.  Amongst those he 
sees risk management and operational task roles as being of special 
importance.  Such a view recognises that the governance of a small company 
and the role of the board is distinct from that of a large organisation in that 
process inevitably involves a twin focus on both strategic and operational 
management.  It may be relevant that CO1NED has a background in the 
National Health Service which may partially explain his process-driven 
perspective of the value added through corporate governance.  He states, 
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“It gives a small company a framework to look at, almost like a check 
list, so you can understand who is doing what and why and also to 
ensure the key elements of risk and operations are identified in terms 
of who actually does what.”. 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
influence corporate governance?  
CO1MD, a major shareholder in the enterprise, replied to the question in 
terms of shareholder value creation over the long-term and acknowledged 
that he believes corporate governance is a crucial element in achieving that 
goal, 
“I think that I am looking at the long term shareholder value and that’s 
my primary role…..  So, yes, Corporate Governance is an intrinsic part 
of creating value in what we do.” 
Concerning his own ethical stance, he seeks to balance profit maximisation 
with correct behaviours 
“Well, my values and morals [pause] - I believe that you must make as 
much money as you possibly can but do it in a sustainable and correct 
manner.  Yes, [CO1] is all about making money and hopefully we do it 
in the right manner.” 
When faced with a supplementary question as to whether he would work with 
businesses who did not share his ethical viewpoint, it is profits that override 
ethical considerations and this is justified by reference to others adopting a 
similar relativist position, 
“We actually deal with a tobacco company and we recycle all their 
tobacco waste into compost, do we have a moral problem with that?  
No, our corporate governance is not that high. [laughter]” 
CO1FD accepts, with a somewhat resigned demeanour, that it’s the owners’ 
train set and he can play with it the way he wishes, stating, 
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“Again, he will take on board people’s views …, but ultimately he will 
do what he thinks is best and that’s sometimes not based on what is 
best for the company long term - he is quite a dominating figure at 
times” 
In the case of disagreement, directors have recourse to the independent NED 
chairman although there are varying levels of confidence in the office-holder’s 
ability to effectively challenge the owner-manager,  
“I would go to the chairman of the board and have a chat. Now we 
used to have a guy called xxxxx.  To be fair xxxxx was probably a lot 
stronger character than what yyyyyy is, and … he would possibly go 
and speak to [CO1MD] if that situation actually arose.  With CO1NED 
I don’t feel, he has got the gravitas or clout to actually do that.” 
The reply to this question by CO1COMD reflects a recurring trend of 
deference to the views of the owner-manager where his beliefs and values 
have become institutionalised as part of the corporate DNA over many years 
“…most of the people are not mini-[CO1MDs] in effect, but we are all 
his ethics and beliefs.” 
When asked to expand upon the nature of those values CO1COMD said,  
“hard work, reward, hard work, questioning, challenging, always 
challenge stuff particularly hard work and challenge everything.  
Honesty and integrity, you know, it’s not bad principles to live by even 
in from a work point of view.” 
The chairman of the board (CO1NED) recognises that the views of the owner-
manager pervade the company and that single source dominance leading to 
intimidation can be a threat to the business. CO1NED undertook a SWOT 
analysis and presented this to the owner-manager who concurred that, in 
addition to being an asset to the business, through his domineering 
personality he also represented a threat. CO1NED responded saying, 
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“Well, the views of the owner-manager do influence and the owner-
manager can be a very dominant person, because (a) they have set 
the business up so in that they must be quite an alpha male in that 
regard and, (b) because they are able to, being the employer, to ride 
roughshod over the views of others who might be intimidated by and 
actually what we have in CO1,”  
“…I have made sure a SWOT analysis was done for the business and 
one of the threats which we identified was the strength of character of 
the current Chief Executive who is the owner-manager and he agreed 
that that he was a threat as well.” 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk 
management in your company? 
CO1MD perceives a direct link between corporate governance and risk in its 
role as guardian/watchman and as a morality moderating factor.  He says, 
“Corporate governance de-risks the business because it prevents you 
from making rash, [decisions] for the want of a word, that are illegal or 
immoral”  
When pressed to illustrate how this relationship is exercised in practice the 
owner-manager qualifies his answer and refers to a theoretical example in 
the past,  
“Well, at the moment, it’s not a great board I have to say, but in the 
past we bring projects to the board for their approval,….someone will 
say that we can’t do that because it’s breaking the law and we haven’t 
got a licence to do this or this could be effect of that, we just buy it and 
take the project on or adapt the project and make allowance for these 
factors”. 
Asked what he would do if the board disagrees with a risky proposal with 
which he demurred, his replies, 
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“[Long pause and nervous laughter] It’s a good question.  In the past I 
have won out and I have said no I think we ought to do this.  But in 
actual fact hopefully I would be a big enough man to say, you know, 
we’re not going to do this if there was enough body of opinion against 
it” 
This comment reflects a quite different perception of collective decision 
making to that of his fellow directors who view the decisions of the owner-
manager as incontestable.  CO1FD however acknowledges that the 
company’s attitude to risk has changed for the better and that change is due 
in part to having learned the lessons of history where risks have been taken 
that have subsequently been proven as unwise,  
“We were a lot more gung-ho a few years ago and would test the 
boundaries considerably of what we had to do here.  We’ve been 
burned a couple of times, quite literally once.” 
As to the reasons for this “gung-ho” approach to risk CO1MD gave a brief 
answer, 
“Maximising profits, maximising profits.” 
CO1FD illustrates an example of risk taken in the pursuit of profit 
maximisation in the case of wood stored on a dockside berth, 
“We knew that too much wood there would be a fire hazard because 
you get internal combustion from inside.  We always knew that.  There 
was a risk and to be honest about it, and we would all hold our hands 
up here, perhaps didn’t pay enough attention to it as what we should 
have. The whole thing went up in smoke and unfortunately for it cost 
us £600,000 as a one-off.  So, that lack of corporate governance, hit 
us long term and I think we have changed over the last two to three 
years in terms of risk and taking it a bit more seriously than what we 
used to.” 
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Some changes in operational procedures do however emerge as a result of 
the fire on the dockside berth as can be seen from the following comment by 
the owner-manager, 
“Now we have piles that are a quarter of that size and we turn them 
regularly, yes.” 
A major risk concern of the Finance Director relates to a failure of compliance 
as a consequence of an inspection by the relevant government regulatory 
body.  He offers an example of an event that occurred, 
“External risks would be basically pissing off your neighbours in terms 
of smells and odours - we used to treat food waste here on site – made 
loads of money for a year so long term because the liquids contained 
stank to high heaven and the people down at the airport complained 
like hell and the Environment Agency came back and we had to close 
it down in the end.” 
After this incident the behaviour of the directors changed their view of risk as 
memories inform attitudes and where, what the FD describes as a culture of 
“seat of your pants” management, morphed into a more mature approach,  
“we’ve learned a bit from that and our view of risk both internally and 
externally has changed substantially probably in the last three or four 
years” 
CO1COMD found difficulty in understanding the question asked and 
prevaricated somewhat with a reply that was related to his role rather than to 
the governance of the business overall stating,  
“So the management and the governance is quite robust on 
commercial decisions, we’re quite robust.    Financial risks we’re quite 
good at looking at these in the first instance.  The management 
thereafter is sometimes a bit difficult” 
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The focus of his risk outlook is that of the commercial risks involved in 
negotiating a contract with a trade customer and he expresses a particular 
concern that whilst the terms of the deal may be well structured, there is a 
concern that on-going contract management is not of a sufficiently high 
standard.  Although this personal view can be appreciated, it is surprising that 
as a director he was unaware of any formal risk register stating that he had 
“heard the term before”. 
CO1COMD, when asked if there was, for example, a denial of access to the 
site that has a single point of egress, reflects the lack of planning as to how 
such a risk would be handled, replying that, 
“[CO1MD] would probably go down there and shout and get them to 
move (laughter) he would shout and bawl at them - that’s how we 
cope.  Or just how we would deal with people blocking our gate?  Brute 
force I suspect.  Maybe negotiate, it all depends.” 
The NED offers a more erudite view of risk stating,  
“I think it [risk] is a subset of corporate governance. I would say it is 
part of corporate governance.” 
Adding that  
“corporate governance is intertwined completely with risk, because 
ultimately, especially in a small company, there is often a small head 
room to succeed if things go particularly wrong and, therefore, these 
risks need to be identified so that a plan can be developed to mitigate 
risk and, indeed, people can then know that if something does happen, 
what they need to do in order to survive as a company.” 
The asymmetry of information that typifies an issue related to NED 
effectiveness is illustrated in the answer to a question related to the existence 
of a risk management plan or policy to which the NED replied, 
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“I don’t know that.  I haven’t asked [CO1MD] about that and I suspect 
that the answer is, no, I don’t know.” 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the 
company has faced recently?  
The latter of these three themes appears to support earlier comments from 
all four participants from CO1 relating to the impact of memories of an 
untoward event where the legacy of such an event informs a more cautious 
approach to future similar activities.   
CO1MD makes a revealing comment concerning crisis management policies 
indicating fuzzy thinking as to the very existence of a policy and its application 
at a time of a crisis, 
“In terms of the pipe that broke, I think that we do have a crisis 
management plan but we didn’t actually use it at the time.”  
and referring to the dockside fire,  
“We had, obviously, a series of meetings about it and we sort of 
basically agreed that it had been run in an unsustainable fashion, erm, 
yes, it had been run in an unsustainable fashion.  We resolved not to 
do it like that again.” 
The owner-manager then went on to state that as a direct consequence of 
the incident both he and the company are more risk-averse and with more 
than a hint of litotes says, “I was a bit cavalier”. 
The FD, unlike the owner-manager, is unaware of the existence of any formal 
policy or plan related to crisis management and whilst lauding the 
entrepreneurial culture sees the lack of corporate governance procedures as 
“our biggest problem” when set in the context of long term sustainability 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or 
mitigation?  
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CO1MD, when asked this question, replied,  
“Basically, our philosophy is that if we’ve got a risk and we can afford 
the risk, we self-insure.  If it is less than £70,000 we tend to take it on 
the chin because we can afford it and with insurance all you are doing 
is working out the probability and then paying them 30% for 
underwriting that risk.” 
In determining the risks to transfer CO1MD states that, 
“We do have a risk register, we have two levels of risk here, firstly, we 
have our risk assessments on every activity on the site and that is 
done on an operational level and on an annual or as we change a 
contract where we have a risk assessment done at a board level, no, 
it is at a senior management level; we have a risk register that 
demonstrates all the top 20 risks of the company and we review it 
every quarter.” 
In a small business the board of directors, who act as the thinking and 
controlling mind of the company, are readily identifiable and as such carry a 
high level of personal risk in respect of their duty of care and accordingly an 
evidence trail of good preventative practice is a necessity to demonstrate 
“reasonableness” as to polices adopted, monitored and actions taken.  
CO1MD gives an example relevant to this issue, 
“a guy fell off a belt and broke his hip and was in hospital and off work 
for months or whatever it was.  H&S investigated it and found we just 
didn’t have a case to answer.  It was down to the bloke not following 
our right procedures and yes there was nothing we were found 
culpable of at all.” 
CO1NED confirms the importance of this evidence trail. 
“Yes, yes, so there is an evidence trail, but there isn’t a clear process 
by which you know it was actually done.  That’s right.” 
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And by way of formalisation of the process CO1MD stated, 
“We are currently undergoing ISO 14000 or 14001 whatever it is, so 
hopefully the trail would be even more there by the end of the year 
when we get to accreditation.” 
CO1FD summarises the approach, 
“If we can afford that level of risk we will insure it and transfer that to 
someone else.  So it depends on the particular risk and how people 
assess it and we have a score for each level of risk.” 
CO1NED confirms that the external insurance broker presents the insurance 
cover against the assessed risks to the board for formal approval, 
“it is done with a professional, the board has reviewed the insurance 
cover recently and concluded that the cover is okay” 
COICOMD emphasises the reliance on external expertise stating that, 
“I am a salesman done good.  So for my peace of mind I like to make 
sure that people much cleverer than I have looked at it and said that’s 
watertight or that’s an area for concern.”  
The insurance review is conducted annually, and according to CO1FD there 
is intense scrutiny embedded within the review process, 
“The policies every 12 months obviously to be renewed so we do go 
through it very much with a fine toothcomb.  Every 12 months to see 
what we need to change.”  
A vague answer from CO1COMD however, reveals a weak understanding of 
risk transference policy, 
“Oh crumbs.  We try and manage all risks I think because you can’t 
insure against things. I’m not sure; I don’t know what the insurance 
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premium would have been for firewood not catching fire.  And it may 
have been an oversight so we try to manage risk on everything” 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a 
risk taker or risk averse? 
CO1MD says, 
“I would say that I am a risk taker.  I will take a view on things and I will 
decide and I am a balanced risk taker because you can do nothing 
with no risk and without risk you won’t develop the company and move 
forward.” 
This is also a view shared by CO1COMD with regard to the attitude towards 
risk taken by the owner-manager, 
“Yes, the attitude is push it until it breaks and then bring it back one. 
So, is that a risk taker, probably yes?” 
The owner-manager has however become increasingly more considered in 
his attitude to risk over the years and, as the business matures, he is more 
risk-averse than in the early start-up period, 
“I am more risk averse now.  But you know when you are starting a 
business with very little capital and very little anything else you do have 
to take much more calculated risks and you have to wing it and you 
wouldn’t get started and build up a business if you didn’t wing it” 
He gives an example of such a change to a more risk-averse approach, 
“As an example, we had a discussion on Monday and we found out 
that we wanted to do an activity that wasn’t quite on our permit so 
maybe four years ago we would have winged it and said let’s apply for 
the permit and do it now we are saying we are doing a trial we’ve 
notified the agency and we wouldn’t push it forward until we get the 
permit – so our risk level has gone down”. 
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Both CO1FD and CO1COMD echo the perception of the owner-manager 
related to this shift in risk appetite, 
“But in terms to our attitude to risk, it’s changed and we are a lot less 
gung-ho than we used to be.  We have had to.” CO1FD 
“But this is where it has changed and we have had to have a few things 
happen to realise that we needed to change… So it’s changed but it’s 
more about [CO1MD] accepting pushing until it breaks and he’s 
actually stepped back and let other people manage it more.” 
CO1COMD 
In contrast with the operational directors, CO1NED comments on strategic 
risk and gives an example of how the board is taking a longer-term view of 
risks that are not operational or of an immediate and obvious nature.  He 
states that the forward view of the company extends to five years, a relatively 
distant horizon for most small companies. 
“for example, we have just agreed at the board meeting today, that we 
are going to have the next board meeting as a strategy away-day, 
because we believe that we need to start looking at the impact of the 
external environment on the company from 18 months to five years 
ahead” 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business continuity post any 
crisis? 
When asked what would happen in the aftermath of a severe storm, CO1MD 
replied, 
“Well it depends on what crisis hit us -  yes the structures out there 
wouldn’t be flattened they are all steel so they are not going anywhere 
and some parts of the business would suffer the interruption but would 
just carry on you know. As and when.” 
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CO1FD confirms that the “Disaster Recovery Plan” relates only to the office 
and not to the site as a whole and adds that it would be easy to hire other 
facilities, resolve IT and re-establish normal operations quickly,  
“This disaster plan is really if the office is closed down, not so much 
the site.  So basically if this building caught fire, what would we do?  
And I believe there is no problem actually to take us down to the airport 
and rent some space and our IT people, etc. would get us set up very 
quickly.  So we could be there for weeks on end - not a problem.” 
Without a plan the board of CO1 would, ipso facto, be extemporising and 
although there is a business insurance cover for interruptions in trade, the 
company is at considerable risk as the overwhelming evidence from research 
points towards confusion, delays and disorganisation prevailing as a crisis 
develops. 
The Commercial Director, CO1COMD is aware of a BCP.  His response 
nevertheless suggests that it has a low level of importance in the 
management of a post-crisis event, 
“There is one, but I’ve looked at it and forgotten about it.  There is a 
disaster recovery plan out there somewhere, but I am afraid that I have 
forgotten all about it (laughter) that’s not good is it?”  
and adds the reason the board do not engage in scenario planning,  
“No we don’t because it is too difficult.  No we don’t do a mock-up of a 
disaster, I suppose we have systems in place if a server died and 
everyone knows how to act if it is down”  
Such a high degree of self-belief in the skills of people and the robustness of 
systems corresponds with a prevailing attitude of aggrandisement where 
executive capabilities are invariably over-rated during a crisis (Mitroff and 
Anagnos 2000). 
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CO1NED summarises the stance of the directors concerning BCP and 
rationalises that the reason for a failure to produce and test a plan is due to 
Rumsfeldian “unknown unknowns”. 
“There aren’t formal plans that I am aware of to ensure that the 
business continues post-crisis and the question really is, to what 
extent and what level of crisis are you meant to prepare for?”   
Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO1 
The dominance of the personality of the owner-manager of CO1 pervades 
each nook and cranny of the company.  A well-educated man, the OM is a 
large physical presence and although there is a board, no one is in any doubt 
that he is the decision-maker in all but matters of detail.  He has been 
successful in the past and is the archetypal entrepreneur who has “winged it” 
and at times such actions have resulted in disaster.  Other executive directors 
respect his judgement and over many years have normalised the situation 
albeit with, at times, grudging acquiescence. 
The presence of a de-facto non-executive chairman has been a moderating, 
though limited, influence, and corporate governance is seen largely in terms 
of compliance and regulatory observance.  Past crises and the subsequent 
lessons learned do inform and influence the directors as to current 
behaviours and policy setting. 
Risk management processes are robust in health and safety matters and the 
appointment of a compliance officer has re-enforced the directors’ view that 
past mistakes should not be repeated.  The board receive a detailed health 
and safety report but risk in its wider context is not a specific board agenda 
item and the risk register is not accorded great importance. 
Business continuity plans are set out in a disaster recovery document that is 
not reviewed on a regular basis to the extent that some directors are unaware 
of its existence.  The default position in the event of a major crisis that may 
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cause an interruption to trade is that of extemporisation and a belief that 
normal service can be re-established in short order. 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO2 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
CO2MD prefaced his response to Q1 with a satirical quip, “Let’s start off with 
an easy one then” that reflects his not inconsiderable expertise and 
understanding of corporate governance as a consequence of his Chartered 
Director status.  He states, 
“the IOD support, learning and development for not far off more than 
a decade has enabled me two have a really deep understanding of 
what a director should be, what a director should do and how they 
should conduct themselves” 
His answer combines the concept of corporate governance as both pilot and 
watchman, the former equating with the higher order theme of operational 
excellence and the latter equating with the higher order theme of compliance  
“I think that from the very beginning of a business, good governance, 
good guidance for every business is essential in order that they can 
navigate their way through a really complex and intricate world - a 
macro environment especially.” 
CO2OPD echoes the view of CO2MD, and although he defines corporate 
governance largely in terms of operational practices, reference is made to 
risk and, as such, the role of the watchman is accepted as an element of 
corporate governance.  CO2OPD states, 
“Corporate Governance means effective direction of an organisation 
at board level when, when we set goals and targets that we'd like to 
see flow through the business from costs to risks to work life balance 
to individuals.” 
327 
 
CO2MD goes on to define corporate governance in terms of an ethical stance 
that acts as an assurance for stakeholders, both intimate and distant, and in 
so doing contributes to creating competitive advantage, 
“We want to be a company that people come and work for, that people 
want to come and purchase a service from.  Reputation is something 
that is difficult to build but very easy to lose.” 
“We can not only offer our services in a fair business-like manner but 
also in an ethical manner.”   
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute to a 
small company like yours?  
CO2MD sees appropriate and relevant corporate governance as adding 
value through the clarification of the company’s mission and thereby 
contributing towards the success of the enterprise through increased 
awareness of what the company is trying to achieve. 
“SMEs in particular I think, a great many don't understand the value of 
governance and the fact that, not necessarily complex corporate 
governance, but sound basic governance is essential for every SME 
in order that they can better define who they are as a company” 
CO2MD summarises his views regarding the value of corporate governance.  
He sees it as making a positive contribution and as both the ethical and 
strategic foundations of the business,   
“I think you can do very little wrong if you look at Corporate 
Governance as being the guiding principles on which your business 
strategy is based.” 
CO2OPD prefixes his response to Q2b with the words, 
“Corporate Governance has always been a little bit of a difficult one 
for me because I started on the tools a long time ago and 
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understanding corporate governance at director level is not my 
strongest attribute.” 
His understanding of the value of corporate governance is limited and 
accordingly is a matter that he is content to leave to his MD.  CO2OPD does 
however refer, in a convoluted way, to corporate governance being 
concerned with the leadership of the company, change management and 
managing risk that pertains in particular to the licences without which the 
company could not trade. 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
influence corporate governance?  
The owner-manager of CO2 has delegated day to day responsibility to the 
two executive directors and although he keeps a watching brief on the 
business, his role is principally that of shareholder whilst nevertheless 
retaining his directorship in a “quasi” non-executive capacity.  It was evident 
that the executive directors hold the owner-manager in high regard and that 
his values continue to pervade and influence, CO2MD states, 
“Prior to my becoming a director, the values that he espouses are still 
around in this building today. We trade fairly, we don't cheat 
customers.” 
Whilst the MD admires the values of the owner-manager, it is acknowledged 
that these are personal values as distinct from a formulaic approach to 
corporate values and corporate governance that may be evident in large 
companies.  
“I have a great respect for the way in which he managed the business 
over that quarter of a century and since.  But I think that understanding 
Corporate Governance was something he really hadn't thought about 
too much.”   
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CO2OPD comments equivocally on the way in which he notices that the 
owner-manager’s influence has waned and that his values are ill-at-ease with 
the business and its future direction.  
“when we first came to the board CO2OM was the managing director 
but over the last year he has moved away and I think it is difficult to 
the way the board is now is very different to the way he managed the 
board.  So his values, he is, well you probably…, don't sit as well with 
the direction in which CO2MD is taking the company” 
This view is at odds with that of CO2MD and the prevailing issue of owner-
manager hegemony.  It is also inconsistent with regard to the moderating 
influence of the “outsider” the mantle of which the CO2OM has begun to 
adopt.  CO2OPD concludes, 
“CO2OM has no influence at all in the way that the company is directed 
now so CO2OM's interest is financial.  So he's interested in how well 
the company is doing and the wealth of the company”  
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk 
management in your company? 
CO2MD illustrates the first of the Higher Order Themes in his response to 
Q3, stating that, 
“Our corporate governance helps us, help me, as managing director 
to better quantify risks and understand what the ramifications may be 
should something go pear-shaped on a given day and it enables us as 
a board and as a business to reduce our vulnerability and certainly to 
manage the extent to which we believe we are vulnerable to a set of 
given circumstances.” 
CO2MD stresses that risk management is an integral part of corporate 
governance in a twin capacity of risk mitigation and of risk and crisis 
management.  CO2MD adds that risk is a policy issue for the board and that 
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risks are identified and categorised in a register, which is itself subject to 
review.   
 
“We have a formal critical review on an annual basis.  They are on 
rolling critical review because they are living documents. I refer to them 
on a monthly basis because there are always new risks out there and 
are always elements to risk that change given a set of economic 
circumstances and operational circumstances.” 
 
The risks identified are internal and external, operational and strategic whist 
the influence of relatively recent memories inform attitudes and approaches 
to risk. 
 
“We have the risk management policy and the wider risk register and 
it covers everything that we consider at the moment to be risks 
potentially to the business.  They range from issues to do with people 
internally, macro risks within the wider economy, financial risks, we 
are all aware of what happened in 2008, and equally risks around 
operations and the way in which we perform.” 
 
Given the nature of the business activities undertaken by CO2, many of the 
risk policies and procedures are subject to external, independent audit and 
government agency inspections.   
 
“We currently have 8 or 9 separate externally audited accreditations 
that are undertaken annually and I'm actually just starting just the 
season now where I'm going to see about seven or eight auditors from 
different companies in this business over the next few months.” 
 
The MD states that these audits are business critical and that a failure or a 
non-compliance finding could result in closure or suspension of trade.  
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“any impact on our asbestos removal licence has the capability of 
shutting the business down within a month.  Should that licence be 
reduced or removed then there would not be a CO2.” 
 
CO2OPD concurs with the MD’s assessment of the importance of the licence 
and adherence to process, stating, 
 
“We at board level, want to maintain the three-year licence which 
means that we are incredibly risk averse as far as our asbestos licence 
is concerned.” 
 
The Operations Director draws attention to people risk, administrative and IT 
risk and succession planning and how socio-emotional relationships within a 
small business between owner-manager and staff can be a positive element 
of corporate culture but may also represent a threat and create a source of 
conflict, 
 
“I’m certainly conscious of risk because there are so many ways.  
People risk; we looked at but we get longevity of people at CO2 and 
one of CO2OM’s (pause) faults is that he is very loyal to people that 
work with him and one particular member of staff who left at Christmas 
has been with CO2OM for as long as I have that's 29 years.  But over 
a period of years we saw him as a risk to the business. And it didn't 
work.  He resigned which I accepted, but CO2OM was still keen for 
him not to leave.  And I had to make it quite clear that this was the time 
for him to go.”  
 
In this particular instance the hegemonic authority of the owner-manager did 
not prevail as a result of the insistence of the Operations Director on a 
particular course of action where competence issues superseded gratitude 
based upon loyalty towards a long-serving colleague.  Defiance by a “hired 
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hand” director in contradiction to the wishes of the owner-manager carries 
with it a degree of risk and accordingly acquiescence tends to prevail. 
 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the 
company has faced recently?  
 
CO2MD is critical of previous practices by the owner-manager who was then 
the Managing Director of CO2.  He states that reactivity and a belief in the 
ability to cope was the dominant paradigm, 
 
“I think that to some extent there was an element of the managing 
director being a bit lackadaisical about the whole affair and thinking 
that we can manage small things as we've always managed small 
things and we will deal with it.” 
 
He adds that due process was absent and that as a consequence the 
company came close to closure in 2008, 
“CO2 also weren't looking after its licence properly as well as we 
should have been doing a decade ago and the HSE decided to take 
action.  And at one point HSE were considering revocation of our 
licence” 
 
CO2MD concludes, that as a result of governance failures, a pro-active 
approach to risk and crisis management had to be adopted, 
  
“There was no framework certainly culturally and behaviourally for 
senior management to come together and talk about risk as a wider 
issue for the company.  The practice changed when I became MD.”   
 
The Operations Director acknowledges that operational policies and 
procedures had been weak stating that  
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“Lads were going to site and lads were more or less doing what they 
wanted to do on site so that shows poor supervision from managers.”   
 
He nonetheless accepts that as a director he is ultimately accountable for the 
actions of his team members, 
 
“My job as a director is to manage managers so it wasn’t actually a 
supervisors’ fault it was a directors’ fault.  It was my fault because I 
should have processes and procedures in place so that doesn’t 
happen.”   
 
Whilst it is understandable that the Operations Director has a great focus 
upon service delivery CO2OPD also accepts that crises born from a lack of 
strategic vision and ineffectual risk governance have impacted upon the 
business, 
 
“CO2MD and I look at the strategic risks - what's the risk to the 
business from this and I know that CO2OM did when the licence was 
at risk but actually apart from that he just sees the licence as there.” 
 
The MD recognises that there were signals of an impending crisis that should 
have been acted upon that were in each instance considered to be of minor 
importance.    He adds that, 
 
“There were signals and those signals manifested themselves quite 
early the different number of ways.  They were all relatively small but 
then when viewed as a whole, it was very quickly realised that we had 
a major problem.” 
 
The latter of these three themes appears to support comments from the 
participants in CO2 relating to the impact of memories of an untoward event 
where the legacy of such an event informs a more cautious approach to future 
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similar activities.  With regard to post-crisis learning from the “near miss” 
related to licence renewal the directors implemented a structured review 
process and decided to use outside expertise to support internal procedures.  
CO2OPD states, 
 
“we asked an external auditor to come in, audit our site work and the 
processes behind it and then what should happen then is that we 
should feed that into our company audit and system and when we 
send somebody out to audit our sites the weak area the external 
auditor picks up; the internal auditors then go to site and look for – it’s 
a way to try and change culture informally rather than too formally.” 
 
The review process is not seen as a formal element of governance but rather 
an integral part of business continuity, as CO2MD explains, 
 
“So post immediate crisis and hopefully post-resolution of that crisis 
we will sit down and review what has happened, why we believe it as 
hasn’t come; up what the ramifications are and where we could have 
or could not have of had an influence in doing things differently” 
 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or 
mitigation?  
CO2MD states the approach taken by the company towards the mitigation of 
risk  
“is to effectively, for want of a better phrase, but I'm going to use the 
phrase, use due diligence.”   
He considers due diligence as a wide ranging concept that goes beyond the 
realms of finance and uses this means of mitigation in commercial contract 
assessment and management in what he describes as  
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“a whole range of commercial activities to the level at which we are 
sophisticated enough to do so.”   
He is particularly concerned with ensuring that liquidity levels are maintained 
– an issue that bedevils small enterprises which the UK Government has 
sought to address through The Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) 
Act 1998.  CO2MD states this is, 
“a risk to this business and as with most, the risk is running out of cash 
and I am not funding somebody's projects up to half a million pounds 
to be paid in the autumn of this year.” 
Risk is transferred through a plethora of insurance policies based upon 
discussion with and advice from a specialist commercial insurance broker. 
“My annual insurance review takes the best part of an entire day with 
the broker because it simply isn't the case of discussing what next 
years’ programme is about” 
CO2MD does however have a cynical view of insurers as loophole seekers 
as and when an incident occurs, 
“we also understand the underwriters are equally keen not to pay out 
anything and caveat their way to glory.” 
CO2OPD is not involved in the detailed discussions concerning insurance. 
He states, 
“CO2MD’s the insurance bod.  I don’t sit in on insurance meetings, 
CO2MD just gives me a little synopsis.” 
and is somewhat vague in his understanding of what risks have been 
transferred, “wouldn’t swear to it but last time I heard like we did discus key 
man insurance”. 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a 
risk taker or risk averse? 
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CO2MD explains how the CO2OM started the business in 1980 and ten years 
later  
“the business bombed in the early 1990s in the recession - and then 
the rise from the ashes again”.   
The executive directors perceive the owner-manager as a risk-taker without 
being cavalier.  The nature of the culture within the boardroom is open and 
risk discussions with the owner-manager are frank and open without the need 
for the executives to second-guess the view of the owner-manager. 
CO2OPD recounts an incident where a colleague was killed on site and the 
owner-manager responded through initiating an intensive training 
programme to remove risk from the business.  The owner-manager adopted 
a highly risk-averse position as a direct consequence of a serious incident, 
“so when you talk of CO2OM on a scale of 1-10 about taking a chance, 
what he actually said was that I’m going to take no chances at all I’m 
just going to train you lot until its coming out of your ears.” 
From a position of low autoschediastic behaviour in the aftermath of the death 
the Operations Director still sees the pioneer spirit within the owner-manager, 
“CO2OM taking a risk or as a risk to the business probably 7 out of 10” 
The two executive directors, best described as “settlers”, see themselves as 
taking measured and approaches to risk based upon policies and practices 
that CO2OPD believes would lapse if CO2OM returned to the business. 
“I think within that year at least half the policies we’ve got would slip. I 
think he would pay a lot less attention to the detail of ensuring policies 
are reviewed and I don't think he would review of five-year plan”  
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business continuity post any 
crisis? 
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The responses of the directors to Q7 differ from the Higher Order Themes 
evident in the three other cases.  In CO2 there is strong evidence of 
structured planning designed to ensure minimal disruption to the trading 
activity of the company.   
Business continuity and crisis communication plans are well developed and 
emergency cash is available to meet contingent needs.  Maximum time 
outage is estimated to be between six and eight weeks 
CO2MD states, 
“We would envisage having costs in the six figure range within the first 
48 hours until post crisis and we have funds available for that. We have 
within, within, a business critical process and within a business 
continuity plan a designated recovery site and how we would 
physically manage.” 
Back up of IT systems is an expensive cloud-based solution and directors are 
confident as to its robustness and security.  One weakness in the planning 
that CO2MD accepts is that neither himself nor his Operations Director have 
undertaken grievance counselling training, “something that I think we need”. 
The final word comes from CO2OPD who airs a measure of optimism 
regarding down time following a crisis, but who nevertheless reverts to a 
theme that has been consistent - the crisis from which the company could not 
recover would be the loss of its licence.   
Accordingly, the emphasis on sound operational procedures is a critical factor 
in business continuity. 
“As such for fire and flood we could start work within a couple of days.  
We could start work in a couple of days at least and continue our jobs 
but if we lost our licence tomorrow the company would close down.” 
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Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO2 
Corporate governance is well developed and appropriate to the size and 
scope of CO1.  Whilst the owner-manager is not actively involved with the 
operations of the business on a day-to-day basis he is a passive supporter of 
the MD’s approach to corporate governance. 
The key influence in CO2 is the MD whose attitudes and beliefs are an 
extension of those of the owner-manager but whose background and 
education take the business to a level that is rare in small companies 
concerning corporate governance and risk.  CO2MD provides documentary 
evidence as to the various policies that are an integral part of best practice 
corporate governance and demonstrates compliance with the IOD principles 
of corporate governance for unlisted companies within the sections deemed 
applicable to small companies. 
The company is in a sector where high levels of risk pertain and where the 
government licence to operate is an absolute necessity and a determinant of 
whether the company can function or not.  Accordingly, health and safety and 
procedural operational matters are an obsession for the directors.  The 
corporate governance regime is the impetus behind risk management policy 
in this narrower context as well as being the force behind risk management 
in a strategic setting.  
Incidents in the past have been a major factor in moving towards stronger 
risk management policies and procedures with training playing a significant 
part in the improvement of on-site practice.  Crises that have occurred, 
including a death, weigh heavily upon the directors and the crisis 
management plan is influenced by the personal trauma experienced as a 
consequence of the fatality. 
The company has a comprehensive business continuity plan that is tested in 
table-top exercises and CO2MD is confident that, as a two-building site, the 
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decanting to second premises would ensure maximum time outage 
amounting to no more than three days at worse. 
The greatest threat to the company is loss of the government licence to 
operate and in such an event that would result in the closure of the business.  
Hence it is not unreasonable to conclude that whilst the personal interests of 
CO2MD are a key driver of risk governance the consequence of failure and 
the “stick” that would be applied in such an instance is of primary concern. 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO3 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
CO3MD responds to this question in two distinct phases, the first of which 
relates to compliance with the law and the second of which is concerned with 
attitudes and behaviours towards colleagues, customers and suppliers.  He 
refers to the latter as “A bit Christian in a way” and references the so-called 
Golden Rule as expressed in Luke chapter 6 verse 31, adding, 
“yes, so, so, we are very sure of how we treat people and we want to 
make sure that we treat people the way that we want to be treated” 
This altruism is reflected in further comments made by CO3MD, in which he 
views the legal contracts as being of lesser importance to him than value-
based relationships, 
“You know, sometimes we have to use agreements, legal agreements, 
to just highlight what it is that we expect; what are our expectations 
are and how our relationship should be governed, but at the end of the 
day you know, those agreements are just a guideline for how we 
should be doing business either with our suppliers, with our resellers - 
and then employment contracts - they’re just a guideline as to how we 
should treat our employees” 
CO3MD summarises his view stating, 
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“Corporate governance, it's making sure we abide by the law and we 
operate in accordance with the values and principles that we set out 
as being core to what it is that we believe in.” 
The Finance Director, CO3FD, also places primary emphasis on corporate 
governance as being a framework for ethical practices, saying, 
“it's about operating in an ethical way within a framework that is 
considered best practice, reasonable, effective” 
He adds that corporate governance is a multifarious construct that 
incorporates structures to manage the business and facilitate a range of 
internal and external relationships, 
“managing, managing risk effectively and ultimately is able to fulfil the 
requirements of its various stakeholders from shareholders to staff, 
regulatory bodies, government and so on.” 
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute to a 
small company like yours?  
CO3FD sees the value added to a small business through corporate 
governance as being that of a framework that contributes to organisational 
effectiveness and legitimacy particularly during the metamorphosis from 
small to medium-sized enterprise,  
“as these businesses become more successful and they grow, they 
have to start operating a little bit more like a corporate and have more 
structured framework or they are not going to attract the right people 
and operate effectively.  And I think that's where good governance, 
quite aside and in addition to the risk and crisis side, will have a real 
part to play.” 
CO3FD makes a further point concerning the transition from start-up to 
growth phase and the inferential subjugation of managerial hegemony facing 
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the owner-manager as he or she moves from “pioneer” to “settler” and some 
measure of corporate governance becomes therefore a sine qua non, 
“small businesses, I'm generalising here, tend to be owner-managed. 
They tend to be successful or have reached a certain level on the back 
of the owner-manager.  Obviously being pretty good at his desired job 
but, but, also being quite determined and “I'll do it my way””  
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
influence corporate governance?  
CO3MD is adamant that his values and beliefs are a key factor in the exercise 
of corporate governance within the company, stating in somewhat 
Kafkaesque terms, 
“I would say 100%. If I do believe what it is that I believe in and the 
way I want to operate.  I can't be someone I'm not.”  
CO3MD goes on to expand his belief that “the feeling we have in the 
business- it's like a family. So we trust each other.”  When asked if that trust 
had ever been abused, he cites an instance of a director, subsequently 
dismissed, using a company credit card for private purchases.  The actions 
of that director were exposed through a whistle-blower following which 
CO3MD responded by confronting the executive stating that, 
“he needed to be pulled up because he was in more than a position of 
trust; he was the keeper of the company coffers and he had abused 
the trust that I had in him.  And he had abused his own standards and 
ethics” 
CO3FD sees the sales background of the CO3MD and owner-manager as a 
critical influence on the management of the business where his close 
relationships to customers have been instrumental in creating opportunities.  
He adds a caveat however, 
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“I think what has happened in this business historically, is that desire 
to maintain and build those relationships and to grab opportunity, 
although I wouldn’t say at any cost, but maybe without considering the 
full impact on the business” 
When prompted to expand further upon the non-universal nature of values 
across different cultures and the implications that could arise under the 
Bribery Act (2010), CO3FD replied, 
“Personally, I think that the ethics of owner-manager here are very 
sound.  I think one has to look at what’s normal in that market, and this 
is just hypothetical, we may say that in the UK taking a customer out 
to dinner at a half decent restaurant with a half decent bottle of wine 
is perfectly acceptable, but taking them for a long weekend to a five-
star hotel backing onto a golf course might be considered to be a little 
bit excessive.” 
CO3FD does however acknowledge, with accompanying laughter, that the 
board meetings do not include an agenda item regarding declarations of 
hospitality given or received or of any conflicts of interest. 
He concludes,  
“Certainly with my financial control hat on I’ve got absolutely no 
evidence of any untoward transactions.” 
The company has two directors who are “living people” and one corporate 
director.  CO3MD is the Managing Director whilst his spouse, although a de-
jure director whose role may resemble that of a NED, plays a negligible role 
in the managing or directing the company. 
The outsiders upon whom CO3MD relies are his accountant [W] and his 
solicitor [G], (“I’ve had these two guys with me all the time”) both of whom 
attend board meetings, 
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“[W] has been involved with me ever since I did the MBO 
[Management Buy Out] back in 2005.  He sits on every board meeting.   
He plays devil’s advocate and Peter Pessimist to me who’s the 
optimist.  ….  [W], show me that this is actually going to happen and 
that plans are in place. That’s the role he fulfils.” 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk 
management in your company? 
CO3MD ascribes a key factor concerning internal risk management as being 
that of the open culture of the company where colleagues are encouraged to 
think critically about the ways in which business is conducted and to consider 
the risks that are inherent within a particular process. 
He emphasises task ownership on staff at all levels in the company and 
promotes a culture that enables individuals to exercise judgement, stating,  
“Well I need things in this way if you don’t give it to me, yeah, we have 
a risk - so can you change things - so we have that culture where we 
encourage people.” 
Whilst such a “laissez faire” style of management adopted by CO3MD may 
appear to be counter-intuitive to the prescriptive and authoritarian approach 
of the archetypal owner-manager, it nevertheless is a reflection of his 
particular ontology. 
Through extension of this perspective, extemporisation is favoured over 
prescriptive risk management policies although CO3MD states that the 
company does have a risk register, a statement confirmed by CO3FD, where 
the basis of risk directly relates to the annual business plan.  Many of those 
risk may be described as “micro operational” matters including the possibility 
of a key sales executive taking maternity leave as being “highly likely” and 
the concomitant impact being “severe”.  This reflects the eternal issue of 
resource scarcity in small businesses where, for example, an important role 
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involving personal relationships comes to an end and in effect becomes a 
business critical concern.   
External risks on the world stage affect the company’s global markets and 
CO3MD points to a large fall in Middle East sales,  
“It was because there was a war in Syria and god knows what else, 
things outside of our control.” 
He goes on to identify other external risks, 
“currency exchange rate risks, there’s tariff barriers, customs charges, 
there’s the risk that regulations and the operation of products in market 
places if that changes so a combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
as well as exchange rate risks.” 
Given that the owner-manager clearly recognises that there are strategic 
risks that he perceives to be “outside his control” it should be axiomatic 
therefore that the board scan the environment and takes appropriate pre-
emptive action to mitigate the impact of such an eventuality.  When asked a 
supplementary question “Have you taken out any cover as a consequence 
of what is going on in the Middle East? Anything that you didn’t do 
before? CO3MD replied “No, No.” although he later says that, 
“On the exchange rate side of things what we do there is sit down with 
our bankers on a regular basis.  They produce regular reports and we 
look at what their economists are saying about where the project 
where exchange rates will be.” 
CO3MD adds that risk is not a standard item on the board agenda although 
he refers back to the driver of risk management thinking as the business plan 
and adverse variances in the plan do trigger discussions that are risk related.  
CO3FD comments on this matter and refers to the backward-looking nature 
of the risk register that is memory-related and believes that as well as learning 
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from the past there needs to be a forward-looking perspective that occurs 
within the corporate governance framework. 
“the business has a risk register where historically it has looked at what 
sort of risks it might encounter; We have talked about that we need to 
bring this on to the board agenda as something that needs to be 
looked at more frequently but haven’t If I’m honest.” 
CO3FD refers to risk as an integral part of corporate governance that is 
concerned with, “managing risk effectively” an in particular to the various 
externally audited standards as being part of risk management,  
“we have the ISO,9000, is it 9001? registration quality management, 
yes, it is.  … and I think 2015 and 2016 is on the horizon and within 
that there is really a real appetite for looking at risk and what I’ve tried 
to do is to introduce a little bit more risk management into the business 
by dovetailing into the ISO process” 
The use of such bespoke, and credible, risk management practices are a 
means by which, and at relatively low cost, directors of small companies are 
able to demonstrate to stakeholders that they are taking reasonable steps to 
manage risk that is within their control so to so.  CO3FD uses an example 
illustrate the difference using the “likelihood and impact” model,  
“We’ve got to look at the potential for it occurring and the impact, so a 
meteorite from outer space crashes on the building we’re finished 
(laughter), but the chances of it happening are fractional.”  
Mitroff (2000) refers to a view that sees risk in terms of a statistical rarity as 
“intellectualisation” although in this instance there is a distinction between a 
genuine statistical outlier and, for example, a major customer teetering on the 
brink of collapse being given extended credit. 
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Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the 
company has faced recently?  
In the event of a crisis CO3MD does not have a plan and his response to an 
unforeseen event that may have negative potential for the company is, 
“if something were to happen and we need to manage a crisis then 
either the operational management team or the senior management 
team would get together and say O.K. this has happened, and what 
resources do we need to mobilise to sort this out?” 
CO3FD describes this approach in the following terms, 
Personally, I think that there is an element of ‘next year we will be 
millionaire’s Rodney’ in the business (much laughter) My reference to 
Only Fools and Horses refers to over-optimism and just believing that 
it will come good”  
This ex tempore approach is in line with the classification of crisis response 
that Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) describe as both denial and disavowal. 
CO3MD uses the services of a PR company to assist with a reputation crisis, 
“and we have a sort of plan in place should the brown stuff hit the fan.  
Yes, yes who are we going to talk to? And how are we going to spin 
things? And you know, …and have been working with them for seven 
years now, so they know the business and they know us.” 
CO3MD has undertaken media training with the BBC, albeit seven years ago, 
and in the event of his absence CO3FD would deputise as spokesperson 
having himself recently completed media and crisis management training, of 
which the CO3MD was unaware, in a previous company.  
In the case of CO3 there was one mention of post-crisis learning that took 
place following a lack of cost control in Research and Development due to 
what CO3FD refers to as an “almost a head in the sand approach” that 
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brought about a £600,000 overspend.  The action taken as a result of this 
crisis is explained by CO3FD,  
“cash flow is looked at on a daily basis, it’s being reported monthly.”   
Other finance reports to the board now include 
“P&L, balance sheet, some KPIs such as debtor days, creditor days 
which should be pointing towards – if things are getting out of hand, 
bank invoicing, finance availability, aged debtors, aged creditors, sales 
and order trends.  There is a graph that looks at where is that heading.”  
That cash flow crisis resulted in late payments to suppliers who then placed 
CO3 on stop which required emergency bank finance to resolve what became 
an existential crisis. 
 
“we got a new loan from the bank and it was quite touch and go as to 
whether that was going to come forward and then, frankly, we were in 
a situation where if we got the loan we could carry on, but if it didn’t it 
would have withered on the vine.” 
When asked “Would better governance have either mitigated that crisis 
or, indeed, prevented it in total?”CO3FD replied, 
“Without a doubt, because it found itself in the hole and should have 
seen the hole being dug”. 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or 
mitigation?  
A major risk for small companies is that of cash flow and the timeliness with 
which invoices are settled.  CO3MD chooses to use bank invoice discounting 
as a means of ensuring at least a large part of the invoice total is settled 
quickly.  Although this is an expensive method of obtaining working capital, 
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the maximum exposure to an overseas debt is £1000 and for a UK debt £500.  
CO3MD opting for “peace of mind” says  
“I’ve got no problem of paying the one or one and a half percent”.   
This choice reflects the risk appetite of CO3MD who states,  
“so it’s how much do I want in my pocket versus how much do I value 
a good night’s sleep. And I value a good night’s sleep more than a few 
thousand pounds at the end of the year because health is more 
important to me” 
There is a concern in small companies that is associated with the health and 
safety of colleagues for both altruistic reasons and for fear of prosecution 
where the thinking and controlling mind can be easily identified.  Hence the 
evidence trail is an important issue for directors in small companies.  CO3MD 
states, 
“We’ve got very robust health and safety procedures in place so that 
everyone goes through training at working at heights and that sort of 
thing, and we have not had any major accidents”   
And asked if there was a robust evidence trail, CO3MD replies,  
“Absolutely. Because that is all part of our Health and Safety side of 
things”.   
CO3FD adds, 
“we’ve got a car policy that labours the point about, you know, the 
employee is the most important asset at the expense of everything 
else and do not undertake long journeys and so on and so forth.” 
As was stated earlier, the CO3MD relies on his accountant as solicitor for 
external advice but CO3FD points out a potential conflict of interest in such 
an arrangement related to their independence, 
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“the external advisors, I think also they are in a slightly difficult position 
because the business is a customer, so they therefore have future 
business to protect so they can’t be too demonstrative about how they 
tackle the issues, particularly with an individual.” 
He does go on to qualify this view and concedes the advantages of the 
outside advisors, 
“but at the same time they have got the objectivity to say, look I am not 
in here day-to-day, but what this is telling me is that you have got a 
major problem here.” 
The directors of CO3 work through a local broker to monitor insurances and 
CO3FD is responsible for oversight of this process and to ensure there is not 
a feeding frenzy on the part of the broker at the annual review, 
“We’ll have a discussion if we have the right policies in place as much 
of a sin as it might to be to under-insure, I think there is always a risk 
of over-insuring and duplicating cover in different things” 
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a 
risk taker or risk averse? 
CO3FD assesses the owner-manager’s attitude to risk in the following terms,  
“I’d say that it’s more at the gung-ho end of the spectrum than the I’m 
not going to leave the house today in case something goes wrong but 
I wouldn’t say gung-ho at the expense of operating in an ethical 
manner - there is always a rainbow around the corner.” 
A belief that the “glass is half full” is symptomatic of the pioneer where the 
risks implicit in the unknown are outweighed by a sense of eternal optimism.  
The owner-manager agrees with his colleague’s sentiments and takes a 
phlegmatic view of life and risk stating, that in the event of a crisis, 
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“we could run around saying woe is me and what the heck are we 
going to do?  But that’s not very productive. So you just sort of take it 
on board and read it as is” 
The owner-manager has given personal guarantees on both bank loans and 
invoice discounting that he sees in quite “matter of fact” terms as an integral 
part of owning a small enterprise and as such displays a large measure of 
self-belief and self-confidence. 
“I have taken on board risk personally to ensure that this business has 
got a future because I believe it has a future.  And that’s what I needed 
to do to make it happen.  So, other people may say O.K. that’s too 
risky I am just going to sell it.  That for me would be failure” 
This self-belief is however tempered through “settler” key man insurance in 
the event of his incapacity to work in the business. 
Q7 What plans are in place to ensure business continuity post any 
crisis? 
When asked if he had a plan to ensure business continuity after, for example, 
a crisis such as an enforced denial of access to premises, CO3MD replied 
“Nnnnno.  It’s in my head Yes, I know – dangerous.”.  And if you are on 
holiday in the Bahamas? 
“O.K. so I’m camping out with my telephone, or I would work from 
home, but we don’t have anything written down.  So there is an 
omission there and thank you for bringing that to my attention.” 
As if rehearsing the argument to convince himself of a need to take action on 
BCP, CO3MD went on to add, 
“Yes, precisely.  It’s either on a Sunday when there is no one here. 
Yes, indeed.  So, that in essence could be a weak point in a sense? 
Yes, it could be, absolutely.” 
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CO3FD agreed that there was no formal written BCP although the IT servers 
had recently been moved to the cloud to enable homeworking in the event of 
loss of premises.  CO3FD adds, 
“So there isn’t a plan in the sense of who gets notified, I mean there 
are key holders for this building that are on a cascade system from the 
alarm company.  Do we have a plan that says these are the people 
who we call and we take a skeleton team off to a hotel or somebody’s 
lounge and get things going again, no!” 
Time outage post crisis is estimated to be  
“Potentially, I think it could be two or three months”  
according to CO3FD and whilst loss of profits insurance is in place his belief 
is that customers would migrate to other suppliers.  He recognises that a lack 
of planning down to the level of where the directors and managers should 
gather is a matter in a crisis where denial of access to premises is a reality, 
stating that, 
“I think we really ought to give some thought to what we should do.” 
Conclusions - interviews with participants in CO3 
There are similarities between the two directors’ views on corporate 
governance and how it does, or could, add value although the emphases 
differ.  The owner-manager primarily sees corporate governance through the 
lens of altruism whereby behaviours are signposted and relationships are 
facilitated.  The Finance Director chooses to view corporate governance in 
the first instance as a construct which ensures compliance with statutes and 
directives in addition to providing the ethical backdrop against which business 
is conducted. 
The value added through corporate governance is largely restricted to the 
role of the watchman although mention is made of its contribution to 
organisational performance and strategy.  Outsiders, in the form of the 
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accountant and solicitor are key influencers in ensuring compliance and 
awareness. 
The company has a risk register the focus of which is operational and pays 
minimal heed to strategic risks despite this issue exercising the mind of the 
FD with particular reference to business in the volatile areas of the Middle 
East and potential exposure through regional business practices that may be 
in conflict with UK law. 
The company has recently experienced a major internal crisis related to a 
failure of cost control and that has resulted in significant improvements in 
financial probity. As such, memories have impacted upon processes. 
The owner-manager takes a relaxed view towards crisis response and 
believes that he will cope without too many problems should an unanticipated 
event occur.  Such self-belief has been the downfall of many small 
companies, a situation that CO3FD appreciates as a result of engaging in 
crisis management training in his previous role. 
Such offhand, impromptu and autoschediastic behaviours and attitudes lean 
towards the norm in small business and hence the resilience level is reduced 
when a crisis materialises.  The recognition that some action must be taken 
points to an acceptance of the practical wisdom of doing so, yet the 
managerial melee of a small business with scarce resources will tend not to 
prioritise planning to manage an unanticipated event that the owner-manager 
hopes will never happen.  The owner-manager does however suggest that 
as a result of the interview he will take action to improve the resilience of the 
business. 
Emerging key concepts and higher order themes in CO4 
Q1a. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
The participant director from CO4 is the former owner-manager and MD of a 
full service marketing agency that collapsed and as such the answers are 
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framed in the past tense as are his interpretations of “what was” rather than 
“what is”.   
CO4MD provides a copy of a private letter written to his adult son and 
daughter explaining why the failure of the business occurred and what it 
means regarding their own futures.  This expansive missive sheds light on 
the self-reflexive nature of CO4MD and on how, to its detriment, owner-
manager hegemony pervaded and contributed to the fall of the business.  
When Q1a concerning the definition of corporate governance was put to 
CO4MD his initial reply showed a level of hesitancy.  He slowly said, 
“mmm It’s a fairly new term to me -  it was a term that I wasn’t familiar 
with and didn’t really resonate” 
but then nonetheless continued on to present a coherent view aligned to the 
stakeholder model, stating that, 
“My understanding of corporate governance is that it is there to protect 
customers, clients, employees more than shareholder value. It’s 
protection for the consumer more than shareholders.” 
A further comment suggests his perspective is also closely aligned with an 
ethical dimension of the role of corporate governance as being that of, 
“ensuring that products are sold by companies or the services that are 
provided by companies deliver what they promise” 
With use of words such as “protect” and “ensuring”, these initial responses 
place his views on the primary role of corporate governance not as the “pilot” 
but as that of the “watchman”.  
Q1b. What added value does corporate governance contribute to a 
small company like yours?  
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CO4MD sees the added value that corporate governance offers as that of 
positive “behaviour” across the company that has culture at its heart in 
delivering client benefits,  
“Good behaviour by the board and the management and all the staff 
within the organisation…… professional integrity and dedication and 
commitment to deliver our promises to clients who were paying us 
fees.” 
CO4MD reveals a further element of his view on the added value of corporate 
governance processes in terms of due diligence as part of risk management 
in the particular instance of recruitment and selection, a critical feature of any 
service-based company. 
“I suppose you would say corporate governance is involved in 
enquiring about the key people you were taking on in terms of their 
background, not only their academic suitability and qualifications for 
the job but their mind-set, their integrity, and their honesty as 
individuals.” 
This statement deals with several aspects of corporate governance in that it 
touches upon risk – especially people risk, ethical behaviour and the 
superordinate goal of operational excellence.  A subsequent comment 
related to people risk, including his own dysfunctionality, suggests that 
CO4MD attributes failure in this area as a major contributory factor that led 
to the demise of the company, 
“It was personality disorders and dysfunctional behaviour that created 
problems for me and the company. Perhaps I’m talking about myself 
as well” 
Q2. In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-manager 
influence corporate governance?  
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In his letter to his son and daughter CO4MD writes of his arrogance having 
been successful and “believing I could walk on water”.  He writes, 
“I was making some very foolish business decisions, a mix of 
arrogance, recklessness and cockiness that resulted in some heavy 
financial losses. I bought a business out of liquidation and reinstated 
the original owners as the managers. That company and I lost 
£960,000 over four years” 
CO4MD, despite possessing considerable business nous, displays naivety in 
his approach to due diligence with regard to new clients that at times 
approached recklessness.   
“we took on client business as I explained a moment ago that was risky 
because they couldn’t pay their bills, but we were conscious, I think in 
corporate governance terms to take on businesses that operated 
honestly… we would carry out some superficial financial checks. Not 
enough.” 
Q3 How would you describe the way in which governance relates to risk 
management in your company? 
Corporate governance was largely unstructured in the early days of the 
company although as the business grew to around 25 staff, the board met 
quarterly and used an agenda to steer the meeting.  The board meetings 
were however largely ceremonial over which the owner-manager presided,   
“because I always made the final decisions and that perhaps alienated 
a number of my key people because they felt that whatever they 
advised on what to do I still had the final say and I took opinions and 
observed in this and the arguments that I didn't always do what the 
majority of managers wanted me to do”.  
It was the dominance of the owner-manager and his decisions that, in his 
own words, contributed to the demise of his company. 
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“when the business was getting close to failure and I overruled the rest 
of the board and took on three pieces of business which over three 
years cost the company losses of about £600,000 of working capital 
through these companies not being able to pay the best part of £3 
million of turnover.  I have to accept that my management team and 
my NED and finance director and company secretary said we 
shouldn't take on this business but I did.” 
CO4MD gave a detailed description of an instance where an executive of a 
major plc demanded that in order to continue doing business CO4 should add 
10% to their invoices which he would collect in cash at a later date.  
“well you have enjoyed good fee income and if it is going to continue 
this has to be the deal” 
This issue was considered but as CO4MD said  
“I am ashamed to say that I took 24 hours to think about it because I 
needed the generous profits brought by that company”  
and duly rejected.  This decision proved to be correct as, 
“A year later he and a very high profile director of an international 
corporate law organisation who was employed as a main board 
director at ***** got found out and got five years and my client, ex-
client, working with ***** got three years.” 
Although this incident influenced the behaviour and risk appetite of CO4MD 
the commercial pressures became such that the company took on greater 
risks in order to remain trading.  That policy proved to be disastrous. 
Q4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage a crisis that the 
company has faced recently?  
Evidence of confusion between forward planning and reactive response can 
be observed in the reply to this question, 
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“Policies for me - it’s difficult to find the difference between policy and 
strategy.  I had a strategy time each time there was a crisis. We lost 
client turnover and the strategies were always as soon as we could 
see client moving [away from us] we would rack up our new business 
development activity and go for a strategy, you may call it risk 
governance.”  
CO4MD acknowledges that the company did not have policies to either 
prevent, mitigate or respond to a crisis and were reactive in spite of their 
involvement in preparing crisis management plans for clients, 
“We never thought about writing a crisis management PR strategy or 
corporate crisis management plan for ourselves.  We can see exactly 
what the clients needed but couldn’t see what we needed.” 
Once again the operational imperatives of winning work and then delivering 
it to clients took precedence over forward planning.  In the case of CO4 there 
is little evidence of post-crisis learning as similar crises from the past 
reoccurred,  
“so I wasn’t sensible enough to investigate possible areas to protect 
us from a similar catastrophe on breaking clients’ equipment.” 
Q5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, acceptance or 
mitigation?  
Of primary importance to CO4MD was gross profit and key man insurance 
for what he describes as the “wealth creators”.  This cover would ensure that 
families would continue to be supported in the case of a death in service and 
cash would be available to employ an MD if required to enable the business 
to continue to trade.  
The insurance broker provided advice and guidance at the annual review 
meeting.  To the regret of CO4MD, that advice was heavily relied upon 
without challenge and then acted upon.  CO4MD states that, 
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“I would sit down and review and if he told me to enhance areas of our 
cover I’d just sign up.  I didn’t take an intellectual view. Yes, these were 
abdicating moments.” 
Mitigation of commercial risk  
“wasn't particularly robust and it resulted in me having to put the 
business in administration” 
 and sales insurance proved to be prohibitive due to cost.  
Q6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk and crises – a 
risk taker or risk averse? 
CO4MD, from the outset to the maturity of his business life was a pioneer 
and an adventurer.  He acquired a company and felt his business acumen 
would be enough to ensure success.  On reflecting upon this he states, 
“the time I took on the [new] company I was “gung-ho” to the point of 
stupidity. I hadn’t had any failures other than letting a few clients down 
accidentally so I took on the company out of liquidation and I thought 
I'd mitigated the risk because I knew the 2 founding owners.” 
Basic corporate governance and financial due diligence were side-lined in the 
dash for profit, an arm’s length approach to managing the enterprise and the 
triumph of misplaced optimism over rationality.  CO3MD states, 
“Well, all the processes that you would expect me as an owner to have 
in place were not there because I was an absentee owner”  
Q7 What plans were in place to ensure business continuity post any 
crisis? 
There was a simple unwritten Business Continuity Plan but behind that was 
an underlying belief that nothing could or would go wrong.  When asked, 
Was there a sense of denial that this nothing could ever go wrong?   
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“Yes, yes - you are absolutely right and that’s how I see it now and this 
is why I shared that letter because you will see that paper to my 
children in that document that I am giving you completely honest 
replies and would draw the analogy not only with business but also in 
my private life as well.” 
The plan, such as it was, was not shared with colleagues and never tested.  
It was based around insurance and the capital inflow that would result. When 
asked the maximum time outage that the company could have sustained 
CO4MD replied, 
“Oh, I could probably survive indefinitely as long as I had the cash from 
the insurers to reinstate equipment and files were not crucial to this.”  
BCP was instigated by clients who demanded that their documents and work 
in progress be stored in a fire-proof safe and this was audited through 
unannounced visits.  CO4MD ran a profitable business for many years 
through hard work and good fortune but he states.   
“I thought I could walk on water, most of what I did on the business 
and property front worked quite well” 
Hubris and arrogance is admitted in the letter to his children and he 
summarises his autoschediastic approach to business,  
“A lifetime of work squandered by my stupidity and greed in the first 
instance and then by blind panic and desperation as I tried to recover 
the situation by taking on new clients without properly checking their 
financial integrity or ability to pay what they owed my company!” 
Conclusions - interview with participant in CO4 
CO4MD created a company in the early 1970’s that some 40 years later went 
into administration and was sold.  The owner-manager is a strong-willed man 
who had a sense of being invulnerable.  Since the failure of his business he 
has suffered from a loss of self-esteem and an overwhelming sense of “mea-
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culpa” in both a private sense and with regard to a loss of prestige in the 
commercial world. 
His self-confessed understanding and appreciation of corporate governance 
is minimal although on being asked the question he is able to articulate the 
behavioural perspective and after some hesitancy the compliance view and 
the “keep out of jail” notion. 
As the company grew and prospered CO4MD formed a board but his 
dominance was such that irrespective of the views of other directors he made 
the critical decisions and accepts that he should have listened to others. 
CO4MD was a pioneer and a serial entrepreneur with an ego to match and a 
conviction that he could ride out a storm.  He took, what he now sees as, 
extreme commercial risks when advised no to do so.  He relied 
unquestioningly upon his insurance broker to provide the appropriate levels 
of cover and signed up for whatever was proposed rather than spend time on 
what would have perceived as an activity that did not contribute to profitability.  
He was unwilling to delegate such tasks to colleagues due to a need to be in 
control of every aspect of the company. 
The focus of his attention was that of profitability based on high volume, high 
margin sales and as such, the time that one can argue should have been 
spent on thinking about risk governance was devoted to other areas of the 
enterprise.  
Cross-case pattern matching and explanation building 
Two of the four managing directors have an MBA and a third is completing 
his MBA in addition to being a Chartered Director by examination.  The fourth 
MD, the owner-manager of the failed business CO4, does not have a high 
level business qualification.  Whilst it would be foolhardy to attribute causality 
in respect of the failure of CO4 to this one factor, it may however be that 
through the processes of “working on the business” and an engagement with 
continuing professional development, in addition to “working in the business” 
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a deeper appreciation of corporate governance and its relevance to risk 
management may become more acute.   This issue could offer opportunities 
for further research. 
Of the nine directors who participate in this study, the MD of CO2 is 
outstanding in his understanding and application of appropriate, relevant and 
meaningful corporate governance.  This is, in part, due to an intrinsic personal 
interest in the topic, but also as a consequence of close association with other 
like-minded peers through his involvement with the Institute of Directors and 
the intense study involved in obtaining chartered status.   
Through a process of pedagogy and by learning through osmosis, CO2MD 
has developed corporate governance systems that are exemplary and could 
readily serve as a template for other small companies.  It is recognised 
nevertheless that the nature of the industry in which the company is engaged 
carries with it a high level of risk and that there are external drivers within a 
volatile environment that function as both an incentive and as a coercive to 
operate a high quality corporate governance regime and to implement risk 
governance in particular. 
Across all cases, the responses to the questions in the interviews display a 
sound appreciation of matters that are related to what might be called 
phronesis, practical wisdom, but the concept of corporate governance 
resides within a more ethereal hemisphere that is akin to sofia, academic 
wisdom, and accordingly is scantily understood nor meaningfully applied by 
many of the respondents. 
As the business passes through the early growth and survival phases and 
thinking extends beyond production and sales so the “gung-ho” attitude 
becomes less evident and a more considered approach emerges as external 
moderators in the form of NED’s and professional advisors are recruited to 
act as sounding boards for the owner-manager.  It is clear from the interview 
with CO4MD that he admits to his failure to listen to the views of other 
executive and non-executive directors. 
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With the exception of CO2MD, the evidence from the survey and the 
interviews point towards a weak and times minimal understanding of 
corporate governance and its role.  There is, however an acceptance that it 
is somehow a “good” that carries with it an inherent value, but that value, 
such as it is, remains hidden in the fog of ignorance.  Indicative of this limited 
knowledge is witnessed in that, when shown the IOD’s Corporate 
Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK, with 
one exception, the directors in all of the four participating companies were 
unaware of its existence.   
The answers relating to their understanding of corporate governance fall into 
two distinct areas: those answers that are related to a perception of corporate 
governance as a compliance regime and those that associate corporate 
governance with a code of ethical behaviour.  The role of corporate 
governance as the “pilot” and as a contributory factor in risk management 
was barely mentioned. 
Without an acceptance that a high level of risk is intrinsic in the creation and 
management of a small business there would be few entrepreneurs and even 
fewer successful entrepreneurs.  It is therefore unsurprising that a “gung-ho”, 
pioneer spirit is evident in many of the directors in this study who have 
established a small business and that a similar pioneer mind-set is infused in 
the management teams who work in them.   
The autoschediastic mentality of the owner-managers and directors 
participating in this study derives from high levels of self-belief, optimism and 
a “can do” attitude bordering at times upon arrogance and hubris.  Polices 
and plans tend to be weak, non-existent or “they’re in my head”.  Such self-
belief is translated through the substitution of planning in favour of Freudian 
defence mechanisms related to denial and an over-exaggerated conviction 
in their ability to cope should an unanticipated crisis event occur.  Evidence 
from the literature shows this conviction to be misplaced and this is 
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recognised by CO2MD. whose approach to policy and planning differs greatly 
from that of the directors of the three other companies. 
Although some participants expressed healthy cynicism regarding the 
transfer of risk through insurance, there is a widespread belief that the 
insurance company would settle without a great deal of quibbling.  The lack 
of a plan and appropriate recording of assets, loss of intellectual property and 
destruction of premises are viewed through a reductionist perspective as 
matters that could be dealt with speedily in the chaotic aftermath of a crisis 
and in the face of a loss adjuster seeking detailed information. 
Business Continuity Planning likewise is generally anaemic with such plans 
that had been prepared lacking in detail and directors being unaware of their 
existence.  The overall status of business continuity planning is that an event 
that might incur the implementation of a business continuity plan is very 
unlikely to occur and hence it becomes a consideration of minor importance.  
Thinking along such lines accords with Mitroff’s (2001) theory of the 
Intellectualisation of Crises – “We don’t have to worry about crises since the 
probabilities of their occurring are too small” (Mitroff 2001 p.47). 
Summary of Findings 
The owner-managers’ and directors of the small companies participating in 
this study generally accept that there are omissions and weaknesses in their 
corporate governance, risk and crisis management processes and claim that 
the reason for this relates to the supremacy of operational imperatives upon 
which much of the focus and energies of the board is directed. 
The findings are broadly consistent with the limited literature relating to small 
companies and corporate governance, an area of research that cannot be 
understood without reference to the owner-manager who is invariably the 
central decision-maker within the business (He 2008; Bridge and O'Neill 
2013; Durst and Brunold 2017). 
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The findings also concur with the view of Child (1997) in that despite the 
dominance of the owner-manager, the chances of their success will be 
influenced by the remaining organisation members’ willingness to support 
them .  CO1FD in states, 
“he is not a dictator, but there will be a topic for discussion or an item 
for discussion and the board will comment on something, but invariably 
it’s [CO1MD’s] way more so than other people’s way.” 
CO4MD acknowledges his own dominance as the central decision-maker, 
and recognises the consequences of alienating board colleagues, 
“because I always made the final decisions and that perhaps alienated 
a number of my key people because they felt that whatever they 
advised on what to do I still had the final say and I took opinions and 
observed in this and the arguments that I didn't always do what the 
majority of managers wanted me to do”.  
Moving beyond owner-manager dominance, Uhlaner et al (2007) state that 
owner-managers in small companies “often rely on informal controls rather 
than contractual governance” (Uhlaner et al. 2007a, p.276) p. 276 that are 
based upon social capital and trust resting upon deep and long-standing 
relationships with family members and employees (Mustakallio et al. 2002).  
Evidence of such trust can be seen whenCO1FD says,  
“I think to be fair to [CO1MD], …  people trust or accept most of his 
decisions anyway” 
The findings of this study show that trust is a critical component within the 
informal governance system in small companies where there is a high degree 
of internal and external collaboration and exchange.  CO3MD for example, 
states,  
“but at the end of the day you know, those agreements are just a 
guideline for how we should be doing business either with our 
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suppliers, with our resellers - and then employment contracts - they’re 
just a guideline as to how we should treat our employees” 
CO3MD adds,  
“the feeling we have in the business- it's like a family. So we trust each 
other.”   
The sense of hurt is acute once that bond of trust has been broken.  CO3MD 
refers to an incident where the FD had been using company credit cards for 
his own purposes,  
 “he was in more than a position of trust; he was the keeper of the 
company coffers and he had abused the trust that I had in him” 
From comments such as these it would appear that corporate governance is 
more about working in collaboration with internal and external stakeholders 
rather than control.  This is, nonetheless, tempered by an acceptance of the 
primacy of the ultimate decision-maker – the owner-manager. 
There is a sense that the boards in small companies differs greatly from those 
in large organisations due to the directors’ involvement with a range of 
authentic relationships some of which act in the role of quasi NEDs as critical 
friend to the organisation.  Those relationships extend beyond the contractual 
to peer-to peer networks, professional advisers and consultants. 
The literature concludes that beyond a system designed to control and 
monitor, corporate governance in small firms fulfils a role relating to 
enterprise that contributes to longer-term success as the “pilot”.  The 
respondents in this study however consider the primary role of corporate 
governance to be concerned with compliance and behaviours rather than 
entrepreneurial activities.  
“Corporate governance is all about manning or managing the 
company…. In the correct legal, moral [very long pause] yes, basically 
legal and moral will cover most things in a sound way” CO1MD 
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“My understanding of corporate governance is that it is there to protect 
customers, clients, employees more than shareholder value. It’s 
protection for the consumer more than shareholders.”CO4MD 
“Corporate governance, it's making sure we abide by the law and we 
operate in accordance with the values and principles that we set out 
as being core to what it is that we believe in.”CO3MD 
An exception to that is CO2MD who states that corporate governance has a 
“navigational” function, 
“I think that from the very beginning of a business, good governance, good 
guidance for every business is essential in order that they can navigate their 
way through a really complex and intricate world - a macro environment 
especially.”  
An overview of emerging key concepts and higher order themes 
Q1a. The two Higher Order Themes emerging from Q1a are Ethical 
Behaviours and Compliance.  Key concepts within the former focus upon 
operational excellence and ethical practice.  A further key concept relating to 
compliance is that of the role of corporate governance as “the watchman”. 
Q1b. The two Higher Order Themes emerging from Q1b are polar opposites.  
One theme asserts that corporate governance contributes to success whilst 
the second theme is that corporate governance adds limited value.   
Within these Higher Order Themes reside key concepts as to the positive 
aspects of corporate governance such as “risk management, supports 
internal motivation, a means of achieving structure at board level, PR value, 
adding to a positive corporate culture and defining the nature of the 
company”.   
Q2. The Higher Order Themes emerging from Q2 are those of owner-
manager hegemony and the moderating impact of the outsider. 
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Q3. Three Higher Order Themes are evident from the responses to Q3.  
Firstly, that risk is a key element of corporate governance; secondly owner-
manager hegemony effectively over-rides governance policies related to risk 
and finally that history and memories informs current thinking related to risk. 
Q4. The three Higher Order Themes related to Q4 are that ambivalence tends 
to be the default position; operational considerations are of primary concern 
and that post-crisis review does take place.   
Q5. The Higher Order Themes relating to the responses to Q5 are firstly that, 
there is a subjective approach to acceptance of risk and that secondly that 
there is a significant reliance on advice from external specialists.   
Despite the subjective nature regarding the risks that could be considered 
acceptable and what should be mitigated or transferred, there is however a 
common theme related to the maintaining of an evidence trail to demonstrate 
reasonable diligence on the part of the board. 
Q6. The Higher Order Themes for Q6 are displayed in attitudes that lean 
towards the “pioneer spirit” which, as the business matures, shifts from a 
“gung-ho” approach to a more considered attitude resembling what may be 
called those of the “settler”.   
Q7. The Higher Order Themes related to Q7 concerning business continuity 
planning are those of extemporisation and an autoschediastic approach.   In 
general, formal planning for business continuity is ill-structured and there is 
a belief that “it will be alright on the night”.  . 
Table 48 gives higher order themes from the reductive process.  
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Table 48: Research questions and higher order themes 
Research Question Higher Order Themes 
1a What do you understand by the term corporate 
governance? 
Ethical behaviours 
Compliance 
1b What added value does corporate governance 
contribute to a small company like yours? 
Contributes to success 
Adds limited value  
2 In what ways do the values and beliefs of the owner-
manager influence corporate governance? 
Owner-manager hegemony 
Outsider moderation 
3 How would you describe the way in which 
governance relates to risk management in your 
company? 
Key element of corporate governance 
History and memories inform 
4 What specific policies enabled directors to manage 
a crisis that the company has faced recently? 
Ambivalence 
Operational considerations 
Post-crisis review  
5 How do you determine a risk in terms of transfer, 
acceptance or mitigation? 
Reliance on external specialists 
Subjective approach to acceptance of risk 
6 What is the owner-managers’ attitude towards risk 
and crises – a risk taker or risk averse? 
Pioneering risk taker 
Mature settler 
7 What plans are in place to ensure business 
continuity post any crisis? 
“Ex Tempore” mind-set 
Autoschediastic perspective 
Source: Author 
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Chapter 7-Discussion and Conclusions 
Overview of the chapter 
The final chapter is structured around six main sections.  Following an 
introduction, section two revisits the research context.  Section three contains 
a summary of the findings of the study.   
Section four provides some reflections on the methodology used and sections 
five and six outline the contribution of the thesis to both theory and practice.   
Section seven discusses the limitations of the research and makes 
recommendations for future research, respectively.  The thesis then closes 
with some concluding remarks. 
Section 1: Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is “to explore the contribution of corporate 
governance to risk and crisis management planning in small companies”.  
The research involves detailed examination of the relevant literatures which 
reveal that extant research into corporate governance in small companies is 
underdeveloped both conceptually and empirically.  Furthermore, research 
into the link between corporate governance, risk and crisis management 
planning in small companies is de-minimus and thus, this study addresses a 
gap in the current body of knowledge.  The contribution to knowledge is 
detailed in sections five and six of this chapter. 
From the literature, a provisional conceptual model is developed and the 
central research question emerges, “How can corporate governance 
contribute to risk and crisis management in a small company?” together with 
three related “theory questions” and a series of “interview questions” following 
Wengraf (2001).  The “theory questions” are: 
1.  What do directors perceive to be the purpose of corporate governance 
in their company? 
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2. What are the factors that link corporate governance to risk and crisis 
management? 
3. How does the owner-manager’s ontology and axiology affect 
corporate governance, risk and crisis management? 
Section 2: Revisiting the research context 
Based upon the literature review, the provisional model, see Figure 55, 
establishes the contextual frame of the small, closed company, its 
endogenous and exogenous landscapes and in particular, the influence of 
the owner-manager, the details of which are expanded upon in the following 
paragraphs. 
Figure 55: Provisional conceptual model for corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management in small companies – the endogenous and exogenous 
landscapes. 
 
Source: Author 
In developing this provisional conceptual model, the broad backdrop of the 
collibrational approach, see Figure 2, remains as the strategic context within 
which corporate governance in small companies is examined and where the 
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literature points towards widespread failure on the part of small companies to 
introduce effective corporate governance, with or without a code as guide, 
(Drummond and Chell; Crossan 2015) and to analyse, consider and take 
preventative actions to minimise the risks faced or to prepare and test a crisis 
management plan (Gerber and Feldman 2002; Hough and Spillan 2005a; 
Budge et al. 2008a; Herbane 2013b).   
With reference to the provisional conceptual model, see Figure 55, the 
beating heart of a small company is the owner-manager whose beliefs and 
attitudes dominate the business (Curran and Blackburn 2001; Kotey and 
Slade 2005; Torres and Julien 2005; He 2008; Bridge and O'Neill 2013; Smit 
and Watkins 2017).  The following comments by directors participating in this 
research exemplify and amplify this claim concerning the owner-manager,  
“Again, he [the owner-manager] will take on board people’s views …, 
but ultimately he will do what he thinks is best and that’s sometimes 
not based on what is best for the company long term - he is quite a 
dominating figure at times” from CO1FD. 
“Prior to my becoming a director, the values that he [the owner-
manager] espouses are still around in this building today. We trade 
fairly, we don't cheat customers.” from CO2OPD. 
 
“the feeling we have in the business- it's like a family.  So we trust each 
other.” from CO3MD. 
In a small company, it is neither a code nor a protocol that drives corporate 
governance.  Rather, it is the disposition, pervasive values, beliefs and 
attitudes of the owner-manager that provide impetus behind the level of 
intensity and engagement with corporate governance and its constituent 
elements of risk and crisis management (Lobontiu and Lobontiu 2014; Spiers 
2017).  
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Although within the model, the in-company perpetual dynamic, driven by the 
owner-manager, determines effective corporate governance, associated with 
that process there are four exogenous factors that influence those 
endogenous quadrangular linkages.   
There are, for example, societal values such as the changing attitudes 
towards CSR, environmental impact and product ethics that, through 
osmosis, influence the operational tenor of the company (Haugh and McKee 
2004; Carter and Jones-Evans 2006).  
Likewise, procedures and processes emanating from legislation and industry 
protocols create commercial pressures that foster primacy of resource 
utilisation upon operations that are designed to ensure survival (Crossan et 
al. 2015; Falkner and Hiebl 2015).   
The pace of change and the nature of our cultural norms also touches the 
epidermis of the company as radical shifts in technology (Gibb and Davies 
1992; Deakins and Freel 2006) and internationalisation impact upon 
management style and employment practices.  Finally, the legacy of 
memories and associated past events, for example the fire at Summerland 
on the Isle of Man, the canoeing disaster at Lyme Regis and the Aberfan 
landslide, prompted by review and reflection, lead to changes in behaviours, 
practices and perspectives (Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Topper and Lagadec 
2013; Hopkins 2013) with the objective being that the ubiquitous “lessons” 
will be learned. 
The activation of the internal quadrangular loop of the model stresses the 
dominance of the attitudes and beliefs of the owner-manager (Gilmore et al. 
2004) as the driver of culture and activity in a small company.  It shows that 
this dominance then prevails in determining the degree of engagement with 
effective corporate governance that in turn promotes and champions 
meaningful risk and crisis management practices.  The revised conceptual 
model, see Figure 56, reflects nuanced changes to the provisional conceptual 
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model as a direct result of responses to the research questions.  The 
awareness on the parts of directors of pertinent externalities is shown as 
having considerably greater bearing upon the internal culture and the 
governance dynamics of the business than was previously thought.   
One such exogenous factor of note in particular is that of the raised profile of 
corporate governance within the public discourse that has in turn heightened 
the general level of awareness concerning legal and compliance issues within 
all companies (Institute of Directors 2017).  Added to this awareness is the 
growth of the public debate concerning the social responsibilities of 
organisations that in turn influence values and attitudes to change amongst 
company directors (Albareda et al. 2007).  The small company is not immune 
to the changes in wider society and the revised model shows those 
externalities conjoined with the internal environment as they bestride the 
permeable perimeter the organisation. 
Figure 56: Revised conceptual model for corporate governance, risk and 
crisis management in small companies reflecting the bestriding externalities 
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The literature points to Culture and Change (Rafiee and Sarabdeen 2012), 
Memories (Sommer 2011) Operations and Processes (Institute of Directors 
2010) and Values, such as those expressed by the Financial Reporting 
Council, (Carr 2017) as being four highly influential force fields that bestride 
the internal-external interface between the company and the environment.  
These influences reflect the tectonic shifts that are taking place in wider 
society on both global and national platforms that inevitably impinge upon the 
internal reality of companies.   
Such “becomings”, drive both legal and collibrational change, and are aligned 
with the school of process philosophy first articulated by Heraclitus as a 
counter to the philosophy of “things” and their immutability espoused by Plato 
and Aristotle.  Processual thinking points to a truism in that the directors of 
the small companies participating in this study will indeed never step into the 
same river twice.  Hence, it could be argued that the term “governance” is a 
misnomer that should be read as “governing” to reflect accurately its 
changing nature and the dynamism of the processes involved. 
The disposition of the owner-manager remains central to the argument and 
is the driver behind the extent to which a corporate governance regimen, 
worthy of the name, operates.  The effectiveness of that regimen then 
determines the efficacy of risk and crisis management that may vary, 
depending on the views of the owner-manager, between a laissez faire 
approach that is fatalistic in the extreme to a well-crafted analysis of risk and 
a series of plans to manage and mitigate crises and to ensure business 
continuity is secured.  The owner-manager’s personal attitude to crises is 
however, a further direct factor, apart from corporate governance procedures, 
that directly affects the approach to crises.  This approach involves a personal 
psychology that differs from denial on one hand to a risk aware and crisis 
prepared mind-set on the other.  Hence the model shows a twin headed arrow 
suggesting an ebb and flow whereby the owner-manager’s views both 
influence, and are influenced by, crises.  
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It has become evident throughout the progress of this study that each 
bestriding influence has a more profound impact on the small company than 
that anticipated in the original model.  Evidence obtained during the course 
of the study shows that such influences are instruments of perturbations, 
creators of uncertainty and sources of organisational fracture that combine to 
present challenges to the directors and owner-managers’ relating to the 
governance of small companies with limited resources.  A concise review of 
each of the externalities follows.  
Culture and Change 
The macro-changes evident during the period in which this study has been 
undertaken include, for example, a rise of populism and increased mistrust 
of elites, the growth of secularism, further moves towards boardroom 
diversity, instant dissemination of both accurate and bogus information to a 
worldwide audience, the ever closer coupling of systems, the dichotomous 
phenomena of increased freedom for some alongside growing oppression 
and terror for others and a greater public interest in the ways in which public 
and private corporations operate.  The speed of this change is unprecedented 
and as societies begin to understand the implications of The Anthropocene, 
small companies, in order to thrive, must be aware of, and respond to, these 
shifts.  Examples of the impact of changing cultural attitudes are found 
throughout the evidence obtained from participants in this study.  The case 
of raised standards for environmental protection resulted, in two of the 
companies concerned, in much improved processes, failure of which to 
observe carry the most serious of consequences.  The Bribery Act, 2012 and 
the Companies Act 2006, have impacted upon operations and processes and 
were particularly germane to the overseas business undertaken by CO3 in 
the Middle East.  The directors of CO3 made special reference of changes in 
process as a consequence of the requirements of the Bribery Act in particular. 
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Memories  
The mantra that “Lessons must be learned” is uttered after every crisis by 
those who have presided over failure.  Whether the crisis is an exploding oil 
rig in the Caribbean creating environmental devastation, a jetliner flown into 
a mountainside, the needless loss of life and property in street riots or another 
child abused by those in whom they placed their trust, flowers, teddy bears, 
candles and vigils precede the ritual enquiry and a report produced calls for 
changes.   
Within the confines of a small business, mayhem and failure does not 
normally generate a public enquiry, (the damage caused by the Tottenham 
riots is an exception), but past events do have a clear and direct impact upon 
the future thinking and the processes that live within the entity.  Those 
memories also derive from inside the organisation and its history as well as 
from sources external to the company.   
The directors and managers of such companies recognise that for much of 
the time they operate on the lower rungs of survival of Maslow’s hierarchy 
and if history is ignored it is done so at their immediate peril and with a very 
real risk of prosecution for negligence where acting without due skill, care 
and diligence can be observed and where the thinking and controlling mind 
of the company can be identified and shown wanting.  This point is evidenced 
in the following statements from Directors of CO1, 
“But in terms to our attitude to risk, it’s changed and we are a lot less 
gung-ho than we used to be.  We have had to be.” 
“But this is where it has changed and we have had to have a few things 
happen to realise that we needed to change” 
Memories from whatever source, for directors of small companies are within 
touching distance as the private sphere and the business sphere are intimate, 
immediate, interwoven and for owner-managers who are unincorporated, 
inseparable.  The incentive, therefore, to take corporate governance, risk and 
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crisis management seriously, is considerable.  Yet this is not generally the 
case.  The conundrum is this: that despite the immediate and potentially 
existential impact of a major crisis in a small company, owner-managers fail 
to plan for such an eventuality due to denial, intellectualisation of the chances 
of such an event occurring and an unwavering belief in their own invincibility 
and coping mechanisms.  All of these are misplaced beliefs.  Yet, such are 
the pressures of commercial survival through the maintenance of production, 
services and sales that a rudimentary plan to counter the worst effects of a 
“might happen adverse event”, is relegated to a high shelf in the basement 
store room. 
Examples of memories informing shifts in attitudes and the way risk is 
assessed and managed were evident in all interviews.  In the case of CO1, 
the decision to save on costs through stacking woodchip in one single high 
pile resulted in a £606k uninsured bill as a consequence of internal 
combustion.  The company now stacks woodchip in several small heaps 
where internal temperatures are much reduced thereby minimising the 
chance of a similar crisis occurring a second time. An accident many years 
ago resulting in death informs operating process in CO2 and its spectre 
haunts the corporate memory.  A programme of defensive measures was 
subsequently undertaken and constant reminders of the consequences of a 
failure to adhere to strict operating guidelines are evident throughout the 
factory and in procedural manuals. 
Procedures and Processes 
In addition to internal process related to people, production, sales and 
finance, small companies, along with their larger counterparts are subject to 
a vast array of directives, regulations and laws passed at a local, national and 
trans-national level.  Without in-house specialists in HR, legal services, tax 
and accountancy, health and safety and data protection (Durst and Henschel 
2014a), the owner-manager is facing a barrage of requirements imposed 
from outside sources and failure to act in accordance with the various 
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requirements can have severe consequences, financial and otherwise, that 
affect both the directors personally and the company.  Attempts such as the 
Red Tape Challenge promoted by the UK government in order to reduce the 
21,000 regulations that are imposed on business have, however, met with 
limited success.  Thus, argue small companies, the time spent on compliance 
limits the time available to engage with planning on matters such as crisis 
management. 
Mention has been made of the impact of memories on procedures and 
processes as one particular driver of change.  Market-driven requirements 
however, in the form of standards and quality protocols, have prompted 
individual companies and whole industrial sectors to adopt recognised 
standards across a range of operations. 
Three of the companies taking part in this research display on the walls of 
their offices an array of such certifications and approvals from both 
government and non-government agencies, many of which are pre-requisites 
to their ability to function as a business.  Licences to remove asbestos, 
permits to deal with hazardous domestic waste and export certificates were 
clear evidence of the influence of procedures and process emanating from 
external sources and then being subsumed within an internal operating 
process. 
Disposition of owner-manager 
“Beliefs and attitudes” were removed from the provisional model and in the 
revised model are now contained within the single overall umbrella term of 
“disposition” that more precisely describes a complex and inter-linked 
ontology and axiology on the part of the owner-manager.  Disposition, 
defined as a person's inherent qualities of mind and character, incorporates 
notions of personal values, attitudes and beliefs a description of each is 
shown below.   
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Values are defined as the moral principles and beliefs or accepted 
standards of a person or social group.  Attitudes however, concern our likes 
and dislikes towards things, people and objects and are evaluative 
responses that are a product of our values.  Belief is associated with 
personal ontological and axiological assumptions concerning our world view 
and may often be founded upon either, or both, culture and religion. 
The idea of owner-manager disposition and its impact upon the success of 
the company would appear to offer further research opportunities. 
The directors interviewed as part of this study are comfortable and at ease 
whilst talking about the values within their business and recognise that 
those values are part of a wider set of ever-changing societal values.  The 
directors are also aware that a crisis of reputation, as a consequence of a 
failure to live out the stated values, represents a significant threat.   
The unavoidable conclusion regarding values in each of the businesses 
taking part in this study is that the values prevalent within the business 
acknowledge the values of the society in which they function, but are 
essentially those of the owner-manager.  Those values and associated 
behaviours do morph over time as the business matures, but the core value 
stance would appear to remain consistent. 
Section 3 Summarising the research findings 
Within a context of small companies operating in environmental turbulence 
and rapidly shifting sands, the overall aim of this thesis is achieved by 
focusing upon the findings of an exploratory questionnaire, three theory 
questions and eight interview questions arising from the research purpose 
and the central research question, the findings of which together build on the 
current understanding of corporate governance, risk and crisis management 
in small companies.   
Although the constituent elements are the subject of extensive academic 
research and are understood at both theory and practice levels, the literature 
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suggests our current understanding of the relationship between the 
components is limited.  Accordingly, this study makes an original contribution 
to knowledge in that, within the cases concerned, it examines this triad.  A 
more detailed exposition of the contribution in both theoretical and practical 
dimensions is contained later in this chapter. 
Prior to discussing whether the overall aim is met, a reminder is provided of 
how the research questions are approached.  Whilst the discussion of 
findings draws from the literatures examined in Chapter 2, further 
explanations are grounded in the findings presented in Chapter 6.  The first 
of the “theory” questions designed to inform and answer the central research 
question is: 
Q1. What do directors perceive to be the purpose of corporate governance in 
their company? 
To address this question, several literatures are examined, and two empirical 
studies are conducted.  In the case of extant knowledge, the current 
understanding of corporate governance in small companies is based on 
reviews of three different areas of the literature:  
1. The small business/entrepreneurship literature which represents the 
wider context in which the study is conducted, and  
2. The corporate governance literature.   
3. The finance literature 
Within the second and third elements, the corporate governance and finance 
literature, the focus of research is largely related to corporate governance in 
large organisations, which, whilst it offers useful insights into governance 
history and theory, is of limited relevance to small business.  The literature is 
dominated by agency theory and its assumption of rational economic agents, 
code compliance and the performance of the board (Huse 2001; Durst and 
Brunhold 2017; Gabrielsson 2017).  There is therefore, a yawning gap in the 
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literature that offers opportunities for research into the neglected area of 
corporate governance in small companies that comprise around 99% of 
businesses in the UK and elsewhere and where the implicit assumption of 
the separation of ownership and control is not applicable. 
The second and third of the detailed questions designed to inform the central 
research question are: 
Q2. What are the factors that link corporate governance to risk and crisis 
management? 
Q3. How does the owner-manager’s ontology and axiology affect corporate 
governance, risk and crises? 
Hence the two further bodies of literature informing the findings in this study 
are: 
4. The risk management literature, particularly the literature relating to 
risk in small businesses 
5. The body of literature concerned with crisis management 
Once again, the literature regarding both risk and crises is mainly concerned 
with the spectacular and high profile, with large organisations and incidents 
with wide-reaching impacts.  Much of the risk management literature is 
positivist and is often grounded in finance whilst extant research related to 
corporate governance, risk and crisis management is both conceptual and 
empirical with data in the latter mainly collected through surveys and 
analysed using quantitative techniques (Gabrielsson 2017).  
The crisis literature abounds with repetitive expositions of case studies of 
such as the Challenger spacecraft explosion, the Johnson and Johnson 
Tylenol poisonings, the Mann Gulch fire and the Union Carbide chemical leak 
at Bhopal.  With few exceptions (Irvine and Anderson 2004; Runyan 2006; 
Budge et al. 2008; Herbane 2010, Doern 2016) the literature pays little heed 
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to crises in small businesses.  Hence this study seeks to address a gap in 
our knowledge. 
From the interviews conducted with the directors and owner-managers, the 
degrees to which corporate governance, risk and crisis management are 
understood and implemented are identified.  The superordinate finding is that 
even the term corporate governance, let alone its practice, carries with it a 
mystique and a sense of that, whilst it is worthy, it is a matter nonetheless of 
peripheral interest when set alongside production, marketing, sales and 
finance.  One of the respondents differs greatly from the remaining eight and 
does not view corporate governance as in any way peripheral.  Indeed, as a 
result of engaging in high level study to become a Chartered Director, he 
sees corporate governance as the central tenet of company direction for 
small companies as well as large organisations.   
This finding suggests therefore that there is a case for the de-mystifying of 
the construct that is corporate governance and highlighting its relevance to 
small companies.  There is benefit in re-branding the concept for directors of 
small companies in non-patronising, non-exclusive language that promotes 
corporate governance as having relevance to both the future direction of the 
company and as sentinel, supporter and critical friend. 
Corporate governance is widely perceived by the directors and owner-
managers of small companies participating in this research in one of two 
ways; firstly, it is considered to be a means of authenticating and validating 
the ethical dimension of the company as a reflection of the values, beliefs 
and attitudes of the founder.  For example, the values established in the 
“garage” at 367 Addison Avenue in Palo Alto, California during the genesis 
of Hewlett Packard still remain strong despite HP shedding the mantle of the 
small company many years ago.   
The second perception of corporate governance by the respondents is that 
of a process imposed to ensure compliance with externally conceived rules 
and regulations.  It may be argued that directors of small companies perceive 
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a form of dualism similar to that of Zoroastrianism where good in the form of 
Spenta Mainyu, the ethical dimension, exists in direct contradiction to evil in 
the form of Angra Mainyu, the compliance dimension.  
In another example of dualistic thinking, the value added through a regime of 
effective corporate governance is seen at one end of the pole as a contributor 
to organisational success whilst the other end is seen as offering little value.  
Many of the participants find difficulty in responding to the question related to 
the value of corporate governance as their understanding of the subject is 
limited. 
The central assumption within the revised conceptual model is that of the 
dominance of the owner-manager’s beliefs, attitudes and values and their 
role in determining the corporate zeitgeist and the subsequent degree of 
application of corporate governance, risk and crisis management.  This 
assumption is confirmed by the research in three of the case studies where 
the owner-manager is a strong personality with high energy and a driving 
passion for the business to succeed.  Even in the one case where the owner-
manager is all but retired from day to day involvement his influence is evident 
and his shadow is cast across the company albeit at a distance.   
Outsiders such as family members, professional advisers, NEDs and 
shareholders who may be considered “shadow directors” are valued for their 
expertise.  In respect of the accountant and solicitor, who are fee-earning 
suppliers to the company and may therefore face a conflict of interest, they 
too are respected for their experience and contribution.  Their advice is acted 
upon where expertise fills the gaps that exist around uncertainty and where 
the Cassandra Syndrome is evident when valid warnings or concerns are 
dismissed or disbelieved by executives. 
Although the degree of understanding and appreciation of corporate 
governance varies considerably amongst respondents, there is general 
acceptance that managing risk is an integral component of effective corporate 
governance.  Of far greater importance however than a corporate governance 
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risk management policy framework in providing guidance and advice to the 
board are the collective and residual memories of past events where the 
company has suffered through both weak risk governance and contributory 
negligence. 
Contributory negligence and omissions arise in part as a result of the limited 
resources that are available for crisis management planning due to time spent 
on core line management responsibilities such as production and sales that 
represent the essentials of business survival (Abu Bulgu 2005).  The directors 
interviewed do conduct post-crisis reviews in order to change processes and 
procedures although there is a wider culture of ambivalence towards crises.  
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) (Festinger 1957) goes some way to 
explain such attitudes in that the directors are fully aware that if they do not 
devote time and effort to crisis management planning, an unanticipated event 
could cause major disruption and incur significant corporate and personal 
cost, and may lead to the demise of the company.  With the potential for 
serious negative outcomes for the company and its stakeholders, such 
ambivalence seems at odds with the fiduciary duty of a director, but CDT 
proposes that it is not necessarily the dissonance itself that leads to 
ambivalence, rather, it is the individual’s construct of the given contention and 
a false optimism born of denial and a belief in the Shield of Achilles.  
In all four cases the directors have transferred some risks through insurance.  
The decision is largely reliant upon the advice of a broker although in one 
instance a financial ceiling based upon affordability is in place as to the level 
of risk accepted.  This relatively crude metric is the response to a cynical view 
of insurance and personal views concerning its efficacy.  This view is 
encapsulated by one comment that refers to the loss-adjuster seeking to 
minimise the settlement sum and in so doing to enhance personal bonus 
payments. 
For some respondents who recount the early days of the company, the 
phrases used to describe the prevailing attitude to crisis management 
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planning are “winging it” and “gung ho”.  This pioneer approach to risk 
changes as the business matures and the level of potential loss becomes 
greater.  The risk-taker, normally the owner-manager, develops a perspective 
that leans toward a risk-averse view where some planning, although not 
sophisticated, does take place and where reflective learning contributes to 
mitigation of a re-occurrence. 
Business Continuity planning is widely seen as a matter of low importance 
founded upon a sense of repudiation and a belief that, even in the event of a 
crisis such as denial of access, the directors will extemporise and normal 
service will be resumed with relative ease.  The exception to this line of 
thinking is that of CO2MD who has a well-constructed plan that is the subject 
of regular review and testing.   
The overall approach however is one of reactivity and risk-taking despite, 
when probed, an acknowledgement of the disruption that a crisis may present 
in the absence of a plan, no matter how basic. 
Section 4 Reflections on the philosophy and methodology used  
The philosophical foundations of this study follow the statement by Howell 
(2013), that, 
“Research involves understanding the relationship between theory, 
philosophy (ontology and epistemology), methodology and methods” 
(Howell 2013, p.32). 
The ontological perspective of the author concurs with the view that the 
nature of reality is subjective; the epistemological stance of the author is 
consistent with an interpretivist philosophy and the axiological stance of the 
author is such that research, ipso facto, involves varying degrees of 
interaction with the phenomena being examined.   
Pertaining to the nature of reality, this study incorporates a deeper 
fundamental philosophical position adopted by the author that reflects the 
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thinking of the Process Philosophy School the founder of which was the Pre-
Socratic scholar Heraclitus (535bc-475bc), with his concept of the 
omnipresence of shifting sands, or panta rhei (“everything flows”) as he 
compared the nature of reality with the element of fire, asserting that change 
is reality and stability is illusion. 
A second train of philosophical thought lays claim on this study, and is 
reflected in the Aristotelean concepts of sophia and phronesis. 
“Phronesis inheres in the ability to allow for the fluid, indeterminate 
nature of the circumstances in which we must act, and to accept that, 
each time we act, we must, in a sense, start afresh.” (Shotter and 
Tsoukas 2014, p.240) 
This study examines the notion of corporate governance, risk and crisis 
management via the lens of phronesis in a “Lebenswelt” – real-world setting, 
with all its inherent uncertainties, through an interpretive and subjective 
philosophy. 
In the first exploratory pilot study undertaken in this particular work, five 
owner-managers are interviewed.  Several owner-managers’ state that they 
have limited knowledge of corporate governance and that it is more 
applicable to large companies than to a small business.  Yet in delving into 
the practices and procedures surrounding the work of the board it is evident 
that much of what would represent good practice in corporate governance is, 
in some measure, in place, though not recognised as such by the 
respondents.   
It is concluded therefore, that one method of expanding understanding as to 
how small companies engage in corporate governance, and especially 
corporate governance and its links to risk and crisis management, is to 
conduct an exploratory questionnaire that would also investigate personal 
attitudes and beliefs in addition to gaining data as to the activities and process 
that take place under the general umbrella of governance.   
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In the subsequent main study, nine directors, of which three are owner-
managers, are interviewed in order to explore and examine how, or the ways 
in which, corporate governance is practiced in their companies and the extent 
to which such practices contribute towards risk and crisis management.  The 
focus of this research represents a significant shift from earlier research 
conducted the differences being that: 
1. from simply identifying the functional aspects of corporate 
governance as measured against code requirements or an 
external compliance driver, this study has at its focus an 
examination of the attitudes, beliefs and values of the owner-
manager as the core impetus leading towards whether or not 
there is a governance regime suited to the size and complexity 
of the company. 
2. from perceiving risk in quantitative terms, the study examines 
the subjective and interpretive nature of risk assessment and 
management and explores its ambivalences and its likely 
contradictions and thus takes a subjective view of the 
phenomenon. 
3. from focusing not upon on the legal fiction that embodies the 
existence of the firm as the main unit of study, to focusing upon 
individual directors and owner-managers together with their 
associated values. 
4. from identifying corporate governance, risk and crisis 
management solely through the lens of a limited-choice list of 
predetermined questions, this study offers the opportunity for 
directors and owner-managers to reflect upon the means 
through which governance matters are addressed and to 
identify solutions to improve resilience. 
5. from widespread use of quantitative analysis of corporate 
governance, risk and crisis management this study prefers to 
use interpretive phenomenological analysis to examine 
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meaning and value within both a personal and external context 
as the motivators leading to effective corporate governance. 
With a sample of nine, this study does not claim theoretical generalisability.  
Neither does it make any claims related to the statistical generalisability of its 
findings, as the study, through purposive sampling, focuses on exploring the 
richness of a specific unit of analysis involving the context-based 
experiences, attitudes, beliefs and values of directors and owner-managers 
and the unique and intricate interplay between the researcher and the 
research subjects.  
This research does however align itself with, ‘analytical generalisation’.  The 
objective of conducting a case study is to expand and generalise theories -
known as analytical generalisation (Curtis et al. 2000) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin, 2003).  Burns (2000), argues in 
relation to theory and frameworks that the framework can only ever be a 
momentary glimpse of reality in that such objectivity is impossible because 
objective reality and the subject are always in the process of what Heraclitus 
describes as becoming.   
The philosophical underpinning of this study is that of assuming a standpoint 
allied with the school of process philosophy and a belief that in research of 
this nature the data reflects a moment in time and no more.  Support for this 
notion comes from McGinn (2000) who comments that, 
“credibility is a relative judgment taken from a particular perspective, 
rather than a definitive claim about the case study as a whole” (McGinn 
2000, p.244). 
In summary, while this research does not make any strong claims of statistical 
or theoretical generalisability, it is nevertheless aligned with analytical 
generalisation. 
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Section 5 The contribution of the study to knowledge 
The work in connection with this thesis has led to the publication of a paper 
in a peer-reviewed journal and has accordingly made a contribution to the 
current body of knowledge, [see Spiers, L., 2017. Corporate governance, risk 
and crises in small companies: shedding light from inside the boardroom 
black box. Economics and Business Review, 3 (17), 112-126] Appendix 2.  
This thesis also makes further contributions to knowledge in that it adds to 
our understanding of corporate governance and the way in which it directly 
affects risk and crisis management in small companies as is demonstrated in 
the model below.  The evidence from the case studies is such that as the 
internal linkages show, effective corporate governance makes a positive 
contribution to managing risk that in turn leads to improved crisis 
management.  The whole system is however predicated on the disposition of 
the owner-manager and his or her choice to champion, promote and allocate 
resources to this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model also shows that exogenous factors influence the owner-manager 
at the interface between the company and its environment and exert pressure 
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on the owner-manager and directors from a series of legal and collibrational 
drivers.  There are also bestriding factors that emerge from within and beyond 
the boundaries of the company in the form of memories specific to the 
company or from memories emanating from a wider conversation.  
These contributions illuminate the differences between perceptions of 
corporate governance and its attendant functions that are applicable to public 
companies rather than to small, owner-managed businesses.  The focus of 
corporate governance in large companies centres on a compliance model at 
the heart of which resides shareholders and stakeholders and their 
relationships with those who manage the business.  Such relationships do 
not exist in small companies and this study contributes to knowledge in that 
it demonstrates that one size does not fit all and that a myopic, blanket and 
code-based approach is irrelevant to 99.1% of all UK business.  The corollary 
to that view is that a new corpus of literature is needed to address the 
development of imaginative models of corporate governance, including risk 
management, that are appropriate to small companies where fragility is such 
that the bulwark of a governance process would add resilience and thereby 
reduce incidences of failure. 
According to McNulty et al. (2013), Zattoni et al.(2015) and Gabrielsson 
(2017) the majority of research into corporate governance is quantitative.  
This study, through its qualitative approach, adds a rich insight into the little-
known activities of director disposition in small companies, and in this regard 
differs from the bulk of quantitative research in this area of study, see Figure 
57. 
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Figure 57: Types of Methodological Approach  
 
Source: Handbook of research on corporate governance and 
entrepreneurship (Gabrielsson 2017, p.11) 
A further feature of this study is that it differs from the bulk of research into 
corporate governance that is conducted in public companies and large 
corporations.  This research is undertaken in small companies and 
accordingly, central to this study is the owner-manager whose attitudes, 
beliefs and values are the impetus of corporate governance rather than codes 
and compliance requirements that occupy the minds of the boards of large 
companies. 
The research finds that a high level of awareness of corporate governance 
processes and procedures by the owner-manager, or their proxy, together 
with acceptance that such mechanisms add value, lead to the introduction of 
a meaningful system of corporate governance.  The converse is also true.  
The research also suggests that where formal board meetings are held there 
is an undercurrent of belief that such events are more of a symbolic gesture 
than a genuine gathering of independent directors’ intent on decision-making.   
UK law deems all directors as having equal status and equal responsibility 
for the stewardship of the company, yet it is clear from the findings of this 
study that a director with a significant shareholding can, and does, over-rule 
his or her non-shareholding counterparts.  Dominant behaviours by the 
owner-manager present the non-shareholding director with a conundrum that 
carries with it profound implications and significant personal risk.  The 
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findings of this study suggest that a version of the Cassandra syndrome, 
where valid warnings or concerns are dismissed or unbelieved, operates 
within the boards of small owner-managed companies where the principal 
and the agent are one and the same person and have almost unfettered 
power.  Such limited agency on the part of non-shareholding directors, whilst 
still carrying legal and directorial responsibilities, can lead to internal conflict, 
moral distress, loss of self-esteem and acquiescence.  Hence, the prevailing 
internal culture, ultimately derived from the owner-manager’s beliefs, 
attitudes and values, is a key determinant in the way in which corporate 
governance functions in a small company.  
Writing upon the issue of internal culture in organisations, Hofstede (1984) 
claims that in companies with a high power/distance culture those in positions 
seen as subordinate to the senior manager or owner-manager may be 
reluctant to disagree and therefore may engage in malicious compliance with 
decisions they find unacceptable (Hofstede and Bond 1984).  In contrast, 
within small companies where there is a low power/distance culture, 
colleagues tend to be willing to disagree with the owner-manager.  In addition, 
owner-managers in small companies with flat organisational structures 
actively seek out the opinions of those involved in technical specialities such 
as IT and view colleagues as a resource (Barney 1991) and as a repository 
of expertise and support.  Evidence of this is seen in CO3 especially, and to 
a degree in CO1 and CO2.   
Within all of the participating companies in this study, there is nevertheless a 
universal acknowledgement and acceptance that the owner-manager is the 
ultimate source of authority, agency and activity.  In a private conversation 
with the author, a finance director of a small company not participating in this 
study, commenting on the issue of owner-manager hegemony, said that, “It’s 
his train set and he can play with it in whatever way he chooses”.  The “train 
set” analogy summarises neatly the all-pervasive influence of the owner-
manager. 
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In small companies this pervasiveness is evident and is demonstrated where 
the principal and the agent are combined into one person and thus the 
concept of Agency Theory is rendered irrelevant in the way that it is normally 
considered.  There is however, an internal agency arrangement that, as the 
previous paragraph illustrates, is not between distant shareholder and a well-
informed executive but between an internal, well-informed 
shareholder/director and an internal, well-informed director where the 
balance of power resides with the former.  This has implications in practice 
for directors of small companies and will be expanded upon in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Small companies, as has been mentioned, face limitations on resources and 
accordingly systems are more prone to failure and disruption than 
organisations that have expertise and capital upon which to draw.  Small 
companies frequently operate on the principle of “good enough” (Topper and 
Lagadec 2013) rather than with the principles of High Reliability Theory (La 
Porte and Consolini 1991) that seeks to address instability and vulnerability 
in complex systems such as those found in air traffic control, nuclear power 
plants and military organisations where process aberrance, human or 
structural failure presents significant and potentially disastrous outcomes 
(Smith and Elliott 2006).   
In contrast to HRT, Normal Accident Theory (Perrow 1999) purports that no 
matter the level of input and energy designed to prevent catastrophe, the 
characteristics of complexity are such that, despite best efforts, failure will 
eventually occur at a systems level as opposed to mishaps at the more 
ubiquitous, workaday component level of operator error or equipment 
malfunction. 
This raises the questions;   
1. How can small companies ever attain high reliability status and 
are accidents and malfunctions an inevitability?  
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2. How can the investment in people and systems to achieve 
greater reliability be justified in small companies? 
3. Are crises in small companies therefore subject to the vagaries 
of contingent leadership? 
A further contribution from the literature relates to Affective Events Theory 
(AET) (Weiss and Beal 2005) which argues that the intensity of a negative 
event or some form of crisis experienced at work may lead to disassociated 
behaviours such as work withdrawal, absenteeism and alienation.  However, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), an element of corporate governance, 
within an appropriate corporate governance model that is not only sound in 
theory but is implemented with care and skill, can contribute to organisational 
commitment and affiliate behaviours (Meyer et al. 2002).  This phenomenon 
may be observed using evidence from CO2 with its enlightened staff health 
and well-being policy including the construction of an on-site gym and 
counselling in personal financial management.  Such thinking suggests that 
small companies can engage in meaningful activities that create a sense of 
belonging and affiliative behaviours.  CO3MD likewise, sees the workforce in 
the company more as “family” than as employees. 
Additional contributions to knowledge 
In addition to the published paper mentioned earlier, other contributions to 
knowledge have been:  
Paper given at BAM Conference, Portsmouth University, September 2015: 
Corporate Governance in an SME and its contribution to crisis management 
planning–awarded Best Development Paper in Corporate Governance SIG. 
Paper given at BAM Workshop, University of Salford, June 2016: A review 
of governance in small companies – the lived experience of the author.  
Paper given at BAM Conference, University of Newcastle, September 2016: 
Director engagement in corporate governance and its contribution to risk 
and crisis management planning in small companies. 
Paper given at BAFA Conference, Sheffield University, December 2016: 
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Corporate Governance, Risk and Crisis Management Planning in Small 
Companies – perspectives from inside the black boxes.  
Paper given at BAM Workshop, Nottingham University, June 2017, 
Corporate Governance, Risk and Crises in Small Companies: shedding light 
from inside the boardroom black box. 
Paper given at BAFA Conference, University of West of England September 
2017: Corporate Governance, Risk and Crisis Management Planning in 
Small Companies – perspectives from inside the black boxes 
Paper given at Research Seminar, Bournemouth University, October 2016: 
Research Philosophy and its journey along the Highway of Ideas  
The author has also been a guest lecturer at Bournemouth University, 
Portsmouth University – International Leadership Programme, The University 
of Kent – Entrepreneurship Module of BA Business Studies and at Poznan 
University, Poland – risk and crisis management on the MBA programme.  
Since 2016, the author has acted as Secretary to the BAM Corporate 
Governance Special Interest Group. 
Section 6 The contribution of the study to practice.  
Presentation to directors as part of the Added Value Board programme, 
Portsmouth University, November 2016: Best practice Corporate 
Governance in a small company  
Presentation to Dorset IOD members May 2015: Corporate Governance and 
the High Performing Board in Small Companies 
Keynote Paper given at ESRC Conference to directors and SME owner-
managers, Coventry University, November 2016: Corporate governance and 
its contribution to risk and crisis management planning in small companies. 
Presenting a Corporate Governance Ethics Programme for Directors of a 
Trade Organisation: April 2017 
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Understanding of both the concept and practice of corporate governance in 
small companies is important for policymakers, owner-managers and 
directors of such enterprises.  Corporate governance policies, company law 
and the bulk of academic research is, however, mainly concerned with public 
corporations (Lane et al. 2006) and as such, small and medium sized 
companies, contributing over half of the UK’s GDP, have tended to be 
marginalised and ignored (van den Heuvel et al. 2006; Huse and Zattoni 
2008).  
This study refers to corporate governance in small companies in terms of its 
meaningfulness, appropriateness and relevance (MAR), in order to highlight 
that to adopt a one size fits all approach is not the way forward.  As such, 
neither the UK Code of Corporate Governance, nor its proposed “Version 
Lite”, are considered as a suitable signposts or guiding protocols for small 
companies.  This thesis may nudge the thinking of bodies such as the IOD in 
this regard. 
Although the current codes that relate to small companies emanating from 
both the Institute of Directors and the British Standards Institution require 
revision and updating to reflect the new digital age and the virtual nature of 
many small companies, they also need to include templates, examples and 
diagnostics to facilitate the implementation of good practice.  Directors of 
small companies need to know “how” in addition to know “about”.  The 
advantages and benefits of engagement with corporate governance practices 
and procedures must be also be made clear with an emphasis on the ways 
in which those in processes are smart and can contribute to profitability and 
growth rather than over-focus upon compliance and the role of corporate 
governance as watchman. 
 
Policy studies concerning risk and crisis management such as that prepared 
by the Cabinet Office (Sterling 2011) have value in raising awareness 
amongst decision makers in government, but lack the practical advice and 
templates that small companies require with a focus on “knowing how” rather 
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than concentrating on “knowing about” prevails.  Fast-moving small business 
that have unrelenting pressures of an operational nature require information 
to be presented in the form of the “Director Briefings” series, promoted as “a 
book in four pages”, that provides a topic précis and an allied “to do” list.   
 
An output of this research that will impact upon practice is the production of 
three versions of a “book in four pages” aimed at small companies on the 
themes of corporate governance, risk and crisis management complete with 
supporting material such as a diagnostic tool, a sample board agenda, annual 
calendar of board events, minute template, and templates giving terms of 
reference for a board charter, crisis communication checklist and risk register 
examples.  These copyright-free briefings will be launched through events in 
business organisations that support small enterprises as well as on-line 
through their websites.  The briefings will also feature in a number of director 
training workshops designed for owner-managers at local venues. 
The language used and the means of distribution through media will be such 
that practitioners will have access to information that they understand and 
presented in a format that is engaging and speaks a truth that has relevance. 
 
A précis of this study will also be sent to the professional institutes and 
agencies dealing with small companies. 
 
The survival rate of small companies is such that actions taken to mitigate 
the failure level will be of considerable benefit to owner-managers, 
employees, suppliers, other stakeholders and to wider society.  In order to 
achieve greater resilience, and based upon the findings of this study together 
with the benefit of thirty years of board chairmanship by the author, it is 
recommended that the following actions should be taken by directors in order 
to create an effective, forward-looking board within the context of meaningful, 
appropriate and relevant corporate governance: 
 
1. Review the size and composition of the board 
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2. Assess processes and performance against good practice 
3. Consider how the board functions as a unit 
 
1. Review the size and composition of the board 
Appoint a Non-Executive Director to chair the board 
Develop a director succession plan 
Ensure a balance of skills and in particular finance and strategy 
 
2. Assess processes and performance against good practice 
Adopt all or part of an appropriate code of corporate governance 
Prepare a written statement defining roles, responsibilities and powers 
Create a mission statement, values and long term vision for the company  
Clarify what the board does and what managers do 
Agree the purpose, frequency, conduct and agenda for board meetings 
Record decisions and keep accurate minutes 
Review the external environment and initiate change 
Ensure a focus on policy, strategy, compliance and accountability 
Arrange a director development training and induction programme 
Conduct regular board and director evaluation 
Focus on customers and quality and people development 
Prepare annual risk assessment and risk register 
Balance risk against entrepreneurial activity 
Prepare and test the crisis management and business continuity plan 
Ensure insurance cover is appropriate  
 
3. Consider how the board functions as a unit 
Ensure board members share common goals 
Create a climate of open debate, challenge and independent judgement 
Expect full participation by all directors 
Avoid groupthink and acquiescence 
Communicate effectively and openly within and beyond the boardroom 
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In summary, the board should provide dynamic leadership and take the 
company purposely forward into the future bearing in mind the risks involved 
and taking such actions so as to manage, mitigate or transfer such risks. 
 
Section 7 Limitations and recommendations for future research.  
This study mainly focuses upon corporate governance and its contribution to 
risk and crisis management planning in small companies.  However, it is clear 
that many parties contribute to and are engaged with the process of 
governance other than directors and owner-managers.  For example, there 
are stakeholders such as colleagues, customers and suppliers, external 
advisors, family members who may or may not be shareholders, service 
providers such as banks, insurance brokers, consultants, trainers, 
accountants and solicitors all of whom support owner-managers and are 
tacitly involved in the wider aspects of governance and risk management.   
 
Accordingly, there is scope for future study into corporate governance, risk 
and crisis management that goes beyond the boardroom and includes an 
expanded network of interested and related parties. 
This research is cross-sectional in nature and hence it is limited to a particular 
time frame that does not sit well with alongside the researcher’s embrace of 
process philosophy.  A longitudinal study undertaken over a period of years 
using an ethnographic approach could generate useful data that would 
illuminate the changes and force fields occurring in both wider society and 
inside the case companies.   
Furthermore, this study focuses mainly corporate governance and how it 
contributes to risk and crisis management planning without reference to 
performance data such as profitability, capital and cash flow.  Thus, future 
studies could seek to answer the question as to the impact of effective 
corporate governance on the financial performance of small companies.  
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Although this study is qualitative, the exploratory questionnaire could be a 
useful starting point to conduct a research project of a quantitative nature 
using a large sample and leading to results that could be generalisable. 
The study has identified factors such as dominance of personality, beliefs, 
attitudes and values relating to the owner-manager that have ramifications 
for both theory and practice.  However, it has not investigated the relative 
importance of the factors identified.  Hence, in future studies, it would be 
helpful to determine the impact of these factors based on an assumption that 
not all the factors carry equal weight. 
This study is limited to small companies in the South of England.  Future 
research could therefore be conducted in different areas and indeed in 
different countries both within a sector-specific context and across sectors as 
well as expanding the size of business to include both micro and medium 
sized enterprises.   
Section 8 Some concluding remarks.  
If academic research is to make a difference in practice to, in this instance, 
small companies, the research cannot remain inside the wall of the fortress 
and must, Janus-like, have twin perspectives.  Abraham and Allio (2006) 
comment on this issue, stating, 
“Academic research is usually communicated exclusively to its own 
constituency –instead of to the world of business.  And the results 
often take years to evolve from draft to publication. (Abraham and Allio 
2006 p.4) 
Although this study has value to an academic audience, that value is largely 
limited to the seven people who will read it, including supervisors, examiners 
and proof readers (Spafford 2017).  Hence, in order to further both sofia and 
phronesis, this research will be suitably summarised into a concise form and 
freely offered to those managing and directing small companies. 
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Whilst in 1776 in his work “Wealth of Nations” Adam Smith conceived the 
phrase, later attributed to Napoleon, “Britain is a nation of shopkeepers”, it 
still resonates today although the nature of shop-keeping and its complexity 
has changed dramatically.  If we are to become better “shopkeepers” and 
create more resilient businesses, whether or not in retail, one means of doing 
so is the adoption of meaningful, appropriate and relevant corporate 
governance practices that have a de facto interplay with risk and crisis 
management planning.   
Whether “corporate governance” is a fit and proper term to refer to such 
practices is questionable and a new nomenclature may be required to reflect 
the view that small businesses see themselves as neither “corporates” in the 
normal use of the term, nor are they institutions that necessarily require 
“governance” or a “governor” with all their attendant meanings and 
associations that reference such as schools, prisons, colonial officials and 
central banks.  One such suggestion for a new term is the concept of 
“Boardroom Brilliance”! 
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[The diagnostic shows a clear preference of +16 for an interpretivist research 
philosophy. 
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Appendix 7 Research Protocol 
“Corporate Governance and its contribution to risk and 
crisis management in small companies” 
 
Researcher:  Leslie Spiers 
Supervisors: Professor Steve Letza and Associate Professor Donald Nordberg 
 
Faculty of Management Bournemouth University 
1. Introduction / Background  
 
Despite the number and disparity of small companies and their productive 
contribution to the economy, there is comparatively little research into corporate 
governance in this sector (Lane et al. 2006; Uhlaner et al. 2007b; Siebels and zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012; Saxena and Jagota 2015).  Lane et al (2006) go on to 
claim that not only is there a general lack of research into small companies but that, 
in particular, there is also a paucity of research relating to the usage and application 
of codes of governance within small companies (Lane et al. 2006).  
Few studies have been completed that examine the workings of boards of directors 
in small companies (Voordeckers et al. 2014; Ponomareva and Ahlberg 2016) and 
the manner in which the principles of corporate governance and the actions related 
to risk and crisis management that arise therefrom are applied in practice (Huse 
2000; Lynall et al. 2003b).   
The evidence that emerges from the literature has been central in the development 
of the research question.  That evidence points unambiguously towards a 
widespread failure in small companies to introduce an appropriate governance 
regime; to analyse, consider and take preventative actions to minimise the risks 
faced and to prepare and test a crisis management plan (Gerber and Feldman 
2002; Hough and Spillan 2005b; Budge et al. 2008b; Herbane 2013a). 
This research using multiple case-studies, seeks to discover the contribution of 
appropriate corporate governance towards effective risk and crisis management 
planning in small companies. 
The research will contribute to the body of knowledge in that it addresses a gap 
relating to governance and its relationship to risk and crisis management planning in 
small companies and proposes means by which improved practice can result in 
added resilience, longevity and success of the enterprise 
In structuring this research therefore, I recognise that context and temporality are 
significant determinants in what may be thought of as a rheostat where output is 
contingent upon impedance.  Hence I am seeking to delve into how we can 
understand the emergence of apparently novel conditions of which a crisis 
represents a highly significant element of “what is coming about”. 
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Data Management  
All data will be coded so as to protect the identity of both companies and individual 
respondents.  Case records will be stored on a password controlled electronic file 
system and hard copy such as transcriptions will be stored in a locked unit at 
Bournemouth University. 
A database will be created to code and analyse responses  
Objectives  
The principal objective of this case-study research is to obtain evidence concerning 
the means by which corporate governance contributes to risk and crisis 
management planning using a series of semi-structured interviews that will enable 
the respondents the opportunity of supplying information on a wide range of relevant 
issues related to the research topic. 
Based upon the literature, my a priori assumption is that the small companies 
managed by the respondents will tend to have weak governance arrangements that 
are essentially pre-liminal; will have an unstructured approach to risk and will have 
failed to create and test a meaningful crisis management plan.   I am further 
assuming that the linkages between governing, risk and crisis management 
planning will, likewise, be somewhat tenuous. 
Background information will be gleaned by means of an exploratory questionnaire to 
be completed by directors in the respondent companies. This will be followed by a 
series of a semi-structured interviews as part of a case study approach.  This 
approach is consistent with my ontological perspective, my research methodology 
and my research method.  I draw upon Silverman (2015) who said that the 
interviewer is seeking to generate data which give an authentic insight into the 
experiences of the various critical actors within the unit of analysis (Silverman 
2015).  Whilst it is the intention to allow a significant degree of freedom to 
respondents regarding the way in which they answer the questions, the interviewer 
will nevertheless use a guide to ensure that there is a focus and to prompt if 
required.  
The questions are exploratory in nature and are open-ended. The bases of my 
questions emanate from a number of relevant theories and a model of governance 
excellence for small enterprises including those devised and promoted by the 
European Confederation of Director Organisations and The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), part of the World Bank, to assess the standards of governance 
policy and practices prior to a decision by the bank to invest in an entity.  Whilst the 
underpinning of the model is rooted in theory, there is a clear reference to praxis 
and hence this affords meaning for benchmarking purposes. 
Within each of the study organisations I propose: 
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1. To identify and analyse the structure and nature of the governance  
2. To identify and analyse risk and crisis management planning policies and 
procedures 
3. To identify and analyse the role of other stakeholders in crisis management 
planning,  
Study Philosophy and Methodology  
The research questions reflect the themes contained within the literature related to 
governing, risk and crisis management in small businesses and are based upon a 
processual model that has a theoretical focus on the cognitive limits of rational action 
and the micro-politics of organisations (Whittington 2001).   
The questions acknowledge the ubiquitous nature of dynamism and uncertainty and 
reflect the thinking of the Process Philosophy School and Heraclitus’ concept of the 
omnipresence of shifting sands, or panta rhei (“everything flows”), in contrast with 
the prevailing illusion of stability and recurrence that looms large in our perception of 
reality as a self-unfolding of dynamic structures or templates (Seibt 2016).   
Philosophy is concerned with the nature of reality and assumptions about what 
constitutes social reality (ontology) and what we accept as valid evidence of that 
reality (epistemology).  It seeks to provide an understanding of the causal 
relationships between observable phenomena and the interpretations of meaning.  
Axiology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with human values and 
beliefs and includes aestheticism – the study of questions regarding art, beauty and 
logic – and the study of reasoning.  Saunders et al. stress the importance to the 
researcher of appreciating and understanding their axiological perspective.  They 
state,  
“The role that your own values play in all stages of the research process is of 
great importance if you wish your results to be credible.(Saunders et al. 
2012)” 
Turning to what I consider as being acceptable knowledge, I see the work of the 
“detective” as being as relevant as the work of the “natural scientist”.  By extension 
of my ontological perspective, I prefer to consider knowledge as relating more to 
insight that is case-specific with its own set of meanings, rather than consisting of 
broad generalisations.   
Study population 
This research uses a non-probability, purposive sampling approach.  The 
respondents are all current or former directors of small companies, as defined in the 
literature, and are from a range of sectors.  The criteria for selection included size of 
business by number of employees and the occurrence of a self-defined crisis in the 
preceding five years.  All the companies are based in the south of England and 
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operate in Dorset and Hampshire.  I have obtained basic information on each 
company from Companies House and other sources such as trade press and a 
variety of databases. 
Study procedure  
I have been in direct contact with the respondents and have written to each 
explaining the nature of the research, the time required for the completion of 
questionnaires and interviews as well as issues relating to recording and 
confidentiality.  The respondents have signed a consent form agreeing to the basic 
terms of the interview and BU ethical approval has been obtained in this regard.  
The interviews will take place on company premises.   
I have no material relationship with any of them to the extent of a commercial 
arrangement or participation in the activities of their companies as a director, 
manager, supplier, customer or consultant.   
I am aware however that interviewer bias could impact on the reliability of the 
findings and that both verbal and non-verbal actions on my part must remain neutral 
and any manifestations of my personal values and beliefs will require suppression 
throughout the interview. 
Documentary evidence and external sources of information will be sought to support 
verbal intelligence and provide triangulation.  With consent, I will speak informally to 
other staff at each company in order to obtain rich data concerning the overall 
culture of the enterprise.  Data collection across the four companies will take place 
between January 2017 and May 2017. 
Companies and individuals are at liberty to refuse to supply information or withdraw 
from the research at any time. 
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Appendix 8 Invitation to Participate, Information Sheet and Consent 
Form 
 
10 November 2016 
Research into governance, risk and crisis management planning in small companies 
Dear  
 
Small companies are a vital element in the UK economy accounting for 99.9% of all 
businesses as well as over one third of sales turnover and close to 50% of 
employment.  Even though small companies are such an important part of the 
economy, research shows that they tend to be fragile and lacking in resilience when 
things go awry.  According to the Cabinet Office around half of all companies 
experiencing a disaster and are without effective plans for recovery fail within the 
following 12 months resulting in both commercial and personal disruption.  We 
need to have a better understanding of why this is the case, and what can be done 
to reduce this waste. 
 
As a researcher at Bournemouth University I am seeking interest from directors of 
small companies (those employing between 10 and 49 full time equivalent staff) to 
participate in a study to discover how the board considers risk management and 
how the company has coped with a crisis that has occurred at any time within the 
past five years.  It may be that you have lost a key customer or member of the team 
that led to a severe loss of profits; you were denied access to your premises as a 
result of a natural event; there was a supply chain breakdown or a product failure 
resulting in a loss of reputation.  The definition of what constitutes a crisis is a 
matter for the directors to determine!   
 
The themes I would like to explore are: 
 
The way the board functions within your business - even if there is only one director 
The risk appetite of the company 
The nature of the potential risks that the company faces 
The approach taken by the board to threat orientation and crisis management 
planning  
The way in which the company has coped with a crisis in the past 
The post-crisis learning and policy changes that have taken place 
 
Participating in this research will enable you to critically reflect upon the means by 
which the board manages the business and its attitude towards risk and crisis 
The Business School 
Executive Business Centre 
89 Holdenhurst Road 
Bournemouth  
BH8 8EB 
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response.  Each participant will receive a digest of the responses from its own 
directors and a summary report of the findings from companies across the sample.  
I intend then to publish the findings not only as academic research but also through 
dissemination via the Institute of Directors and in workshops.  Your participation 
will help me to gain a better understanding of what drives the directors and 
managers of small businesses to engage, or not, as the case may be, in meaningful 
governance, risk and crisis management planning.   
 
Each individual’s contribution will be handled with the greatest confidentiality, even 
from other directors of the company.  All company-level information will be made 
anonymous and, where necessary, details of finances and events will be altered to 
ensure the privacy of individuals and the businesses without distorting the findings 
of the research. 
 
About the researcher:  As well as being a doctoral candidate at Bournemouth 
University conducting research into governance, risk and crisis management 
planning in small companies, I am a Fellow of the Institute of Directors and have 
been a practising company director for over 35 years, currently chairman of the 
board in several companies.   
 
 
If you have questions or concerns about the survey or your rights as a participant, 
please do contact me (lspiers@bournemouth.ac.uk), or my supervisors Professor 
Steve Letza (sletza@bournemouth.ac.uk) and Associate Professor Donald Nordberg 
(dnordberg@bournemouth.ac.uk) 
 
 
Thank you for your input on this important business topic, 
 
 
 
Leslie Spiers MA MBA CertEd FIOD, Doctoral Candidate 
 
Participant Information 
 
Research Project Title: Contribution of the board to risk and crisis management in 
small companies 
 
What is the participant’s involvement in the research?  
 
Participation is through a case study approach involving completion of a 
questionnaire, semi-structured interviews with each director and senior managers 
who is a heads of department.  Each interview will last for around 45 minutes will 
take place at your office or a private venue at your convenience.  The research will 
also benefit from information from other sources, such as accounts, reports and 
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board minutes, etc.  Participants will also be invited, at their discretion, to take part 
in an open forum discussion with others who have contributed to the research. 
 
How will the interview be conducted? 
 
Interviews will be recorded on an audio device and later transcribed for purposes of 
analysis and coding.  Written notes will also be taken.  The recording and 
subsequent transcriptions are for the sole use of the research project. 
 
How will confidentiality of my information be maintained?  
 
Contributions of individuals and firms will be anonymous at transcription according 
to a key code held separately from the data.  The recording will be stored only on 
the computer of the researcher and backed up on university servers in password-
protected form.  No one, other than the researcher (Leslie Spiers) and supervisors 
(Professor Steve Letza and Associate Professor Donald Nordberg) will have access.  
If you unwilling to agree to the recording of the interview on an audio device, the 
means of recording will be restricted to interviewer notes only.   
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
 
Whilst there is an abundance of research into quoted, public companies and 
unlisted large and medium-sized organisations, research into small companies is 
limited and this is especially the case with regard to governance, risk and crisis 
management planning.  Your participation will not only offer you an insight into 
best practice in this area but you will be making a contribution to the overall body 
of knowledge in this subject.   
 
What next? 
 
You are asked to complete the consent form overleaf and return it to Leslie Spiers 
via email as a pdf if possible or to post it to me at the address shown. 
 
Once you have registered your interest, I will contact you to arrange a preliminary 
meeting in order to arrange dates and times for the research to commence. 
 
Thank you. 
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Research Participation Form of Consent 
 
Researcher: 
 
Leslie Spiers MA MBA CertEd FIOD, Doctoral Candidate  
Faculty of Management 
Bournemouth University  
Executive Business Centre  
69-89 Holdenhurst Road 
Bournemouth 
BH8 8EB 
 
Mobile: 07747 843307  lspiers@bournemouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors: 
Professor Steve Letza 
sletza@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Associate Professor Donald Nordberg 
dnordberg@bournemouth.ac.uk 
 
Please initial here 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet and 
the covering letter regarding this study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions to clarify any points of concern 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the research programme at any time and that I am free to refuse to answer any 
question without giving reason. 
 
I give permission for the information gathered to be used for the sole purposes of 
research and that my responses will be anonymised and I understand that neither I 
nor my organisation will be identified or identifiable in any reports that result from 
the interview.  
 
I agree to participate in this research under the terms stated 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded on an audio device.  (If you prefer not to 
have the interview recorded, please do not initial the box.)  
 
Participant _______________Date  _________  Signature_______________ 
Researcher______________ Date __________ Signature  ________________ 
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Appendix 9 Exploratory Questionnaire 
 
Governance, Risk and Crisis Management 
The following survey has been designed to assess the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk and crisis management in your organisationn.  This survey is one 
instrument within a range of research approaches within the overall case study in which the 
company has kindly agreed to participate. 
The questionnaire will take about 15 minutes to complete and the information provided will 
be treated with the utmost confidence.  The answers will not be attributable to either any 
company or individual.  
Please return the completed questionnaire as a pdf and email to 
lspiers@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
Many thanks for your assistance. 
 
Leslie Spiers MA MBA FIOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relating to your organisation, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements  
 
1= Strongly agree; 2= Agree; 3= Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5-Strongly disagree 
 
 1     2     3     4    5 
1. The board has an established governance framework 
 

2. 
The board has adopted a recognised code such the IOD code for 
unlisted companies or BS 13500 
3. 
There is a board charter or written terms of reference for the 
board and for any board committees 
Please complete the details in this box before completing the questionnaire.  Thank you! 
 
Name:      Company:       
       
Job Title:      Date: 
 
Are you registered at Companies House as a director?  Please circle Yes/No 
 
Number of years as a director: 
 
Circle the post-school qualifications have you gained –: Bachelors’ degree; Post-Grad Certificate; 
Post Grad Diploma; Masters’ Degree; Doctorate;      
Professional/Technical qualification – please specify_______________________________ 
 
Of which professional organisations are you a member (if any)? ______________________ 
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4. 
There is a division of responsibilities between the 
running of the board and the running of the business 
5. 
The board is of sufficient size and comprises people with a range 
of skills to ensure its responsibilities are met 
 

6. 
The board largely focusses upon the long term success of the 
company 
7. The board meets sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties 
8. 
The board agenda and papers containing appropriate 
information are sent out in advance of the meeting 
 1     2     3     4    5 
  9. There is a standard template for board reporting 
10. 
Directors declare any conflict of interest at the start of each board 
meeting 
11. The board conducts regular director and board evaluations 
12. All directors engage in continuing professional development 
13.  The board has a regular dialogue with shareholders  
14.  The board comprises one or more non-executive directors 
 
15. New directors receive formal induction training  
16. There is a family governance mechanism (if applicable)  
  
17. 
 The board regularly reviews the external environment and 
business context  
18. 
 The company has a policy for the selection and appointment of 
the external auditor 
 
19.  The board uses the services of a company secretary  
20.  The board has established a risk oversight policy  
21.  There is a specific board committee that deals with risk  
22. The board has established a risk management policy  
23. 
There are formal record-keeping processes to ensure that 
important documents relating to risk are maintained and 
important dates are recorded and reported to the board 
 
24. 
There is a comprehensive whistleblower policy that allows 
whistleblowers to divulge unethical or illegal practices  
25. Risk is a standard item on the board agenda  
26. 
The board ensures that any discussion around strategy considers 
the full range of key risks to which the organisation is exposed 

 
27. 
The risk management policy provides an overview of the risk 
governance structure of the organisation   
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28. 
The risk management policy outlines the steps involved in 
the risk management process  
29. 
The risk management policy describes how risk management is 
integrated and embedded into organisational processes 
 
30. 
The risk management policy specifies risk categories to be 
included in the risk register and in risk reporting 
 
 
31.  The risk management policy outlines the risk reporting 
requirements 
 
32.  The risk management policy articulates the organisation’s risk 
appetite through a risk appetite statement? 
 
33. Following a risk event, the board assumes a learning mindset   
34. The board focusses on those risks that, given the company’s 
current position, could threaten its business model, future 
performance, solvency or liquidity,  
 
35. The board approves how the key risks will be managed or 
mitigated and which controls will be put in place 
 
36. The risk register is kept up to date through regular review  
37. The ownership of risks and risk treatment actions is assigned to 
relevant roles within the company 
 
  38 The risk management system is based on a recognised standard, 
e.g. ISO 31000 
 
 
39. Managers’ report to the board in relation to the effectiveness of 
the company’s risk management and internal control system in 
managing the organisation’s risks 
 
40. The company has adequate insurance for its level of operations 
and staff numbers 
 
41. Staff are fully trained in their risk management responsibilities  
42. The MD and FD provide the board with certifications/assurance 
that the financial records of the organisation have been properly 
maintained 
 
43. The board engages the services of an external risk specialist  
44. 
The risk management and internal control systems are operating 
effectively based on the company’s risk management system  
45. The board conduct an annual insurance review  
46. The directors are insured through a Directors and Officers Policy  
 
47. Directors demonstrate the qualities that the company seeks to 
embody in its risk culture 
 
48. The risk culture is integrated with the corporate culture, 
i.e. working behaviours and practices 
 
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49. The company has appropriate crisis management framework to 
minimise the effects of a broad range of unanticipated events 
 
 
50. The organisation uses a recognised framework with respect to 
crisis management planning e.g. BSI 11200 
 
51. The board conducts crisis management scenarios to test the 
effectiveness of the plans 
 
52. The board has engaged with key stakeholders in the preparation 
of its crisis management plans 

 
  
 1     2     3     4    5 
53. Crises only happen to others.  We are pretty invulnerable 
54. Crises happen, but their impact on our business is small 
55. Crises do not happen to a well-managed company such as ours 
56. We are powerful and as such will be well protected from crises 
57. 
If a crisis were to happen, it must be because someone else is 
has acted with malice and intent to harm 

58. 
We need not worry about crises as, statistically, the chances of 
one occurring are small 

59. 
Crises cannot affect the whole of our business since we have 
other premises independent of one another 

60. 
We have determined the maximum outage time from trading 
that we can endure following any crisis 

61. 
We have a business continuity plan to enable us to operate 
following a crisis 

62. 
We have a relationship that links governance, risk and crisis 
management planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Please make any additional comments you wish concerning corporate governance, risk and crisis 
management planning: 
471 
 
Appendix 10 Interview Activity Control 
Sheet No. 
1 
Bournemouth University Faculty Management 
Performed 
by 
Leslie Spiers   Code: FSQ Department 
Accounting and 
Finance 
 
Interview  
 Date 
Code Job Title Co. Code Location 
Time 
 Started 
Time  
Ended 
Comments and 
Observations 
16 Feb 2017 CO2MDF Managing Director CO2 office 10.00 10.45 
4802words 
transcribed 
16 Feb 2017 CO2OPD Operations Director CO2 office 10.50 11.50 
6076words 
transcribed 
22 Feb 2017 CO4MD 
Ex Managing 
Director and Majority 
shareholder 
CO4 home 09.30 10.30 
5268 words 
transcribed 
15 Mar 2017 CO3MD 
Managing Director 
and Majority 
shareholder 
CO3 office 09.30 10.15 
4230 words 
transcribed 
15 Mar 2017 CO3FD Finance Director CO3 office 10.30 11.35 
6098 words 
transcribed 
24 Mar 2017 CO1FD Finance Director CO1   office 10.00 10.35 
4203 words 
transcribed 
24 Mar 2017 CO1COMD Sales Director CO1 office 10.45 11.20 
5291 words 
transcribed 
26 April 2017 CO1NED Interim Chairman CO1 boardroom 10.00 10.35 
2864 words 
transcribed 
1 June 2017 CO1MD 
Managing Director 
and Majority 
shareholder 
CO1 office 09.00 09.35 
3200 words 
transcribed 
 
Signature 
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Appendix 11 Transcription Guide 
 
File name example  Interview CO1MD 010617 
Margins Left:   2.54 cm. Right: 2.54 cm 
Adjustment   Left 
Headings  Calibri (Body) 11point bold 
Text    Calibri size 11point 
Interview Date and time  04 02 17  10.15 
Line spacing,   1.15 and double line spacing between sections 
Interviewer   “FSQ "... 
Respondent example  CO1NED 
If there is a pause  (pause), (hesitation) 
If there is laughing  (laughing) 
If there is crying   (crying) 
If anyone goes out CO3FD leaves the room)  
Unable to hear words (? - Trace ..?.)  
Repeats   (state all repetitions) 
Ohm, erm, oh, mmm, etc. (Omit unless it is very significant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
473 
 
Appendix 12 Node Code Book sample pages 
26/09/2017 14:35 
 
Node Codebook 26 Sept 2017 
 
Hierarchical Name Description Number of Sources Coded Number of Coding References 
Nodes\\CO2OPD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO3FD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO1FD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO3MD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO1NED interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO1MD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Assurance 
References to assurance and security 1 2 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Cost of ownership 
References to low cost in use 1 2 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Credibility 
References to solid nature of the 
business 
1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Global Reach 
References to a wide network of 
distributors 
1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Innovative 
References to the use and 
development of new tech 
1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Integrated technology 
Ability to integrate with other 
systems 
1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Personalisation 
Sign off by owner-manager 1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Quality and Value 
References to quality and value 1 3 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Relationships 
References to partnerships 1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Scalability 
System is capable of developing as 
the business grows 
1 1 
Nodes\\Marketing material 
CO3\\Support 
References to customer support and 
back up 
1 1 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview\CO4MD 
letter to his son and daughter 
Personal letter outlining the 
interlocking spheres of business and 
life beyond work and its implications 
for family 
0 0 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview\CO4MD 
letter to his son and 
daughter\Admission of failure 
References to failure 1 6 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview\CO4MD 
letter to his son and daughter\Plan 
for the future for the family 
References to what Max had hoped 
to do 
1 2 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview\CO4MD 
letter to his son and 
daughter\Reason for the letter 
References to why the letter is 
written 
0 0 
Nodes\\CO4MD interview\CO4MD 
letter to his son and daughter\Self-
belief misplaced 
References to hubristic attitude 1 3 
474 
 
Nodes\\CO2MD interview   1 1 
Nodes\\CO1COMD interview  1 1 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition 
References to definitions and 
perceptions of what CG means 
0 0 
 
Reports\\Node Codebook 26 Sept 2017 Page 1 of 14 
26/09/2017 14:35 
 
 
Hierarchical Name Description Number of Sources Coded Number of Coding References 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\CG as the pilot 
References to CG as a means that 
provides direction 
5 6 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\CG as the watchman 
References to ensure bad things do 
not happen or reoccur 
4 4 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\Ethical perspective 
References to CG as a behavioural 
matter related to ethics and morals 
6 13 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\Legal perspective 
References to CG as a legal construct 4 5 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\Policy perspective 
References to CG in terms of policies 2 2 
Nodes\\Q1a Corporate governance 
definition\\Corporate Governance 
definition\Stakeholder perspective 
References to CG that seeks to 
achieve stakeholders benefit 
5 7 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small company 
References to elements of CG that 
add value to the enterprise 
0 0 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Aids risk management 
References to CG as a contribution to 
risk management 
1 1 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Attracts staff 
References to CG being a positive in 
attracting staff 
0 0 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Causality 
References to measuring the 
contribution of CG to results 
1 2 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\CG has PR value 
References to the improved image of 
the company as a result of a CG 
regime 
0 0 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Contribution of board 
References to the contribution of CG 
to the work of the board 
4 5 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Corporate Conscience 
References to CG as the conscience 
of the company 
1 1 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Defender and protector 
References to CG as the watchman 4 5 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Defines the nature of the 
company 
References to CG as defining what 
the company is all about 
2 2 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Education and CPD 
References to ongoing CP as an 
advantage to understanding CG 
1 1 
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Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Enhances ethical behaviour 
References to CG as a driver of 
ethical behaviour 
3 5 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Moderating 
References to CG acting as a 
moderating factor as part of checks 
and balances 
1 2 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Offers added value to 
shareholders 
References to CG and shareholder 
value 
1 2 
Nodes\\Q1b Added value of CG\\CG 
as success factor in a small 
company\Positive role of NEDs 
References to the contributions of 
NEDs in CG 
3 10 
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Appendix 13 UK Code of Corporate Governance  Effectiveness Criteria 
“The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, 
experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to 
discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively. 
There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of 
new directors to the board. 
All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively. 
All directors should receive induction on joining the board and should regularly update 
and refresh their skills and knowledge. 
The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and of a 
quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. 
The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees and individual directors. 
All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to 
continued satisfactory performance.” 
 
 
